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GERMANY UNDER THREE EMPERORS 




EMPEROR WILLIAM II AND THE EMPRESS AUGUSTA VICTORIA 




GERMANY UNDER 
THREE EMPERORS 



BY 



PRINCESS CATHERINE RADZIWILL 

(Catherine Kolb-Danvin) 



With Eight Photogravure Plates 



New York 

FUNK AND WAGNALLS COMPANY 

1917 



CONTENTS 



Introduction .... 

Part I 
Before the Empire 

CHAPTER 

1. The Dawn of Imperialism . 

2. Bismarck's Political Debut 

3. Prussia and Russia . 

4. Austria and Prussia . 

5. Genius at the Helm . 

6. Frederick III. and his Father . 

7. Playing with Austria 

8. Austria becomes a Pawn . 



PAGE 

is: 



1 
14 
83 

49 
68 
84 
97 
112 



Part II 
The Process of Union 
9. First Steps to Empire 

10. Welding the Southern States . 

11. The Process Continues 

12. New Light on the Ems Dispatch 

13. Sedan and Paris 

14. Inauguration of the Spy System 

15. A King becomes Emperor 

a* v 



125 
137 
153 
166 
179 
186 
195 



VI 



Contents 



Part III 
Development of Militarism 

CHAPTER 

16. Bismarck and the Empress 

17. Juggling with War . 

18. Balkan Intrigues 

19. Fears of Isolation 

20. The Dual Alliance . 

21. Some Missing Documents . 

22. Bulgarian Matters 

23. Behind the Veil of Intrigue 



PAGE 

209 
221 
232 
243 
257 
269 
281 
299 



Part IV 
William II. in Power 

24. Last Days and First Days 

25. William II. and Bismarck 

26. After the Crash 

27. The Outcome 

Index .... 



317 
332 
350 
360 

369 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



Emperor William II. and the Empress Augusta 

Frontispiece 



Victoria 

Prince von Bismarck 
Marshal von Moltke 
Emperor William I. in 1871 
William II. in 1884 . 
Emperor William I, in 1884 
Emperor Frederick III. . 
Emperor William II. in 1899 
Emperor William II. in 1905 



PAGE 

52 
114' 

200 
244 
282 
804 
338 
338 



vn 



INTRODUCTION 

Amid all the grave preoccupations that have absorbed 
the world during the last three years and prevented it 
from thinking about the past I experienced a strong 
feeling of hesitation before deciding to relate the incidents 
of which I write. And yet, according to the eloquent 
remark of Catherine the Great, it is only in reading the 
past that one can foresee the future, so far, at least, as 
the historical development of nations is concerned. 

Perhaps, indeed, Europe would have fared better had 
it studied with closer attention the events that gradually 
transformed Prussia into the powerful war machine the 
great European conflict has proved her to be. 

The processes of Militarism spread over three reigns. 
In the development of these processes is embodied prac- 
tically all the history which Germany has made under 
William I., Frederick III., and, so far, William II. 
Any account of Germany under these three Emperors, 
therefore, must perforce make that predominance the 
thread of the narrative, and particularly must this be so 
with the present volume, which deals with the political 
evolution of Germany in its relations with the rest of 
Europe. 

From this same cause, too, it is inevitable that, even 
to the limits of iteration, one name should recur. For 
who but Bismarck was mostly responsible, through the 
three reigns, for the international political situation? 

ix 



x Introduction 

Yes ; one always attributes to Prince von Bismarck the 
creation of the German Empire such as it became in 1914. 

In reality, however, Bismarck, with all his genius, 
was a consequence of Prussian development ; Prussian 
development was not the consequence of his presence 
at the head of affairs. He was not like Richelieu, a 
man of wide conceptions which he carried through in 
defiance of every obstacle. Bismarck did not create, he 
only built. As a worker he was, undoubtedly, one of 
the most gigantic figures the world has ever seen. The 
future alone can prove whether the edifice to which he 
placed the topmost stone will continue to stand after 
passes the tempest which is sweeping round the world in 
unabated fury. Yet the past may help us to an intelli- 
gent anticipation. 

One cannot foresee the storms of the morrow. The 
only thing which is within human power is to examine 
the past with care. To do so is the aim of this book. 
To the task I bring some material it has been within 
my discretion to divulge, and which has long been within 
my knowledge. At this distant date no great harm can 
be done by thus bringing to light personal experiences 
and private documents which may help to a clearer 
view of the path the Prussian has trod during the three 
reigns. 

Catherine Radziwill 



Part I 
Before the Empire 



GERMANY 
UNDER THREE EMPERORS 

i 

The Dawn of Imperialism 

MANY people who have not taken the trouble to 
study closely the history of Prussia in particular, 
and of Germany in general, when speaking about the 
events which raised the Hohenzollerns to an Imperial 
Throne, do so under the impression that the war of 1870 
with France was the great lever. But twenty-two years 
before the disaster of Sedan a Parliament assembled at 
Frankfurt had offered the crown of the Hohenstaufens 
and of the Habsburgs to King Frederick William IV., 
King of Prussia. 

Had there been at his side a Minister possessing the 
undoubted and unscrupulous genius of Prince von Bis- 
marck, he might have been persuaded into accepting 
the diadem. But Frederick William, whose mind was 
as timid as his nature was tortuous, could not agree to 
what he conceived would be a revolt against tradition — 
the degradation of the Austrian dynasty to the position 
of a vassal of another German Power. 

When thinking of those years between the Revolu- 
tion of 1848 and the Franco-German War, one must 
always remember that there existed in Germany two 
different countries, as it were — Monarchical Germany 



2 Germany under Three Emperors 

and Democratic Germany. The former was repre- 
sented by the King of Prussia, whilst the majority of 
his advisers held Democratic opinions. Both parties 
wanted union, for the very fact that the Parliament 
assembled at Frankfurt had been called into being was 
owing to the unacknowledged yearning after German 
unity under the supremacy of one or other of the 
German Princes. That Parliament had met in order 
to bring some kind of order out of the chaos that had 
existed ever since 1815 and the Congress of Vienna. 
It had met also for another purpose, of which every 
one of its members was aware though he would never 
have owned to it : to exclude Austria from the new 
Germany. Herein lay the divergence between the 
Monarchical and the Democratic attitudes. 

We may say, therefore, that the national passion 
for unity which has become so overbearing in the 
present Germany already existed in 1848, but it had 
not yet gathered sufficient courage or power or vanity 
to assert itself. It was as a means of transition from 
a system of government which was weakening Ger- 
many, and threatening it with impotence, that this 
Frankfurt Parliament, at whose decisions King Fred- 
erick William IV. was afterwards so terribly indig- 
nant, proceeded almost immediately upon its election 
to create a Central Power from among the members of 
one of the reigning German dynasties. The name of 
the Archduke John of Austria obtained almost all the 
votes of the Assembly, which elected him to this 
supreme dignity on the 29th of May, 1848. 

The Archduke, as Imperial Vicar, immediately 
called together a responsible Ministry, and assumed 
the attitude of a Constitutional Sovereign. Unfortu- 



One Flag in Common 3 

nately for him, and for the success of an attempt that 
was doomed to failure almost before it had been 
entered upon, the new ruler had not to deal only with 
a nation ; his task was also to exercise supreme 
authority over one Emperor, five Kings, Grand Dukes 
and Dukes without number, and free towns like Ham- 
burg and Bremen. How could he possibly bring them 
all to act according to his instructions without wounding 
their extremely sensitive consciousness of their own 
authority ? 

The Ministry believed that it could reconcile all the 
interests at stake by deciding that the armies of the 
different German States were to swear allegiance to the 
Imperial Vicar, with one common flag — the red, black 
and gold colours of Germany — as the symbol of the 
new unity. 

This pretension, the significance of which lay in 
dispossessing the German independent Princes of the 
command of their own troops — the foremost of their 
rights — instead of smoothing matters, caused a storm of 
indignation all over the country. In Prussia especially 
it gave rise to an opposition which no persuasion could 
allay. The army hastened to protest against a humili- 
ating decision which would have been contrary to all 
the traditions associated with the name of Frederick 
the Great. The King, who was the first to cry out, 
declared that nothing in the world would ever make 
him agree to what he characterised as a monstrous pro- 
posal, the result of which would have been to make 
him surrender his authority over his troops to a power 
that owed its existence to revolution. 

What infuriated Frederick William especially, 
though he did not openly acknowledge it, was the fact 



4 Germany under Three Emperors 

that the representative of this revolutionary power was 
a Prince belonging to the House of Habsburg, which 
had always been beaten in battle wherever they had 
encountered the Hohenzollerns. He declared that he 
would resist to the last the decrees of the Imperial 
Vicar. All the other German Princes followed his 
example, so that, though the Central Ministry of 
Frankfurt went so far as to fix a day upon which the 
oath of allegiance to the Archduke John was to be 
sworn, no such oath was ever taken. The Prussian 
army remained under the command of the King of 
Prussia, whilst the Hanoverian, Saxon, Bavarian, and 
Wiirtemberg troops still recognised their respective 
Sovereigns as supreme military chiefs. 

Remembering all that took place at that time, one 
cannot help discovering food for thought in the fact 
that the Frankfurt programme was carried out almost 
to the letter twenty-two years later. But this time it 
was for the benefit of Prussia. Even at the time of 
Archduke John's brief span of power people in every 
part of Germany whispered to each other that the 
ferocious opposition of Prussia to the scheme of one 
large German army might vanish altogether in the 
then improbable case of the King of Prussia being 
offered its command. And the prophets were right. 

This idea of unity, which was already gaining 
ground, was assiduously cultivated by partisans of the 
then Prussian Kingdom, who proceeded with alacrity 
to encourage the Frankfurt Parliament to vote the 
constitution of a new German Empire, from which 
Austria was to be excluded. This, however, was fated 
only to take place after the decisive battle of Sadowa had 
ratified the decisions of an Assembly no one had ever 



English Sentiment 5 

taken seriously into account, but which, nevertheless, laid 
the foundations of the work that Bismarck was to accom- 
plish with such success later on. For when this separa- 
tion of Austrian from the German community became an 
accomplished fact in 1866, after the Treaty of Nikolsburg, 
it had been already voted some seventeen years earlier by 
the National Assembly of Frankfurt. 

It is not inopportune, perhaps, here to remind our- 
selves that it is chronicled in the Memoirs of Baron 
von Bunsen that this idea of ousting Austria from her 
place in the German Confederation had been viewed 
with considerable sympathy by several English states- 
men. Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Sir Robert 
Peel and others said to Bunsen that the Parliament of 
Frankfurt, in taking the initiative of such a resolution, 
had shown proof of real political intuition. 

It must be remembered, in order to explain why 
these clever politicians had been led to take such a point 
of view of a situation that could not but engross their 
attention on account of the complications that were 
bound to follow upon its development, that at the time 
to which I am referring the Austrian Government was 
in the hands of an intelligent, daring and inexorable 
man, whose ambitions constituted a perpetual threat to 
the safety of Europe. Prince Felix Schwarzenberg had 
replied to the votes of the Frankfurt Assembly, which 
had excluded the realm of the Habsburgs from the 
common German Fatherland, by declaring his intention 
to oblige the new Empire to accept all the Austrian 
provinces that had not hitherto been included in the 
German Confederation, e.g. Hungary, Bohemia, Galicia, 
etc. This mass of foreign peoples, once they had been 
merged into the Empire, almost inevitably would have 



6 Germany under Three Emperors 

obliged it to submit to the policy of reaction pre-con- 
ceived by Austria. Thereby Prince Schwarzenberg, the 
precursor of Bismarck, would have created a Central 
European Empire of over seventy millions of inhabitants 
which would have swallowed Prussia and quashed her 
pretensions for ever. It would also have constituted a 
permanent uncertain factor in European politics ; hence 
the opposition it produced. 

In proof of the opinion I have already ventured to 
express, I reproduce in its entirety a curious letter from 
the then well-known Donoso Cortes. It will be seen that 
it emphasises the point that Bismarck was not the 
originator of the revival of a German Empire for the 
profit of the Hohenzollerns, as so many people think. 
He simply took up with unusual ability, much un- 
scrupulousness, and a certain degree of recklessness, an 
idea that had already appeared before a few minds gifted 
with more perspicacity than others, as being the inevit- 
able result of the development of a situation that had 
been carefully prepared from the days of Frederick the 
Great. The disaster of Jena merely caused the matter 
to be relegated to the background for a season ; it cer- 
tainly never induced any thought of abandonment. 

Donoso Cortes wrote on May 23rd, 1849, from 
Berlin to a friend : " The Austrian, Bavarian and Hano- 
verian Plenipotentiaries have assembled here to discuss, 
in the name of the respective Sovereigns, a new German 
Constitution, and, in accord with Prussia, they have 
elaborated one which will shortly be promulgated. 

" This Constitution is nearly the same as the one of 
the Frankfurt demagogues, except for a few modifica- 
tions. For instance, the Imperial veto will not be a 
suspensive, but an absolute one; whilst the vote of 



A Forecast 7 

the citizens will not be universal, but restricted and sub- 
ject to certain conditions determined beforehand. 

" Germany is to become a military State that will 
be designated an Empire. This Empire will be ruled 
by the King of Prussia, who, however, will not be 
called Emperor, but bear a name which in German will 
mean i Guardian of the Empire.' No other German 
State will be allowed to maintain at foreign Courts its 
independent diplomatic agents, nor accredit any. This 
right will only belong to the Guardian of the Empire, 
and the King of Prussia himself will only be able to 
avail himself of it in virtue of his quality as such. 

" Austria is to remain outside the Union, forming 
a separate Empire. 

" As you can see for yourself, this means the 
mediatisation of all the independent German Princes, 
who, rinding themselves placed between the revolution 
that weighs upon their future and Prussia that crushes 
them with her protection, have no other choice left to 
them than that of the way in which they are to die. 
They have been called together not to hear whether they 
wish to live, but to learn whether they desire to perish 
from the hand of a king or of a peasant. At present 
the future of that immense and mighty German Empire 
which is itself as yet unformed is uncertain : will it be 
democracy or Monarchy ; ruled by an obscure, glib- 
tongued demagogue, or the King of Prussia?" 

That a statesman of long experience and superior in- 
telligence should have been compelled to ask such a 
question in 1849 must necessarily require the presump- 
tion that already certain people whose political acumen 
allowed them to guess the probable march of events 
considered that Prussia becoming supreme in Germany 



8 Germany under Three Emperors 

was only a matter of time. In reality it was even more 
a question of form. Prussia was preparing her own 
aggrandisement without leaving those spheres of the 
divine right so dear to the pious heart of its King ; she 
was advancing with discretion, noiselessly, slowly, but 
she was advancing all the same, and things had already 
gone so far that sagacious spectators of her conduct like 
Donoso Cortes could see whither they led. I have only 
quoted his letter because it is but one among the many 
proofs that could be advanced in favour of the theory that 
in May, 1849, Prussia was already making ready to grasp 
Imperial dignity as her legitimate possession, and that 
according to the best judges nothing would be able to 
stop her. 

Donoso Cortes, however, had been absolutely mis- 
taken in his prophecy that the independent German 
Sovereigns would be forced into the dilemma of having 
to perish either at the hand of a king or by the demand 
of the populace. They resigned themselves to nothing 
of the kind, but tried to play a double game. Outwardly 
they seemed to be in perfect accord with Frederick Wil- 
liam IV., but in the secret of their hearts they were still 
expecting that Austria would be able to recover sufficient 
strength to deliver them from Prussia. 

This was clearly proved when a little later Austria, 
having really recovered the full liberty of her move- 
ments, Hanover and Saxony denounced the Treaty which 
they had accepted on May 26th. Frederick William IV. , 
who believed he had coerced them to his policy, had been 
in reality their dupe. The Kings of Hanover and 
Saxony had found in the Treaty an excellent pretext 
to gain time, which was the only thing they wanted. 
Indeed, on the very day after he had agreed to the 



What Wellington Advised 9 

arrangement proposed by Prussia in regard to the 
Treaty which had bound it with its neighbours, the 
King of Hanover had written to the Duke of Wellington 
to consult him as to the conduct which he ought to follow 
in such a grave juncture. " Would he not do better," 
he asked, "to keep his liberty in spite of the Treaty 
he had been compelled to conclude by trying to delay 
things as long as possible, so as to allow to Austria 
sufficient time to reconstitute her strength and her 
army? " In spite of the indignation of the Iron Duke, 
the King persisted in his opinion. This, too, was shared 
by Saxony. The Government there made no secret of 
its intentions to break the Treaty, and Herr von Beust, 
questioned on the point, had replied: "We have re- 
served ourselves a door to escape from the obligations 
we have entered upon. We have let the Bavarian 
Government know that, unless it and the Vienna Cabinet 
consent to join the Alliance, we should not consider 
ourselves as bound by it. This declaration has produced 
in Munich the impression which we had expected it to 
make. Bavaria will refuse to accept the Treaty of 
May 26th, and we shall thus be free to disengage our- 
selves from its terms whenever we like." 

Some Prussian statesmen have tried to represent 
Prussian policy at that time as a model of disinterested- 
ness and chivahy. We who look at things by the light 
of subsequent events do not feel quite so ready to award 
it such praise, but find reason for the attitude of Prince 
Schwarzenberg, who attributed the hesitations which 
at the last moment kept back Frederick William IV. 
from adding to the embarrassments of his neighbours, 
and especially to the distress of Austria, to the feeling 
that the time had not yet come when Prussia might, 



io Germany under Three Emperors 

without danger for her future prestige, assert herself as 
the one great Power in Germany. 

Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, the Emperor Francis 
Joseph's Prime Minister, was one of Prussia's most 
dangerous foes. This great nobleman was an ex- 
ception among the ignorant Austrian aristocracy. He 
was certainly a great man, even if not a great statesman, 
and he at least had a carefully elaborated programme that 
he followed all the time that he remained in office — that 
is, until his death, because he expired in harness. He 
hated Prussia with one of those ferocious hatreds which 
knows no bounds, and even when he had to fight against 
internal difficulties that very nearly wrecked the Aus- 
trian Monarchy he was thinking of the moment when 
he would be enabled to crush Prussia, in whom he 
already saw the foe of the morrow — the one enemy to 
whom Austria was to owe its final humiliation. 

The Prince had understood very well, if others had 
not, the real significance of that Treaty of May 26th, 
1849, which the King of Prussia had compelled the 
Sovereigns of Hanover and Saxony to sign, and which 
associated them with him in one political existence. It 
was the beginning of that future unity of which Prussia 
was to become the centre. This state of things he 
meant to destroy. By a stroke of genius he persuaded 
Prussia to conclude another Treaty, this time with 
Austria, a Treaty which put an end to the power of 
the Imperial Vicar, and which constituted an interim 
authority exercised by Prussia and Austria in turns, in 
the name of the German Confederation; its term was 
to extend until May 1st, 1850. It was opening the 
door to all kind of discussions, and it was directed straight 
against Prussia and her ambitions. One can but wonder 



Prince Felix Schwarzenberg n 

how the latter was induced to accept such a revolution, 
because it was nothing else, in the government of the 
German States. King Frederick William IV. evidently 
did not realise its importance, because he immediately 
proposed to call together another Parliament at Erfurt — 
that is, the Parliament which, according to the Treaty 
of May 26th, had, with the help and co-operation of 
the rulers of the German independent States, to remodel 
the Constitution of Frankfurt. As soon, however, as 
he had declared this intention, Hanover said that Prussia 
did not interpret correctly the sense of the Treaty of 
May 26th, and that the King of Hanover had only 
allied himself with the King of Prussia in order to fight 
the democracy, but not at all to transform Germany 
into one vast and united State. The people having been 
crushed, the Treaty of May 26th had become null, and 
Hanover consequently repudiated it altogether. Thanks 
to the intrigues — for it is impossible to call his conduct 
by another name — of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, the 
famous Alliance of the three Kings, which went in Ger- 
many by the name of " Dreikonigsbiindniss," remained 
nothing but a dead letter, devoid of every sense. 

At the same time, also by reason of the influence 
which directly or indirectly he succeeded in exercising 
over the minds of certain Sovereigns and Ministers in 
Germany, the Prince caused indignant protestations 
without number against the supremacy which Prussia 
had claimed as a right, to shake the whole of the Southern 
German States. They began to awaken to the fact that 
their independence was being seriously threatened. On 
February 27th, 1850, Bavaria, Saxony and Wiirtemberg 
signed a Convention which had for its object the preser- 
vation of the sovereign rights of the small States in that 



12 Germany under Three Emperors 

future German Constitution about which everybody was 
talking, but which no one cared to see become a fact, 
with the exception, of course, of Prussia. A fortnight 
later the King of Wiirtemberg, in opening the Chambers 
at Stuttgart, uttered words which caused undescribable 
emotion all over Germany. 

" Gentlemen," said the King of Wiirtemberg, "the 
dream of a united great German State is the most 
dangerous of all dreams, not only from the point of 
view of Germany, but also from that of Europe. Every 
violent fusion of the German races, every complete 
subordination of one of these races to the other, would 
carry in itself the danger of our own inner dissolution, 
and would be the death of our national existence. It 
is only the maintenance of the old fidelity to historical 
traditions, and of the rights of each of us, that can 
assure us strength and salvation amidst the storms of the 
present day. I, together with the Governments allied 
with me, desire that each nation should remain in pos- 
session of its undoubted right to be represented in a 
German Assembly. We do not wish to raise a new 
political edifice upon the ruins of our old rights and 
privileges, we desire only to give to the former Con- 
federation a new shape more in harmony with the spirit 
and the needs of the present time. We wish to see the 
just pretensions of Prussia allied with the general in- 
terests of Germany, and if we consent to sacrifice our 
own particular and personal rights, it is not in favour 
of this or that Power that we do so, but for the general 
welfare, for the good of the Fatherland. We do not 
care to be Austrians or Prussians, we wish with Wiir- 
temberg, and with the help of Wiirtemberg, to remain 
Germans." 



A Protest from Berlin 13 

The impression produced by this speech was so im- 
mense that the Berlin Cabinet went so far as to break 
diplomatic relations with Stuttgart. But beyond this 
platonic expression of an anger which was natural under 
the circumstances, Prussia abstained from any manifesta- 
tions that might have compromised her policy, which 
was trying to shape itself in the minds of certain people. 

In those years some personalities, who were to play 
an important part in the reconstitution of that new 
Germany to which three successful wars were to give 
birth, were beginning to interest themselves in Prussian 
politics. There were in Berlin at that moment some 
persons who were already looking towards the then 
Prince of Prussia, and to hope that he might repair some 
of the mistakes into which his brother had been led or 
had allowed himself to drift. Among these persons was 
the man who was to destroy all the work of Prince 
Schwarzenberg, the man who for a quarter of a century 
was to become the leading political power in Europe, 
as well as one of the most imposing figures of his time, 
and who was to die at Friedrichsruhe as Prince Bis- 
marck of Schonhausen. 



CHAPTER II 

Bismarck's Political Debut 

ON February 5th Bismarck, who had already begun 
to attract public attention, was elected to the 
Prussian Second Chamber. In his early speeches 
he defended extreme Conservative principles with such 
energy that he had very quickly acquired the reputation 
of being a ferocious reactionary. He had openly declared 
that he would not hesitate at anything which would 
strengthen Royal authority. To his Monarchical con- 
victions Bismarck added a decided conviction that to 
Prussia alone belonged the future of Germany. And this 
he maintained in spite of the arrogance of Prince 
Schwarzenberg, who just at that time was starting the 
campaign which was to end with the Convention con- 
cluded at Olmutz between Austria and Prussia. The 
result of this achievement in diplomacy was that Prussia 
had to give way on every side to her rival under circum- 
stances that constituted one of the most shameful humilia- 
tions to which an independent Power had ever been 
driven. 

Though unavowed, this Convention of Olmutz was 
really one of the reasons of Prussia's aggression against 
Austria in 1866. By the war they hoped to wipe out the 
indignity of Olmutz. To explain this in detail would take 
too long, and, moreover, the thing has now lost signifi- 
cance, unless as an introduction to the work which Bis- 
marck was to complete at Sadowa. The Convention arose 

14 



Frederick William in a Dilemma 15 

out of the insurrection in Hesse, the Elector of which 
had appealed to the German Diet of Frankfurt for help 
in subduing his rebellious subjects, whilst the latter, 
thinking that they had good reason to complain of their 
Sovereign, had claimed the succour of Prussia. For 
the first time, in consequence, Frederick William IV. 
found himself in a dilemma. Either he had to fight 
against Austria, the representative of that Holy Empire 
whose shadow he still worshipped, or to place himself 
resolutely as the protector of those whom Austria 
oppressed. 

The position was a terrible one for a mind like his, 
in which, in spite of everything, mysticism remained the 
dominating factor. Ignoring the representations which 
were made to him by his Ministers, that even in the 
latter case it was indispensable to make some display of 
military force, he tried to negotiate. The King resisted 
even the entreaties of his personal friend, General von 
Radowitz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to show some 
energy in presence of the haughty insolence of Schwarzen- 
berg. For once Prussia found that she had to do with 
an adversary whom no concessions would disarm. Prince 
Schwarzenberg had not only secured for Austria the 
co-operation of Bavaria and of Wiirtemberg, but also had 
succeeded in putting himself into accord with the Emperor 
Nicholas of Russia, who, during an interview with Francis 
Joseph at Warsaw, had encouraged him to crush the 
idea of a United Germany. 

When all this came to the ears of Frederick William 
IV. he was more than ever encouraged in his opinion 
that every kind of sacrifice ought to be made by 
Prussia rather than accept the alternative of an armed 
conflict with Austria. Radowitz resigned, and his sue- 



16 Germany under Three Emperors 

cessor, von Manteuffel, by order of his Sovereign, wrote 
to Prince Schwarzenberg that the Prussian Government 
did not oppose the decisions of the Diet in regard to 
Hesse. Schwarzenberg did not wish for anything better, 
but he was far too clever and experienced a diplomat to 
show at once the satisfaction which this communication 
of Manteuffel had been to him, and he delayed replying 
to it. This dallying with fate, however, was fatal. A 
few days brought a sudden change in the decisions of the 
King of Prussia, who at last gave way to the clamours 
of public opinion and authorised General von Radowitz 
to mobilise his army, obliged von Manteuffel to give 
his consent, and thus brought a little more confusion 
into a situation which was already chaotic. 

As a military measure this mobilisation came much 
too late. As a political demonstration it was devoid of 
importance, because the commanders of the Prussian 
troops received orders which practically took away any 
freedom of action. The whole conduct of the Berlin 
Cabinet had been characterised by a foolishness which 
verged almost on the criminal, and of which Schwarzen- 
berg had at once seen the weakness. Von ManteuffePs 
dispatch had been dated November 3rd, and it was only 
on the 9th of the same month that he received a reply. 
This reply was more an ultimatum than anything else, 
because, before consenting to negotiate with Prussia and 
to disarm her own troops, Austria required guarantees 
upon three points : 

1. The dissolution of the Treaty with Hanover and 
Saxony. 

2. The formal recognition of the authority of the 
Frankfurt Diet. 

3. The evacuation of the Electorate of Hesse. 



Prokesch and Manteuffel 17 

Under these conditions she was willing to take part 
in a conference, but reserved to herself the right to 
submit any decisions this conference might take to the 
ratification of the Diet. In case Prussia did not imme- 
diately signify its acquiescence to these demands the 
Austrian Minister in Berlin, von Prokesch, had orders 
to ask for his passports. 

The demands caused von Manteuffel much consterna- 
tion. He offered to grant some part of what was de- 
manded, but Prokesch showed himself inflexible, and 
asked the same day for his passports. After the personal 
intervention of the King, von Prokesch consented to a 
delay of two days, which he declared he was doing 
entirely on his personal responsibility, and for which he 
expected that he would be most severely censured by his 
Government. 

At last, after a repeated exchange of letters and of 
notes, which Schwarzenberg made as offensive in tone 
as possible, Manteuffel — who saw that nothing could 
avail against the determination of the Vienna Cabinet — 
wrote asking his formidable opponent for an interview, 
and without even waiting for a reply, started for Olmutz, 
where, with insolent leisure, Schwarzenberg at last 
joined him. The outcome of that interview was the 
famous Convention by which Prussia accepted all the 
conditions dictated to her, and humbly reassumed its 
earlier position as a vassal of the Habsburgs. The comedy 
ended : drama followed, in which Austria was not to have 
the most glorious nor the principal part. 

The impression which the immoderate victory of 
Prince Schwarzenberg excited in Germany can best be 
interpreted in the words of a foreigner who happened to 
be in Berlin at that time. This personage wrote to one 



18 Germany under Three Emperors 

of his friends in France a letter to which subsequent 
events were to give significance : ' ' You ask me for my 
opinion as to what has taken place at Olmiitz," says this 
man, who was none other than my own father. "Neither 
is Prussia so weak as one believes, nor Austria so strong 
as one thinks, or as one could suppose, judging by the 
light of the events which have just taken place. Austria 
has abused the momentary advantage which circum- 
stances of which she has not realised the real causes have 
given to her; whilst the so-called defeat of Prussia has 
left her military strength intact, it has embittered her 
national resentment against the people who — intention- 
ally, perhaps — allowed her to be humiliated in order to 
excite hatreds which, without the Convention of Olmiitz, 
would have died a natural death. After this no one in 
Prussia will allow their anger to €001.' ' 

That public opinion was most bitter, and that Olmiitz 
really laid the foundation of the idea of revenge, which 
was cemented by Sadowa, can be appreciated nowhere 
with more intensity than in a letter addressed to Baron 
von Bunsen by one of his intimate friends, Count Albert 
Pourtales, then Prussian Minister at Constantinople, who, 
on learning the details of the arrangement at Olmiitz, 
expressed his indignation in a fiery epistle which deserves 
to be quoted, because it lays bare all that inexorable 
programme which every Prussian carried written in his 
heart since the signing of this ill-fated convention, but 
which Bismarck alone proved strong enough to bring 
through and to execute : 

" Constantinople, January 18th, 1851. 
" If you think me full of bitterness against Radowitz, 
my dear friend, you must not wonder that I cannot find 



Count Pourtales' Letter 19 

words to express my indignation against Manteuffel, 
because, in spite of Haugwitz, in spite of George William, 
in spite of Tilsit, our history offers nothing, in my 
opinion, that can be compared to the defeat of Olmiitz. 
To think that we have called together the Chambers and 
the Army in order to receive a box on the ear during a 
State ceremony ! To think that we have jested with 
all the remembrances of 1813 ; and in what a way ! How 
does one dare to mention the concessions that Austria 
has made to us, because next to the executioner Rech- 
berg we have been allowed to place another; because 
we have been allowed to drag ourselves secretly towards 
Holstein, as if we were thieves or receivers of stolen 
goods. 

"All this is so painful that I cannot find expressions 
capable of describing all that I feel. But in my sorrow 
I remember the French proverb, i Aide-toi, le ciel 
t'aidera. 9 We cannot expect others to do anything for 
us if we do nothing ourselves. Never mind how bad, 
how shameful our position is to-day, there is one fact 
that neither cowardice nor treason can destroy, and this 
fact is, that Germany still has a future, and that in Ger- 
many it is Prussia who will be called to take the lead. 
The history of the last few years proves that Fate con- 
tinually gives us back this hegemony which we have 
refused so often and in such a miserable way. The blind 
party of the Kreuzzeitung can talk as much as it likes 
of its so-called historical system ; Rochow, Gerlach, Stahl 
can continue as much as they like to speak and to act 
against the interests of Prussia, and in the sense of the 
ones dear to Austria and to Russia. They will fail in 
their attempts to pervert public opinion, because it is 
God and not Manteuffel who rules the world. The 



20 Germany under Three Emperors 

Dresden conferences will lead to nothing; the best they 
can achieve will be but a weak reproduction of the Con- 
stitution elaborated by the Diet, and this the least breath 
of wind will carry away. 

"In the meantime, my dear friend, we must work 
without interruption against our good friends Nicholas 
and Francis Joseph ; we must encourage the Turks ; we 
must advise the Italians to rally round the house of Savoy ; 
we must make the national revolutionary party through- 
out Europe understand and realise that the Piedmont and 
Prussia are the only two European States whose existence 
and future are closely linked with the success of the 
nationalist idea on a reasonable basis. We must come 
to an understanding with the Liberal party in Sweden 
— which the other day obtained a great triumph in the 
Parliament of Stockholm — because, sooner or later, the 
Swedish Liberals will feel and act as should real Scan- 
dinavians. We must prevent, no matter at what cost, 
the smaller German States from becoming stronger than 
is now the case ; we must strangle at its birth this 
diabolical idea that could only have been conceived by 
the Habsburgs of a Hanoverian-Saxon-Oldenburg Sonder- 
burg, and then ... we must wait for the moment when 
Austria, in trying to regulate her financial condition and 
organise her political system, makes a tremendous fiasco 
of both, as she is bound to do when this moment arrives, 
then, as one says in French, ' chacun son tour.' Then 
we shall return to this abominable Schwarzenberg, with 
full interest, all the harm that he has done to us." 

Whether this cry of hatred had been a spontaneous 
outburst on the part of Count Pourtales or whether he 
had simply repeated what he had heard from others is 



The Justice of History 21 

immaterial. The point of his letter is, that it forevisions 
jvith accuracy the story of what was to happen sixteen 
years later — it can be considered as a prophecy of 
Sadowa. It is impossible exactly to understand the 
events which occurred in 1866 if one did not look upon 
them as a consequence of Olmiitz in 1850. 

In all this we find a great example of the final justice 
which history deals out to all. Though Frederick 
William IV. had refused to accept the Imperial Crown 
which was offered to him by the votes of a Parliament 
which he persisted in considering as the product of a 
revolution, he had nevertheless tried to exclude Austria 
from the German circle, in order one day to become 
himself absolute master in Germany. The progress of 
this idea, that Germany must be confiscated for the profit 
of Prussia, was a kind of evolution ; the crowned mystic 
of Berlin who had refused to agree with the Council on 
the question of Federation eventually came to the same 
conclusion as the German democracy. Was it a coin- 
cidence only that this agreement was not reached until it 
seemed possible to the King that Prussia could dictate? 

Prince Schwarzenberg, thinking that the weak and 
dreamy character of King Frederick William IV. would 
make Austria's enterprise easier, attempted to exclude 
Prussia from the German Confederation, or at least to 
paralyse her movements by relegating her to the position 
of a second-rate Power, something like Bavaria or Saxony. 
He temporarily achieved this by the Olmiitz Convention. 

Sixteen years later the Battle of Sadowa destroyed 
what Olmiitz had created, and the Treaty of Nikolsburg 
finally ejected out of Germany the ancient monarchy of 
the Habsburgs. Prince Schwarzenberg had died almost 
on the morrow of this victory, of which he had made 



22 Germany under Three Emperors 

use without regard to equity or to moderation. There- 
after another of the Schwarzenberg type arose in 
Germany, but this time in Prussia. He had the same 
genius, perhaps even more, the same character, the 
same audacity, the same disdain for justice, the same 
confidence in the brutal strength represented by big guns. 
It is he who finally triumphed. 

And what was his opinion on this Olmiitz Convention ? 
The majority of Germans saw in it one of the bitterest 
humiliations which had ever fallen to the lot of Prussia. 
Austria considered it to be one of the greatest diplomatic 
triumphs she had ever obtained. In this man's eyes, 
however, it had no importance whatever, except for the 
manner in which it could be used to excite public opinion 
against Austria. This man was Bismarck, and in his 
Memoirs, when reviewing the events of those critical 
days for the Prussian Monarchy, he writes the following 
significant phrase: "The great error of our Prussian 
diplomacy during that time was to believe that others 
would do for us what we did not dare to do ourselves." 
Bismarck's worst enemies can never accuse him of having 
fallen into this error; on the contrary, he rather dared 
more than he ought to have done. This made him a great 
man, but it also prevented him from becoming great in 
the abstract sense which we attach to a word susceptible 
of many different interpretations. His nature was far 
too calloused for him to resent the humiliation of any 
temporary failure provided it only retarded but did not 
endanger the security of a future which he was beginning 
to see quite clearly. But Olmiitz furnished him with a 
pretext for his hatred against Austria, which was more 
assumed than real; because it was only individuals he 
hated; nations he simply despised. He was always 



A Suppressed Book 23 

willing to make friends with the political enemy of the 
day before. He was not at all an opportunist; but he 
never neglected an opportunity, especially when it meant 
the destruction of something which he found in his way. 
He always liked to wipe out old scores, but was very 
careful that in doing so any projects he entertained in 
regard to a third party should not be erased. 

In 1900 a book, published in Vienna, immediately 
upon its appearance was bought in and destroyed by 
the Prussian Government because of certain facts 
which it disclosed and which they could not allow to 
become public property. This book was called "A 
Kienast's Monograph." Among other interesting 
things which it contained was a conversation which 
Count Seherr Thoss, a Hungarian refugee who had been 
compromised during the mutiny of 1848 and taken 
refuge in Paris, had had with Bismarck in the year 1862, 
when the latter, after his appointment as Prussian 
Minister President, had returned for a few days to France 
to present his letters of recall to Napoleon III. The 
Count had begged the new Minister to grant him an 
audience, at which it turned out that the Hungarian 
nobleman wanted to offer to Prussia the services of his 
countrymen against Austria should Austria become 
entangled in a war with Prussia. This eventuality, the 
Count said, appeared to be within the limits of prob- 
ability. If we are to believe his Memoirs, which were 
written in 1881 and never printed, Bismarck heard him 
with great attention, and then replied to him with a 
frankness that surprised him, not having been used to 
meet the like in a diplomat : 

" You are quite right; my aim is to take revenge for 
the shame inflicted upon my country at Olmutz. I will 



24 Germany under Three Emperors 

destroy Austria. I mean to get for Prussia the place 
which belongs to her by right in Germany as a pure- 
blooded German State. I realise quite well of what 
importance the help of Hungary would be to us, and I 
also know that, already, Frederick the Great has had 
negotiations with dissatisfied Hungarian Magnates as to 
an alliance between Hungary and Prussia. If we are 
victorious in the war which will break out before long, 
then you may feel quite sure that Hungary also will 
recover her freedom." 

When the Count in the course of further conversation 
touched on the necessity of securing the neutrality of 
France by offering some inducement for her abstention 
from intervention, Bismarck owned to him that he had 
already secured the consent of Napoleon III., and that 
it had cost him nothing to obtain. It was true that the 
Emperor had spoken of his desire for the cession of the 
Saarbruck coal fields, but he had bluntly refused, and 
prided himself on his firmness. 

What, however, Bismarck did not mention to Seherr 
Thoss was what else had transpired during his momentous 
interview with the French Sovereign. The interview 
had taken place in the latter's study after Bismarck had 
presented his letters of recall and at which no one else had 
been present, not even the Empress. The Prussian 
Minister mentioned the burning question of an eventual 
cession of Luxemburg to Prussia in exchange for annex- 
ing Belgium to France. So persuasive, indeed, was 
Bismarck in his explanations as to the manner in which 
this monstrous infraction of treaties that had been 
solemnly accepted was to be effected, that at last 
Napoleon had been induced to reply that he would think 
about it, and then give his views on the subject. At this 



Bismarck's Secret 25 

promise Bismarck had eagerly caught, understanding the 
importance it would be for him to have in his possession 
indisputable documentary evidence that such an idea had 
been entertained by the Emperor. 

Bismarck may have thought his secret safe. And so 
it was for the moment; but Seherr Thoss was far too 
clever to believe that such a shrewd mind as Napoleon 
III.'s would have given a promise of neutrality to Prussia 
without some definite advantageous condition being 
understood between them. This is demonstrated by a 
remark the clever Hungarian makes in his Memoirs to 
the effect that he would not feel surprised if the policy 
which Bismarck meant to inaugurate after becoming 
Prussian Prime Minister did not bring many surprises 
along with it not only for his countrymen, but for the 
world at large. To this the Count adds, not without 
melancholy, "It is always a matter for regret when fate 
brings one into contact with men about whose sincerity 
and veracity one cannot help entertaining doubts." 

Count Seherr Thoss was to meet Bismarck again seven 
years later, in January, 1869, after the war of 1866 had 
revenged Prussia for the humiliation of Olmiitz. Another 
result of the conflict was the reconciliation between 
Hungary and the dynasty of the Habsburgs, by which 
Hungarian exiles were free to return to their native land. 
This time the conversation was conducted in different 
terms. The future Chancellor of the future German 
Empire had already formed intentions toward Austria. 
He was foreseeing the hour when he would call upon 
the Dual Monarchy to contract a close alliance with its 
conqueror of the day before. There was no longer any 
question of sympathising with the cause of the Hungarian 
rebels, or even with any aspirations of Hungary toward 



26 Germany under Three Emperors 

separation from the Austrian Empire, whose supremacy 
it had refused to accept, and with whom it had only 
submitted to collaborate in politics when driven to that 
course by political necessity. In relating this second inter- 
view with Bismarck the Count makes one short but sig- 
nificant comment as to its sense and purpose. " His 
words would have surprised me had I not known that 
everything could be expected from this extraordinary 
man whose principles were wholly Prussian." And this 
is what these principles induced Bismarck to say : 

"Prussia has absolutely no necessity to favour strife 
between Austria and Hungary. . . . On the contrary, 
it is to our greatest interest to see the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy become stronger and enter into close rela- 
tions of friendship with us. The sincerity of this wish 
is founded on the present development of Austro- 
Hungary. One consequence of this Dual development 
is that it does away with any fear of our being in danger 
of an aggression from that side. Another consideration 
is that it is of immense importance for us to become the 
ally of Austro-Hungary. They have not yet forgiven 
us in Vienna for 1866, but this will come in time, when 
it is realised there what strength will accrue to Austro- 
Hungary from an alliance with us. ... As regards 
France, we shall soon be at war with her because she 
has not forgiven us for Sadowa, which she considers as 
a personal defeat. We shall win this war. . . . And 
then a long period of peace will follow, during which 
we shall be obliged always to keep an attentive eye on 
France and on her doings. Perhaps we shall require 
another war to prove to France that we are not to be 
beaten. When Frenchmen realise this fact there will 
exist no reason why France and Germany should not 



Fear of Russia 27 

entertain good and neighbourly relations with one 
another. The real enemy of civilised Europe will then 
be only Russia. When the Tsar has built the railways 
he needs and reorganised his army, Russia will be able to 
march against us with two millions of soldiers. In those 
days Europe will be forced to unite itself in a strong 
coalition in order to be able to resist this Power." 

It seems strange to read this to-day, but at the same 
time it must be recognised that the man who had uttered 
these words judged well of a political situation, for the 
creation of which he was chiefly responsible. One can- 
not help feeling a sincere regret that this massive in- 
telligence had only " Prussian principles," and that he 
did not place his genius at the service of a better cause 
than to secure the triumph of sheer brutal force. 

According to the terms of this Olmiitz Convention, 
Prussia had engaged herself to take part in a Congress to 
be held at Dresden to regularise the German Confedera- 
tion. This Congress re-established the rights of the 
former Frankfurt Diet. King Frederick William IV., 
who by that time had heard a good deal about Bismarck, 
and who had been struck by the energy with which the 
latter had defended the cause of the Monarchy in the 
Prussian Chamber, sent for him, and offered him the post 
of King's Delegate at the Diet. Bismarck accepted 
without hesitation. Hj afterwards remarked that at that 
moment he had had the intuition to realise that it was the 
opportunity of his life, and that he would be a fool to 
refuse it. 

King Frederick William, surprised at his immediate 
acquiescence, told him that he " must be very courageous 
to take upon himself duties with which, after all, he was 
not familiar." 



28 Germany under Three Emperors 

" If I find that I cannot fulfil them I shall be the first 
one to ask to be relieved of them," proudly replied Bis- 
marck. " I have the courage to obey if your Majesty 
has the courage to give me orders." 

" In that case we can try," said Frederick 
William IV. 

The experience was more successful than could have 
been foreseen. The new Prussian Delegate, however, 
soon made himself felt among his colleagues by a dignified 
insolence, which left no doubt in their minds as to his 
determination not to allow either himself or his country 
to be crushed by the importance either of Austria or of 
any other Power which considered itself if not superior, 
at least equal to Prussia. It is useless to remind the 
reader of the anecdote of the cigar which he lighted, 
during the debates of the Diet, in response to the one 
which Count Thun was smoking. It is too well known 
to be repeated in detail, but this was but one of the small 
things with which he contrived to assert his personality, 
and little by little to force all the other members of the 
Bundestage to take his opinions into consideration. One 
day Thun lost his patience, and allowed the exclamation 
to escape, " Manteuffel was not so insolent as you at 
Olmiitz." To which Bismarck replied instantly, "We 
are not at Olmiitz, and we shall never return there, and 
I . . ." He waited a few seconds, then slowly added, 
"I am not Manteuffel." 

These years which he spent in Frankfurt proved of 
the greatest use to him. It was then that he learnt 
diplomacy in handling big affairs of world-import, and 
the experience which he amassed during this stage of his 
public life helped him considerably later on, when he had 
to give his main attention to foreign politics. Then, 



The Crimean War 29 

again, he used the time he had at his disposal to make 
several journeys abroad, and during a visit which he paid 
to Paris at the time of the Great Exhibition, while he was 
the guest of his colleague, Count Maximilian Hatzfeldt, 
at the Prussian Legation, he had the opportunity of being 
presented to Queen Victoria and to the Prince Consort. 

The Crimean War was raging at the time referred to, 
and Bismarck had done his best to prevent Prussia 
taking part in it, as he did not think it opportune for 
his country to enter into a quarrel with which it had 
nothing to do. Moreover, a conflict with Russia would 
have interfered for the time being with his dream of 
revenge against Austria for the Olmiitz humiliation. 
His decision to abstain was further accentuated by the 
fact that during the Congress of Paris, which he had 
attended as Prussian Plenipotentiary, his Austrian col- 
league had treated him with a disdain he was the last 
man in the world to forgive. About this time he wrote 
to his friend, General von Gerlach, a letter in which he 
expressed his conviction that the time had come when 
Prussia ought no longer to submit to be considered as 
a negligible quantity by her neighbours. Owing to an 
indiscretion the contents of this epistle were divulged. 
It came to the knowledge of the Austrian Foreign 
Office, and thereafter the relations between the two 
countries became even more strained than ever. Per- 
haps it had been written with that intention. With 
Bismarck one never knows. 

Concerning this visit to Paris, it is interesting to 
read in the Memoirs of the Chancellor his appreciation 
of Napoleon III., whom he then met for the first time, 
and with whom he had opportunity to converse on more 
than one occasion. Among other things he says : 



30 Germany under Three Emperors 

" The Emperor gave me to understand in general 
terms that he wished for a close alliance between France 
and Prussia. He told me that these two neighbouring 
States, who were both at the head of European civilisa- 
tion, ought to help each other." It had evidently been 
reported in Berlin that Bismarck had tried to win the 
good graces of Napoleon III., because the next time 
that he visited the Prussian capital the King asked him 
one day, in rather ironical terms, what he thought of 
the Emperor, to which Bismarck answered, that though 
he considered him " an intelligent and amiable man, he 
did not think him so clever as he was generally thought 
to be." 

Frankfurt had been a stage in the career of the future 
German Chancellor, an initial stage, one may almost 
say. His attitude whilst there had been a surprise for 
his friends and a bitter disappointment for his enemies, 
who had hoped that he would render himself guilty of 
so many blunders that he would never more be employed 
in any official capacity after this experience. 

As for Bismarck himself, he had fully meant to make 
his period in the Confederation Parliament a stepping- 
stone to much higher things. It is difficult to say 
whether he was already at that time dreaming of the 
Foreign Office, but that some idea of the kind was cross- 
ing his brain can be inferred from the fact that he tried 
to avoid being sent to Vienna as Minister. He knew 
very well that the reign of Frederick William IV. was 
drawing to a close, and he wanted to remain in the 
vicinity of his future master, in whom he had discerned, 
as he expressed it himself in his picturesque and rough 
language, "the soul of a King." 

At the time when the state of health of the Sovereign 



Bismarck and Prince William 31 

was giving rise to the gravest apprehensions, and when 
it was already evident that a Regency would have to be 
instituted, Bismarck came again to Berlin and had a long 
conversation with the Prince of Prussia, the future 
William I., during a walk which they took together in 
the park at Potsdam. The Prince discussed with Bis- 
marck whether, on ascending the throne, he ought to 
accept the Constitution as it was, or if he had better 
insist on some modifications being introduced into it. 
The reply which he obtained is sufficiently characteristic 
to deserve being reproduced in the words of the man who 
framed it : 

" I told him," says the Chancellor in his Reminis- 
cences, " that as a point of right he could reject the 
Constitution, because though a son is bound by disposi- 
tions taken by his father this does not apply to the 
brother of a Monarch, but I advised him for political 
reasons not to provoke in the country a feeling of political 
insecurity which would follow on the rejection of the 
Constitution, even if this were done from excellent 
motives. ' One must not,' I added, ' every time a new 
Sovereign ascends the throne, cause national apprehen- 
sion that it may mean a change in the whole political 
system.' The prestige of Prussia in Germany, and the 
efficacy of its influence in Europe, would be diminished 
by dissensions between the Crown and the Landtag, and 
the whole of Liberal Germany would protest against the 
projected measure. I further insisted on the point that 
all constitutional questions must be subordinated to the 
needs of the country and to its political situation in 
regard to the rest of Germany. Moreover, there was no 
need at the present moment, I added, to touch our Con- 
stitution; the question of internal peace was by far the 



32 Germany under Three Emperors 

more important matter .with which the Prince could 
concern himself on his accession." 

In the meanwhile one began to get uneasy in Berlin 
at the presence of one so generally disliked as Bismarck, 
and especially at the conversations which he was having 
with tne future Sovereign. People even asked him why 
he did not return to Frankfurt. He replied that he 
thought his presence was more useful and necessary in 
Berlin. In reality he wanted to see the turn events 
would take, and to be present when the Royal authority 
passed into other and stronger hands than Frederick 
William IV. He was, however, to wait for a consider- 
able time before being called upon to take in his own 
hands the reins of Prussian government, because, though 
the Prince of Prussia, owing to the mental illness of his 
brother, was appointed Regent in 1858, he did not ask 
Bismarck to enter the Cabinet. On the contrary, he 
appointed him Minister in Petersburg, which, in the 
opinion of his opponents, was a method of getting him 
out of the way of people whom his presence irritated. 
Among others, the Regent's Consort, the Princess 
Augusta, had never "taken" to the talented statesman 
who was, in the years to come, to pursue her so merci- 
lessly with his enmity and to thwart her with such 
persistence, even after she had become Empress. 



CHAPTER III 

Prussia and Russia 

AT the Russian Court Bismarck for the first time 
Jr\- really came into active touch with international 
politics from other points of view than those of Prussia 
and Germany. That visit widened his outlook and helped 
him to lay his plans for the future, particularly in regard 
to Austria. Before he left Petersburg he had learnt that 
though Russia would not help him to wipe out the shame 
of Olrmitz, it would look with a certain satisfaction on 
the abasement of the Habsburg Monarchy — the Tsar had 
not forgiven the treachery of Austria at the time of the 
Crimean War. 

Bismarck had always sympathised with the Romanoffs, 
the autocratic character of whose government appealed 
to his own authoritative individuality, and he very 
quickly came to the conclusion that Prussia could not 
rise unaided to the position which she coveted. The 
Hohenzollerns were bound by family ties to the Russian 
reigning dynasty, and no opportunity of persuading 
the latter to enter into closer relations with their rela- 
tives in Berlin ought to be neglected. At least that 
was Bismarck's opinion, and he therefore decided, even 
though he knew it was against the will of those above 
him in State affairs, to employ his best efforts to draw 
Russia into the inner circle of Prussian politics. He was 
well aware that he would encounter opposition in 
Court circles, especially on the part of the Princess of 
n 33 



34 Germany under Three Emperors 

Prussia, whose decidedly anti-Russian feelings were very- 
well known. 

Bismarck did not at that time hate the Princess 
Augusta with the same intensity he was to display later 
on, but he did not like her, and feared her influence 
over the Prince Regent. He therefore adopted a line 
of conduct all his own, and proceeded to act as if he 
had received no instructions from home at all. Indeed, 
if we are to believe all that we have heard concerning 
his early days in Petersburg, he made no little stir in 
diplomatic circles. He told Count de Nesselrode, the 
Russian Chancellor, on the first occasion of speaking to 
him on matters of State and in reply to a question on 
the point of his authority : " I have brought no instruc- 
tions, but I mean on my return to instruct others as to 
what ought to be our future relations with your country." 
Nesselrode was far too wise a statesman to allow himself 
to be surprised by this boutade, and he ironically re- 
marked that it was impossible to use the word ' ' ought ' ' 
in politics; his own experience had taught him that "it 
is never the things which one ought, but those which 
one can, that events allow one to do." 

In Austria Bismarck's appointment to Petersburg 
was viewed with dismay. The Austrian Ministry, which 
was just as clumsy at that time as it is to-day, imagined 
that it would be advantageous to make an attempt to 
bribe him. The anecdote becomes the more interesting 
when one remembers that this system of "oiling" the 
people whose help one wants, which he denounced with 
much indignation, was put into practice by himself when 
he was in office on a hitherto quite unknown and un- 
precedented scale. 

In his Reminiscences the Prince records : "In 



A Letter from Levinstein 35 

March, 1859, when I was staying in Berlin previous to 
my departure for Russia, I received, on the very morning 
that I was to start for my new post, a letter from a 
certain Levinstein, a Jewish banker who, as I was aware, 
was in touch with the leading men in foreign political 
circles. This letter was couched in the following terms : 

" ' I take the liberty to wish most humbly a safe 
journey and a successful mission to your Excellency, 
and I hope that we shall soon be able to present to you 
again our duty in this capital, because the services which 
you can render in your own country will be far more 
useful here than abroad. 

"'I have made to-day a Stock Exchange operation 
which, as I hope, will bear productive fruits. I shall 
have, later on, the honour to speak to you about it. 

" ' In Vienna your mission in Petersburg causes some 
uneasiness, because one considers you as an adversary of 
Austria. 

" ' It would be very useful for us if your Excellency 
would consent to write me a jew lines saying that 
'personally you are not badly disposed in regard to 
Austria; these lines might be of incalculable value. It 
is a pleasure to me to offer to you my services for the 
time of your absence, and if you desire it I shall watch 
over your interests either here or anywhere else you may 
be pleased to say. You would never be served with more 
disinterestedness and loyalty than by me. 

" ' In expressing to you my sincere feelings of con- 
sideration, I remain 

" ' Your Excellency's must humble servant, 

" ' Levinstein. 
" ' Berlin, March 23rd, 1859.' 



36 Germany under Three Emperors 

"I did not reply to this letter," writes Bismarck, 
"but received in the course of the day, just before start- 
ing for the railway station, a visit from Mr. Levinstein. 
He brought me an autograph letter from Count Buol, 
then Austrian Foreign Minister, and he proposed that 
I should take part in a financial operation which would 
'bring me a yearly income of 20,000 thalers without 
any risk whatever.' I replied to him that I had no 
money to invest ; but the banker observed that no funds 
whatever would be required for this transaction, and that 
all I should have to do would be to champion, at the 
Russian Court, the policy followed in Vienna, because 
the financial business in question could only be success- 
ful if relations between Russia and Austria remained 
good. 

"It would have been most important for me," con- 
tinues Bismarck, "in view of the future, to have in my 
hands some document proving that I had been right in 
telling the Regent that I strongly doubted the sincerity 
of the policy of Count Buol. I therefore said to Levin- 
stein that in such a serious matter I required a better 
guarantee than verbal assertions, with nothing behind 
them except a few lines from Count Buol, which he had 
not even handed over to me. He refused to give me 
anything in writing, but raised his offer to 30,000 thalers 
a year. After that I told Levinstein he had better retire, 
and myself prepared to leave the room. He followed 
me on the stairs, saying that I had better beware, because 
it was not a pleasant thing to have the Austrian Govern- 
ment for an enemy. It was only after I had bade him 
observe that the stairs were very steep and that I was a 
stronger man than he that he left me in a hurry. 

"This so-called negotiator was personally known to 



The Satire of History 37 

me on account of the confidence which our Foreign 
Office reposed in him. He had been several times sent to 
me on special missions by Manteuffel, but when I became 
Minister for Foreign Affairs I immediately suppressed 
all intercourse with Levinstein. Many years later I took 
opportunity to relate the whole incident to King 
William I., and at the same time to enlighten him as 
to the corruption which had formerly existed in our 
Foreign Office." 

The curious thing in all this passage, in the glaring 
absence of scruples on the same point in his own 
diplomacy, is the indignation of Bismarck. No one in 
the world manipulated the Secret Service funds with 
more dexterity than the Iron Chancellor during the years 
he ruled at the Wilhelmstrasse. He certainly beat 
Austrian statesmen in that respect, for not only did he 
succeed in obtaining, for a handsome consideration, 
people in high position in Petersburg to serve him, but 
much later, after the War of 1870, he entertained similar 
relations with certain eminent French political men. 

The real memoirs of the Iron Chancellor have not 
yet seen the light of the day. They exist, nevertheless, 
carefully preserved in a bank — not a German one — and 
his instructions to his heirs were to allow half a century 
to elapse after his death before publishing them. In 
these one may expect far more intimate revelations as 
to his work in Russia than at present extant. His 
Reminiscences are devoid of certain curious details of vital 
interest. Nevertheless the few pages of this volume in 
which Bismarck describes his sojourn in Russia contain 
one or two comments worthy of notice. Rather bitterly 
he remarks that already, in 1859, Russian society had 
begun to shake off German influence. At one time 



38 Germany under Three Emperors 

it had been strong and powerful at the Court of 
the Romanoffs, through the sympathies of the Empress 
Alexandra Feodorovna, the consort of Nicholas I., who 
was the sister of the King of Prussia and the daughter 
of the famous Queen Louise whose memory is to this 
day dear to every German heart. 

As an instance of the change, the younger Russian 
officers and officials would always make a point, when 
addressed in German, to reply in French or not to reply 
at all. The older generation of the time of Nicholas I. 
and Alexander I., Bismarck considered, were much better 
educated and far more cultivated than their children ; 
and mainly to this declension among young people can 
be ascribed, says Bismarck, the weakening of German 
influence over the Russian higher classes. 

At that time the German t ' Kultur ' ' had not yet 
asserted itself, but in this estimate one can already see 
it appearing on the European horizon, with all its in- 
sufferable pretensions to infallibility, which reached their 
culminating point with the outbreak of the present war. 
This same super-vanity is seen in the way the Prussian 
Colossus referred to Prince Gortschakov. Whilst Bis- 
marck had been Envoy in Petersburg he had flattered 
and cultivated the Prince, but on becoming head of the 
Prussian Foreign Office he proceeded to make the 
Russian statesman aware that he considered himself his 
superior in personal magnetism as well as in political 
acumen. With serene complacency Bismarck diagnoses 
the natural reserve with which such conduct was met : 
" As soon as I showed myself on the scene as a German, 
as a Prussian, or rather as his rival in European opinion 
and in the esteem of historians, his forme, kindness for 
me changed into bitter jealousy." 



Prussia's Future 39 

The sojourn of Bismarck in Russia did not last a long 
time, but long enough for him to consider Russia as a 
country ' ; in regard to whom nothing can give us reason 
to foresee a conflict arising out of clashing political in- 
terests. We shall never be at peace with France," is 
his dictum, " but a war with Russia will never become 
necessary for us unless the mistakes of Liberalism or the 
awkwardness of the dynasty produce a false situation." 
The friends the Chancellor made in Petersburg and cer- 
tain agents he secured proved of considerable use in 
keeping him informed as to what was going on in Peters- 
burg, and especially of the sentiment of the Court in 
regard to the idea of a German union under the pro- 
tectorate of Prussia, about which he managed to convey 
some hints in conversation with different Russian 
political personalities of the day. No one in Russia at 
the time gave any thought to the possibility of Prussia 
rising to the rank and importance of a first-rate Power. 
Austria, on the other hand, they watched with constant 
and unfailing interest. Prussia's future, they considered, 
might be one of honest mediocrity ; as for a Prussia 
healthy, strong and ambitious, the idea was ludicrous. 

A few persons, more observant than others, had 
gauged with some accuracy the character of this man 
who went about quietly, but who at the same time took 
great care to assert himself with an almost stubborn 
determination every time the interests of his country 
came into question. One of those who, from the first 
moment that he had met him, had been struck by the 
personality of Bismarck was my own father, Rzewuski, 
who in his diary left long chapters concerning the future 
creator of the modern German Empire, passages that I 
am going to reproduce because they afford a valuable 



40 Germany under Three Emperors 

contribution to modern history and present quite a 
different valuation of the Iron Chancellor from that 
arrived at by his contemporaries. 

"I met last night at dinner," writes my father on 
April 12th, 1859, "the new Prussian Envoy, Herr von 
Bismarck. I had heard all kinds of stories about him, 
some people pronouncing him an insolent, disagreeable, 
overbearing man, whilst others declared him to be only 
a dull fool, very much taken up with an exaggerated idea 
of his own importance. Bloudov was the only person who 
had a good word for him, whilst Antoinette 1 had told 
me that she did not in the least share the general opinion 
of our superficial society concerning this ' Prussian,' as 
Marie Stolypin had named him and everyone, thereafter, 
called him. All these different appreciations put to- 
gether had made me rather curious in regard to this 
paragon, and I was very glad when Adlerberg introduced 
me to him. We had not much time to talk before 
dinner, but during the meal I took occasion to observe 
Bismarck. I was struck by the strength of individ- 
uality denoted by the shape of the head of this much- 
discussed personage. His physiognomy gave one the 
impression of great power, combined with considerable 
self-control and inexorable will. When he becomes old 
he will look like a bulldog, eager to attack and to fight, 
and already now there is at times when something annoys 
him — which I fancy was the case once or twice during 
the meal — an expression in his e)^es which is singularly 
ferocious. Combined with it, and in curious contrast to 
it, is an excessive, almost too great, politeness and 
courtesy. Altogether, he is a strange individual, and 

1 Countess Antoinette Bloudov, one of the personal friends of the Empress 
Marie Ale^androvna, known for her Slavophil sentiments, 



My Father and Bismarck 41 

one almost regrets that fate did not put him into another 
position than the one which he occupies ; he would have 
made a splendid Prime Minister in a constitutional 
country, but his force seems sadly wasted there where 
his destiny has put him. 

"After dinner I approached him, and we began 
smoking together in our host's study. I asked him how 
he liked Russia, to which he replied that so far what 
he had seen of it had pleased him very much. His only 
regret was that he did not speak the language, because 
this ignorance prevented him from journeying to the 
interior which, he was sure, must be most interesting. 
'Petersburg is too much European,' he added. 'One 
only sees in it the civilised side of your country ; it is 
the other one I would like to know.' 

" I told him that in Moscow and in Kiev, for in- 
stance, he could easily travel without speaking Russian, 
but he made a gesture of impatience at my remark, 
which seemed to indicate a distaste for contradiction that 
rather amused me. 

" I asked him how he had fared at his reception by 
the Emperor, to whom he had presented his credentials 
a few days before. ' I suppose that I ought to make 
the conventional reply to you that I was delighted, 
and that the Emperor showed himself unusually kind 
and amiable to me. I cannot do so, however. The 
reception was like all receptions of this kind ought to 
be. Every new Minister, when he makes his debut at 
a Court, is warmly welcomed. How can it be other- 
wise? In my career it is the last step, the retiring before 
the fall of the curtain, which is the important thing.' 

'' I could not help smiling, and remarked that he was 
a cynic. 'Perhaps I am,' was the blunt reply. 



42 Germany under Three Emperors 

' Humanity is not such a beautiful thing that one 
should nurse illusions in regard to it. In my whole life 
I have met but one person on whom I could absolutely 
rely and of whom I could be absolutely sure ; it is my 
wife. The rest do not count.' 

"He then changed the conversation, asking me 
whether I had been in Germany often and when I had 
visited it the last time. I replied that I had spent some 
months in Frankfurt after my marriage, which had taken 
place at Schwalbach, and that I might have had the 
opportunity to meet him there. 

" ' When was that? ' he immediately asked. 

" 'In September, 1853.' 

"'I was not at Frankfurt at the time,' he quickly 
remarked ; ' I was at Norderney. I thought I had not 
seen you, I would have remembered your face ; every 
new arrival of some importance was noticed there at the 
time.' 

" I excused myself by saying that I was not a per- 
sonage of importance. 

" ' You were already a general aide-de-camp to the 
Emperor of Russia,' he said. i Surely you will not deny 
that this is considered as important in our good Father- 
land? ' 

" He smiled, and I laughed, too; then we began dis- 
cussing Frankfurt. I expressed my curiosity as to 
whether he regretted the time he had spent there. 

" ' Certainly not; it was a most interesting time, and 
I think that I did some good too. Some people wanted 
to be put in their places, and I fancy I succeeded in 
doing so.' 

" He smiled again, a broad smile which was a kind 
of noiseless laugh that impressed me unpleasantly. The 



About the Empress Eugenie 43 

man began to interest me tremendously, and I could 
see that he realised such was the case. He then started 
to question me in a quick, resolute way that savoured 
of imperativeness concerning the impressions which my 
different journeys in Germany had produced upon my 
mind, and he seemed particularly pleased when I told him 
that, so far as I could judge, the national feeling was 
developing itself with an astonishing rapidity in Prussia, 
whilst Southern Germany seemed, on the contrary, to 
be growing more insular than had been the case ten years 
before. 

" ' You have observed this? ' he exclaimed. ' My dear 
Count, you are the first foreigner I have met who has 
made such a remark.' 

" I then related to him some of my personal experi- 
ences during my last journey abroad, and this led us to 
talk about Paris, which he called i a most pleasant place,' 
but he confessed he would not care to live there, at least 
not in any official capacity. He spoke of the Emperor 
Napoleon and of the Empress, whom he characterised 
as i une bien jolie femme, qui se creit des aptitudes poli- 
tiques.' I asked him whether this was a defect in his 
eyes, and he said, 'Yes, in a certain sense, because the 
consort of a Sovereign is always badly advised when she 
tries to keep herself informed as to affairs of the State.' 
6 However,' he added, ' in France it is not quite the same 
thing as in other countries, and I can understand the 
weakness of Napoleon in presence of his beautiful wife. 
At all events, she has one great quality, she does not 
intrigue, and any political influence she chooses to exer- 
cise is done quite openly; she does not care for back 
doors, and that is a thing that everyone cannot say ! ' 

" I fancied that there was a covert allusion in the 



44 Germany under Three Emperors 

remark and that he would have liked me to ask for an 
explanation, but I did not care to do so, and so changed 
the conversation. Adlerberg then came up to us and put 
an end to our tete-a-tete. But before I took leave of 
our hosts, Herr von Bismarck asked me to call upon him, 
expressing in a few polite words the pleasure he had had 
in making my acquaintance. I shall certainly not allow 
his to drop ; he interests me immensely, and we have 
got so very few men of real value here at present that it 
is a pleasure to be able to talk with one who, whatever 
may be his shortcomings, is certainly an intelligent and 
even, in certain respects, a remarkable fellow. This 
opinion of mine, however, does not seem to be shared 
by others, because the next day I was asked at my step- 
daughter's what I had found to talk about with the new 
Prussian Minister, and when I said that I had extremely 
enjoyed the conversation we had had together, someone 
remarked that this was affectation on my part, because 
anyone more dull than ' this Prussian ' could seldom be 
found." 

Three days later my father wrote again in his diary 
concerning his acquaintance with Bismarck : 

"This morning I called upon the Prussian Minister. 
He received me with great cordiality, and the conversa- 
tion at once turned on politics. Someone had told him 
that I had been violently opposed to the intervention of 
Russia in the Hungarian insurrection, and that I had 
even expressed this opinion to Nicholas I. ; he asked me 
whether such had really been the case. I replied in the 
affirmative, adding that, having studied history, and 
especially the history of Poland, I had formed the opinion 
that Austria and the Habsburgs could never be honest 
in their dealings with anyone. Bismarck assented with 



The Concern of the Future 45 

an alacrity the later remembrance of which gave me con- 
siderable thought. I quoted the remark of the Emperor 
Nicholas that he had not rushed to Hungary from a desire 
to crush a revolution, as he had been accused of doing, 
but because he had seen a brother Sovereign in distress 
and had thought it was his duty to rescue him. 

" ' Yes,' said Bismarck, * but this is not sufficient when 
one is responsible for the welfare of an Empire. Politics 
must also be concerned with the necessities not only of 
the moment, but also of the future.' 

" The words struck me immensely, and I could not 
help telling him so, adding that so very few people had 
realised this fact. 

" ' People seldom give themselves the trouble to 
think,' was the disdainful retort. 

" ' This is a reproach it will not be possible to hurl 
at you,' I said. 

" ' Oh, I do not count,' he said negligently. ' People 
do not mind what I say, and yet I feel quite sure that 
the day will come when I shall make myself listened to. 
However, the time has not come for that. For the 
present I am quite content with watching all that is going 
on in the world ; I do not, though, fall into the error so 
common to men in public life of forming opinions — mine 
being all ready a long time since — yet I will confess that 
for some time to come I shall not attempt to enter the 
Prussian Cabinet, as some people say I am aspiring to 
do. The political situation is too unsettled there for the 
possibility of pushing through any important reforms just 
now. And then, after all, a Regent is not quite the 
same thing as a King, though he carries all the responsi- 
bilities of a Sovereign. To do certain things one must 
have the uncontested right to be addressed as " Your 



46 Germany under Three Emperors 

Majesty " by those upon whom the act works to 
detriment.' 

" I remarked that he was a staunch Monarchist. 

" ' Yes,' he said, ' I have always been one, and I 
mean to end my days as such. Republics have not yet 
made good, "n'ont pas encore fait leurs preuves." Our 
country as yet is still a small and poor one, poorer and 
smaller in the opinions of those who do not know her 
well than she is in reality. She can only develop herself 
and rise to some importance under the protection of a 
Monarchical form of government. Besides, I doubt the 
possibility of Prussia becoming great and strong without 
the Hohenzollerns being there to help her.' 

"'It is a pity,' I said, 'that your diplomacy has 
shown itself so weak in presence of the demands of 
Austria.' 

"'Do not say our diplomacy,' he quickly inter- 
rupted ; ' say rather our policy, which has always been 
inspired by feelings of absolute condescension in regard 
to Austria. Austria is the great danger, though, mind, 
I would never advocate a perpetual enmity with her on 
our side. She may be very useful to us in the future, 
only she must be crushed into the conviction that with- 
out Prussia she cannot do anything. If it would be 
possible for us to establish our supremacy in Germany 
without quarrelling with Austria none would rejoice more 
than myself, but it is entirely out of the question, un- 
fortunately, because they will never hear reason in 
Vienna (On ne sera jamais raisonnable a Vienne) until 
events have persuaded Count Buol, with all his valets 
(avec tous ses laquais), that we are not at all afraid of 
war, because we can fight with even chances. Now, as 
concerns Russia, it is a very different thing, and what I 



Plain Words 47 

have come here for is to persuade your Government, if 
I can, that its friendship is something for which we care 
a good deal, and that we should not hesitate for one 
moment to sacrifice Austria and put ourselves against 
her with you if this were the price you asked for your 
alliance with us.' 

" ' Excuse my asking you the question,' I said, ' but 
have you come here to offer us any such alliance ? ' 

" 'Offer it, no; but to persuade you that it is worth 
having, yes,' he instantly retorted. 

" ' I am not a diplomat,' I replied, ' and I am not 
a public man. I am a soldier who, owing to circum- 
stances, is compelled to remain strictly within the limits 
of his military activity ; therefore, all that I can tell you 
can only have an academic interest for you; but, con- 
sidering the fact that in Prussia you cannot feel any 
sympathy for us in view of our attitude in 1850, when it 
was only our encouragement which decided Austria to 
insist on the most painful conditions of the Convention 
which you signed with her at Olmiitz, you cannot feel 
any affection for us. What can therefore induce you 
suddenly to exhibit such a desire for our alliance? This 
is entirely inconsistent with Prussian traditions.' 

" ' But it is not Prussia who is anxious for the 
friendship of Russia,' said von Bismarck, 'it is only I 
who desire it, and who mean to win it.' 

" There was such an assurance in the words of this 
extraordinary man, such a conviction of his own, not 
importance — he would have been incapable of such 
pettishness — but of his own superiority, that he struck 
me in that moment as being really, if not a great man, 
at least one inspired with great thoughts, and I could 
not help expressing to him my admiration for his clear 



48 Germany under Three Emperors 

outlook. He received my compliments with an indif- 
ference that also struck me as something quite out of the 
common. Herr von Bismarck lit a big cigar, offered me 
one, and settled down in his chair, as if about to begin 
a long conversation. Unfortunately, we were inter- 
rupted by a visitor, and I had perforce to take my leave. 
But at dinner I spoke about my visit of the afternoon 
to my mother-in-law, and expressed to her the interest 
which my conversation with the Prussian Minister had 
excited in my mind, and I told her that I certainly meant 
to see as much of him as possible during the few days 
that remained to me in Petersburg." 1 

1 My father was at the time in command of an army corps stationed at Niegine, 
in the government of Poltawa, and had come to Petersburg for a few weeks' leave 



CHAPTER IV 

Austria and Prussia 

A FTER the remarks in his diary related in the previous 
-tV chapter my father mentions that several times he 
had interviews with Bismarck, but without entering into 
particulars concerning the conversations. On May 17th, 
however, I find the following references to the great 
statesman, which may be read with a certain interest, 
as in many of the judgments expressed traits of Bis- 
marckian character can be discovered that at the time 
they were observed by the clever man who consigned 
them to his diary had not yet developed with the energy 
which burst forth later on. 

"I went yesterday to take leave of Herr von Bis- 
marck, and to express to him the great pleasure which 
his acquaintance had afforded me. He received me with 
his usual graciousness, and remarked that he hoped I 
would not forget him, which I could with all sincerity 
assure him was not likely to be the case. He is indeed 
a most interesting man. 

' ' Whether the high opinion which he entertained in 
regard to the future of his own country is justified it is 
difficult to say, especially in view of the very poor 
opinion which is entertained abroad concerning Prussia 
and Prussian diplomats. The remark which he made to 
me once, that a land which had given birth to a Frederick 
the Great was not to be despised, may be quite true as 
regards the past, but one could have replied to him that 
e 49 



50 Germany under Three Emperors 

precisely because the man whose name he mentioned was 
such a great one it was hardly to be expected another 
one like him would be born so soon, and that he had 
been an exception which the present Hohenzollerns did 
not appear to be likely to transform into a rule. 

"Bismarck dreams of an united Germany entirely 
given up to Prussian influence. This I could understand 
if I put myself at his point of view ; but what appears to 
me to be quite impossible is that Austria will submit to 
this elimination of its influence and importance in Central 
Europe. I will go so far as to admit that in case of war 
between Austria and Prussia, Austria will suffer a defeat. 
What will this defeat change in the general situation? 
Very little, I should say, because, if only on account of 
their geographical position, the two principal countries 
in Central Europe, Prussia and Austria, can hardly be 
enemies, or, at any rate, remain so in perpetuity. One 
of the two countries must take the lead, and it is difficult 
to assume that Austria will allow her rival to do so ; the 
contrary seems to be more likely. Austria in continual 
enmity with Prussia might not perhaps do any harm to 
the latter, but it will certainly interfere with her plans 
unless by some circumstance, unforeseen at present, she 
will persuade the leaders of Austrian foreign affairs that 
it is in their interest to work on the same lines as 
Prussia. But this could be done only if they had a 
common enemy against whom it would be necessary to 
ally their respective strengths. 

" Now this enemy can only be Russia, because France 
will never put herself into direct opposition to the 
Habsburgs except upon the Italian question, which does 
not interest Prussia at all; and Prussian public opinion 
would not allow its Government to entangle it at present 



An Estimate of Bismarck 51 

in the complications of a foreign war, unless it were one 
against Russia. 

"It is difficult to foresee what will be the policy of 
the present Prince Regent after he ascends the throne ; 
but should he ever take von Bismarck as his Minister he 
will, from what I have seen of him, most certainly try 
to make Prussia assert herself in the European concert 
very much more than has been the case in recent years. 
He has a fully defined programme in his mind, though, 
of course, he did not disclose it to me. What struck me 
in all our conversations was the animosity, real or assumed, 
which he displayed, not only against Buol, but also in 
regard to certain people in Berlin to whom he attributes, 
rightly or wrongly, feelings of dislike for his personality. 
I say real or assumed, because it seemed to me at times 
that what he wished was to accredit the idea that he 
could be a bad enemy, and thus to induce others to second 
his designs, for fear of being severely punished should 
they not do so. 

"I do not think Bismarck will remain long in Peters- 
burg, and certainly he is burning to return to Berlin 
and to measure himself there with those whom he accuses 
quite openly of mismanaging Prussian politics. Whether 
this applies also to the Regent, or only to the latter's 
Ministers, he did not allow me to guess, but if I were 
asked to proffer a judgment on this man about whom 
so many conflicting opinions are heard, I should say that 
he was at heart a Revolutionary in spite of all his pro- 
testations of Conservatism, but Revolutionary in the 
sense that he is so sure of being able to build up anew 
the old edifice he desires to pull down that this allows 
him to speak of his Monarchical convictions, inasmuch 
as he aims not at overthrowing his King, but only the 



52 Germany under Three Emperors 

political system to which that King clings and which 
this strange man does not consider to be favourable to 
the interests of his Fatherland, which he has made his 
own in quite a remarkable degree. What he will become 
in future is difficult to say. Either a great Minister or 
a country gentleman. There is no via media for him. 
Perhaps I am wrong in writing the word ' great ' Min- 
ister ; I should rather have said ' powerful ' Minister, 
because I am convinced he would not care for the great- 
ness unless it were associated with the power. In a 
certain sense he is as unselfish as he is interested — i il est 
aussi pen egoiste qu'il est interesse!' " 

Reading this judgment of a man who had certainly 
great experience of humanity, one cannot but be struck 
with that persistency in opinion which he notices, and 
which remained one of the principal features in the 
character of Bismarck throughout his career. He never 
tried to hide it from the public, who most of the time 
believed that he was deceiving them when, in reality, 
he was absolutely sincere. 

Bismarck is reported to have told someone once that 
the " best way to mislead people is to tell them the 
truth." And he spoke the truth far more often than 
any other man placed in the position which he occupied 
would have cared or dared to do. It was this habit — 
which must not be confounded with honesty — that gave 
him his great power. He would say disdainfully that any 
of his plans might have been interfered with, and even 
defeated, had one only taken the trouble to listen to 
him, and to believe that they existed, and that he meant 
to carry them out regardless of opposition and conse- 
quences. He used to complain — he even said so one 
day to my father — that in Prussia Ministers persisted in 




PRINCE VON BISMARCK 



Prussia and Petersburg 53 

following a sentimental line of policy, which was the 
most fatal mistake a Government could commit. He 
had fully made up his mind to banish sentimentality from 
his programme, to care not whether he hurt or wounded 
the people with whom he had got to deal. There was in 
him something of the nature of that Brennus, the Bar- 
barian chief, who, in throwing his sword into the balance 
in which the vanquished Romans were weighing the gold 
which they were offering to him as their ransom, had 
exclaimed the famous words, " Vse victis! " He had no 
mercy, and would have laughed at the person who dared 
mention such a word in his presence. For him politics 
was a game in which the greatest mistake consisted in 
not using and abusing the advantages which the clumsi- 
ness of one's adversary had put within one's reach. For 
him implacability w T as a virtue, the one virtue needed 
for the government of a nation. 

Some people have said that Bismarck had been offered 
the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs during his stay 
in Petersburg, but that he had refused the offer and 
begged to be sent to Paris instead. This, however, is 
not exact, because if he had been left to follow his 
inclination he would have preferred to remain in Russia 
a few months longer, so as to bring before the eyes of 
Russian statesmen more prominently than he had been 
able to do the advantages of an alliance between their 
country and Prussia. 

At that time Bismarck was a resolute partisan of an 
alliance with the Tsar, whose prestige he fully appre- 
ciated in spite of the Crimean War. That conflict, by 
the way, Bismarck did not consider was the great success 
for the Anglo-French entente which England and 
France believed it had been. He knew very well that 



54 Germany under Three Emperors 

Sebastopol was not Russia, and that Russia would only 
consider herself defeated were she struck in a vital spot, 
such as Moscow or Kiev or Petersburg. He saw clearly 
that an alliance with Russia not only would considerably 
strengthen the position of Prussia in Germany, but 
would also bring advantage to the Empire of the Tsar, 
inasmuch as it would counteract the designs of Austria 
and oblige the latter to give some attention to what was 
going on across her Galician frontier, where, so far, she 
had refused to see a menace for the future. The game 
of Bismarck was to play one Power against the other, 
and this he succeeded in doing to perfection during the 
whole period he remained at the head of affairs. 

Vast plans were maturing in Bismarck's mind which 
he did not want marred. During the Regency definite 
decisions were difficult, because there was always the 
feeling that the finality of authority invested in kingship 
was absent. Bismarck did not want to risk a reversal of 
any part of his policy. So, until the Regency lapsed, 
he was diffident of taking office. 

He did not, however, abstain from pressing his con- 
victions upon responsible Ministers. During a meeting 
which had taken place under the presidency of the 
Regent, at the latter's palace in Berlin, Bismarck had 
strongly advocated the necessity of a decided line of 
policy and of conduct in regard to Austria. He found 
a strong opponent to these views in the then Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Baron von Schleinitz. The Baron 
staunchly advocated the need of maintaining good rela- 
tions with Vienna, no matter at what cost. This he 
considered necessary in view of the possible danger of a 
Franco-Russian Alliance directed against the States of 
Central Europe, as had been mentioned in the Press 



Death of Frederick William IV 55 

recently. It is a curious thing to observe that this point, 
which in the years to come was to cause so much uneasi- 
ness and annoyance to Bismarck, was then simply ignored 
by him as quite an improbable contingency. On the 
other hand, Schleinitz, who, together with the Princess of 
Prussia, of whom he was the intimate friend, had been 
the first one to recognise its possibility, refused later on 
to admit the peril for the German Empire which might 
lie in such an alliance. The two men hated each other 
already at that time, and this enmity was to last until 
the death of Schleinitz, when Bismarck carried it so far 
that he forbade the members of the staff of the Foreign 
Office to be present at the funeral of their former chief. 

In the meanwhile King Frederick William IV. died 
and his brother succeeded him. Even to a superficial 
observer it became evident that a great change was im- 
pending in the conduct of affairs, and that the new 
Sovereign would try to inaugurate a new system, about 
which the general public was in uncertainty, at least 
concerning its broader lines. At the head of the Cabinet 
stood Prince William of Hohenzollern, a very well- 
intentioned man, but neither a politician nor a states- 
man, who, besides, stood completely in awe of the War 
Minister, General von Roon. The General was the only 
man among his colleagues in the Cabinet who approached 
von Bismarck in intelligence, with whom he was upon 
terms of close friendship. 

Almost the first day after the accession of the new 
King a conflict arose in the Ministry concerning the 
question of the oath of allegiance traditionally taken by 
the estates of the Realm on the occasion of the corona- 
tion of the Sovereign. Some of the Cabinet thought 
with William I. that the oath was compatible with his 



56 Germany under Three Emperors 

well-known desire for a new constitutional law, whilst 
others assured him that under the circumstances the oath 
had better be avoided. Roon consulted Bismarck in a 
long letter, in which, among other things, he asked 
whether, in view of the seriousness of the crisis, he would 
not agree to enter the Cabinet, seeing that the resigna- 
tion of Baron von Schleinitz seemed to be certain. In 
his reply Bismarck told von Roon, among other things, 
that, in his opinion, " the principal mistake of Prussian 
policy had been to consider too little the rights of its 
own King and too much those of foreign Sovereigns. 
It is," he added, "the natural consequence of the 
dualism between the constitutional policy of the Min- 
isters and the legitimistic direction given to our foreign 
policy by the personal wish of his Majesty. It would be 
very difficult for me to take upon myself the succession 
of Schleinitz, and one of the reasons is that I do not feel 
at present strong enough in health for the work which 
such a thing implies ; but if I accepted I should consider 
it a necessity, even for reasons of home politics, to give 
quite a different direction to our foreign policy. It is 
only by changing entirely our attitude abroad that we 
shall be able, in my opinion, to deliver the Crown from 
internal movements which it would not be able otherwise 
to resist, even though, I believe, if it would, it has at 
its disposal the power effectually to crush any untoward 
development. No one abroad would understand the fall 
of the Cabinet on this question of the oath of allegiance ; 
it would be said that a long course of bad administration 
of public affairs had exasperated the nation against the 
Government to such an extent that the least breath of 
wind was sufficient to kindle a destroying flame. . . . 
For fourteen years now," he went on, " we have tried 



A Letter to von Roon 57 

to develop in the Prussian nation a taste for politics 
without allowing it to satisfy its appetite ; is it to be won- 
dered that to-day it seeks its food in the gutter? 

"We are almost as vain as the French, and if only 
we believe that the foreigner esteems us we allow him 
to do what he likes in our own country. . . . Among 
the Royal houses of Europe, to begin with that of Naples 
and to end with that of Hanover, there is not one among 
them who feels thankful to us for the proofs of affection 
which we have given, and we practise in regard to them 
all a truly evangelical love for our enemies, to the detri- 
ment of the security of our own throne. I am as faith- 
ful to my own Prince as the Vendeans were in regard to 
their King, but I feel so indifferent to other Monarchs 
that I would never raise a finger in their defence. I fear 
that my point of view in this question is too different 
from that of our most gracious lord and master for him 
ever to think it wise to offer me a place among his 
advisers, and if he should decide to employ me at all I 
suppose it will not be otherwise than in home matters. 
However, I am quite indifferent, because, taken as a 
whole, I do not think that the Government can arrive 
at any brilliant results unless our attitude in regard to 
foreign affairs becomes clearer and less under the influence 
of dynastic sympathies. Hitherto we have had such want 
of confidence in our own strength that we have ever sought 
their help — aid which nearly always they could not give 
us, and which we did not in the least require." 

This letter was still written from Petersburg, on the 
point of leaving for a short stay in Germany. When 
Bismarck reached Lubeck on July 9th he read in the 
papers that the crisis had come to an end, and that the 
King and his Ministers had left Berlin. On July 3rd the 



58 Germany under Three Emperors 

Sovereign had published a message to the nation, in which 
he said that though he was determined to uphold the old 
tradition of the oath of allegiance, he had decided, out of 
respect for his brother's memory, to content himself with 
the ceremony of the coronation, which was linked with 
the principle of the direct succession to the Royal dignity. 
A letter from von Roon, written on July 24th from 
Brunnen, in Switzerland, to Bismarck gave some details 
concerning the crisis and the circumstances that had 
accompanied it, and criticised severely the part which 
the Queen Augusta had played. " One of the reasons," 
said von Roon, " why it had been decided that a corona- 
tion had to take place was that, at the instigation of the 
King's Consort, the Royal robes to be used at it had 
already been ordered in the month of February preced- 
ing," and that the King was entirely under her influence 
and that of her friends, foremost among whom was Baron 
von Schleinitz. The latter at this time telegraphed to 
Bismarck asking him to come to Baden-Baden where the 
King was staying, and seemed to think that the former 
would use the opportunity to speak to the Sovereign in 
regard to home political questions. But Bismarck was 
far too clever to commit such an error, the more so that 
he immediately noticed that his arrival at Baden had 
been anything but agreeable to the King. He therefore 
merely told William I. that, in view of the coronation, he 
had come to beg the favour of a longer leave, as he wished 
to be present if allowed. William I. seemed quite re- 
lieved, and granted the request most graciously. Bis- 
marck arrived in Konigsberg on October 13th, where 
the coronation took place on the 18th. Before that day 
Baron von Schleinitz had tendered his resignation, which 
the King had accepted, and Bismarck noticed that the 



Strained Relations 59 

antagonistic feelings of the Queen in regard to himself 
had undergone a change. She even took the initiative 
in a conversation with him on the subject of a German 
national policy. Count Bernstorff had then assumed 
the direction of foreign affairs, and as he was not sympa- 
thetic to Augusta she showed herself more amiable toward 
Bismarck than she had been for a long time, going so 
far on one occasion as to stop and talk to him in the 
middle of some Court ceremony, much to the impatience 
of the King who unsuccessfully tried to draw her away. 
Bismarck, always attentive to everything that was going 
on around him, thought that he observed that relations 
between the Royal couple were slightly strained. Wil- 
liam I. avoided him, probably because his consort 
showed herself gracious to him. Such incidents were 
of frequent occurrence in the menage, and did not tend 
to make easier the position of those who were obliged 
to remain in close proximity to William and Augusta. 

Bismarck did not return to Russia except to pre- 
sent his letters of recall; he journeyed back 10 Berlin 
in May, 1862, took rooms in a hotel, and remained 
there some weeks, feeling himself entirely out of place 
in the capital. He would not hear of entering the 
Cabinet, principally because he did not believe he would 
get from the King the support which he would have 
needed to carry through his plans. This lack of deflni- 
tude on the part of William I. arose from domestic in- 
fluences which he was unable to resist, and which were 
constantly at work around him. At last, disgusted — as 
he put it himself — at the uncertainty of his position, 
Bismarck applied to Count Bernstorff, asking him 
either to give him an appointment of some kind or else 
to allow him to retire altogether from the diplomatic 



60 Germany under Three Emperors 

service. The reply to this request was his appointment 
as Prussian Minister in Paris on May 22nd, 1862. Bis- 
marck did not lose any time in starting for the French 
capital, because on June 1st following he had already 
presented his credentials to Napoleon III. at the 
Tuileries. 

The Emperor showed himself exceedingly gracious 
in regard to the new Envoy ; he had been nursing for 
some time the idea of a Franco-Prussian alliance which 
might help him to keep Austria in check, and he allowed 
Bismarck to realise that such was the case in the course 
of a conversation which he had with him at Fontaine- 
bleau, whither the Prussian Minister had been invited. 
Napoleon suggested a walk, and during its progress 
suddenly asked Bismarck whether he thought that the 
King of Prussia might be induced to consider such an 
eventuality. Bismarck answered that his Sovereign 
entertained the best feelings in the world for the Em- 
peror, and that the prejudices against France which 
existed in Prussia at the beginning of the century had 
almost entirely disappeared. But, he added, as a rule, 
alliances were the result of circumstances, and that 
circumstances alone decided their utility or their need, 
because every alliance presupposed some determined aim 
or motive. Napoleon objected, saying that some Powers, 
without any ulterior reason for being so, were upon 
decidedly friendly terms with one another, whilst others 
could never be so. Napoleon continued that his idea of 
an alliance was not inspired by the desire of launching 
France into any kind of adventure, but because he sin- 
cerely believed that between Prussia and France there 
existed well-defined common interests, and consequently 
were present all the elements of an intimate and lasting 



Prince Metternich's Orders 61 

friendship and understanding. It would be a sad mis- 
take, he agreed, to try to create certain events, because 
it was impossible to foresee either their direction or force. 
One could, however, make the necessary dispositions not 
to be surprised by them, and it was just as well to be 
prepared for everything, so as to be able to profit by 
one's chances when the moment to do so arrived. 

The Emperor went on to develop this thought of a 
diplomatic alliance, whereby would grow up a mutual 
confidence and the conviction on both sides that each 
could rely on the other in moments of difficulty. 

He went on to explain that a few days earlier Austria 
had caused certain overtures to be made to him in view 
of a rapprochement. So far as he could see this was 
owing to Bismarck's appointment to Paris, the news of 
which had provoked something like a panic in Vienna. 
Prince Metternich — the Ambassador — had told him that 
he had received instructions of such magnitude that on 
reading them he had been quite frightened. He had been 
given the most unlimited powers to come to an arrange- 
ment between the Imperial Government and France, 
no matter what the latter might require in exchange. 

Bismarck was far too clever to engage in any under- 
taking either for himself or for Prussia ; he merely 
thanked the Emperor for his confidence, adding that he 
must report to his Government the subject matter of 
the conversation they had just had. His personal 
opinion, which without scruple he explains in extenso 
in his Reminiscences, led him to believe that there was 
some truth in what Napoleon had told him, though he 
considered that the latter had been very imprudent in 
thus laying his cards before a comparative stranger. 
His own experience at Frankfurt had convinced him 



62 Germany under Three Emperors 

that Austria was ready to make any sacrifice, including 
even that of Venice, in order to assure its predominance 
over Prussia, and if it had not yet concluded an alliance 
with France this was not because it had hesitated to 
pay the price, but because the Emperor Napoleon mis- 
trusted Austrian politicians and had an innate prejudice 
against a dynasty with which friendship had proved so 
fatal to his great uncle. On his return to Paris from 
Fontainebleau Bismarck wrote a long report to King 
William I., but instead of recommending the alliance 
which Napoleon had indirectly proffered he explained 
that the conclusion he drew from his conversation with 
the French Monarch was that it would be useless for 
Prussia to reckon on the help of Austria against France. 

At the same time, by the back-stairs methods, he 
caused to be conveyed to the Foreign Office in Vienna 
the nature of the offers which he had received from 
Napoleon, thus poisoning with suspicion the relations 
between Austria and the French Court. Long after, 
when Bismarck was disgraced, Prince Richard Metter- 
nich recalled this incident, and owned that it had in- 
fluenced him considerably in regard to his intercourse 
with Napoleon III., whom he had never been able to 
forgive the duplicity which had brought Austria such 
serious difficulties. Napoleon's indiscretion had justified 
the Prussian Government in advance in any betrayal of 
Austrian confidence it might make. 

16 And I was wrong to attach such an importance 
to it," added Prince Metternich, " because we should 
have fared better if we had not allowed France to be 
crushed in 1870. To be sure there was the remembrance 
of Sadowa, but, considering we had forgiven Prussia, 
there was no earthly reason why we should have gone 



Forgotten Promises 63 

on for such a long time resenting the action of France 
on that occasion, seeing that it was purely a passive 



one." 



This was very well reasoned, only it was a remorse 
which came too late, and which he would have done 
better, perhaps, not to have mentioned, because by it 
he stood self -accused of want of foresight, which, in 
a man of his mental calibre, was inexcusable. 

After the Fontainebleau incident Bismarck thought 
it wiser not to remain in Paris, but under the pretext of 
a summer holiday went to Biarritz. A strong current 
was setting in his favour, and his great friend General 
von Boon was continually pressing him to join the 
Ministry; so far he had objected, saying that he con- 
sidered he had not been well treated by the King, who 
had markedly avoided talking with him the last time 
he had been in his presence. What he wanted was 
some certainty as to his future. When he had been sent 
to Paris this had been done under the implied under- 
standing that his stay would be short, and that he would 
either be transferred to London or else called upon to 
occupy some important post in Berlin. But after his 
departure these fine promises had been forgotten, and 
Count Bernstorff had either not replied at all to Bis- 
marck's inquiries or else done so in ambiguous terms. 
Roon was constantly assuring him that all that was 
needed to ensure his being called upon to take the 
direction of the Prussian Foreign Office was his presence 
in Berlin, but this was precisely what Bismarck did not 
care for, thinking it would be far more to his advantage 
if he were called by the King than if the latter found 
him at his elbow when he required him. Nevertheless, 
he was alive to every chance, and had assured himself of 



64 Germany under Three Emperors 

allies in the capital. On September 16th he received a 
telegram from Roon : " Periculum in mora, hurry up. 
The uncle of Maurice Henning." This signature had 
been agreed upon beforehand for use in case of necessity ; 
it told Bismarck that the time had come to return to 
Berlin if he wished to be in " at the death." He arrived 
in Berlin on the morning of September 20th. The 
Crown Prince had been apprised beforehand of his 
coming, probably by Roon, and at once summoned him 
to his side. This incident very nearly cost Bismarck the 
post which he coveted, because when the King heard 
that he had seen his son first he remarked bitterly to 
someone who ventured to praise Bismarck : " There is 
nothing to be done with this one either; he has already 
seen my son." 

On September 22nd Bismarck was at last summoned 
to meet the King at Babelsberg, near Potsdam, the 
summer residence of the latter. William I. immediately 
plunged into conversation, saying that he did not want 
to govern if he was not allowed to do it according to his 
conscience, and in a manner for which he could answer 
before God, as well as before his subjects. This, he 
went on, was impossible if he had to conform to the wishes 
of the present majority in the Landtag. On the other 
hand, though he had looked for them, he had been un- 
able to find Ministers willing to take the responsibility of 
the Government without considering Parliament. He 
had, therefore, made up his mind to divest himself of 
supreme power, and had already prepared his act of 
abdication, as it was impossible for him to govern in 
accordance with his personal views and opinions. 

Bismarck replied to the Sovereign that he was quite 
ready to enter the Cabinet, and that he was quite certain 



Military Reorganisation Begins 65 

that Roon would remain in it too, once he did so, 
and he added that he felt also convinced they would be 
able to discover others willing to co-operate if any of 
the present Ministers resigned. The King then asked 
him whether he would be ready to help him in a complete 
reorganisation of the army even against the majority of 
the Landtag. Bismarck, having given him his promise 
to that effect, William I. then declared that that being 
so, he thought it his duty to go on with the struggle 
and that he would not abdicate. 

This is Bismarck's version of the incident. The King 
told a somewhat different tale to one of his personal 
friends a great many years later. His story was that, in 
spite of Bismarck's entreaties not to allow himself to 
be discouraged, he had felt rather nervous at the thought 
of embarking upon a struggle of such magnitude as 
opposing the wishes of the nation, and especially with the 
help of a man whom he knew well had not the sympathy 
of his colleagues, and whose personality was, moreover, 
particularly obnoxious to the Queen. But Bismarck had 
almost violently declared to him that he would not be 
doing his duty if he gave up the fight, and this appeal 
— always a powerful one with the old King — had de- 
cided him to tear up the abdication act he had already 
written and signed. 

That same afternoon a long and earnest conversation 
took place between the Sovereign and Bismarck. This 
intimate talk gave Bismarck a much better understand- 
ing of the character of the King and inspired in him 
feelings of affection for the personality of William I., to 
which he remained faithful through many vicissitudes 
and trials. At the same time, that interview convinced 
him that he would always find one impediment he would 

F 



66 Germany under Three Emperors 

never be able to get rid of, and that was the influence 
of the Queen. 

Augusta was a very clever woman in her way, cleverer, 
perhaps, than her husband, and certainly more brilliant, 
but her unfortunate propensity for intrigue, and her 
conviction of her own importance and of her own 
intelligence, was bound to produce a permanent 
antagonism between her and the man who had under- 
taken to pilot the Prussian ship of State until he 
was dropped by a new captain. So long as the King 
had been the heir to his brother's throne he had shared 
his wife's opinions upon political matters, but when he 
became Sovereign, and was faced with all the responsi- 
bilities of his high position, he kept his own counsel — 
much to the Queen's chagrin. The Queen was given 
to excessive criticism, and was, moreover, very much dis- 
posed to take prejudices at the suggestion of the friends 
among whom she generally sought her inspirations. They 
represented things to her in a false light, always tinted 
with self-interest. She was obstinate, had no opinions 
of her own, but a very high conception of her duties as 
a woman and a Queen. She fully believed that she had 
the right to mix herself up in matters of government and 
of being informed in regard to all important questions 
of State. This the King did not like and was determined 
not to allow, but at the same time he lacked the courage 
to say so, and so much friction was caused all round. 

At the same time the small, mean intrigues of the 
Queen never had the importance which Bismarck attri- 
buted to them, and it is surprising how such a powerful 
mind as his could not conceive their inanity and harm- 
lessness. He would have fared far better had he ignored 
the Queen. This would have convinced the Court of 



An Error of Tactics 67 

her insignificance and considerably diminished her im- 
portance ; it would have nullified any influence she might 
have had, and compelled her to give up a useless struggle. 
But the very fact that he continually opposed her and 
tried to thwart her transformed her, in the eyes of the 
enemies of Bismarck, into a formidable opponent ; this 
she could never have been, and would never even have 
known how to be. Unfortunately for both, from the 
very first moment of Bismarck's assumption of power, his 
enmity with Queen Augusta assumed a scale quite out of 
proportion to her importance, and was to become the 
source of much unpleasantness and considerable strife in 
years to come. 



CHAPTER V 

Genius at the Helm 

SEPTEMBER 23rd, 1862, was a fateful date, inaugu- 
rating a new era for Prussia and weaving into the 
web of circumstance for the world a new pattern in 
cruder colours and of sinister design. On this day the 
Royal Cabinet Order which appointed Bismarck to the 
functions of Minister of State and President ad interim 
of the Council of Ministers was published in the Official 
German Gazette. The maker of modern Germany, the 
moulder of the policy of its Emperors, came into power 
provided with a programme and armed with an indomit- 
able will which was to carry his Fatherland to heights of 
which no one had ever dreamed. From the very first day 
that he took in hand the direction of public affairs he 
gave proofs of that moral courage, energy and brutality 
which were to remain the prominent features in his 
character until his death. He was absolutely sure of 
himself, as great geniuses have a way of being sure, and 
he was not to be persuaded to deviate one iota from any 
line of conduct he had thought out. His views as to 
the future were as simple as they were far-reaching and 
domineering. The Prussian army was to be reorganised 
according to the plans elaborated by the King and 
General von Roon ; Austria was to be banished from the 
German Confederation, and Prussia was to become the 
leading Power in Germany. In a word, the Frankfurt 
programme was to become a reality after all, but under 

68 



Defying the Constitution 69 

Hohenzollern instead of Habsburg control — a very dif- 
ferent matter. 

To govern in defiance of a Constitution, Bismarck 
remarked to one of his friends, rather " tickled his fancy " 
— he deliberately used the English words because he felt 
they expressed the true state of his feelings on the sub- 
ject better than anything he might have said in German 
or in French. He lost no time before he put into 
operation his ideas on the government of Prussia, and 
especially on the conduct of foreign affairs which, he 
declared with vehement impoliteness, had been atro- 
ciously managed for over half a century. He withdrew 
the Budget which his predecessors had laid before the 
Chambers a few days before his accession to office, and 
he caused the official Press to use words which left no 
doubt as to his intentions to administer the funds of the 
State independently of Parliamentary control and with- 
out an approved Budget. This revolutionary procedure 
was adopted almost as soon as Bismarck assumed office ; 
he was nominated on the 23rd and the withdrawal of 
the Budget took place on the 29th ! 

The next day the Chamber protested against so 
arrogant an act, and on the motion of Max von Forcken- 
beck, a member of the Budget Commission, requested 
information as to the national Exchequer. Upon this 
Bismarck made one of the most sensational declarations 
that ever fell from the mouth of a responsible Minister 
of a Constitutional country. He began with the 
remark that the Budget, according to the Prussian Con- 
stitution, could only be accepted if the Government and 
the Chambers were in complete accord with the King 
as to its details, then went on to make the historical 
announcement — which Europe has never forgotten — that 



70 Germany under Three Emperors 

' ' Prussia must gather together her strength and be- 
come prepared to grasp the first favourable opportunity 
instead of letting it slip by, as she has so often done in 
the past. The Prussian frontiers, as they have been 
fixed by the Treaty of Vienna, are not favourable to 
the healthy development of her existence as an inde- 
pendent State. It is not with speeches or with parlia- 
mentary resolutions that the great questions of the day 
are decided, as was mistakenly done in 1848 and 1849, 
but with blood and with iron." 

One may imagine the impression which this fiery 
speech produced in Prussia and all over the Continent. 
Especially was this so in Austria, where it was interpreted 
as a direct threat against the dynasty of the Habsburgs. 
In France, too, the few people interested in the events 
which were taking place in Berlin began to wonder 
whither the new Minister of King William I. was in- 
tending to go and what was his ultimate object. Among 
these people was M. Thiers, who, however, was one of 
the few who did not hesitate to see in the declaration 
a foreshadowing of war with Austria. 

Writing to my father on the subject, M. Thiers 
said : 

" I am sorry that our Government here does not 
seem to realise that what is going on in Berlin is of a 
world-wide importance, and not at all the i querelle de 
docker' which some believe it to be. It is so strange 
to me that people who profess to have made a study of 
history fail to notice this important incident among all 
other important things, the development of a nation 
from the historical point of view. We are used to think 
of Prussia as a small and insignificant nation who has 
not yet recovered, nor ever will recover, from the blow 



Far-sighted Diplomacy 7 1 

which was dealt to her by the battle of Jena, and we 
have given no attention whatever to the methods of mili- 
tary expansion she has followed ever since with such 
unostentatious perseverance. Prussian diplomacy has 
always been of the intriguing kind; we have seen it at 
Frankfurt when, in defiance of the undoubted rights of 
the Emperor of Austria, the Imperial diadem was offered 
to Frederick William IV. That he refused it was a 
mistake which, unless I am very much mistaken, will 
only inspire in his successor or successors the desire to 
repair it. 

"Prussia and Austria cannot exist side by side in 
Germany any longer. One of them must make way for 
the other, and the prize will remain in possession of the 
most clever and the most determined of the two rivals. 
I cannot imagine Austrian statesmen capable of being 
either clever or determined ; I am speaking, of course, 
of those of to-day. Had Schwarzenberg been alive things 
might have turned out differently. They might, or they 
might not; because it is another thing to prove oneself 
clever when one has to do with fools than when one is 
confronted by persons as clever as oneself, if not more 
so. With all his intelligence, Schwarzenberg, so far as 
I can judge, only looked at the immediate consequences 
of a fact. Now it seems to me that von Bismarck thinks 
far more of its future effects; and quite right too. He 
takes office with the firm intention of wresting from Fate 
the place to which he thinks Prussia is entitled — foremost 
of all the other German States. 

"This Bismarck will succeed because he is quite right 
in his appreciation of facts. It is impossible, in the long 
run, for Germany to remain the agglomeration of small 
States she is to-day. Unity is not only a necessity, but 



72 Germany under Three Emperors 

her unavoidable destiny. And every attempt toward 
unity must have someone to lead it. Do you admit 
Austria will ever become a leader? I think that there 
cannot exist any doubt as to the reply to this question. 
And if she is not a leader, then her position in Germany 
becomes an impossible one, unless she holds out the neck 
of her own accord to the noose which Prussia means to 
put around it. The struggle between the two countries 
is inevitable ; do what you will you will not be able to 
prevent its being fought. Von Bismarck is but too well 
aware of this, and he disposes his batteries accordingly ; 
he abandons nothing to chance. 

" I can see, therefore, that Prussian administration will 
remain for the present more military than political in aim 
and effect. Politics and diplomacy will come later on, 
when the King begins to reap the fruits of the battles 
that others will have won for him. But the danger is not 
there. The danger resides in this taste for further ex- 
pansion, which a victorious war is sure to raise in the 
minds and hearts of the Prussian nation. Once trans- 
formed into a military camp, she will necessarily want 
to show to the world what she is capable of, and then 
will come the dangerous moment for which I fear no one 
in France is prepared. If we were, consequent with our 
historical traditions, we should most certainly renew the 
system introduced by Richelieu, and go for Austria — 
nous devrions courir sus contre VAutriche. As we shall 
not do so, we shall have to swallow the consequences of 
the inane diplomacy upon which the third Empire prides 
itself, and when the danger will become patent to the 
eyes of every blind man in the street we shall most 
probably try to stop the torrent that will sweep us away 
in its waters before we shall have had time to cry out. 



Thiers' Mistake 73 

No, my dear Count, do not call me ' un radoteur.* I 
know that I am not mistaken, and that the Prussian 
danger, about which so many people keep laughing, is 
a very real and serious one." 

As we have seen, Thiers was wrong in assuming that 
the Imperial Government had forgotten the principles to 
which Richelieu had remained faithful all through his 
Ministry. Napoleon III. had indeed made some move 
to ally himself with Prussia in an endeavour to put a 
stop to the inordinate appetites of Austria. It had not 
been his fault that the man to whom he had made the 
necessary overtures had not accepted them. He could 
not foresee that in the game which Bismarck began at 
Fontainebleau the French Empire was destined to become 
one of the stakes, and by no means the least important 
one either. 

In Petersburg, too, the new Minister of King 
William I. was the object of suspicion, at least in circles 
where his wide intelligence had been appreciated, though 
not with sympathy. Those who, on his arrival in Russia, 
had treated him as a negligible quantity, had discovered 
before his departure that there was much more in him 
than had been imagined. There were persons, indeed, 
who had seen through his play and suspected that he 
wanted to buy the support of Russia against Austria. 
Among them was the Princess OrlofT, nee Gerebzow, 
my father's stepdaughter, a woman of alert intelligence 
who lived in close intimacy with the Imperial family. 
She knew more about the secrets of politics than perhaps 
any other woman in Russia, and shared the Francophobe 
feelings of her husband, Prince Alexis Orloff, one of the 
Russian delegates at the Congress of Paris, who had 
never forgiven the Government of Napoleon III. for the 



74 Germany under Three Emperors 

humiliation which it had inflicted upon Russia as a con- 
sequence of the Crimean War. 

The Princess had at the time, though I believed she 
changed later, very decided German sympathies, based, 
perhaps, on her personal relations with the Royal House 
of Prussia, and she had very quickly discovered Bismarck's 
game in Petersburg. When she heard about his later 
appointment as Prime Minister she recognised how 
pregnant it was with immense consequences in the future. 
Having occasion to write to my father soon after, she 
expressed herself in the following terms in regard to it : 

"Your friend Bismarck is now a great personage, 
and tries to become a greater one if we are to believe 
all that we hear. It would be a curious thing if, after 
all, the treachery of Austria at the time of the Crimean 
War were punished, and if, after having helped to oust 
us from Constantinople, she finds herself ejected from 
Germany by this very Prussia who had to lick her feet 
such a short time ago. The man's speeches in the 
Chamber leave no doubt as to his intentions. It will be 
a battle for life and for death, because Prussia will not 
give way so long as he is there to push her along. What 
I would like to know would be whether he really secured 
something from our Emperor during his stay here. It 
seems to me hardly likely that he would have adopted 
such a resolute anti- Austrian policy if he had not had 
something or somebody behind him to back him up. I 
know that he had some conversations with our gracious 
Sovereign about which the latter has not spoken to 
anyone, and I have no doubt that he knew how to appeal 
to all the remembrances of the past, and to speak of the 
deceased Empress-Mother, and of all the Prussian rela- 
tions we have always been so fond of. Whether he has 



An Impudent Declaration 75 

succeeded is another thing. I hope he has ; for one thing, 
I always like people who know their own mind, and 
secondly, I believe that it would be to our advantage to 
see a strong Prussia in opposition to a weak Austria and 
a weakened France." 

The great lady who had penned these lines evidently 
shared the mistake of that experienced politician, M. 
Thiers. They both believed that Bismarck required some 
foreign help to push through his extensive plans. In 
reality he did nothing of the kind, and his supreme 
ability consisted in persuading everybody but Austria — 
with whom he disdained to use any metaphors — that he 
wanted their aid, whereas he was already absolutely con- 
vinced that he would contrive, unaided, to emerge vic- 
torious out of one of the most entangled situations in 
which a statesman had ever found himself. 

After the impudent declaration made in the Landtag 
on September 30th Bismarck was prepared to meet with 
violent reproaches, not only on the part of his enemies, 
but also from his colleagues, and he was not without 
some apprehension as to the impression that his speech 
might have made upon the mind of the King himself. 
Even General von Boon, who up to that day had always 
stood at his side, expressed to him after the sitting his 
displeasure, and told him in so many words that he did 
not consider such "witty digressions" likely to further 
the cause they had both at heart. But Bismarck remained 
unmoved and only protested against the words "witty 
digressions," saying that, on the contrary, he had never 
been more serious in his life than when he had made 
this memorable speech. He fully acknowledged, however, 
that the account which probably would be given of it to 
his Sovereign might dispose the latter against him; and 



76 Germany under Three Emperors 

to counteract the effect of his words he had decided to 
meet William I. on his way back from Baden-Baden, 
whither he had gone for the celebration of the Queen's 
birthday, so as to be able to have a quiet hour's conversa- 
tion with him in the train before the Monarch's return 
to Berlin. 

The Chancellor has given us an account of this inter- 
view, so dramatic in its consequences. He waited for 
some time at a small junction called Jiiterbog for the 
train in which the King was travelling, and had some 
difficulty to discover William, who was in a reserved first- 
class carriage. He was quite alone and seemed excessively 
displeased at something. When Bismarck began explain- 
ing to him what had taken place and why he had been 
led to make such strong declaration concerning Prussia's 
future intentions, William I. interrupted him by saying : 
"I can quite well foresee how all this will end. They 
will cut off your head in the square before my window, 
and a little later it will be my own turn." 

To this impatient phrase Bismarck replied in words, 
the grandeur of which was at the moment entirely lost 
on his interlocutor : 

"And what after, your Majesty?" 

"How do you mean," answered the King, "after- 
wards? But afterwards we shall be dead." 

"Yes!" said Bismarck. "Afterwards we shall be 
dead; but we must both die one day; and could we do 
it better or in a more dignified way? I should perish in 
fighting for my King, and your Majesty in sealing with 
your blood the rights which God has conferred upon you. 
Nothing would be able to change a fact so glorious and 
so honourable for both of us — that we fell for the defence 
of the rights which the Almighty has granted to your 



Royal Comparisons 77 

crown. Your Majesty must not think of Louis XVI. ; 
he lived and died as a weak man, and he is not a great 
historical figure. But Charles I. will always remain a 
splendid figure ; remember how, after having drawn his 
sword and lost the battle, he nevertheless remained in- 
flexible and sealed with his blood the Royal privileges to 
which he clung. Your Majesty is compelled to fight. 
You cannot capitulate ; you ought to oppose yourself to 
the violence which is intended against you, even if by 
doing so you endanger the security of your own person." 

Bismarck had always been a profound student of the 
human heart, and he never showed it more than upon 
this occasion, when he was fighting for the triumph of 
ideas which none knew better than he might easily 
encompass the ruin of his Sovereign within the destruc- 
tion of the hopes which they both had nursed and con- 
ceived. He was perfectly well aware that the one passion 
of William I., and the one principle which had always 
ruled him in life, was an over-developed sense of duty ; 
once he thought his duty commanded to him to do this 
or that, he became inflexibly resolute, determined, firm, 
and even cruel if need arose. He was, as his Chancellor 
described, a true type of the Prussian officer, always 
ready to obey, but fearful of criticism when left alone to 
act on his personal responsibility. 

As Bismarck explained the intricacies of the posi- 
tion, the King recovered assurance. The storms raised 
by the attitude of his Prime Minister made William 
wonder whether he had not gone too far in calling him 
to his side, and this feeling was accentuated by the 
hostility of the Queen and the latter 's advisers. But, as 
soon as Bismarck had spoken with him — and this was the 
supreme ability of the future Chancellor — he looked upon 



78 Germany under Three Emperors 

the situation from the point of view of a Prussian officer 
entrusted with the defence of a place until death or 
victory resulted. Once he had been brought to look at 
the position in that light there was no longer any fear 
that the King would give way to weakness of any kind. 
He no longer dreaded the criticisms of his wife or was 
shaken by adverse public opinion ; he did not even fear 
the judgment of history. When they reached Berlin, 
after this conversation, William I. was perfectly calm; 
he had recovered the good temper which was one of his 
characteristics, and his Minister parted with him at the 
railway station much relieved, convinced at last that he 
would find in his Sovereign the support which he needed. 

The struggle which had just begun under these circum- 
stances even people well-intentioned in regard to Bismarck 
declared to be dangerous enough to bring about his down- 
fall and his material ruin. A few months later, indeed, 
the Landtag, by a majority of 274 against 45 votes, 
declared the Ministers responsible in their persons and 
in their fortunes for all the expenses to which they had 
lent themselves without Constitutional sanction. Some 
people advised Bismarck to sell his landed estates to his 
brother in order to save them from eventual confiscation. 
He disdained to avail himself of this advice, and proudly 
went on with the policy which he and Boon had elaborated 
and the King approved. 

A haughty page occurs in the Beminiscences where 
the Chancellor outlines the future of his Fatherland 
and the part Prussia was to play. 

"I had never doubted," he says, "that the key to 
German politics was in the hands of the reigning Sove- 
reigns and dynasties, and not at all, as some people 
thought, in possession of the press, the publicists, the 



A Lapsed Friendship 79 

Parliament, or the barricades. Weak dynasties tried to 
find a support against the idea of union in nationalism, 
whilst the Royal Houses who thought themselves capable 
of resistance to the general movement were suspicious 
of it, because any development of the idea of German 
unity would, as a matter of course, diminish their inde- 
pendence to the profit of a central Power. The Prussian 
dynasty, however, could foresee that the hegemony of 
the future German Empire would inevitably belong to 
it. Since the time when during the Federal Diet of 
Frankfurt, the conception of a united Prussia- Austria 
had been replaced in my mind by the conviction that 
Austrian friendship, upon which I had relied formerly, 
did not exist any longer for Prussia. It seemed to me, 
therefore, that with Austrian treachery almost certain, 
it would not even be possible to regain, on the basis of 
the authority of the Federal Diet, the position which 
Prussia held in the German Confederation previous to 
the Revolution of 1848, and still more impossible to 
reform the Federal Constitution so as to raise the German 
people to the position of a great European nation. 

" In spite of the humiliations of Olmiitz, I arrived at 
Frankfurt with very good feelings in regard to Austria ; 
but after I had seen certain documents which exposed 
the political aim of Schwarzenberg, which could be ex- 
pressed in three words, 'degrade, then destroy,' I lost 
my illusions and realised that it was quite impossible to 
untie in a pacific manner the Gordian knot of the general 
German situation. It could only be cut with a sword. 
The King of Prussia must be won over to the national 
cause, and with him the Prussian army in order to 
establish, from the Prussian point of view, the unity of 
Germany as an Empire. So much became quite clear 



80 Germany under Three Emperors 

to me, hence my allusion in my speech before the 
Budget Commission to 'blood and iron.' 

"German patriotism, unless helped by its feelings 
of affection for a dynasty and the excitement of its rage 
or its enthusiasm, runs the risk of dying a natural death. 
Even in Prussia, where the national character is more 
formed than in any other German State, it is uncertain 
whether the integrity of the Prussian State could subsist 
were the Hohenzollern dynasty to disappear. As a result 
of this attachment of the individual German nations for 
the individual dynasties which rule them, this curious fact 
emerges that each German is ready at a given moment, 
if the chief of the dynasty gives the order, to do battle 
to the last extremity with his German neighbour. And 
though this often interfered with my plans, it yet helped 
them more than once in the case of our differences with 
Austria." 

What a programme ! and how strong and sure of 
oneself one must feel to flaunt it thus before the eyes of 
the world ! Every one of the speeches of Bismarck can 
be considered as political acts more than anything else. 
At all events he never left his adversaries in the dark as 
to any of his intentions. When he was reminded of the 
Constitution he scornfully smiled and set it at naught. 
For instance, he did not allow the Landtag to make any 
use of Article 99 in the Constitution, whereby it had 
power to reduce the expenses of the State. He never 
waited for the Budget to be voted, but went on adminis- 
tering the kingdom on his sole responsibility. Finding 
himself at variance with the majority in the Chamber 
concerning the reorganisation of the army, he just went 
his way, knowing he now had William I. behind hiin. 
He never considered himself a Constitutional Minister 



Rule by the Sword 81 

in presence of a Parliament, only as the Minister of the 
King of Prussia. Once he disdainfully proposed a com- 
promise, saying that the Crown, having consented to 
make some concessions, the Chamber had better follow its 
example. He expressed this opinion with such haughti- 
ness that Count Schwerin interrupted, bringing upon 
himself the famous retort, " Might is better than right." 

Bismarck afterwards declared that he had never said 
such a thing, but, nevertheless, it was the sense of his 
speech and the only way in which one could interpret 
it. When Count Schwerin accused him of having abused 
the power which he wielded, Bismarck maintained that 
he had only done so when the safety of the country 
required it, adding that, "as it is impossible for the 
existence of a State to come to a standstill, the man 
who is himself in possession of authority is under the 
necessity of making use of it in order to further the 
general interests of the nation." 

The crux of the situation was that the whole existence 
of Prussia reposed on a military basis. The kingdom 
had always been ruled by a sword, and William I. did 
not mean to break this tradition. It appeared, indeed, 
to the King a monstrous thing that anyone should dare 
to question his right to advance the welfare of his army. 
Prussia was an absolute Monarchy so far as its soldiers 
were concerned. The King intended to keep within his 
personal control every matter connected with the military 
situation in his country. He carried this feeling so far 
that one evening, during a party which was given at the 
Royal Castle of Berlin, he accosted a Deputy who had 
voted against the military budget. Having received an 
invitation, the Deputy had thought it his duty to accept 
it; but William I. wrathfully told him that he could 



82 Germany under Three Emperors 

not understand how he had dared to appear in the 
presence of his Sovereign after his conduct of the day 
before, adding that he considered him as a rebel against 
the Royal authority. Bismarck found such outbursts 
not only a considerable help in his vast designs, but also 
an outward justification of his conduct all through his 
administration of the affairs of Prussia, and, later, of 
the German Empire. 

All this while Bismarck never lost sight of his 
cherished plan to get into closer touch with Russia. The 
Polish mutiny of the year 1863 gave him the opportunity 
he had been seeking to establish upon a better basis a 
friendly understanding between the Romanoffs and the 
Hohenzollerns. He offered the Tsar the aid of Prussia 
in the repression of an insurrection which was threaten- 
ing both countries. On February 8th, 1863, a Conven- 
tion was signed in Petersburg which allowed Russian 
and Prussian troops to help each other for the purpose 
of re-establishing order in Poland and crushing the 
rebellion. This Convention, which received the name of 
Alvenslebem Convention, after the General who had 
signed it in the name of King William I., had been 
viewed with very favourable eyes by Alexander II., who 
had been irritated by the attitude of France, England 
and Austria, which showed that public opinion favoured 
the Polish cause. He found in Prussia a useful support 
to the line of policy he had adopted in regard to the 
Poles. England was not at all satisfied with this Conven- 
tion, and its representative in Berlin, Sir Andrew 
Buchanan, told Bismarck that Europe would never 
accept it. 

" Who is Europe? " sarcastically inquired the Prussian 
statesman. 



Turning the Tables 83 

"All the great Powers," replied Sir Andrew. 

" Are they in agreement with one another? " further 
asked Bismarck. 

And as it was impossible for the English Ambassador 
to give an affirmative reply, his interlocutor smiled signi- 
ficantly and the matter dropped. As things turned out, 
France was the only one who protested against the Con- 
vention, whilst Great Britain and Austria merely blamed 
it in a more or less timid and discreet manner. Bismarck 
had obtained his first great diplomatic success, the pre- 
cursor of others which were to bring about the foundation 
of the new German Empire. 



CHAPTER VI 
Frederick III. and his Father 

A GREAT deal has been said and written concerning 
the antagonism which at one time prevailed between 
Frederick III. and Bismarck ; much of it is pure inven- 
tion, and a goodly proportion of the balance mere hear- 
say. The Crown Prince Frederick undoubtedly dissented 
strongly — particularly on ethical grounds — from his 
Minister, but when all is said and done, and notwith- 
standing many things which must have painfully impressed 
the Crown Prince, he was grateful by nature, and fully 
recognised the services which Bismarck had rendered to 
his country as well as to his dynasty. 

In a certain sense Frederick recognised them even 
better than did his father, because he was a convinced 
Imperialist. He had at heart a profound disdain for the 
independence of the smaller German States, which he 
looked upon as an anachronism; if he had been listened 
to, all the outward privileges which the Sovereigns in 
miniature — who believed themselves to be important 
factors in the German Empire — and which Bismarck had 
condescended to leave to them in about the same way 
that one throws a bone to a dog whom it is necessary to 
pacify, would have been abolished in 1871. One day 
when we were discussing the question Frederick expressed 
the opinion to me that the great mistake had been not 
to tell these crowned nonentities, initially, that they were 
only the Peers of the Empire, " les Pairs de rEmpire." 

84 



A Champion of Imperialism 85 

To allow them to believe themselves indispensable 
factors in a situation which their pretensions only compli- 
cated to the detriment of its safety and welfare was to 
him an error which should have been extinguished as 
soon as it was born. Bismarck, however, did not share 
this opinion, having very well realised that the States 
of Sojthern Germany required some sort of pretty 
fiction to keep them in their proper place in the body of 
the new Empire, which, without them, could hardly have 
been expected to make progress. The great Minister and 
the heir to the Prussian throne were both Imperialists 
in the sense that they felt the necessity of an Empire. 
On the means whereby their desire was to be attained 
they were, however, at variance. This gave no reason, 
though, to conclude that the two were mostly at cross 
purposes. Each, indeed, had cause to be grateful to the 
other on more than one occasion. The Crown Prince not 
seldom championed Bismarck's policy, as, for instance, 
at Nikolsburg on the eve of the conclusion of peace with 
Austria, and it happened, too, several times that Bismarck 
came to the help of his future master and stood buffer 
— or peacemaker, if you will — between him and King 
William I., when the latter would have liked to show him- 
self severely autocratic in regard to his heir's independence 
of opinions, in which Frederick displeased him more 
often than would have been either politic or opportune 
for the world to guess. 

There is a circumstance which is very little known 
abroad, where the legend of the enmity of Bismarck with 
the Emperor Frederick III. has become an established 
fact, and this is that, among the people who insisted on 
Bismarck being asked to form a Cabinet, the Crown Prince 
had been one of the most pressing. Frederick had been 



86 Germany under Three Emperors 

predisposed toward Bismarck by his friend Max Duncker, 
whom the King had placed in close attendance on the 
Crown Prince, to initiate him into the management of 
State affairs. From the first moment the Crown had 
entered into conflict with the Chamber Duncker declared 
that Bismarck was the only man capable of pulling the 
Government out of the mire in which it had become 
entangled. Then again, Ernest von Stockmar, the 
private secretary of the Crown Princess, and the son of 
old Baron von Stockmar, the friend and adviser of 
Victoria of England and the Prince Consort, had also 
spoken in favour of the energetic statesman who had so 
well defended Prussian interests at Frankfurt. It 
naturally followed, therefore, that when the King had 
consulted his heir as to whether he should really entrust 
the presidency of the Cabinet to the clever diplomat who 
had been able to hold his own so well in the presence 
of Austrian arrogance at the Federal Diet, that Prince 
Frederick had expressed his agreement with the idea, 
and as soon as he heard that Bismarck had arrived from 
Paris he requested him to call upon him. The Crown 
Prince was a staunch Liberal at heart, and his sympa- 
thies were entirely in favour of the English system of 
government. He never for a moment imagined that the 
new President of the Council of Ministers would dare to 
rule in the despotic manner he immediately proceeded to 
put into force. On the contrary, he had hoped that he 
would use his best efforts to induce the Chamber to accept 
some kind of compromise with the Crown, and thus to 
put the governmental machine upon a sound basis, founded 
on a mutual understanding between the Sovereign and 
the elected Parliament. 

This, however, was not to be, and soon rumours began 



Mutual Misunderstandings 87 

to be whispered that, among the persons who could not 
reconcile themselves to the new policy the King had 
sanctioned, the Crown Prince of Prussia was the most 
prominent figure. It was not remarkable that the very real 
unrest and indignation which arose out of Bismarck's high- 
handed methods of Empire-building gave birth to an 
opposition party who seized upon this foundationless 
gossip about Frederick and used it to " put spokes in the 
wheels " of the new Prime Minister. 

Out of this agitation arose the conviction on the part 
of Bismarck that Frederick had become an enemy, which, 
however foundationless, the Minister resented deeply. 
Thus the rift began, and the wide differences of tempera- 
ment between the two men did not tend to heal it. 
Things, however, might have gone on indefinitely in the 
sluggish condition into which they had lapsed if the 
incident which took place at Dantzig in 1863 had not 
brought everything to a crisis. 

In the spring of 1863 rumours began to circulate that 
the Government had determined on a kind of coup d'etat 
in order to put an end to the many expressions of dis- 
content that had found their way among the public and 
in the Press. The Crown Prince had heard these grum- 
blings, as others had done, and being on the point of 
starting for a journey of military inspection in Eastern 
Prussia he had written to his father before his departure, 
begging him to avoid, for the time at least, any too 
authoritative demonstration. This was on May 31st, 
1863. On June 1st, however, was published a Royal 
decree limiting the liberty of the Press. The Crown 
Prince was incensed at it, and on the 4th addressed a 
long letter to the King, in which he expressed his dis- 
approval of the measure, and complained that he had not 



88 Germany under Three Emperors 

been invited to take part in the deliberations which had 
led to it, and which concerned him as the future Sovereign 
of the Prussian Realm. On June 5th there was a recep- 
tion in the Town Hall of Dantzig, where both the Crown 
Prince and his Consort, who had joined him two days 
before, were welcomed by the municipal authorities, and 
where the Mayor of the town, de Winter, expressed in 
his address his regret that the political situation of the 
country did not allow the city to display the joy that 
they really felt at the presence of its guests. The Prince 
was visibly moved, and replied : 

"I also regret that my presence amongst you has 
coincided with a most serious disaccord between the 
Government and the nation, the news of which has sur- 
prised me considerably. Personally I have not known 
anything concerning the reasons that have brought it 
about. I have taken no part in the deliberations which 
have led to such a sad result. But all of you, and I too, 
who, perhaps, am better aware than others of the noble 
and paternal intentions and of the loftiness of feeling of 
his Majesty the King, we all have the full conviction 
that under the sceptre of his Majesty Prussia will go 
forward with firm steps toward the glorious destinies 
which Providence has in store for it." 

The Prince, to give further weight to his words, sent 
from Graudenz, where he was staying with the Princess, 
an energetic protest to Bismarck against the decree con- 
cerning the liberty of the Press, requesting him to com- 
municate it to the other members of the Cabinet. This 
course the King forbade ; instead, he wrote a most severe 
letter to his son. The latter instantly replied by asking 
the Sovereign to forgive him for a step he felt he could 
not avoid taking in the interest of his children and of his 



A Rebuff for Prince Frederick 89 

own future, and begging him at the same time to allow 
him to resign all his military commands and offices and 
to retire into private life. William I. answered him on 
June 11th, granted him the pardon he had asked for, but, 
whilst saying nothing concerning his proposed resignation, 
ordered him to remain silent for the future no matter 
what could happen. 

In a certain sense the irritation of the King against 
his heir was legitimate, and at all events easy to under- 
stand; but Bismarck was too far-seeing not to perceive 
that it would have been most impolitic to give vent to it 
at a time when the Sovereign was already unpopular. 
William I. wanted to have the Crown Prince confined 
in a fortress as a punishment for his act of insubordina- 
tion, and it was only with a great deal of trouble that his 
Prime Minister succeeded in quieting his wrath. On 
this occasion Bismarck decidedly proved himself a good 
friend to the Crown Prince. The latter, therefore, might 
have been expected to show himself, if not grateful, at 
least better disposed toward his father's Minister. On 
the contrary, Frederick thought it his duty to write to 
Bismarck from Stettin on June 30th a rather violent 
letter in which he expressed himself in terms of strong 
indignation against the policy which the Minister of State 
had persuaded the King to adopt and which, in his eyes, 
was equivalent to a violation of the Constitution. 

The strictures of the Crown Prince would have been 
more than sufficient to incense an irritable man like 
Bismarck, but his wrath was further excited by an unfor- 
tunate article that appeared in the London Times in that 
same month of June, in T .vhich, among other things, that 
organ declared that : "The Crown Prince of Prussia has 
allowed himself, during a journey of military inspection, 



go Germany under Three Emperors 

to enter into open contradiction .with the policy of the 
Sovereign and to express his doubts concerning certain 
measures adopted by the latter. The least that might have 
been expected from him after this grave offence would 
have been a public retraction of his words. The King 
wrote to him to that effect, threatening him with the 
alternative of deprivation of all his public functions. The 
Prince, having consulted with her Royal Highness the 
Princess, replied in a most dignified way to this demand. 
He firmly refused to retract anything of what he had 
said, and offered to resign all his dignities and commands, 
and to retire with his wife and children, somewhere, where 
no one would be able to suspect him in the future of 
the desire to mix himself up with any business of State. 
It seems that his letter was a most remarkable one, and 
one can only congratulate the Prince upon having a wife 
who not only shares his political opinions but who is also 
capable of being such a great help to him in such an 
important and critical moment in his life. It would be 
difficult to imagine a more painful situation than that 
of this princely couple in the presence of an obstinate 
Sovereign, a mischievous Ministry and an over-excited 
nation." 

This article added fuel to flames that had not had time 
to burn themselves out. The King was absolutely furious 
and suspected his daughter-in-law with having inspired 
it. Bismarck had once more to intervene. He did not 
at all share his master's suspicions on the subject. His 
profound knowledge of human nature told him that the 
Crown Princess was far too intelligent and proud to have 
abased herself to the point of asking a newspaper to take 
up her cause and her defence. At the same time he 
felt suspicious of certain persons who surrounded her, such 



The Grown Prince Speaks Out 91 

as her private secretary, Ernest von Stockmar, who had 
in consequence to resign his functions, an event which 
proved most unhappy for his Royal mistress, as his 
influence had been all the time in the direction of a policy 
of conciliation and abstention from party strife on the 
part of the Crown Prince. This Dantzig incident was 
but the prelude of several others which led to a state of 
chronically bad relations between the Crown Prince and 
Bismarck. When the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved, 
in September, 1863, the former wrote to the Prime 
Minister a curt letter : 

"I have communicated to-day to his Majesty the 
ideas which I have already put to you in my letter from 
Stettin, which I had asked you, however, not to reveal 
to the King before I had done so myself. A very serious 
decision has been taken yesterday during the Cabinet 
Council. In the presence of the Ministers I did not wish 
to say anything to his Majesty. To-day, however, I have 
done so ; I have explained my scruples, I have told my 
grave fears in regard to the future. The King is now 
aware that I am a resolute adversary of the Ministry. 

"Frederick William. 

"Berlin, September 3rd, 1863." 

When one considers the natural violence of character 
which belonged to Bismarck one must come to the con- 
clusion that he must have had singularly at heart the 
success of the vast plans which were maturing in his 
mind to have shown himself so patient in regard to this 
opposition. It would have been relatively easy for him 
to get rid of it by allowing the King to reduce Frederick 
to silence. But in this circumstance the genius of the 



92 Germany under Three Emperors 

statesman got the upper hand of the anger of the man. 
He was well aware that it was most essential for the 
security of the country as well as of the dynasty that the 
public should gain no real insight into the Royal quarrels. 
In his desire to be allowed a free hand in the measures 
which he saw and hoped would bring Prussia to glory 
and to fame, as well as to power, he went so far as to 
seek the Crown Prince, whom he asked direct why he 
refused to be present at the meetings of the Council of 
State, and why he systematically kept himself aloof from 
the Government. "It will be your Government in a 
few years," he added, " and if you hold different opinions 
from it you ought to try to smooth over the road to a 
change rather than to persist in tacit opposition." The 
Prince protested so angrily that Bismarck could not 
help becoming irritated in his turn. But, controlling his 
feelings, he merely replied that he had only spoken out 
of his attachment for the dynasty and in the hope of 
bringing about a reconciliation. He added that he had 
done what he could in the preceding June to prevent the 
King from taking violent measures against his son because 
he had wished for the welfare and the dignity of the 
Fatherland, and on account of the struggle in which the 
Government was engaged against Liberalism, to maintain 
harmony among the members of the dynasty. Bismarck 
concluded his remarks by declaring that he hoped that 
when the Prince ascended the throne he would find a 
servant as faithful as he was to the reigning King; but, 
whatever might happen, that servant would never be 
himself. 

The conversation, however, ended more amicably than 
this might lead one to expect. The Crown Prince, never- 
theless, persisted in his refusal to take part in the delibera- 



Rumours of Abdication 93 

tions of the Council of State, and on that subject addressed 
a long memorandum to his father in which he sought to 
give reasons for his opposition. This only embittered 
relations that already had ceased to be cordial. William I. 
forwarded to Bismarck the document in which his son 
had unfolded his views, requesting him to make any notes 
thereon he considered to be necessary. Bismarck did so 
at much length, and with the evident desire to reassure 
his Sovereign as to the possible consequences of an 
opposition directed by the Crown Prince against his 
administration. The Minister rather feared the effect of 
any antagonistic step on the part of Frederick, perhaps 
because some people had persuaded him that this opposi- 
tion was headed by the Queen, whom, in 1848, a certain 
party had wished to become Regent of the Realm in the 
name of her son when the abdication of Frederick 
William IV. had been expected. 

The relations of William I. with his Consort were 
extremely curious in more than one respect. Their mar- 
riage had been entirely one of convenience, and they had 
never really agreed. Yet Augusta had contrived to 
acquire considerable influence over her husband, due 
principally to the fact that she worried him so much 
whenever something became a fixed idea with her that 
he gave way simply for the sake of peace. The Queen 
had a very high notion of her duties as a Sovereign, and 
William I., though he may not have loved her as much 
as she would have had the right to expect, yet respected 
her good qualities, and also the fact that she was the 
Queen, whose conduct it was his duty not to allow to be 
criticised. But the persistence with which she had always 
headed any opposition that manifested itself against his 
Government had made him suspicious of her and of their 



94 Germany under Three Emperors 

son, whom he would have liked to put beyond reach of 
his mother's influence. 

Bismarck was very well aware of this state of things, 
and played his cards in consequence. His remarks con- 
cerning the memorandum of the Crown Prince were, 
therefore, so framed as to produce on the mind of the 
King the impression that it had to be treated as something 
without any consequence whatever, not worth contra- 
diction. In a lengthy document he sought to persuade 
William I. that he was the only personage that counted 
in the State, that his opinions alone were to be taken into 
account, and that the position of the Crown Prince was 
an absolutely unimportant one which he had been foolish 
enough to take au serieuoo, but to which no one attached 
any weight. 

With such sophistries as the following the Minister 
succeeded in lulling the troubled mind of his Sovereign : 

"The words 'tied hands,' used by his Royal High- 
ness, have absolutely no sense. The country could never 
by any means identify his Royal Highness with any 
decision of the Cabinet because the country knows very 
well that the Crown Prince is not in a position which 
allows him to participate officially to the decisions of the 
Council of State. Unfortunately the position which his 
Royal Highness has chosen to take against the Crown is 
very well known in the country, and every head of a 
family, no matter to what party he may belong, will 
disapprove of it because it constitutes a refusal to submit 
himself to paternal authority. This wounds the feelings 
and the traditions of loyalty of the country. Nothing, 
therefore, could more harm his Royal Highness in public 
opinion than publication of his memorandum as he re- 
quests. The position of his Royal Highness Frederick 



A Double-faced Document 95 

is, no doubt, a completely false one, because it is not 
part of the mission of the heir to the throne to raise the 
flag of opposition against his King and his father. On 
the contrary, it is his duty to cease this opposition; he 
ought to make up his mind to play the part of an heir 
presumptive, as it should be, with submission and defer- 
ence for his father and Sovereign." 

Among the many other clauses in this long and in- 
sidious reply the thirteenth is typical of the manner in 
.which Bismarck uses the art of suggestion to get sufficient 
"sting" into his argument to cause his ulterior aim to 
be achieved without history being able to point a direct 
finger at him as the cause : 

"There is no doubt that the work of the Ministers 
would be made easier if his Royal Highness did not take 
part in the meetings of the Council of State. But it 
seems to me that it is impossible that his Majesty should 
wish to avoid the duty his Majesty has to watch over the 
Crown Prince as far as is humanly possible and to insist 
on his becoming acquainted with the affairs as well as 
.with the laws of the country. It would be a far too 
dangerous experience to allow the future King to remain 
a stranger to these policies and to these laws, because the 
welfare of millions of people depend on his becoming 
familiarised with them. His Royal Highness has given 
in the memorandum which his Majesty has seen fit to 
communicate to me the proof of his ignorance of the fact 
that the part taken by the Crown Prince in the delibera- 
tions of the Council of State is never a responsible par- 
ticipation in them, but only an educative one, and that 
on no occasion whatever can a vote be required from his 
Royal Highness. This is the point which the Prince has 
completely misunderstood, because if he were more 



96 Germany under Three Emperors 

familiar with the affairs of State it would never enter 
into his mind to threaten the King with the publication 
of details of the deliberations of the Council which, in 
itself, would mean a violation of the law and an offence 
against the criminal code." 

Such incidents as these conspired to embitter the life 
of Frederick and to make his path a thorny one. 



CHAPTER VII 

Playing with Austria 

THE incidents which I have described regarding Bis- 
marck's relations with the Crown Prince were, later 
on, to have a considerable bearing on the whole course 
of German politics, and the remarks of the future Chan- 
cellor upon the memorandum of the Crown Prince were 
to play a serious part in the relations of Frederick 
with his eldest son, the present Emperor William II. 
At the time that these comments were made to William I. 
Frederick remained in ignorance as to their import, and 
they only came to his knowledge through an indiscretion 
of the Queen Augusta. 

One day when the old Emperor was unwell he had 
asked Queen Augusta to look out from his pigeon-holes 
some document which he required. In doing so she 
came across Frederick's letter to his father with the critical 
memoranda of Bismarck still attached to it. She quietly 
put both in her pocket and communicated them to her 
son. This occurred about the year '78 or '79, when the 
war which had always been raging between the Empress 
and Bismarck had reached a particularly active phase. 
She was the more delighted, therefore, to get into 
possession of a paper which she hoped would yet further 
irritate the Crown Prince against the Chancellor. Her 
hope, however, was not realised because the Prince at 
that time had, to an extent, reconciled himself with his 
father's Minister, and, at all events, had made up his 
h 97 



98 Germany under Three Emperors 

mind that it would not be to the advantage of the 
dynasty to lose Bismarck after the services which he had 
rendered to it. 

In after years, when differences of opinion occurred 
between the heir to the throne and Prince William, he 
was glad to be able, on the strength of the remarks which 
Bismarck had made concerning himself, to require from 
the Chancellor his support in the exercise of his parental 
authority over a young man who seemed determined to 
set it at naught. 

Of this, however, I shall speak later on in its proper 
chronological order. At present I must go on with my 
story, not without some shade of doubt whether I relate 
it quite correctly. In view of its importance I must ask 
my readers to forgive me if any inaccuracy has slipped 
into it. The incidents about which I am speaking did 
not take place under my eyes, and, unfortunately, at the 
time we discussed them were still too recent to be judged 
with the impartiality which they deserved. After 1873 
I had opportunity personally to observe the development 
of the influence of the Chancellor and to watch the unequal 
fight which took place between him and the people who 
had foolishly imagined that they could drive him out of 
office in the lifetime of the Emperor William I. Of all 
that occurred in the years when I lived in Berlin I can 
speak with far more assurance than the events which 
preceded the war of 1870. 

Now; to my story and the progress which, in spite of 
the opposition which his policy met in the country, Bis- 
marck succeeded in making in the confidence of his 
Sovereign and among the extreme Imperialists in Ger- 
many who, tired of Austria, were but too willing and 
ready to enlist under the protection and leadership of 



Father and Son 99 

Prussia. Bismarck owed much to the help of this party, 
and William I. would have had longer to wait for his 
Imperial sceptre had not they been at the back of things. 
It was thanks to the Imperialists, too, that the Crown 
Prince gradually adopted a more peaceful attitude. 
Frederick was perhaps the most convinced Imperialist in 
the whole of Germany, and once he had become aware 
that Bismarck was working toward the restoration of the 
old German Empire for the profit of the Hohenzollern 
dynasty, he forgave him freely for the years of un- 
pleasantness which he had caused him and even for the 
humiliating position into which he had thrust him — a 
Crown Prince without power. 

A curiously anomalous position arose out of this change 
of feeling. Although King William I. had supported his 
Minister in all his enterprises, he was not always in accord 
with him concerning the means and the aims of Bis- 
marck's policy, yet had not the courage to forbid him 
taking any particular course. The Crown Prince 
Frederick, who, on the other hand, had never been able 
to reconcile himself to the methods employed by Bis- 
marck, yet supported him most cordially in many of his 
views from the moment that he had realised what they 
meant for the future of Prussia and of its dynasty. 
Between these two currents, equally favourable to him, 
the Chancellor was able to push through most of his 
conceptions and to maintain himself at the head of affairs 
for more than a quarter of a century. 

Prussian statecraft during the first years of Bismarck's 
administration of foreign affairs was at once simple and 
complicated. Diplomacy was active in those years to keep 
Prussia absolutely free in all her movements, unent angled 
by any alliances with foreign Powers, no matter how 



ioo Germany under Three Emperors 

useful they might seem at first sight. It was on this 
account that Bismarck turned a deaf ear to the proposi- 
tions of Napoleon III., and that whilst willing to draw 
Russia into the inner sphere of Prussia's politics, he had 
not advised the King to conclude a treaty with France 
directed against Austria. His plan was to use Austria 
in such a way that she would co-operate in the work of 
her own destruction. He ardently desired to see the. 
destruction of Austria as a German Power, but he fully 
meant to make her realise her importance as among the 
Slav nationalities. It had been on this account that he 
had hesitated to enter into the views of the Tsar in regard 
to the destruction of the Habsburgs whilst otherwise 
lending himself outwardly at least to the Russian plans 
concerning the settlement of the many perplexing ques- 
tions of the day. By so standing aloof he would be free 
to bend Austria to the task of weakening Russia in order, 
ostensibly, to secure to herself the position as leader 
of the Slav races. In reality Bismarck's far-sighted 
machination did not arise from any sympathy with 
Austria, but he saw in Russia the strongest and most 
serious opponent of German unity. 

The Cabinet in Vienna, however, understood that 
Prussia was aiming at securing its dominance in Germany 
by driving Austria out of the circle of its inner politics. 
An interview which the Emperor Francis Joseph had with 
King William at Gastein very nearly destroyed that plan, 
because it elevated the relations of the two Sovereigns 
with each other to a more personal and, consequently, 
a more satisfying plane. This was a palpable check for 
Bismarck's ambitions, and, as if to justify the proverb 
which says that misfortune never comes alone, the 
elections to the Prussian Chamber which took place 



Isolated ! 101 

immediately after resulted in a considerable increase of 
the majority against him. 

Bismarck found himself thus isolated in his own 
country, with nothing abroad to support him except the 
equivocal friendship of Russia ; despised in Prussia for the 
struggle in which he had engaged with its parliamentary 
and constitutional traditions; and in direct conflict with 
the Royal Family, of whom not one would say a word in 
his favour. He began to wonder, indeed, whether he 
would be able to maintain himself in power when, sud- 
denly, one of these events occurred which change the 
whole face of the world by their unexpectedness. King 
Frederick VII. of Denmark passed away at a moment 
when nobody had ever given a thought to his demise. 

His natural successor in regard to the Duchies of 
Schleswig and of Holstein was his kinsman, Duke 
Christian of Sonderburg Augustenburg, who, however, 
had, so far back as 1852, resigned his hereditary claim to 
them for a sum of two and a half million thalers. This 
might have been a most excellent operation for him if 
it had received the assent of the German Confederation, 
and if his two sons had not strongly objected ; the eldest, 
to the extent of making a formal declaration of his rights 
to succession, and declaring that nothing in the world 
would ever make him accept a renunciation which his 
father had had absolutely no right to make. 

This was the beginning of the crisis. Lord Palmerston 
once remarked that there had been but three men in 
Europe who had really understood the Schleswig-Holstein 
question — one was dead, the second in a madhouse, and 
the third, who was himself, had forgotten it. Without, 
therefore, entering into the tiresome details which made 
war so acute a probability it is sufficient to say that what 



102 Germany under Three Emperors 

set fire to the barrel of gunpowder was the incorporation, 
in defiance of several Treaties, of the Duchy of Schleswig 
into Denmark by King Christian IX. immediately after 
his accession to the throne. This act of authority was 
immediately followed by a solemn protest from the Diet 
of Frankfurt in the name of Holstein and of Lauenburg 
against this violation of the autonomy of the Duchies and 
flaunting of the Conference held in London in 1852. 

This protest gave Bismarck an opportunity to offer 
what French people call vulgarly " Eau benite de cour" 
to Austria, whom he induced to declare jointly with 
Prussia its determination to uphold the rights of the 
German Confederation in Holstein as well as in Schleswig. 
Both the Berlin and the Vienna Cabinets declared that 
the Confederation was in honour bound to occupy 
Schleswig. Two members of the Prussian Chamber, 
Virchow and Stavenberg, thereupon proposed that the 
Confederation should also recognise the rights of the 
hereditary Prince of Augustenburg to the sovereignty of 
Schleswig as well as of Holstein, thereby ignoring and 
annulling the renunciation of Duke Christian, father of 
the Prince, in 1852. Bismarck immediately retorted 
that Prussia would consider the Treaty of 1852 as binding 
provided the King of Denmark expressed his willingness 
to conform to it. If he refused, the Prussian Govern- 
ment reserved for itself full liberty to act for the best 
according to its personal interests, and he added that 
upon this point it was in complete agreement with Austria. 
The Prussian Landtag was not satisfied with this reply, 
and declined to help him occupy the territory of Schleswig 
and also refused " contingency " credits for which he had 
asked. 

There were some people who wondered what could 



Baron von Goltz 103 

have produced this sudden change in the anti- Austrian 
feelings for which Bismarck was so well known. The 
public began at once to say that he was a man on whom 
it was impossible to rely, an accusation which, after all, 
was not so very wrong. Among these people was Baron 
von Goltz, then Prussian Ambassador in Paris, who took 
it upon himself to express to Bismarck his apprehensions 
concerning this renewal of friendship for Austria which 
had struck everybody as being so entirely strange. Bis- 
marck's reply revealed much that was in his thoughts : 

" You tell me," he said, " that you have no confi- 
dence in Austria. Neither have I ; but I find that it is 
better for our present interests, and more opportune, to 
have Austria with us. Whether we shall drift apart, 
and by whose fault, time alone will show. I am not in 
the least afraid of war, and perhaps you will soon have 
cause to convince yourself that war is upon my pro- 
gramme. It is European Treaties that create European 
right, as a rule ; if we wanted to interpret them in terms 
of morality and of justice we should speedily want to 
annul most of them." 

What he did not add was that the crucial point of 
the whole Danish question lay in the acquisition of the 
Duchies by Prussia, for which every Prussian longed, 
with the difference that whilst the Chamber openly avowed 
it Bismarck wished to do it and to say nothing about it. 
He thought it his duty, however, to remind the King, 
on the day following the demise of Frederick VII. of 
Denmark, that all the ancestors of William I. had added 
something to Prussian territory, and that he ought to 
do the same. This took place during a meeting of the 
Council of State. The Ministers listened to him in 
silence, whilst the Crown Prince raised his arms to heaven 



104 Germany under Three Emperors 

in a mute protest. The King only replied that " he had 
got no right whatever to take Holstein." 

This reason was not the only one which made Wil- 
liam I. hesitate. It was far more the influence of the 
Queen Augusta which held him back, and the dread that 
she might be right after all when she had threatened 
him with the possibility of France seizing the oppor- 
tunity which would present itself to occupy Rhineland 
as a compensation for the conquest of the Duchies. 
When this fear was communicated to Bismarck he simply 
laughed at it. He carried the day, and an Austrian and 
Prussian army entered the territory of the Duchies, a 
step which was finally to give to William I. the military 
harbour of Kiel and the right to build the famous canal 
which was only to be completed by his grandson. He 
had followed the example of his ancestors and added a 
priceless jewel to Prussian territory. 

But what was Austria doing in the meanwhile? 
Austria had fallen into the snare which had been held 
out with an ingenuity which can only be compared with 
the orders that were given to her from Berlin in 1914, 
by which the whole of the world was thrown into the 
biggest war of history. Her statesmen did not at all 
see the future. They thought that they had matter for 
congratulation in the Treaty which they finally con- 
cluded with the Prussian Government at Gastein on 
August 20th, 1865, by which Austria remained in posses- 
sion of the administration of Holstein, whilst Prussia 
took that of Schleswig, and Kiel became, potentially, 
the harbour of a German Imperial fleet still to be called 
into existence. Both Duchies were to accede to the 
Zollverein, and the whole Constitution of the German 
Confederation was to be reorganised. It is related that 



King and Emperor Meet 105 

after the signature of this compact Bismarck exclaimed, 
"Now I have the pretext which will drag Austria 
into a war that will definitely exclude her from the 
position which she aspires to occupy in Germany." 

The King of Prussia and Francis Joseph of Austria 
had a talk together after the Gastein agreement. Bis- 
marck was present and, as a matter of fact, did most 
of the talking. He told Francis Joseph that whilst 
Austria had a great interest at stake in remaining upon 
good terms with Prussia it could not hope for any imme- 
diate advantages from the annexation of the Danish 
Duchies. The Emperor Francis Joseph refused to see 
things from the same point of view. Public opinion 
in his country, he asserted with emphasis, would not 
admit that a war which had cost so much in blood and 
in money would be unproductive of territorial expansion 
for the Monarchy. He bluntly inquired of Bismarck 
whether he meant to transform both Duchies into Prus- 
sian provinces, or whether he would content himself with 
exercising certain rights within their limits. William I. 
was asked for his opinion on the subject. The Sovereign 
felt embarrassed, but at last declared that " he had no 
right to take the Duchies, and that, therefore, he could 
not express an opinion as to what ought to be done with 
them." This put an end to any attempt on the part of 
the future Chancellor to persuade Austria to be a pawn 
in his game. History shows that he forthwith proceeded 
to obtain his end by other means. 

This Schleswig-Holstein affair was, perhaps, the one 
in which the genius of Bismarck revealed itself most 
brilliantly, because his success laid the foundations of 
many other of his achievements. Public opinion in 
Prussia had been incensed against him because he had 



106 Germany under Three Emperors 

allied himself with Austria against Denmark. In reality, 
it had been the cleverest stroke of diplomatic skill he 
could have achieved. If the Prussian Government had 
acted independently of Austria it would undoubtedly 
have had Austria, together with England and France, 
and perhaps even Russia, against it. What was left for 
him to do then, except precisely what he did : obtain 
the complicity of Austria, dupe her later in such a way 
that she would accuse her ally of preparing in secret 
to annex Schleswig-Holstein to her own territory, 
thus provoking the casus belli for which he had been 
seeking ever since Olmutz. The plan was a magnificent 
one, if only by its unscrupulousness. Later on Bismarck 
declared that he had never had occasion to be more 
satisfied with himself than during the negotiations that 
had followed upon the war with Denmark. For one 
thing, the war in itself had strengthened his position 
by making Prussia proud of its military successes. At 
last Prussia understood the reasons which had caused the 
King to insist on the reorganisation of the army, no 
matter what the cost might be. This was already a 
gain for which one could hardly have dared to hope a 
few months before. What Prussia had required was to 
be launched with a firm hand on the road of her future 
victories, and to acquire the conviction that she was about 
to see fulfilled the glorious designs of the Great Elector 
and of Frederick II. Bismarck revived the self-con- 
fidence which Jena had shaken, and he well knew that 
the new appetites which he had awakened would never 
be satisfied. 

The Gastein Convention had hardly been signed when 
Bismarck was already laying his plans how best to bring 
Austria to make some demonstration of hostility towar4 



Francis Joseph Refuses 107 

Prussia. The question which appeared to his mind to 
be most urgent for the moment was the weakening of 
the Austrian Empire. He had said once that in " foreign 
politics one meets with moments which never come back 
if one has not been clever enough to profit by the advan- 
tages which they offer." This profound maxim which 
all politicians ought to take to heart, and which Dr. von 
Bethmann-Hollweg has so often forgotten, this maxim 
was to inspire all his actions during those momentous 
times when he had to contend not only with the diffi- 
culties which his powerful mind had foreseen, but also 
with the unexpected hesitation of King William I., whose 
feelings of loyalty feared the opprobrium that history 
might attach to his name if he lent himself to such a 
conspiracy against honour and truth. In order to find 
some justification for the attack which his Minister was 
meditating, William I. insisted on the latter making an 
attempt to assure himself of the co-operation, or at least 
of the disinterestedness, of Austria in regard to the future. 
Bismarck accordingly proposed to Francis Joseph that 
he and Prussia should divide the small German States, 
whose independence was to be put an end to, and 
together march against France, so as to conquer Alsace 
and thus give to the new Central Empire that was to 
be created out of the ruins of the German Confederation 
the frontier line which was indispensable to its safety in 
the future. As expected, the magnitude of the design 
was beyond the intelligence of the man to whom Bis- 
marck revealed it, and Francis Joseph recoiled with dread 
and with suspicion from the temptation which was put 
in his way. 

The decision of the Emperor cleared the road before 
the great Minister, whose genius was then able to give 



108 Germany under Three Emperors 

itself free rein without being longer cramped by the 
scruples of William I. who followed him whilst not 
understanding him, and who was to become the instru- 
ment through which he succeeded in working out his 
boldest political conceptions. King William I. had be- 
come a partner in the perpetration of terrible injustices 
and iniquities which were disguised as absolutely righteous 
adventures, started out of the necessity of self-defence 
against aggressions no one had ever seen or heard of, 
but in which William I. came to believe in the most 
absolute manner. 

The people who had the opportunity to approach 
Bismarck during that spring of 1866, which was to herald 
the humiliation of Austria before the Prussian eagles, and 
subsequently to lead to German unity, all agreed in say- 
ing that he had never appeared quieter and more 
impassive than during these anxious months. 

He knew himself to be unpopular as no Minister had 
ever been before him in any country in the world. He 
had the Court against him, the Conservative and the 
Liberal parties, his own colleagues, with the exception of 
Roon, the Queen, the Crown Prince and Princess, the 
Royal family and public feeling in Prussia and through- 
out Germany. He treated them all with unconcern, 
because he felt sure that his King would stand by him, no 
matter what happened. That and his profound faith in 
himself was his great strength. Armed with these 
weapons he began, without hesitation and without 
remorse, the struggle which was to end in a war that 
would change the map of Europe. His whole conduct 
at this time can be compared to the discharge of a big 
gun that must take place once it has been fired, and 
which not even the will of those who have set the match 



The War of 1866 109 

can stop. Bismarck, too, had a trump card of no small 
importance in his game — that was the co-operation of 
Italy against interests with which Napoleon III. would 
never have consented to interfere. France had failed to 
play the pawn ; she, therefore, must be checkmated. In 
March, 1866, King Victor Emmanuel, to whom Wil- 
liam I. had sent the order of the Black Eagle a few weeks 
before, had been persuaded to dispatch a military mission 
to Berlin, composed of General Count Menabrea and 
General Govone, with powers to conclude an alliance with 
Prussia, which was signed for a duration of three months 
on April 8th, 1866, and June 7th following the troops 
of William I. entered Holstein. Austria immediately 
called upon the German States of Confederation to pro- 
ceed to mobilisation against Prussia, whom it accused of 
having violated the treaties which it had signed, a thing, 
by the way, with which she was to become familiar in 
the future. 

On June 18th the war began. It was to be one of 
the shortest that has ever been fought. On June 23rd 
the Prussian troops invaded Bohemia, and on July 3rd 
the battle of Sadowa saw the utter defeat of the Austrian 
army, not, however, without the Prussians having been 
for a short moment in extreme danger. Indeed, had it 
not been for the timely arrival on the field of action of 
the Crown Prince with his corps it is likely that the result 
would have been different. At midnight Crown Prince 
Frederick received from Colonel Count Finck von 
Finckenstein the order to march with all haste towards 
Koniggratz, and by a wonder of energy he contrived to 
arrive on the spot just as the Prussian troops already 
engaged in the battle were visibly weakening and being 
slowly driven back from the heights which they had occu- 



no Germany under Three Emperors 

pied in the early hours of the morning. After a short 
but terrible struggle General Benedek had to retire in 
disorder, and Moltke, who, with a beating heart despite 
his impassive countenance, had watched the development 
of this tremendous fight, was able to say to his Sove- 
reign in words that have passed into history : " Your 
Majesty has not only won this battle, but also the whole 
campaign." 

The next day Austria appealed to Napoleon III. to 
intervene in her favour. She offered to cede to the 
French Monarch Venice and the territory appertaining 
to it in recognition. The latter, of course, handed it 
on to Italy, and indeed he could hardly have done any- 
thing else once he had made up his mind not to come 
to the rescue of the unfortunate Francis Joseph. In 
this Napoleon missed his opportunity, which would never 
again come within his reach, to become the arbiter of 
Europe ; had he come to the aid of Austria, Prussia would 
never have been able to resist any attack seriously 
coming from the French frontier. Peace negotiations 
were therefore started ; Bismarck was the first to recom- 
mend great moderation. This led to disagreements 
between him and the King, who wanted not only to 
annex Saxony, but also Anspach and Bayreuth, the two 
latter places because of family reasons and traditions — 
he considered them to have been the cradles of his race. 
The headquarters were then at Nikolsburg, a castle be- 
longing to Prince Dietrichstein in Moravia, and it was 
there that the negotiations were carried through. Sharp 
quarrels took place between Bismarck, William I. and 
the Prussian Head of the Staff, General von Moltke. The 
King wanted to push forward and, if possible, to occupy 
Presburg in Hungary. Bismarck asked Moltke what he 



An Armistice in 

thought, adding, " If we could be absolutely certain that 
we should win the day a victory would certainly place 
us in a stronger position in regard to the peace negotia- 
tions. But if victory is doubtful it will be better to 
give up the whole enterprise rather than compromise our 
chances by a defeat." 

Moltke replied that he thought the operation a 
dangerous one, and that he could not answer for its suc- 
cess. This determined Bismarck to recommend to the King 
the conclusion of an armistice from midday on July 22nd. 
This allowed him to send to General Fransecky, whose 
troops were engaged in an encounter with an Austrian 
corps, the orders to cease righting, which arrived at a 
moment when it was hardly likely he could have come 
out with success from an engagement which the enemy 
had compelled him to accept. Diplomacy for once got 
the better of military science. 



CHAPTER yill 

Austria Becomes a Pawn 

HAD it been his immediate aim Bismarck might 
easily have realised his dream of an Empire at the 
Convention of Nikolsburg; but it would have meant the 
humiliation and subjugation of the whole of Germany 
under the heel of Prussia. An Empire so gained would 
have been compromised almost before it had been com- 
pleted. The new Empire was not to arise out of the 
defeat of its future components ; it had to be desired by 
them as the only thing which could give them, in their 
own eyes and in those of the world, an appearance of 
solidity. The vanity of the small States had to call it 
into existence, not their humiliation or defeat. 

And what was to be done with Austria? Nothing at 
all, said the military party. Nothing at all, declared the 
King. She had been beaten ; let her take the consequences 
of the reverses under which she had succumbed. But this 
was not what Bismarck thought ; this was not, either, what 
he wished. With Austria as a perpetual enemy the very 
existence of Prussia as well as the unity of Germany 
would be endangered and compromised. Austria had to 
be transformed into an instrument of Prussian politics, 
into the useful pawn without which the game becomes 
impossible. She had to be treated with mercy, even with 
gentleness ; and as vanity and self-indulgence were her 
besetting sins, these had to be appealed to so as to blind 
her to her future fate. A victorious entry of the Prussian 

112 



Conditions of Peace 113 

troops in Vienna would naturally have been a source of 
immense satisfaction to the King and the military party, 
but was not a "political necessity,' ' therefore it was 
avoided. 

Many years later Bismarck confided to the one man, 
perhaps, from whom he had no secrets — Baron von Hol- 
stein, who was to become the deus ecc machina of the 
German Foreign Office — that he had wished to give to 
the world, and to France especially, the idea that Prussia 
was a generous nation, and if she had shown herself 
merciless at Nikolsburg she would have awakened the 
anxieties of Europe, and perhaps have influenced 
Napoleon III. to the extent of interfering in favour of 
Austria. It was necessary for the success of Prussian 
policy for the whole world to be persuaded that Bismarck 
did not seek territorial aggrandisement; nothing more 
than the establishment of Prussian supremacy in Ger- 
many. So Bismarck had to keep his secret locked in his 
own breast, and meanwhile try as well as he could to 
moderate the appetites of his Sovereign, to assuage the 
impatience of the Prussian nation. 

The conditions of peace which the King of Prussia 
mentioned in his telegram to Napoleon III., in reply to 
the information which the French Sovereign had given 
him of the cession of Venice to France by Francis Joseph, 
together with the latter 's request for mediation, were so 
severe that one wonders how Bismarck could have allowed 
his Royal master to formulate them. Prussia required 
the reform of the German Confederation ; that it should 
be placed under its authority; the cession of Schleswig- 
Holstein, of the Austrian part of Silesia which Frederick 
the Great had not contrived to wrest from Maria Theresa ; 
the establishment of a frontier zone in Bohemia; and 



ii4 Germany under Three Emperors 

the deposition of the Sovereigns of Hanover, Hesse, 
Meiningen and Nassau, who were to be replaced by their 
presumptive heirs. Later on other demands were formu- 
lated which came partly from the King himself and partly 
from the military party. In these William I. asked for 
the annexation of Saxony, Hesse, and Hanover, and 
especially of Anspach and Bayreuth. 

These terms, however, had to be modified. Austria 
declared that she placed, as a sine qua non condition of 
peace, the preservation of the independence of Saxony, 
whose Sovereign was a personal friend of Francis Joseph, 
and one of the Austrian plenipotentiaries who had arrived 
at Nikolsburg, Count Karolyi, categorically refused to 
consent to the slightest cession of Austrian territory. In 
spite of the opposition of King William, Bismarck gave 
way, because he wanted the preliminaries of peace to be 
signed as quickly as possible so as to avoid any intervention 
on the part of France, the one thing which he feared. 

In the meantime Count Benedetti had arrived at the 
Prussian headquarters as the Ambassador and special 
envoy of Napoleon III. He explained the lines upon 
which his Government was prepared to recommend Aus- 
tria to conclude peace. Prussia was to obtain territories 
jvith a population of about four millions, with the Mein 
as a frontier line. Austria was to retire from the German 
Confederation; King William I. was to have perfect 
freedom in Northern Germany, preserving, however, the 
integrity of the Saxon kingdom. Napoleon's great hope 
lying at the bottom of this proposition was that it might 
lead to the formation of a Confederation of the Southern 
German States, over which French influence would pre- 
dominate. Nevertheless the proposal secured for Prussia 
latitude to move about freely in Germany, and that was 




MARSHAL VON MOLTKK 



William I. is Enlightened 115 

Bismarck's aim. The King, however, was not of his 
opinion, and he decidedly opposed the plan. On July 23rd 
a Council took place at Nikolsburg under the presidency 
of William I., in which was to be decided the question 
whether one should accept the proposed peace or not. 
Bismarck was ill, and in consequence of this it assembled 
in his room. He gave the reasons why he considered it 
essential to accept the conditions offered by Austria, but 
he was absolutely the only one of his opinion. The officers 
of the Staff, not excepting Moltke, were all in favour of 
continuing the war until the fall of Vienna had put Austria 
at their mercy. The King agreed with this advice. 
Bismarck was so agitated that he became the prey of a 
nervous attack that brought about a crisis of tears such 
as no one would have expected a man of his kind to have 
been capable. The next day he had recovered sufficiently 
to go to the King. Whilst waiting to be received he met 
two colonels who had brought with them reports con- 
cerning the ravages of cholera among the troops in the 
field and the terrible figures which these reports revealed. 
This confirmed him yet more firmly in his resolution, and 
when he came into the presence of William I. he quietly 
went over all the political and military reasons which 
rendered the continuation of the war impossible, and 
for the first time revealed to William I. something 
of the gigantic conceptions which were agitating his 
brain. Later on he informed von Holstein that he told 
William I. : " Austria must be considered as a pawn in 
the chess of Europe ; if she is pressed too hard she will 
make alliance with France or Russia, and we shall lose 
the game. Moreover, we can do nothing with the German 
provinces of Austria, and should we annex them in toto, 
or partially, by doing so we should not add anything to 



n6 Germany under Three Emperors 

our own strength. A fusion of them with Prussia is im- 
possible ; they would always remain a thorn in the flesh." 

This account is somewhat different from the one which 
the Prince gives in his Reminiscences, but the sense 
is the same. Personally, I am inclined to believe the one 
which I have reproduced as being the more correct of 
the two, as it was not destined for publicity. The King 
declared that he considered the conditions proposed as 
insufficient as well as unsatisfactory. He added a curious 
remark which proves how entirely he had allowed himself 
to be persuaded of the justice of the war which he was 
fighting : ' ' It is quite impossible to allow the guilty party 
in this war to get off scot free. Austria ought to be 
punished, not the German States it has persuaded to 
follow its lead." 

Bismarck very cleverly replied that it was not Prussia's 
mission to avenge the wrongs of others ; what she had to 
do was simply to bring about the unity of the whole of 
Germany under the leadership of the King of Prussia. 

What William I., who had a goodly share of the 
Hohenzollern spirit of vanity, disliked in the whole pro- 
position was the fading away of his dream of a triumphal 
march into Vienna at the head of his armies ; and being 
brutal, as all Prussians are, he could not see the subtlety 
of the reasonings of a spirit who always thought more of 
the possibilities of the morrow than the successes of the 
actual day. 

At last the irritated King said that he had made up 
his mind and that the war would go on, and dismissed his 
Minister so coolly that the latter thought all was lost. 
Bismarck went back to his room and remained standing 
at the window, with the feeling that perhaps the best 
thing to do was to throw himself out of it to the courtyard 



Bismarck in a Corner 117 

beneath. The whole edifice he had been building had 
crumbled down like a house of cards, and, as he expressed 
himself in the picturesque language he used to people 
before whom he did not restrain himself, he would have 
liked "to wring the necks of all the idiots who did not 
understand him." Suddenly he heard the door open; 
someone came in and laid a hand upon his arm. It was 
the Crown Prince. 

"You know that I have always been against war," 
he told him. "You considered it necessary, and the 
responsibility of it remains on your shoulders. If you 
are convinced that peace ought to be concluded, I am 
quite ready to help you and to discuss your opinion before 
my father." 

The Prince then went to seek the King, and, after 
half an hour, returned to Bismarck, who had been waiting 
for him with an anxiety he could hardly control. " It 
has been hard," said Frederick, "but my father at last 
consented." And he handed the Minister a paper on 
which William I. had hastily written in pencil a few 
remarks which summed up the whole situation : 

"As I find that the President of my Council of 
Ministers sees fit to abandon me in presence of the 
enemy, and as it is impossible for me here to replace him, 
I have discussed the question with my son. He has allied 
himself to the opinion of the President of the Council, 
and I find myself compelled, to my intense sorrow, after 
all the brilliant victories won by my army, to swallow, 
this bitter pill and to accept a shameful peace." 

With this message was concluded the first part of the 
task. The one which remained to Bismarck, though 
difficult, was neither so complicated nor so painful to 
perform. 



n8 Germany under Three Emperors 

It is of interest to compare the impression which the 
Battle of Sadowa and the peace negotiations that had 
followed upon it produced in the Southern States of Ger- 
many, whose future fate depended so entirely on their 
course. Prince Clovis von Hohenlohe, who was a keen 
judge of politics, and at that time had not entirely fallen 
under the influence of Bismarck, records in his diary on 
June 7th, 1866 : " I begin to fear that peace is not quite 
so near as people think. If it is true that Napoleon wants 
to impose too hard conditions on Prussia — as, for instance, 
the reinstatement of the German Princes, the evacuation 
of Bohemia, and so forth — then it is certain that the King 
of Prussia will refuse to accept them, and the natural 
consequence will be that Napoleon will invade the Rhine 
provinces. A good many things speak in favour of this, 
and very likely it would suit the plans of the Emperor if 
Prussia, by refusing the peace conditions, gave him the 
pretext which he requires to occupy Rhineland. This 
might bring a war between Prussia and France, and the 
general entanglement in which affairs would fall in the 
whole of Germany would reach its culminating point. I 
hope that I am mistaken, but it is quite possible that 
affairs may take such a turn." 

A few days later he returns to the subject : " I think 
that though everyone longs for peace, Prussia is dragging 
out the negotiations as long as she can in order to gain 
time and ground. Should an armistice not be concluded, 
then we (the Bavarians) would find ourselves in the very 
difficult position of having to fight with France against 
Prussia, a position which, from the political point of view, 
I should consider dishonourable. The time would very 
soon come when the German conscience would react 
against such an unnatural alliance. On the other hand, 



A Double Misconception 119 

how can we fight against the French and the Austrians 
at the same time ? ' ' 

This extract from the diary of a man who, though a 
stanch partisan of Prussia, was yet in close touch with 
the popular feeling of his country at the time — that feel- 
ing changed considerably later on — proves how thoroughly 
Bismarck had appreciated all the details of the situation 
the victory of Sadowa had created, not only in Prussia, 
but in the whole of Germany. 

An amusing incident, if anything can be called 
amusing in events of such a world-wide importance, is 
the fear which Bismarck owned quite frankly he had of 
a war with France. He had a very high opinion of the 
strength of the French army. Napoleon III., on the 
other hand, felt sincerely afraid of meeting the Prussian 
troops. What is still more curious is that both of these 
men changed their opinion in the four years which were 
to follow; in 1870 Bismarck was absolutely certain that 
the French would be beaten, whilst Napoleon thought he 
could keep his ground against the soldiers of King 
William I. In his favourite game of bluff the Prussian 
had once more scored a triumph; the French Staff had 
gathered a totally false impression as to the degree of 
preparation the Prussians had attained : with very few 
exceptions they believed that war would be a simple walk- 
over from Paris to Berlin. 

The one thing, however, which preoccupied the public 
opinion of Europe at the time I am writing about was 
precisely this attitude of France to which Prince von 
Hohenlohe had referred in the passage which I have 
reproduced from his diary. No one could understand 
Napoleon III., not even his own advisers or Ministers. 
The fact was that the Emperor had been led into a snare, 



120 Germany under Three Emperors 

had realised that he had been entrapped into compromis- 
ing his position, and thought that the best thing to do 
was to allow events to take their course. 

How this trap was laid and baited is as follows. When, 
after his appointment as President of the Council and 
Foreign Minister, Bismarck had returned to Paris to 
present his letters of recall, he had not done so without 
intention. The fact was that he desired to sound Napoleon 
as to the possibility of his consenting to the annexation 
of Luxemburg by France, and eventually of Belgium. 
Napoleon had replied that it was impossible to discuss 
such a question at a moment when absolutely no com- 
plications with England threatened the peace of Europe. 
But he had asked the Prussian Minister to give him in 
writing his views on the subject. Bismarck had been far 
too clever to refuse : he replied that he would have to 
consult William I., whose views he had not yet had the 
time to ascertain. When, in 1865, he returned to France 
and visited Biarritz, Bismarck renewed his conversation 
with the Emperor and told him that, considering the 
gravity of the subject, it were perhaps just as well if he 
could have the French views compactly expressed in a 
precis so as not to make any mistake when talking about 
it with the King of Prussia. Napoleon, therefore, added 
a few words to a private letter which he gave to Bismarck. 
This letter was carefully put aside. During the negotia- 
tions that took place at Nikolsburg the question came 
up once more, whereupon Bismarck gave Benedetti to 
understand that Prussia would very willingly subscribe to 
any views which France might have in regard to Belgium. 
This was done in such a clever manner that the French 
Ambassador appeared to have been the one to formulate 
the demand which, in reality, had proceeded from Prussia 



Trapping Napoleon 121 

itself, the terms of which were published in the famous 
paragraph that went the rounds of the European Press 
in 1870 as the expression of the desires of the Emperor 
Napoleon, and the price which he had required for his 
abstention from going to the rescue of Austria in 1866 : 
"We must have an ostensible Treaty granting to us the 
acquisition of Luxemburg, and a secret one stipulating 
an offensive alliance between France and Prussia, which 
would recognise the right of the former to seize Belgium 
when the Government of the Emperor should consider 
it as opportune and necessary to its interests." 

The initiative in this iniquity seemed therefore to have 
belonged to France. That was all that Bismarck required, 
and we have seen the use which he made of it later on, 
when, for the advantage of his policy, he referred to this 
disgraceful negotiation. It has previously been made 
public that Napoleon wanted to protest against this half 
revelation and to disclose all the circumstances which had 
attended his conversations with Bismarck at Paris as well 
as at Biarritz, and the Empress, too, wished it. But — and 
here comes the supreme iniquity — the German Chancellor 
caused a message to be conveyed to the Sovereign to the 
effect that he still possessed the minute of his offer, written 
in the hand of Napoleon III., and that he should not 
hesitate to make use of it if necessary. With the alterna- 
tive, therefore, of being made to appear either as fool 
or knave, the Emperor could only resign himself to 
his fate. 

Feeling sure that he had muzzled France, and irre- 
trievably compromised the Imperial Government, Bis- 
marck proceeded to sign the peace Treaty as outlined at 
Nikolsburg. That was the second step toward his great 
plan of Empire. He could now proceed with calm and 



122 Germany under Three Emperors 

energy toward its development — the Prussian Chamber 
had at last recognised the wisdom of his conduct. In the 
new battle which he was prepared to fight in the Chamber 
he could claim liberty to lead his King toward an Im- 
perial throne and his country toward the domination of 
a submissive Europe. For this was his aim, a submissive 
Europe ; one in which the only god would be militarism, 
the only right that of the gun and of the sword, the 
only Monarch the King of Prussia, and the only law that 
of Prussia. 



Part II 
The Process of Union 



CHAPTER IX 

First Steps to Empire 

I HAVE always wondered why it has become the 
custom to speak of the so-called will of Peter the 
Great, a document which has never existed, yet no 
mention has ever been made by historians of certain 
instructions left by the Great Elector to his successors, in 
which were formulated these principles of conquest and 
of compulsory annexation that have actuated his de- 
scendants. These instructions exist nevertheless, and 
though, of course, I have never actually read them, I 
often heard of them, not only through the late Frederick 
III. himself, but also one evening from the Emperor 
William I., when, in reviewing the different phases of the 
Austrian and French campaigns, he let fall some remarks 
concerning the fidelity with which his dynasty has con- 
formed itself to the desires of its illustrious ancestor. 
The sense of this document, which, I believe, is always 
given to every Prussian Monarch to read immediately 
after his accession, is to the effect that Prussia ought 
never to rest until she had reached a preponderant posi- 
tion in Germany. Of course, the existence of this paper 
was known to Bismarck, and most probably he made use 
of it to touch the sentimentality of William I. so far as 
to bring that Monarch to believe in the plans of his chief 
Minister. Nevertheless, Bismarck knew that the un- 
hoped-for result of the Prusso- Austrian war was but the 

125 



126 Germany under Three Emperors 

first step to the colossal work with which the Great 
Elector charged his descendants. 

An aspect of the new situation which Bismarck antici- 
pated with no little anxiety was the way in which the 
foreign Powers would view the sudden aggrandisement 
of Prussia, and with what eyes they would look upon its 
new importance as a factor in the European situation. 
He was very well aware that a good many people con- 
sidered that the internal position could only be tem- 
porary, if for no other reason, because of the discontent 
which the new order of things was sure to arouse in the 
Southern provinces. 

But when it came to the foreign relations of Prussia 
with the other great European Powers, the question was 
sure to become even more complicated. Bismarck con- 
sidered as absolutely certain that a war with France would 
quickly follow upon the one he had just brought to a 
succcessful issue ; he never lost sight of eventuality. He 
knew that the Southern States would infinitely prefer 
the renewal of the old Rhine Confederation created by 
Napoleon I., under the supremacy and the influence of 
France, to an alliance with Prussia, and he therefore set 
himself to the task of thwarting this possibility by culti- 
vating good relations with certain important political 
personages in the Southern States, with whose concur- 
rence he hoped to be able to carry through his schemes. 

The first step was the organisation of the North 
German Confederation ; the second without meanwhile 
provoking the hostility of France and of Russia, or 
giving occasion to Austria to develop a thirst for 
revenge. Nor were these all the points needing careful 
negotiation ! At the same time Bismarck had to beware 
lest King William I. should put forward too openly his 



The Underlying Reason 127 

Prussian dynastic ambitions. A war with France was 
indispensable to the achievement of Prussian schemes, 
but it were wiser to wait a few years until the Prussian 
army, through its new military laws, had been rein- 
forced by strong contingents from the newly conquered 
provinces of Hanover, Hesse and Holstein. He also 
hoped before war became inevitable to bring in the 
Southern provinces of Germany. Until this had been 
done Bismarck's policy was to prevent by every means a 
war with France. 

Herein lies the secret of the entirely conciliating atti- 
tude of 1867, when the question of the cession of Luxem- 
burg to Napoleon III. in exchange for a sum of money 
arose ; for this reason Prussian troops evacuated the 
fortress of Luxemburg without hesitation. Bismarck 
was perfectly well aware that in the game he meant to 
play he could not count on the help of anyone. Italy 
would never have engaged herself to march against 
France. Russia also, in spite of the family ties which 
bound the Tsar with the Prussian dynasty and of his 
personal affection for his uncle King William I., was 
disinclined to favour any further accession of power on 
the part of a State which, in an incredibly short time, 
had risen from a subordinate rank to one of considerable 
importance. Prince Gortschakov in particular had always 
been suspicious of the intentions of the Berlin Cabinet, 
and if we are to believe a communication M. Drouyn de 
Lhyys, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, made to 
the Saxon Envoy in Paris, Count Vitzthum of Eckstadt, 
Gortschakov, during that eventful month of July, 1866, 
which had seen the Austrian defeat at Sadowa, had invited 
the Emperor Napoleon III. to join the Russian Govern- 
ment in a protest against the suppression of the German 



128 Germany under Three Emperors 

Confederation. The French Sovereign had refused to 
associate himself with the idea, saying that the matter 
was a purely German affair with which foreign Powers 
had no right to interfere. But the fact that such an 
eventuality had been contemplated was more than suffi- 
cient to excite the apprehensions of such a shrewd and 
far-seeing mind as that of Bismarck, who felt the more 
worried in that he knew very well that Prussia would 
find no sympathy in London either. Yet, notwith- 
standing these perplexing omens, it was essential for him 
to make sure of the neutrality of all the Great Powers 
before he could hope to execute his deeply laid schemes 
against France without becoming entangled in most 
unpleasant complications. 

At home, too, the Prussian policy of dominance 
was beset with serious difficulties. Although Bismarck's 
triumphs had won him a considerable number of parti- 
sans, and even some passionate admirers, he had not 
silenced all his former enemies, some of whom had the 
ear of the King of Prussia. Doctor Maurice von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg, the grandfather of the present German 
Chancellor, was one such. He even went so far as to 
write to William I. detailing all the dangers which, in 
his opinion, were bound to follow on a policy that was 
tending to tear Germany asunder by a fratricidal war. 
The doctor even went so far as to tell to his Royal 
master that he felt sure Austria would show herself ready 
to comply with the Prussian demands if only the Foreign 
Minister were superseded. 

Another great personality, Mgr. Melchers, Arch- 
bishop of Cologne, whose opinion the King had asked 
for through the intermediary of my uncle, Prince 
Boguslas Radziwill, also spoke in the same strain. I 



The Archbishop Pleads 129 

mention the incident in order to reproduce the reply of 
William I. The Archbishop begged his Sovereign to 
stop before plunging the whole of Germany into a war 
which might mean the total annihilation of Prussia. But 
when his letter reached William I. Bismarck had already 
persuaded the King of the absolute justice of his cause. 
He replied, therefore, to the Archbishop by a long 
epistle, explaining that the perfidy of Austria had brought 
about the lamentable crisis which none deplored more 
than he did himself. He began by stating that ever 
since the Seven Years' War Austria had sought to force 
Prussia into the position of a second-rate Power, and 
even the results, the " glorious results," as he called 
them, of the campaign of 1864 against Denmark had 
not made her renounce this determination, though she 
ought to have seen that if she had allied herself with 
Prussia truly and sincerely they could together have kept 
the whole of Europe in check. " Austria," added Wil- 
liam I., " has accumulated lies upon lies, calumnies upon 
calumnies, paid the Press in the whole of the world to 
excite it against us, and has not hesitated before any 
treachery, to rouse public opinion against Prussia, to 
represent her as greedy for conquest, and, by this cam- 
paign of libel, to excite the whole of Germany against 
her. This is the villainy that has brought us to the point 
where we stand at present! No State that respects 
itself," he went on, " could remain indifferent in the 
presence of such facts. Austria suddenly, and without 
any warning, concentrated troops on her frontiers. 
During the last session of the Diet at Frankfurt, by her 
action in bringing before the Assembly the question of 
the Duchies — which, according to this Convention, was 
to have been settled by Prussia together with Austria 
J 



130 Germany under Three Emperors 

alone — she has destroyed the Convention she signed at 
Gastein. Lies and perfidies have attended all her actions. 
I therefore turn my eyes toward God and, certain to be 
approved by Him, and to act for the best interests and 
for the sake of the honour of my kingdom and my people, 
I have decided to draw the sword. ..." He ended his 
letter by asking the Archbishop to pray for him and for 
the success of the Prussian arms. 

This curious letter proves how constant Prussia has 
remained throughout her political existence, to the 
hypocrisy of which she has given such proofs since the 
beginning of the present war. The remark that it was 
a lie to represent her as eager for conquest, in the 
presence of what was to follow, was perhaps the most 
terrible piece of irony in history. 

The first action of Bismarck after the signature of the 
Treaty of Nikolsburg had been to try to conciliate the 
Prussian Chamber. A bill of indemnity for the expenses 
which the country had incurred on account of the war 
was presented by him and accepted without any trouble, 
the more so that he had taken good care to have its 
appearance heralded by a Royal message which informed 
the Deputies that Prussia had annexed Hanover, Elec- 
toral Hesse, the town of Frankfurt and the Duchy of 
Nassau, to which later on were added those of Holstein 
and of Schleswig. Indemnities were also imposed on 
Bavaria, Wurtemberg, the Grand Duchy of Baden — 
notwithstanding the family ties which bound it to the 
Royal House of Prussia — and Hesse Darmstadt. Surely 
this was sufficient to satisfy even the most ferocious 
Prussian appetite. But the clever statesman wanted 
something more, and contrived to persuade Saxony, as 
well as the States of Southern Germany, to conclude 



French Heedlessness 131 

Treaties with Prussia, giving her control of their armies ; 
a formidable clause which, even now, it is hardly possible 
to believe that he actually deluded them to accept. 
Having accomplished these things, Bismarck then entirely 
reorganised the new North German Confederation under 
the presidency of Prussia, consolidating her position so 
effectually that Prussia had no need to mistrust her 
ability to break down the line of the Mein, which 
Napoleon had hoped to establish as a barrier between 
France and the King of Prussia's ambitions. 

At this period the French Government could have 
interfered, but French politicians would not believe in 
the danger which was hovering over their heads, and 
this in spite of warnings which they received from every 
side, and Napoleon began his negotiation with Holland 
for the acquisition of Luxemburg, which was to become 
so fatal for his future prestige. 

Of course, it had never been in the intentions of 
Prussia to allow France to secure Luxemburg into her 
possession, and whilst Bismarck was encouraging 
Napoleon III. in his dreams of annexation he conducted 
an underhand intrigue at the Hague to bring Napoleon's 
plans to naught. The existence of the Treaties which 
he had concluded with the Southern German States was 
revealed by Bismarck, the knowledge of which fright- 
ened Holland, as he expected it would. He did more 
than this, he caused the Prussian Envoy at the Hague 
to signify to the King of the Netherlands that Prussia 
would consider the cession of Luxemburg to France as 
a casus belli. The Monarch hastened to break off nego- 
tiations. In case, however, Napoleon might be influenced 
by public opinion to enter into an open conflict with 
Prussia, Bismarck instantly proceeded to call together 



132 Germany under Three Emperors 

a Conference in London, which settled the question of 
the neutrality of Luxemburg, and insisted that the 
Prussian troops in occupation of the principal fortress 
in the Duchy should evacuate it. This settlement 
allayed the irritation felt in Paris, but was very badly 
received in Berlin. The situation did not trouble Bis- 
marck, who knew very well that he had not been the 
dupe in the transaction, the result of which had been 
to engage an honourable nation like the French to respect 
the neutrality of that same Luxemburg, the frontiers of 
which were to be forced by the Prussian troops on the 
very first day of the present war. Verily the most 
solemn treaties were nothing more in the eyes of Prussia 
than mere scraps of paper. 

King William I. visited Paris in 1867, at the invita- 
tion of Napoleon, to see the great Exhibition which had 
just then been opened. He was given a magnificent 
reception. The appearance of Bismarck, who was with 
the King, produced a great impression upon the people 
of the French capital. His colossal stature, in his white 
cuirassier uniform, fitted their ideas of his massive per- 
sonality. He was immensely admired. One of the 
features of this exhibition — so cynical is destiny — was 
the success of the new Krupp field guns, which were there 
shown for the first time to the people they were to 
destroy three years later. 

The three years following upon the Prusso- Austrian 
war was perhaps the most fertile period in the whole of 
that long struggle of Prussia for power and position. 
Her chief Minister set to work to consolidate his task 
and to lay the foundation upon which the German 
Empire, which was to absorb the new Confederation, was 
to be built. During those years every means was brought 



Prince Clovis Hohenlohe 133 

to bear upon the task of winning the sympathies and 
the help of people who could prove of use to Prussia. 
Especially was this propaganda active in the South of 
Germany, where Bismarck knew that few cared for 
Prussia, and all would have been only too glad to escape 
from the chains she had contrived to wind around the 
recalcitrant States. In Baden the thing was relatively 
easy, but in Bavaria it is doubtful whether anything 
would ever have been achieved had it not been for the 
activity of Prince Clovis von Hohenlohe, the future 
German Ambassador in Paris, and later on Chancellor 
of the German Empire. 

Prince Clovis was a very shrewd man, a statesman 
of experience and of weight, who, though not a political 
genius, had yet a very clear outlook upon the difficulties 
of his time. He was a grand seigneur of the old type, 
one whose position was so great that he could afford to 
ignore snubs and criticisms, and who, thanks to his 
family connections and to his intimacy with the Prussian 
Royal family, was better able than any contemporary 
to make his voice heard in his native Bavaria, where he 
was a great landowner and a most important personage 
at Court. One of his brothers was the famous Cardinal 
Hohenlohe, whose political activities in Rome during 
the Kulturkampf, and especially in the years immedi- 
ately preceding it, were so strongly criticised. It was 
said, by the way, that at one time Bismarck seriously 
thought of putting forward, and backing with his in- 
fluence, the Cardinal as a candidate for the Papal throne. 
If this were so it would have been at the suggestion of 
the Duke of Ratibor, who was the enterprising and 
pushing man of the family. Another of the Hohenlohe 
brothers was High Chamberlain and Master of the House- 



134 Germany under Three Emperors 

hold of the Emperor of Austria, whilst the eldest, the 
Duke of Ratibor, was perhaps one of the most influential 
persons in Berlin and in Silesia, where he possessed vast 
domains. 

In spite of his Bavarian origin, Prince Clovis at heart 
was a convinced Prussian and a stanch partisan of a close 
union between Bavaria and Prussia. For three years he 
held the office of Bavarian Minister President, and 
directed the affairs of this country entirely upon Prussian 
lines : he really believed in the necessity of the restora- 
tion of a German Empire under the protection of Prussia. 
Without him it is hardly likely that the adhesion of the 
German Southern States would have been secured so 
easily as, from his Memoirs, they proved to be. The 
Prince recalls the negotiations that passed between 
Berlin, Munich and Karlsruhe, and in which he was one 
of the principal instruments. He it was who signed the 
secret Convention with Prussia which gave full control of 
the Bavarian troops. At the same time it must be remem- 
bered to his credit that he stipulated for the preservation 
of the integrity, as well as of the Sovereign rights, of 
Bavaria. Bismarck did not dissent, because he knew 
that otherwise it would be impossible to persuade King 
Ludwig II. to give his assent to the new military arrange- 
ment ; and, after all, that was the only thing which was 
wanted by the wire-puller at Berlin. 

Prince Clovis made a curious report to the King of 
Bavaria on the matter. He argued that it was a necessity 
not only to support Prussian politics, but also to con- 
clude a treaty of alliance with her; such an alliance, he 
emphasised, would be the best guarantee for the future 
peace of Europe and for the welfare of the Bavarian 
State. Whether he was really convinced of this or not 



Manipulating Bavaria 135 

it is difficult to say. Prince von Hohenlohe, though 
essentially an honest man and incapable of anything 
mean, yet was a decided opportunist, as all his career 
proved. Whether he acted out of what he believed to 
have been true patriotism, or in view of a high ambition, 
is, of course, unknown to us. My personal impression, 
and I have known him well, always was that, in a mar- 
vellous manner, he could conciliate his honesty and his 
convictions with political necessities such as they appeared, 
but not always such as they were. His remarks, for in- 
stance, concerning the tragic death of King Ludwig II. of 
Bavaria. This tragedy, which at the time occupied the 
attention of the whole world, is dismissed with half a page 
of trite, uninteresting reference in his Memoirs. 

During the years Prince Clovis remained at the head 
of the Bavarian Ministry he contrived to inspire Bis- 
marck with a high idea of his prudence and self-control, 
allied to a rare discretion ; he always thought twice 
before starting and a dozen times before doing anything. 
Without his manipulation of public affairs in Bavaria 
Bismarck perceived quite well that his task would have 
been much more difficult than was actually the case. 
The Prussian Minister found in Prince von Hohenlohe 
the best ally he could have wished for, and it is interest- 
ing to watch the consummate art which the latter brought 
to bear upon the task of persuading his own Sovereign 
to decide for or against Prussia without giving Lud- 
wig II. the least suspicion that such a pronouncement 
could only be academical, as, for instance, was the 
Luxemburg affair. 

Of course, the real aim pursued by Bismarck was to 
decide the Bavarian Government to burn its ships and 
to compromise itself to such an extent that it could 



136 Germany under Three Emperors 

neither hesitate nor draw back. Once this was done he 
could sleep quietly and await, if not exactly with indif- 
ference, at least without apprehension, the development 
of events. The question of Luxemburg gave him the 
opportunity he required, and Prince von Hohenlohe, as 
we shall see, became the instrument whereby the oppor- 
tunity was wielded to Prussia's benefit. 



CHAPTER X 

Welding the Southern States 

AS soon as peace had been concluded with Austria, 
ii. Prussia devoted her whole attention to the com- 
plicated question of winning over the German Southern 
States, among which Bavaria was, of course, the most 
important. Bismarck's natural genius for intrigue had 
at once told him that the first thing to be done was to put 
at the side of the King of Bavaria a man on whom he 
could absolutely rely, and who at the same time could not 
be suspected of being his tool. It was then that the Duke 
of Ratibor, with whom he had always stood upon excellent 
terms, mentioned to him his brother Clovis, whom Bis- 
marck knew but slightly, but about whose character, 
opinions, and general ideas he was very well informed. 
The Hohenlohes were all ambitious, and the Schillingsfurst 
branch of that family was not over-burdened with worldly 
goods, except the eldest of the four Hohenlohe brothers, 
the Duke of Ratibor, who had inherited part of the for- 
tune of his uncle, the Landgrave of Hesse-Rothenbourg, 
together with the castle of Rauden, in Silesia, and the title 
of Duke of Ratibor. The second brother, Prince Clovis, 
by a family arrangement, found himself in possession of 
the entailed estate and castle of Schillingsfurst, but found 
it so encumbered that he had great trouble to make both 
ends meet, notwithstanding the fact that he had married 
a relatively rich woman. This was one of the reasons 
which had made him choose an official career, knowing 

137 



138 Germany under Three Emperors 

very well that his name and title would easily ensure for 
him lucrative appointments. Very possibly the Duke 
suggested to Bismarck that his brother Clovis would make 
an excellent Prime Minister, able to guide in the desired 
direction the young King of Bavaria, whose originalities 
had already attracted the notice of the public. The diffi- 
culty was to make Clovis acceptable to the Monarch, as his 
liberal ideas were widely divergent from those entertained 
by the Bavarian Royal Family, who were ultramontanists 
and clericals. At this juncture Count von Holnstein 
comes on the scene. He was then Master of the Horse 
to Ludwig. He it was who, many years later, played such 
a sinister part in the tragedy which brought about the 
terrible death of the King. Holnstein was always in want 
of money, and it became an easy thing for Prussia to make 
a friend of him. He quickly agreed to mention the name 
of Prince von Hohenlohe to his Royal master. Not long 
afterwards Ludwig II. called Prince Clovis as his adviser, 
and entrusted him with the task of forming a Cabinet. 
Deluding himself that the idea had been exclusively his 
own, Ludwig became most eager to carry it through, the 
more so that it had reached his ears that Hohenlohe had 
not shared the general opinion in Bavaria, that the exile 
of Wagner, who was at that time in full favour with the 
King, was a necessity. Even if no other reason had 
existed, this was sufficient to make Ludwig II. eager to 
have among his Ministers a man whose great name, posi- 
tion, and general reputation would make him independent 
of party influence. 

The appointment of Prince Hohenlohe, which was 
opposed not only by public opinion in Bavaria but also 
by the Royal family, sealed the fate of his native country, 
and definitely gave it up to Prussian influence. It had 



Prussian Influence in Munich 139 

been very cleverly worked. Bismarck had contrived to 
imbue several people who were in constant communication 
with King Ludwig II. with the conviction that it was the 
best choice the latter could make, inasmuch as the personal 
character of the Prince put him entirely out of reach of 
any interested motives. Although financial matters had 
nothing to do with the eager consent of Prince Hohenlohe 
to assume the direction of Bavarian politics, he was not 
above the satisfaction of seeing his income, which was most 
moderate for his rank, increased in a comfortable manner. 
His was of an eminently practical nature in that respect, 
as he later on gave many proofs, especially when upon 
being asked by Bismarck to take upon himself the func- 
tions of Vice-Chancellor, he declared that he could not do 
so unless his salary as an Ambassador was maintained. 
This, however, occurred when he was already an old man, 
and suffering from a tendency to stinginess that increased 
as time went by. 

In 1866 I think the principal aim of Prince Clovis was 
to establish Prussian influence in Munich upon a firm 
basis. He was a convinced Imperialist, and a decided 
adversary of Austria and of Austrian politics. The pro- 
gramme which he laid before the King of Bavaria when, 
on the last day of December, 1866, he assumed office as 
Minister of the Royal Household and President of the 
Council, was in itself a revelation, and it corresponded so 
well with Bismarck's own ideas on the subject that the 
latter caused the Duke of Ratibor to write congratulating 
his brother upon his efficient co-operation, and to convey 
a promise to remember always the good services which he 
had rendered to the Hohenzollern dynasty by his hand- 
ling of Ludwig II. 

In February, 1867, conferences between representa- 



140 Germany under Three Emperors 

tives of the Southern States took place in Stuttgart, under 
the presidency of the Wurtemberg Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Herr von Varnbiiler, and, owing to the influence 
of Prince von Hohenlohe, these conferences settled the 
broad lines upon which the future union with Prussia was 
to become an accomplished fact. The items were formu- 
lated in a long report, which the Prince addressed to the 
Grand Duke of Baden, a personal friend of his, who for 
that reason had been selected by mutual consent between 
Prince Clovis and Bismarck. The conference was to 
assume the appearance of an absolutely independent 
assembly, actuated by pure patriotic motives in its resolu- 
tions and decisions, and therefore Bismarck stood out- 
wardly aloof from its deliberations. The Grand Duke of 
Baden was the son-in-law of King William I., and a 
decided partisan of Bismarck. Hence the choice of the 
Grand Duke as a mouthpiece before the Conferences. 
It was astonishing, indeed, how long Bismarck was able 
to speak undiscovered through other lips. 

Among the resolutions voted bjr the Stuttgart Confer- 
ence was one connected with secret Conventions between 
Prussia and the Southern States, which gave to the former 
full military control. At first the existence of such an 
agreement was not disclosed or suspected. Then the 
Luxemburg affair cropped up, and, in view of the im- 
pression this would produce in Holland, Bismarck deemed 
it advisable to publish its terms. He advised the Duke of 
Ratibor to write in that sense to his brother, and the latter 
then mentioned it to the Grand Duke of Baden, asking 
him for his views in regard to this important affair. In the 
meanwhile Bismarck had summoned Prince Reuss to 
Berlin, whence Henry of Reuss wrote in the following 
terms to Prince Hohenlohe : 



What Prince Henry of Reuss Wrote 141 

"Berlin, February 20, 1867. 
" I arrived here yesterday morning, and saw Count von 
Bismarck at once. I related a lot of things concerning 
you and affairs in Munich. I need not tell you that he 
wishes you all kinds of good luck and full success in your 
handling of your Ministry; he will do everything in his 
power to give you all the support you may need. I have 
discussed with him the wishes which you have expressed 
to me concerning the disclosure of the existence of the 
secret Treaty. Count Bismarck recognised that it would 
be pleasanter for you and for the Wurtemberg Govern- 
ment, as well as advantageous for your position in regard 
to your country, to admit the secret Treaty. Personally, 
he has nothing against that course, but he would like to 
wait until after the debate in the French Chambers con- 
cerning the announced interpellation in regard to the 
foreign policy of the Imperial Government. 1 Then he 
thinks the matter had better leak out through apparent 
indiscretions in the newspapers. He would like to learn 
your opinion on this subject, and to know whether you 
would like publicity to be given to the affair in some other 
way. Count Bismarck has further commissioned me to 
tell you, that should you feel the necessity or the wish in 
this, or in any other kind of business, to address yourself 
directly to him, he would most willingly enter into private 
correspondence with you. He has absolute confidence in 
Werthern, 2 but believes it would be perhaps advisable, 
until you had learned to know W. better, to address your- 
self directly to him (Bismarck). He considers Montgelas 3 
as a good business man, and an honest one too ; but this 

1 This took place from the 14th to the 18th of March. 

8 Baron Werthern had just been appointed Prussian Minister in Munich, in 
place of Prince Reuss. 

J Count Montgelas was the Bavarian Envoy in Berlin. 



142 Germany under Three Emperors 

is all, and it is hardly possible to enter upon more intimate 
relations with him." 

When one reads between the lines of this letter, the 
design which lurks behind such a letter is seen. Appar- 
ently a businesslike communication, it is couched in terms 
which could only natter the personal vanity of the man to 
whom it was addressed, and open to him at the same time 
the road to further intimacy and acquaintance with politi- 
cal schemes of high statesmanship. 

As a complement to this letter we have one of the 
Duke of Ratibor, who, in a certain sense, was the deus 
ex machina entrusted with the mission of urging his 
brother to lend himself to the vast designs of the man with 
whom the whole of Europe was learning to count. 

" Berlin. 
66 1 have been at a ball at the house of Putbus, where 
I had opportunity to talk with Bismarck. He began the 
conversation by offering me a glass of champagne and 
asking me to drink to your health and success. I then 
related to him what you had written to me, and he agrees 
that you ought to proceed with great caution. One does 
not require here anything more from Bavaria than what 
she is willing to give. The material interests of the South 
of Germany require a Treaty with the North German 
Confederation, because, without such a Treaty, the 
Customs Union and the whole welfare of the Southern 
States would be compromised. This is the point which 
one cannot sufficiently put before the eyes of people 
there. Bismarck, however, advises great caution and no 
undue haste. He takes the greatest interest in everything 
which goes on at Munich. 




A Prince as Pawn 143 

" The Queen also spoke with me yesterday in the same 
sense, and she asks me to give you her best regards. Field- 
Marshal Wrangel also wishes you much luck in all your 
enterprises, hopes all will go well in the future as it has 
done until the present day, and sends you his compliments. 
Herr von Wincke has also had a word concerning you, and 
is very glad to know you are doing so well. You can see 
from this that you are in favour here with all parties. 
Bismarck also considers as a matter of course the conduct 
which Bavaria has held in regard to the other South 
German States, and he has refused to accept all the pro- 
positions made by Wurtemberg and Baden, when they 
were not presented in agreement and simultaneously with 
those formulated by Bavaria." 

In the present case Bavaria meant Prince von Hohen- 
lohe, and the reader will draw his own conclusions regard- 
ing the cleverness with which Bismarck contrived not 
only to win him over to his point of view, but also to 
transform him into the very best political instrument he 
had ever had at his disposal. 

One may perhaps wonder why the future Chancellor 
took such trouble to reconcile to his policy individuals 
instead of States. He knew that it is easier to convince 
men than nations, and that certain men have dominating 
power. In the case of Prince von Hohenlohe there were 
psychological reasons which rendered him liable to be 
allured by the prospect of becoming one of the pillars of 
the new Empire. These reasons were connected with 
his position and standing in Germany. Few people 
abroad have got an idea of what it meant to be a 
mediatised Prince in Germany at the beginning of last 
century — the period of Prince Clovis. He had not yet 



144 Germany under Three Emperors 

had time to be relieved of the conviction that he was in 
nowise relegated to a different status to that of any Royal 
family with whom, indeed, he could still marry on a 
footing of equality. The Hohenlohes, Solms, Salms, Ben- 
tincks, Wittgensteins had each been Sovereigns once 
upon a time of a State. Small and insignificant, it is 
true, but Sovereigns all the same, and considered as 
such by the Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns and Wittels- 
bachs. Circumstances had deprived them of certain of 
their rights, but of none of their privileges, and certainly 
of none of their arrogance. At heart they had never 
reconciled themselves to the change which had overtaken 
their independence, and they had in consequence been 
more accessible than private individuals would have shown 
themselves to the idea that what had befallen them ought 
also to befall those other German Princes who had 
escaped becoming mediatised. They never for one 
single moment admitted in their hearts that they were 
but the subjects of the Kings of Prussia, Bavaria or 
Wiirtemberg, and they took great care to keep up certain 
advantages of rank and of station which had been left 
to them. For instance, they conserved the right of 
notifying to the other German Sovereigns every family 
event that took place among them, such as births, mar- 
riages and deaths, and of doing so in the ceremonious 
terms fixed at the Congress of Vienna, which carefully 
preserved their former Sovereign status and permitted 
them to address as equals those German Monarchs who 
had kept their independence. Prince von Hohenlohe 
had succumbed to this weakness, though his ambition 
had told him that it would be in his interest to conceal 
the fact. But conscious that, had things been different, 
he might have been a Sovereign, he was not sorry to 



The Grand Duke of Baden 145 

see in the new developments that all the German Princes* 
whether Kings, Grand Dukes, Dukes, or merely 
Princes, would become no more than the Peers of the 
new Empire. 

Among the various people who, during these event- 
ful years which followed upon the war with Austria, 
took an active part in all the negotiations that were 
taking place in the South of Germany, the Grand Duke 
of Baden displayed the greatest activity. He had strong 
personal reasons for his hostility to Austria, where he 
had met with slights that he could not bring himself to 
forgive. Bismarck, with whom he was in complete 
accord until the accession of the present Kaiser, but 
whose bitter enemy he was to become later on, used 
the Grand Duke whenever it became necessary for him 
to convey either to the King of Prussia or to some other 
Sovereign an idea with which he did not think it wise 
or opportune to associate himself. It was principally on 
the initiative of the Grand Duke, indeed, that the mili- 
tary Conventions which in the long run, and in spite of 
the opposition which they encountered in Bavaria as 
well as in Wiirtemberg, were accepted by the Govern- 
ment of both these countries, though never viewed with 
contented eyes by their population. 

The work of pulling through these secret Treaties 
was not such a light one as even Bismarck himself had 
imagined. In Munich the King, who was influenced 
by the members of his family, and who personally hated 
Prussia and everything Prussian, did not wish to hear 
anything concerning the handing over of his army to the 
control of a nation which he detested, and of which his 
father on his death-bed had advised him to beware. At 
no time had the Imperialist idea exercised any fascination 



146 Germany under Three Emperors 

on the mind of Ludwig II., and he did not wish in the 
least to be considered as a German Prince, being quite 
content as a King of Bavaria. Later on, when he was 
induced under false pretences to write the famous letter 
which decided the proclamation of the Empire at Ver- 
sailles, it was because he had been told that this Imperial 
dignity he was helping to revive would be alternately the 
property of the Hohenzollerns and of the Wittelsbachs, 
and that it was only the great age of the King of Prussia 
that had caused him to be the first to wear an Imperial 
crown. At that time Prince von Hohenlohe was no 
longer Bavarian Prime Minister, having been obliged to 
abandon office before the war of 1870 owing to the un- 
popularity of his Prussian policy. No responsibility, 
therefore, for this error of Ludwig can be attached to 
Prince Clovis, but whether during his years of power he 
had whispered something of the kind in the ear of the 
King is a point which I should not care to deny. 

What is certain is that reports which Prince Clovis 
presented to his Royal master during the time that he 
remained his adviser were couched in terms emphasising 
that the only means by which Bavaria could escape the 
dangers with which she was beset was its union with Prus- 
sia. He characterised these perils as terrifying, but always 
evaded saying in what direction they lay. On March 20th, 
1867, he penned a long document to his Sovereign on 
that theme, in which, among other things, he said : 
" The danger which awaits the kingdom, should it remain 
in its present condition, is twofold : First, every Euro- 
pean complication, no matter to the advantage of whom 
it begins and ends, once it touches Germany, will put in 
the greatest danger the welfare as well as the indepen- 
dence of Bavaria. Then the longing of the German people 



Ludwig II. Agrees 147 

to fulfil its national destiny, in spite of the opposition 
which it may meet on the part of those who rule it, can 
only bring about a civil war that would imperil the 
existence of the dynasty. Therefore the efforts of the 
Bavarian Government ought to be directed toward the 
following desirable achievements : 

" (a) To contract alliances that would nullify the 
danger of European complications, and 

"(b) To bring about a national unity of the whole 
of Germany which would satisfy the just requirements 
of the nation without infringing the Sovereign rights of 
your Majesty or touching upon the integrity and the 
independence of Bavaria." 

Prince Hohenlohe proceeded, in this lengthy docu- 
ment, to develop arguments which he believed to be the 
more likely to convert the King to his point of view, 
and then attempted to explain what, in his opinion, had 
been the real purport of the peace between Austria and 
Prussia as accepted at Nikolsburg and finally signed at 
Prague on August 23rd, 1866. 

" Article IV. of that Treaty," he wrote, " stipulates 
that Germany is to be reconstituted without any inter- 
ference, and with the exclusion, of Austria . . . that 
the South- Western German States are left at liberty to 
ally themselves with the North of Germany, but that . . . 
the South- Western States are to retain an international 
independent existence, notwithstanding their having 
entered into the new Confederation." 

The King allowed himself to be influenced by this 
report as well as by the personal arguments of Prince 
Hohenlohe during the several conversations which he had 
with him on that same subject, and he agreed that nego- 
tiations should be opened with Prussia on the basis 



148 Germany under Three Emperors 

indicated to him by his Minister. His family, however, 
did not agree with him, and bitter controversies between 
them took place in consequence. The Bavarian aris- 
tocracy also was entirely against Prussia, and considered 
Hohenlohe almost in the light of a deserter, the more so 
because of his unorthodox religious opinions. Taking all 
these facts into account, one can but feel surprised that 
the Prince, who later on abandoned office on much 
slighter provocation, held firmly to it at a time when 
he found arrayed against him not only public opinion, 
but all the political parties in the kingdom; and the 
thought involuntarily occurs that he must have had very 
powerful reasons to ignore the attacks to which not only 
his political conduct but also his personality were sub- 
jected from every side. 

Once Ludwig II. had given Prince Hohenlohe the 
authorisation to begin negotiations with Wurtemberg 
and Baden upon a more definite basis than had been talked 
about during the Stuttgart Conference, Clovis lost no 
time in forcing matters along, and they progressed more 
or less satisfactorily, though the Delegate of Wiirtem- 
berg, Herr von Varnbuler, admitted that it would not 
be an easy thing to get the country unanimously to 
acquiesce. Perhaps Bismarck also saw that Bavaria would 
raise objections to the Prussian propositions, because it 
was just about that time that he let loose the Luxemburg 
complication which, as he expected, would give to the 
hesitating spirits, who had failed to grasp the extent of the 
so-called advantages which a closer union of the Southern 
States with Prussia might bring, the necessary impulse 
they required to accept the inevitable. 

The first knowledge that something was wrong reached 
Munich through a telegram dispatched by Bismarck to 



The Luxemburg Incident 149 

the Prussian Envoy in Munich, Baron von Werthern, 
on April 1st, 1867, in which he told him that : 

" It would be desirable if your Excellency could 
ascertain and let me know what impression the proposed 
selling of Luxemburg to France produces on the Bavarian 
Cabinet, and what would be the feelings of that country 
in case we came to an understanding with France on this 
subject." 

Werthern consulted with Hohenlohe, and then 
replied : 

" Public opinion expects that Prussia will uphold the 
rights of Germany in regard to Luxemburg." 

That this, however, was not so certain as the Prussian 
Minister tried to make out can be surmised from a 
remark of Hohenlohe that Werthern ought not to lay 
too great a stress on the last point, as public opinion might 
easily be turned. On April 2nd the Prince telegraphed 
to Count Montgelas, the Bavarian Envoy in Berlin, a 
dispatch which must have caused considerable pleasure to 
Bismarck, because it furnished him with the very weapons 
which he needed to bring pressure upon the Southern 
German States to accept, however unwillingly, the alliance 
and military readjustments about which they still felt 
some hesitation : 

" Last night Baron von Werthern spoke with me 
concerning the desire of Count von Bismarck to ascer- 
tain the views of the Royal Government in regard to 
Luxemburg. I have hastened to confer on the subject 
with his Majesty the King, my gracious Sovereign, and 
I herewith communicate to you the desires which he has 
expressed, but, at the same time, Count von Bismarck 
ought to realise the difficulty which I encounter in giving 
him any definite opinion concerning a thing of which I 



150 Germany under Three Emperors 

have no official knowledge, and which I have only heard 
through newspaper rumours and the telegraphic account 
which we received last night of his declarations in the 
Reichstag. 

" As far, therefore, as it is possible to judge under 
these circumstances, the Royal Government shares the 
point of view of Count Bismarck, and only desires to add 
that, considering the Treaties of April 19th, 1839, and 
July 27th, 1839, every alienation of the Grand Duchy 
of Luxemburg, without the free consent of the Walram 
line of the House of Nassau, its eventual heirs, would 
be considered by it as impossible to accept. The Bavarian 
Government hopes that, at all events and in all cases, 
Count von Bismarck will not fail, and has not failed, to 
assert the legal rights of Germany in regard to this 
question, but that this will be done in a manner not 
likely to endanger the peace of Europe. 

" Should, however, which God preserve, things 
assume a serious turn, the Royal Government expects 
that Count Bismarck will, without delay, give it all 
necessary information on the subject. 

" Your Excellency will please communicate to Count 
Bismarck the contents of this dispatch." 

On this day also a telegram passed from Bismarck 
to Werthern, asking him to try to ascertain, through 
the Bavarian Government, what attitude Austria would 
be likely to adopt in case of a war between Prussia and 
France in consequence of the Luxemburg question. 
Hohenlohe telegraphed immediately to Vienna, but 
before even he could get a reply Bismarck gave Werthern 
the following instruction on April 3rd : 

' ' Will you please tell Prince Hohenlohe, quite con- 
fidentially, that rumour has it that the Treaty in regard 



A Big Bluff 151 

to Luxemburg is already signed. The Emperor Napoleon 
has declared that it is impossible for him to withdraw at 
present, though I have told Benedetti that, in view of 
the public opinion in Germany, we cannot yield and 
will not do so. On the other hand, Count Perponcher 
telegraphs from the Hague that the Treaty is not yet 
signed, and that he hopes to prevent its being done. In 
regard to the state of things in Germany, we must, 
according to my opinion, risk a war, however little this 
question of Luxemburg is worth it. The manner in 
which the nation, whose feeling of honour has been 
wounded in the business, has taken the thing is most 
decisive, and leaves us no other alternative. At all events, 
we ought to use this particular incident to consolidate 
our national strength, so as not to be surprised from the 
material point of view by a war which may still easily 
and soon break out." 

Baron von Werthern at once sent this telegram to 
Prince von Hohenlohe, who was dining at the Palace, 
and for whom it did not probably constitute a very great 
surprise. The latter replied to it on the following day : 

" I have had this morning an audience of the King, 
to whom I have exposed all the details of the Luxemburg 
question, and from whom I have asked what reply I ought 
to give to Count Bismarck in regard to his telegram of 
yesterday's date. His Majesty has authorised me to 
declare that, in case of a war, Bavaria would side with 
Prussia in accordance with the secret Treaty which exists 
between them, but that it seems to the King that the 
interests of the South of Germany urgently require that 
Bismarck should wait for the reply of Vienna to our 
inquiries before taking any extreme decision." 

And on April 5th Prussia was informed through a 



152 Germany under Three Emperors 

note which was sent to Baron von Werthern that, in case 
a conflict arose between Prussia and France on account 
of the Luxemburg affair, the Bavarian Government 
would side with Prussia, and considered that the other 
South German States were bound to do the same accord- 
ing to the terms of the Treaties. 

This was all that Bismarck required. A few days 
later the Luxemburg affair, which in reality had never 
assumed the threatening aspect it had pleased him to 
give to it, was arranged by his proposal to refer the whole 
matter to a conference that met shortly afterwards in 
London ; the question of neutrality of the Grand Duchy 
was settled at that Conference. 

In the meantime Prussia had acquired the assurance 
that, in case of war, the South German States would 
remain faithful to their engagements. Once he was 
reassured as to this most important point, Bismarck 
could go forward with confidence upon his campaign 
of Imperialism. He was not, however, to bring it to 
realisation without many difficulties. 



CHAPTER XI 

The Process Continues 

THE whole aim of Bismarck in this Luxemburg 
affair, as seen from the preceding chapter, had been 
to determine the position which the Southern German 
States would take when it became opportune for him 
to begin the war with France that occupied such an im- 
portant place on his programme. He had also wanted 
to do away with the hesitation which existed in the 
Southern States concerning the publication of the secret 
Treaties they had entered into. Bismarck imagined that 
the secrecy arose out of a desire to be able to deny their 
existence later on if it suited the States to do so. The 
Luxemburg incident gave Bismarck a proof that Bavaria, 
at least, meant to stick to its obligations and would help 
him to exact the same thing from Wurtemberg and 
Baden, which were, perhaps, even more hostile than 
any in Germany to alliance with Prussia. It procured 
also for Prussia the right to call on her unwilling allies 
when danger knocked at the door — an immense advan- 
tage to Bismarck in the delicate and dangerous game 
he was playing. 

Bismarck had never for a moment contemplated the 
possibility of going to war for the sake of Luxemburg, 
and he had known very well that he had the means to 
prevent the Emperor Napoleon from doing so. The 
whole scare had been raised to procure for Prussia the 
advantage of ascertaining whom were her friends and 

153 



154 Germany under Three Emperors 

whom her enemies. At the same time, it led public 
opinion in Germany to believe that Prussia would always 
uphold every German right, and had further consolidated 
the influence of King William I. by presenting him in 
the light of a resolute champion of every German 
Sovereign whose rights or privileges were threatened 
by foreign interference. There seemed at that time 
hardly any possibility of the Biebrich branch of the 
Nassau family ever being called to the throne of Luxem- 
burg, as the King of the Netherlands had two sons who 
were young men and likely to marry ; but the very fact 
that there existed a remote chance that one day it might 
succeed was enough to procure for the line a defender 
and a champion in that very King of Prussia who, only 
a year before, had confiscated the German Duchy of 
Nassau ! The comedy was admirably played, and pro- 
duced everywhere the impression which Bismarck had 
expected it would do. 

All these incidents, however, did not make him lose 
sight of the principal aim he was pursuing, and, as 
soon as the emotion consequent upon the Luxemburg 
incident had subsided, he proceeded to call together at 
Berlin a conference of the different State Ministers of 
Southern Germany to discuss the lines upon which it 
was intended to organise the new Union. Bismarck 
presided over this conference, and did it in a masterly 
way, emphasising to his colleagues points which would 
at once receive their assent, and skipping over with con- 
summate ability those which might excite their oppo- 
sition. The Jesuitical nature of the arguments which 
he used to persuade others that white was black can 
best be appreciated by the perusal of the report which 
Prince Hohenlohe drew of the work of the conference ? 



The Conference 155 

and which, upon his return to Munich, he submitted to 
his Ministry and, later on, to the King of Bavaria. 

"I arrived in Berlin," he writes, "on June 3rd, 
1867, at twelve o'clock in the forenoon. Count Montgelas 
received me at the railway station, and accompanied me 
to the Hotel de Rome, where I found an invitation to 
attend a Ministerial conference which was taking place 
that same day at two o'clock. Before that time I 
received the visit of Baron Varnbuler, who explained to 
me the broad lines of the Prussian proposals. At two 
o'clock I drove with Councillor Weber to Count Bis- 
marck. There we found the Ministers Varnbuler, 
Dalwigk and Freydorf, also the Private Councillors 
Delbriick and Philipsborn, and also the Councillor of 
Legation von Nordeck who had accompanied Freydorf 
to Berlin. 

" Bismarck began the proceedings by a short report 
on the matters we should have to discuss, and then 
handed us the Protocol which explained the point of 
view of the Prussian Government. I immediately replied 
by remarking that I had arrived in Berlin to express the 
willingness of the Bavarian Government to take part in 
the negotiations concerning the reconstruction of the 
Zollverein (Customs Union) and done so, though I had 
absolutely no knowledge either of the programme or of 
the plan upon which these negotiations were to be con- 
ducted ; but that I must observe, before proceeding any 
further, that the point of view of the Prussian Govern- 
ment, such as it was exposed in the Protocol, did not 
at all correspond to the one entertained by Bavaria. 

" The entry of our Deputies into the North German 
Parliament was also an arrangement with which Bavaria 
could not agree. Upon this, Baron von Varnbuler asked 



156 Germany under Three Emperors 

how and in what way the Prussian Government thought 
of constituting the new legislative organisation it wished 
to call into existence, to which question Bismarck replied 
that the distribution of voices in the Bundeszollrat would 
be the same as in the former Bundestag. The legislative 
body was to be on the lines of the North German 
Reichstag, elected directly by the population at the rate 
of one Deputy for 100,000 inhabitants. The franchise 
would be settled by the Treaties. He declared that if 
we had doubts as to the wisdom of having a Zoll Parlia- 
ment (Customs Parliament), Prussia would prefer that 
we should constitute our own Customs Union, which 
would work quite amicably with the North German 
Zollverein. But Prussia would not give up its plan, and 
the dissolution of the Zollverein would be the conse- 
quence if its proposition came to be negatived. In 
regard to the system of the election of the Deputies, 
Bismarck was in favour of direct elections, but left us 
absolutely free in that respect to do what we liked best ; 
he only advised us not to grant any remuneration to 
the Deputies for their services. 

" I retorted that we had imagined the constitution of 
a Customs Parliament as something absolutely different 
from what we were now told. We had had in view an 
Assembly to which the North German Parliament and 
the South German Chambers would have to abandon 
some of their rights, especially those concerning Customs 
and commercial matters, but not an assimilation with 
the North German Parliament. After Varnbiiler and 
Freydorf had declared themselves in favour of the Prus- 
sian propositions, and Dalwigk had remarked that in 
such a case there was nothing left for him to do but to 
follow their example, Bismarck once more proceeded to 



The Zollverein 157 

explain to us the advantages which a Customs Parlia- 
ment would have over the present state of things. 

" I recognised that in regard to pure Customs matters 
I could not dispute the existence of such advantages, 
but that I must make reservations from the political 
point of view. The arrangements proposed would, little 
by little, draw us into the circle of the North German 
Union, and this was a thing which was repugnant to 
us and to our ideas. If we had wanted to enter into 
the union we should have done so of our own accord. 
I therefore repeated my proposal to call together an 
Assembly to which the North German Parliament would 
abandon some of its rights in regard to the Zollverein 
and the South German States some of their privileges 
as to other matters. Bismarck, however, declared that 
he would never agree to such a thing, because it would 
mean the dissolution of the North German Union. No 
matter how much he would like to organise a Customs 
Union, he would not sacrifice to it the North German 
Bund. Minister von der Heydt agreed with him on this 
point. 

" Bismarck then said that when people wished to 
come to some common arrangement they had to make 
up their minds to abandon some of their personal inde- 
pendence. He recognised the sincerity and frankness 
with which I had spoken, and in return for it he would 
say here what he would never declare publicly — that 
Prussia would never cause any inconvenience to the South 
German States. The Prussian Government did not care 
at all for our joining the North German Bund, because 
it would only be put to great inconvenience by the entry 
of eighty new Deputies in the Reichstag. Varnbiiler 
then said that the Assembly could be called the Customs 



158 Germany under Three Emperors 

Deputies Assembly — in German Zollabgeordnetenver- 
sammlung — and Dalwigk reminded us of the English 
Constitution, saying that the Reichstag could, after the 
English fashion, resolve itself into a Committee. Though 
we did not arrive at any decision Bismarck read to us 
an extract of a Convention agreement, after which dis- 
cussions were continued until nine o'clock in the evening 
and a Protocol drawn up, to which the Wurtemberg 
and Baden plenipotentiaries agreed on the next day, 
whilst I contented myself by handing in an explanation 
of the motives which had actuated my opposition to the 
scheme. There is not the slightest doubt but that Prussia 
will rather give up the Zollverein than abandon the idea 
of a Parliament. It is difficult to guess what, under 
these circumstances, will be the decision which it shall 
please his Majesty to take. In favour of the Prussian 
scheme it can be urged that when once we have got the 
Zollverein we can avoid the discussions of a further con- 
stitution of the North German Union, and also the 
dangers attendant on a dissolution of the Zollverein. 
Should the King wish, with the help of another Minister, 
to try to bring about the dissolution of the Zollverein, 
then I am quite ready to hand in my resignation to his 
Majesty." 

Nothing cleverer than this report could have been 
penned, inasmuch as it threw on the King of Bavaria 
the entire responsibility for the decision which events 
required the Bavarian Government to take. At the same 
time it proved that the cause of the Southern States in 
general, and of Bavaria in particular, had found in Prince 
Hohenlohe a warm defender. The Prussian comedy 
engineered by Bismarck was being performed with won- 
derful skill, and in such a masterly manner that the specta- 



The Treaty of July 4th 159 

tors of it could never discover the concealed artificiality 
which pervaded its enactment. When the time came 
for signing the preliminary Treaty of Union, Baden and 
Wiirtemberg did so at once — that is, on June 4th — whilst 
Hesse-Darmstadt only assented to it on the 7th, and 
Prince Hohenlohe declared that he could only look at 
it in the light of a Prussian proposition, in regard to 
which he must reserve the opinion of his Government. 
In Munich they considered that the seventh clause of 
the Treaty was unacceptable, but at last, after long 
debates, Bismarck, who had all the time quietly waited 
for the opportune moment to come out with the offer, 
declared himself ready to make some concessions to the 
Bavarian susceptibilities, consented to its having six 
instead of four voices in the Zollbundesrat, and also 
agreed that, when negotiations began with Austria to 
induce her to join the Customs Union, representatives 
of her neighbouring States should take part in the 
negotiations. He further consented to the Assembly 
being called the " Zoll Parliament." Matters being 
finally settled in that form, the Treaty of July 4th was 
drawn up, and its signature by the representatives of all 
the participating Powers took place in Berlin on July 8th. 
This part of Bismarck's task was thus fulfilled to his 
complete satisfaction. 

Prince Hohenlohe, too, could look back upon the 
work which he had performed with a certain pleasure. 
He had fairly launched Bavaria on the road leading to a 
complete union with Prussia, and he did so in a manner 
which did not excite the susceptibilities of his own 
Sovereign, who, on the contrary, felt grateful to him for 
having stood up with such energy for the rights and 
the independence of his country and of his Crown. 



160 Germany under Three Emperors 

Ludwig II. had been at last persuaded that there was no 
escaping his fate, and that he had better submit to the 
inevitable, trying only to save what he could out of his 
former Sovereignty. He had never been a militarist, 
and this, perhaps, made him more indifferent to the 
abandonment of his army into the hands of Prussia. At 
the same time the proverbial dignity of the Wittelsbachs 
prevented him from bowing the head to the Prussian 
yoke without, at least, some tacit kind of protestation. He 
allowed a free hand to Prince Hohenlohe to Prussianise 
Bavaria, but when he was asked by the Grand Duke of 
Baden to meet the King of Prussia at the Castle of 
Mainau, where the Baden family used to spend the 
summer, he absolutely refused to do so. 

When, at last, Prince Hohenlohe, in the Bavarian 
Landtag, announced that he had concluded, in the name 
of the Government, a military alliance with Prussia, the 
emotion to which this acknowledgment gave rise was 
even stronger than Hohenlohe had foreseen. The 
Deputies heaped reproach upon him, one of them going 
so far as to speak of the chains and of the slavery in 
which the Prince wanted to keep Bavaria in regard to 
Prussia. 

Hohenlohe remained unmoved, and proceeded to 
bring into execution the two principal points of his pro- 
gramme — the reorganisation of the army and the struggle 
against the ultramontane elements in the country. He 
knew beforehand that he would be beaten on the second 
point, but he had never reckoned upon making a political 
career in Bavaria, considering his appointment of Prime 
Minister as only a stepping stone to higher things. He 
had quite made up his mind to enter the service of 
Prussia at the first opportunity, and in a manner befitting 



Prince Humbert's Wedding 161 

his great rank and position as a German mediatised 
Prince. This was what lay behind the efforts Prince 
Hohenlohe so consistently made to get into favour with 
Bismarck, whose genius he had guessed even when others 
had denied it, and whose long tenure of power he had 
foreseen. 

Hohenlohe, though not of the wideness of views which 
distinguished Bismarck, was far-seeing enough to know 
that it was the determination of Prussia to go to war 
with France as soon as she thought she was ready for the 
struggle. And he was not the only one. Even the 
Crown Prince of Prussia, whose aversion to military 
aggression was well known, recognised the impossibility 
of avoiding a new fight if the advantages earned in the 
two preceding wars were to be retained. In April, 1868, 
on his road to Turin, whither he had been sent by the 
King to attend the wedding festivities of the Crown 
Prince Humbert of Piedmont with his cousin, the Prin- 
cess Margherita of Savoy, Frederick passed through 
Munich, spending two days at the Royal Castle, where 
he received Prince Hohenlohe in a long audience. Prince 
Clovis describes the interview as follows : 

" We discussed questions of general politics. I took 
an opportunity which Prince Frederick gave me to warn 
him that Prussia must not show itself too oppressive 
toward the Southern States, and advised him not to lose 
sight of the republican and ultramontane tendencies in 
Wurtemberg, of the state of public opinion in Bavaria, 
and, above everything else, of all that was going on in 
France. He seemed to agree with me, and spoke at 
length of Wurtemberg and the political leanings which had 
become predominant there. He did not mention Baden, 
and showed himself in general extremely reserved in all 



i62 Germany under Three Emperors 

that he said. At one moment, when the conversation 
turned on the subject of the Prussian intrigues in Austria, 
it seemed to me that he disapproved of them entirely. 

" In regard to a war with France, he remarked that 
the alliance of the Southern States with Prussia implied, 
of course, a common action between them and Prussia. 
Who, therefore, he inquired, would be the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Bavarian army? This led the conversa- 
tion to the military efficiency of Prussia, which, he assured 
me, was at least as high as in France. On the whole, 
Prince Frederick showed himself of a very peaceful dis- 
position. He declared that he hated war and the very 
idea of it, but that sometimes one could not avoid it, 
though he could never recommend it as a means to reach 
any aims one might have. He seems to consider inevit- 
able the unity of Germany under the protectorate of 
Prussia, but it appeared to me that he would not care 
to see it brought about by violent means, only through 
moral persuasion." 

The Crown Prince had illusions which Prince 
Hohenlohe did not attempt to dissipate. The words of 
Frederick prove that even a man so averse to violence 
as the heir to the Prussian throne did not see the possi- 
bility of escaping the conflict which Bismarck had con- 
trived to persuade the whole of Prussia would be 
unavoidable. There were some, however, who saw 
through this policy of intrigue. A woman of great 
talent and intelligence, long dead — the Countess de 
Mercy d'Argenteau — who had occasion to see Bismarck 
at this turning point of his public career, when the edifice 
which he had built was yet to be completed, made some 
remarks about him which seem now almost uncanny in 
their exactitude. 



Through French Eyes 163 

" No one seems to care for Bismarck in Germany, 
at least outwardly ; you meet more people who prophesy 
that soon he will be compelled to retire than those who 
maintain that his influence is increasing not only with 
the King of Prussia but also with the country. My 
impression is decidedly the latter. Bismarck's star is 
not in the least on the wane. He is working energetic- 
ally at the organisation of the army down to its smallest 
details, strange as it may seem to find a man who has 
never been a soldier remain absorbed to the extent that 
he does in military matters. His enemies say that he 
does so to win the good graces of the King, but he is 
not the kind of man who cares for the favours of Sove- 
reigns. The secret is that he considers the army an 
indispensable corollary of his political plans, and this is 
sufficient for him. He is upon excellent terms with 
General von Moltke, he is the intimate of General von 
Roon, and the three men have got not only the King 
but also the whole of public opinion in Prussia on their 
side. 

" As for Germany, Bismarck thinks less of its feelings 
than he says. He knows that the Southern States are 
condemned beforehand to fall under Prussian influence ; 
the only question is when. He would prefer this not 
to be delayed too long, because King William I. is already 
old, and that his son may not entirely follow his father's 
views. The Crown Prince is an Imperialist and cares 
only for the Empire, of which he firmly believes Prussia 
will become the head. The King does not care for the 
Empire, and would prefer its chief to remain the King 
of Prussia, without any additional title to add to a glory 
which seems to him to be inherent to the dynasty of 
Hohenzollern. The Crown Prince hates war; the King 



164 Germany under Three Emperors 

says he does, which is something different, but he would 
plunge into its horrors without any repugnance if he 
thought it his duty to do so. This is the difference in 
the character of the two men. One would sacrifice a 
great deal not to see blood flow, whilst the other would 
not even see this blood, should its spilling be in accord- 
ance with his principles and his appreciation of the divine 
right of which he believes himself to be the representative. 
" Bismarck plays upon this difference of tempera- 
ment and of conception of right and wrong between 
father and son, and does it in a masterful way. Between 
these three personages the condition of public opinion 
in Prussia — I do not speak of Germany, because it is 
Prussia alone that counts — is absolutely terrifying. We 
stand before events of an incalculable gravity, of an in- 
commensurable importance. Unfortunately no one will 
see it, not even the Prussians, who have been reduced 
to the condition of a well-oiled machine that slowly grinds 
down the corn it has been given to thresh, but that does 
so unconsciously and unreasoningly, passively obedient 
to the hand that presses the lever and causes millions of 
men to respond to the mechanical appeal he makes to 
them from time to time. Some people tell me that 
Bismarck, the man who is behind all this, is inferior to 
Cavour, and that his methods of statesmanship are not 
beyond discussion. This may be, but does it count, and 
will it count in the presence of success? We live in an 
age when success is everything ; no one looks at the 
means, the result is all that is observed. And Bis- 
marck's policy has already brought about most tangible 
results. Look at the position of Prussia when he was 
called at the head of the Cabinet, and look at what it 
has become to-day. That man knows what he wants, 



A Cry of Warning 165 

and it is a pity that our own French politicians will not 
see it, and a still greater pity that they cannot make up 
their minds as to what they want. If Napoleon III. 
were wise he would either start without delay to crush 
this Prussian danger which so very few appreciate yet, 
or else he would risk everything in order to conclude 
an alliance with this Prussia of whom we have heard so 
much recently, and will hear so much more in the days 
to come. A Richelieu would do so. Some such bold 
stroke as this might perhaps protect France from the 
catastrophe that is hovering over the world, the conse- 
quences of which our children and grandchildren will 
feel even more acutely than we shall do. But there must 
be no delay, because the day is indeed drawing near, 
and we shall soon see it break in all its fury ; and upon 
us, unless we take our precautions to divert it on other 
heads than our own." 

Madame de Mercy was a keen judge of the human 
heart. She had predicted the political situation of 
Europe better than many so-called politicians and states- 
men had done at the time. Her cry of warning was 
unfortunately unheeded, as she expected it would be. 
But it is curious to reproduce it here, when history has 
proved its prophetic truth and shown that this woman 
of talent had been able to appreciate to his real value 
the man of genius whom events were so soon to transform 
into the real master of Europe. 



CHAPTER XII 

New Light on the Ems Dispatch 

MANY persons have said, and not a few have 
thought, that the candidature of Prince Leopold 
of Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne had been put 
forward by Prussia with the intention of manufacturing 
an "incident." Personally, I do not believe it for one 
moment. The policy of Bismarck was far too wide, and 
far too clever, to resort to such means to provoke war. 
He knew very well that something was bound to occur 
to disturb the good relations between Prussia and France. 
Judging from what I have heard, the first news of this 
unfortunate candidature came upon Bismarck as a sur- 
prise. On the other hand, I would not at all feel inclined 
to affirm that the Prussian Foreign Office was entirely 
a stranger to it. I have heard a story which is curious 
enough to deserve mention, though I should be sorry to 
take the full responsibility for its veracity. There was 
at that time at the Wilhelmstrasse a young man who 
was later on to become the most important personage in 
that complicated machinery. At Versailles, where he 
was on the staff, his work was destined to attract the 
attention of Bismarck to an extent none of his col- 
leagues had ever done. This young man was Baron von 
Holstein. Early in 1870 he had gone to Spain on a 
holiday. At Madrid he saw many political personalities, 
and became acquainted socially with a lady who was 

supposed to exercise a considerable influence over the 

166 



The Spanish Succession 167 

mind of Marshal Prim. She questioned Holstein about 
the possibility of inducing Prince Leopold of Hohen- 
zollern to accept the Spanish crown. The idea had been 
first raised during the autumn of 1868, but had fallen 
through because the King of Prussia did not care for 
a member of his family to run the risk of becoming a 
dethroned monarch. This was what the proposed honour 
really amounted to, as no one with the slightest political 
experience could be so lacking in wisdom as to imagine 
that a foreign Prince would have the slightest chance of 
remaining for more than a few months on the Spanish 
throne. William I. had therefore discouraged his cousin 
from acquiescing in the proposed plan. 

It seems, however, that there were people in Spain 
who still nursed the opinion that it would be for the 
interest of that country if Prince Leopold could be in- 
duced to accept the throne, and the lady in question said 
as much to Baron von Holstein. The latter retrenched 
himself, of course, behind his total ignorance concerning 
the ideas of Count Bismarck on the subject, but he 
suggested that a certain Bernhardi, a secret agent 
of Bismarck, might canvass the candidature in Berlin. 
The lady understood, and it is very probable that Marshal 
Prim understood too. A few days later Baron von 
Holstein returned to the Foreign Office, but spoke to no 
one at the Wilhelmstrasse, not even to his immediate 
chief, of his conversations at Madrid ; indeed, when asked 
concerning them one day by Bismarck himself, who had 
been told at Versailles, he merely replied that he had not 
considered himself important enough to think that any- 
thing he might have heard or said could interest the 
Minister, but that he had tried in Spain, as well as 
everywhere else, to serve him and the intentions which 



168 Germany under Three Emperors 

he supposed him to have. The story says that Bismarck 
merely remarked that he did not often find people will- 
ing to do so. But after this the career of Baron von 
Holstein prospered in an amazing manner, though he 
was never given a post abroad, except that of Councillor 
of the Embassy in Paris under Count Arnim and Prince 
von Hohenlohe, when we shall see him playing an im- 
portant part in the war scare of 1875. Afterwards he 
returned to Berlin and never again left the Foreign 
Office, where he was almost as powerful as Bismarck 
himself. 

Even if this incident took place, I feel inclined to 
think that the zeal of the Baron had been entirely due 
to his personal initiative. But it is certain that in the 
course of the month of June a former secretary of the 
Spanish Legation in Berlin, Senor Salazar y Mazarredo, 
arrived in the Prussian capital with the intention of con- 
ferring not only with Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, 
but also with Count von Bismarck, and, thanks to the 
interference of Queen Augusta — this last fact, I believe, 
not being generally known — the King was induced to 
consent to his cousin Leopold embarking upon the 
adventure. 

The Queen, whose everlasting quarrels with Bis- 
marck strongly influenced the last years of William I., 
was a clever woman, very fond of intrigue. She knew 
very well that her husband had married her for con- 
venience, whilst his heart was entirely given to some- 
one else. For her part, whilst pretending a deep attach- 
ment to William I., she nevertheless had on more than 
one occasion intrigued against him. She had very 
decided ideas on certain matters, and was apt to gee 
enthusiastic without any reason for doing so. The 



Prince Leopold Accepts 169 

thought of having a German Prince on the throne of 
Spain had appealed to her, and she had encouraged the 
movement from the very first. At any rate, she argued, 
Prince Leopold's proposed adventure was not more 
risky than the one in which his own brother, Prince 
Charles, had engaged himself in Roumania. William I. 
had been all the time averse to both of these enterprises, 
but, as his wife had made him confess, what it pleased 
his distant kinsmen to do did not, after all, concern him, 
and it was not his business to try to save them from 
themselves. He therefore signified his consent, and on 
July 3rd the Havas Agency announced to the world that 
Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern had accepted the 
Spanish throne. 

It seems that before the news became official someone 
at the Prussian Foreign Office had suggested the advisa- 
bility, in publishing it in the official organ of the 
Government, to add that the Prince Leopold meant to 
pay a visit to Paris, so as to consult Napoleon upon his 
future course of action. This was on the point of being 
done when another person telegraphed Count Bismarck 
on the subject. The Count indignantly replied that such 
a course should not be thought of for one single moment, 
as the Hohenzollerns were in no way dependent on what 
the Emperor of the French thought. 

In his Reminiscences Bismarck does not mention 
this incident at all. It is, however, perfectly true. He 
says instead that he had always fancied that Prince 
Leopold in Madrid would have been rather inclined to 
side with France against Germany than with Prussia 
against France. But we may be forgiven for thinking 
that he was not quite sincere. 

Bismarck's affirmation that France was seeking a 



170 Germany under Three Emperors 

quarrel with Prussia is also absolutely unjustifiable, be- 
cause it was Prussia, and especially Bismarck, who was 
trying to trap the Emperor Napoleon into a quarrel. He 
played admirably the part of an indifferent spectator. He 
caused the Foreign Office to answer in an evasive manner 
the first questions addressed to it by the French Govern- 
ment, and to have replied to them that it knew nothing 
at all about the whole affair, which did not concern 
Prussia or the North German Confederation, but simply 
the head not of the Royal House of Prussia but of the 
whole Hohenzollern family and the Princes of that name : 
a subtle distinction which it is quite impossible for history 
to accept unreservedly. 

We touch here upon a point of history that has never 
been properly ascertained, because there are to this day 
some people in Spain who pretend that representations 
were made at Madrid by the Cabinet of the Tuileries on 
the subject of the possible advent of a German Prince 
in Spain, and that there they met with a non possumus. 

What is certain is that, whilst in Berlin Bismarck 
was proceeding with great caution, Paris was accumulating 
mistake upon mistake and allowing chauvinism to sub- 
merge reason. Looking back upon that time, by the 
light of all which followed upon it, the questions arise : 
Had not this chauvinism, which brought France on the 
verge of ruin, been fomented from across the frontier? 
Had the Press been paid to give way to ultra-patriotic 
feelings? And whether all those who shouted so fiercely, 
" A Berlin, a Berlin! " were all genuine Parisians. 

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs at that 
moment was the Due de Gramont, and the fact was 
counted to be a great misfortune for France by a certain 
section who scarified the Duke as one of the most incap- 



Due de Gramont 171 

able, vain and unreasonable politicians the second 
Empire ever employed. The Duke had rallied himself 
to the cause of Napoleon, much to the indignation of 
the Legitimists who had not forgiven him for deserting 
the Comte de Chambord, after having accepted the 
splendid inheritance which the Duchess of Angouleme 
had left to him — something like seven hundred thousand 
francs a year. He it was who made in the French 
Chamber the famous declarations which inflamed the 
country and made it look upon the Hohenzollern candi- 
dature as an outrage directly addressed to the French 
spirit of independence as well as to its self-respect. 

Nevertheless, in spite of these reproaches, which in 
some slight degree were justified, it is a matter of doubt 
if, even with another than the Duke in his place, it would 
have been possible to avoid the war which Bismarck had 
made up his mind to provoke. The only advantage which 
a cleverer politician than the Due de Gramont might 
have obtained would have been to leave the odium of 
the declaration of war on the shoulders of Prussia. 

The King of Prussia, however, who knew absolutely 
nothing of the machinations that had brought about 
these complications, was doing all that was in his power 
to prevent hostilities. The Queen, too, had been 
thoroughly frightened by the mischief which her ill- 
timed interference had brought about, and was beseech- 
ing William I. to insist upon the Prince of Hohenzollern 
withdrawing his candidature. She wrote herself to 
Leopold's father, Prince Anthony, begging him to 
restrain his son from throwing Europe into difficulties, 
of which she was at last beginning to appreciate the im- 
portance. On his side, Bismarck was in direct communi- 
cation with the Prince, secretly encouraging him to 



172 Germany under Three Emperors 

remain firm and not to yield to pressure, which he 
described as being without purport or necessity. On 
the other hand — and this is again a point which has been 
overlooked by the many historians who have described the 
story of these eventful days — the Queen, through a friend 
of hers, a lady in whom she had perfect confidence, had 
caused a message to be conveyed to Paris, in which she 
had implored the Emperor Napoleon to send Count 
Benedetti to Ems. King William liked and appreciated 
the Count, and she thought that with him as intermediary 
the two Kings might be able personally to disentangle 
matters. 

In consequence of this confidential message Bene- 
detti journeyed to Ems. His first conversation with the 
King was most courteous and encouraging. After 
Louis XIV., William I. was perhaps the Monarch who 
possessed the most complete conception of a Sovereign's 
dignity. He would never have yielded to foreign pres- 
sure, however insistent, upon any question which touched 
the Royal prerogative, yet, though he told the French 
Ambassador that the matter concerned the Spanish 
Government more than his own, William I. wrote to 
the Prince of Hohenzollern, advising him, in the interest 
of the dynasty, to desist. He did not wish for war, 
and certainly among all the people who worked in favour 
of it he cannot be reckoned. Owing to the news which 
he had received from Ems, Bismarck deemed it advis- 
able to confer personally with his Sovereign. So, leaving 
Varzin, he travelled by way of Berlin to the famous 
watering-place. In Berlin telegrams advised him that 
the King was negotiating with Benedetti instead of 
referring him to the Prussian Ministers. This angered 
Bismarck beyond words. He decided not to go imme- 



The Prince Retires 173 

diately to Ems, but that same evening instead asked 
Moltke and Boon to dinner. The meal had just begun 
when a telegram was brought from Paris with the news 
that the Prince of Hohenzollern had relinquished his 
candidature because France had threatened to declare 
war upon Prussia. A man whom I knew personally, and 
who was at that time employed in the Foreign Office, 
was present. He described the scene to me. When Bis- 
marck had read this dispatch his face had changed so 
terribly that those near thought he was going to have 
a fit and rushed to open the window, to give more air 
to the stuffy apartment. The Chancellor, in his account 
of the incident, declares that his first thought was to 
send his resignation to William I., as he did not wish 
to stand before the whole of Germany as officially respon- 
sible for so great a humiliation. There we see already 
quite distinctly his determination to bring matters to a 
bloody crisis. 

He started to explain the position as he saw it, rather 
than it was in reality; it had, he said, become an im- 
possible one. The King, under the threat of war, had, 
four days in succession, received the French Ambassador 
without the presence of one of his Ministers : he had 
personally conducted political negotiations of a first 
importance instead of refusing to enter into discussions 
with a foreign diplomat and simply referring him, as was 
his duty, to his Minister for Foreign Affairs. This, 
continued Bismarck, infringed his obligations as a con- 
stitutional Sovereign. The Queen, he asserted, was at 
the bottom of the whole affair, and he was not altogether 
wrong. Both Boon and Moltke begged Bismarck to 
reconsider his position, asking him at least to wait until 
he had heard in detail all that had taken place at Ems. 



174 Germany under Three Emperors 

What had taken place at Ems? This is the historical 
point which Bismarck himself has cleared for us to his 
everlasting shame, and which I shall briefly repeat here. 
When the news of the retirement of Prince Hohenzollern 
reached the King of Prussia he could not hide the ex- 
treme satisfaction which it gave him. It is a curious thing 
that at St. Cloud the fact produced the same impression 
on the mind of Napoleon III., and that in France, as 
well as in Prussia, it was the responsible advisers of the 
Crown, and not the Sovereigns themselves, who brought 
about the calamity which was to send the Bonapartes 
into exile and to deprive France of two fair provinces. 
The Due de Gramont, instead of telegraphing to Bene- 
detti thankfully to accept the happy solution of a painful 
incident, sent a peremptory order to ask from the King 
of Prussia guarantees that in the future no German 
Prince would ever put himself up as a pretender to the 
throne of Spain. Had the Duke not been the man that 
he was, one could almost suppose that this piece of 
stupidity had been dictated to him by Bismarck himself. 
Almost at the same time the Prussian Ambassador in 
Paris, Baron von Werthern, telegraphed to Ems the 
copy of a note which the Due de Gramont had dictated 
in collaboration with M. Emile Ollivier, in which were 
framed the words in which the King of Prussia was to 
formulate the promises which the French Government 
expected him to give. This note caused a profound 
irritation to William I., and he expressed his regret that 
Werthern had not, upon its communication to him, 
decided to leave Paris on his own initiative without wait- 
ing further orders from Berlin. 

On that eventful day, July ISth, 1870, my brother- 
in-law, Prince Anthony Radziwill, was the aide-de-camp 



The Telegram Arrives 175 

on duty. The King sent him twice on that day to Count 
Benedetti. The first time it was to tell to the French 
Ambassador that he fully approved of the retirement of 
Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. The second time — it 
was already five o'clock in the afternoon — it was in reply 
to the message of insistence of Benedetti, to which the 
King answered that he refused to engage himself in 
new discussions, and could only refer once more to the 
promises which he had already given, but he did not 
say that he refused to see the Ambassador any more. 
On the contrary, he added that he would be glad to say 
good-bye to him the next morning at the railway station 
before his departure for Coblenz. 

At the same moment that my brother-in-law was 
delivering this message the King caused von Abeken, 
the official of the Foreign Office in attendance upon him 
at Ems, to telegraph to Count Bismarck an account of 
the whole incident. This telegram reached the latter 
when he was once more dining with Roon and Moltke, 
whom he had asked the day before to share again his 
meal of the next evening. It was this telegram that 
brought about the catastrophe which so many people 
had tried to avoid. 

This is the telegram : 

"Ems, July ISth. 3.40 evening. 
" His Majesty the King writes to me : 
' Benedetti has accosted me during my walk and 
asked me in a most pressing manner to authorise him 
to telegraph that I engaged myself once for all never to 
grant my consent to the Hohenzollerns putting forward 
again their candidature. I have refused in a rather firm 
tone before putting an end to the conversation, because one 



176 Germany under Three Emperors 

must not, and one cannot, take such engagements for ever. 
I told him that, quite naturally, I had not yet received 
any news, and that he could easily ascertain, as he was 
informed before me of what was taking place in Paris 
and in Madrid, that my Government was quite out of 
touch in this matter. ' 

"His Majesty," Abeken went on, "has received at 
this moment a letter from the Prince. His Majesty, 
having told Benedetti that he was expecting news from 
the Prince, has decided, in reason of the proposition 
which Count Eulenburg and myself have made to his 
Majesty, and in consideration of the opinions expressed 
before, not to receive Benedetti any more, and to let 
him know only by the aide-de-camp on duty that his 
Majesty received the confirmation of the news which 
have been communicated from Paris to Benedetti, and 
that in consequence his Majesty had nothing more to 
say to the Ambassador. 

"His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency to decide 
whether this new exigency of Benedetti, and the refusal 
with which it has been met, ought to be communicated 
to our Ministers abroad and to the Press." 

Bismarck silently handed the telegram to Moltke and 
to Roon. Both read it and said nothing. After a few 
moments of hesitation Bismarck once more took up the 
fatal paper and perused it with great attention, then, in 
sharp, ringing tones that contrasted with his discouraged 
one of a few moments earlier, he addressed a few/ ques- 
tions to Moltke as to the state of the Prussian arma- 
ments and the rapidity with which war could open on 
the Prussian side. The General replied that if Prussia 
had to go to war, he did not see any advantage in delay- 
ing the hostilities. Even if it proved impossible to 



Manipulated! 177 

protect the left side of the Rhine against a French in- 
vasion, the rapidity with which Prussia could begin the 
campaign would bring into action a force far superior to 
any that France could display in the same time. He 
considered, therefore, that it would be more advantageous 
to Prussian arms for hostilities to begin at once. 

This was more than sufficient to decide the course 
of action of Bismarck. Abeken had told him that the 
King was leaving him entirely free to communicate or 
not to the Press the contents of the message. The 
German statesman at once determined this should be 
done, but in his own way, and consequently he thought 
it better not to give publicity to the whole of the tele- 
gram, but simply to make extracts from it, so as to produce 
both in Germany and in France the effect which he 
required to force a declaration of war. The result was : 

" Telegram received in Berlin at 5.9 evening, 
arranged by Bismarck and communicated by him to the 
Press and to Prussia's representatives abroad : 

" After the news of the relinquished claim of the 
Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern had been communi- 
cated to the French Imperial Government by the Spanish 
Royal Government, the French Ambassador has again 
requested at Ems, from his Majesty the King, the author- 
isation to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty the King 
engaged himself for the whole of the future never to 
grant his consent to the Hohenzollerns in the case these 
should wish once more to put forward their candi- 
dature. Upon this his Majesty the King has refused to 
receive again the French Ambassador, and has ordered 
the aide-de-camp on duty to tell him that his Majesty 
had nothing further to communicate to him." 

After using the long pencil he generally used to this 

M 



178 Germany under Three Emperors 

terrible effect, Bismarck read the revision to his two 
companions with the remark that, " If, in obedience to 
the orders of his Majesty, I communicate this telegram 
as I have worded it to the Press, and if I have it at once 
telegraphed to our different embassies, it will be known 
in Paris before midnight. It will madden them. Our 
success depends entirely on the first impressions that the 
origin of the war will provoke at home and abroad. It 
is most essential that we should appear as the attacked 
party. Now let us drink to the success of our arms." 
And such is the true story of the Ems dispatch. 



CHAPTER XIII 

Sedan and Paris 

IN reducing the Ems telegram Bismarck displayed his 
knowledge of human nature. And with what 
psychological accuracy he could grasp all the intricacies 
of a situation ! One cannot sufficiently regret that 
Napoleon III., already worn out by the illness to which 
he was to succumb three years later, had not the energy 
to oppose the mistaken enthusiasm of his subjects, by 
explaining — as, indeed, Benedetti did years later — that 
" no one had been insulted at Ems, and no one had wished 
to insult anyone else." Certainly such an idea was far 
from the mind of William I. Napoleon III. also did 
not care to enter into a conflict with Prussia, which, if 
unsuccessful, he realised but too well would mean the 
fall of his dynasty. The Empress also, in spite of the 
accusations which have been launched against her, did 
not foster the war spirit ; indeed, she no longer had any 
political influence. Emile Ollivier did not care for her, 
and the Due de Gramont, however much he may have 
admired her as a woman, did not trust her as a Sovereign. 
I know from a personal source that he had begged the 
Emperor not to tell his Consort of the Ems negotiations 
until they were completed. The Duke had the naive 
idea that by his own direct influence at the Hofburg 
he would be able to draw Austria into an alliance with 
France against Prussia, a plan which he knew Prince 
Metternich would oppose, and he feared the latter could 

179 



180 Germany under Three Emperors 

hear something about it through the Empress who might 
confide in Madame de Metternich. Eugenie knew that 
in case of a war breaking out she would be called upon 
to assume the functions of Regent, but it is a cruel 
injustice to accuse her of having urged the Emperor to 
declare war. 

Everything conspired to favour the success of Bis- 
marck's plans. On that same evening of July 13th the 
official organ of the Prussian Government, the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, published extra sheets con- 
taining the altered telegram, and the population of Berlin 
feverishly discussed with the utmost indignation the so- 
called insult to which King William I, had been subjected 
by the French Ambassador. About that same time the 
Paris boulevards were filled with an angry crowd scream- 
ing and yelling that the honour of France required that 
they must wipe out with blood the insult offered to its 
representative by the King of Prussia, who had ordered 
him out of his presence. In both countries the excite- 
ment was no longer to be restrained. 

The next day William I. returned to Berlin. To 
his own surprise he was met by wild acclamations and 
the enthusiasm of a delirious multitude, urging him to 
defend the honour of the Fatherland. At the railway 
station Moltke and Bismarck were awaiting their Sover- 
eign, and the former presented to him the order for 
the general mobilisation of the army, which the King 
signed immediately. He was by that time fully per- 
suaded that war was the national desire and that his 
duty as a Monarch commanded him to go forward with- 
out flinching. All his hesitations of the day before had 
disappeared amidst the shouts of the Berlin population, 
who pressed around his carriage, kissed his hands, and 



Attitude of Europe 181 

showered blessings upon his head. The enthusiasm 
which pervaded Prussia on that day had been kindled 
in an entirely artificial manner, but it had become a 
really genuine thing, and it was to continue until the 
end of the war which, among the many things it 
destroyed, put an end to the old Kingdom of Prussia 
which William I. loved so well, and raised in its stead 
a German Empire whose existence will probably be 
neither so long nor so successful a one as that of its 
predecessor. 

On July 20th Bismarck had the audacity to declare 
to the Reichstag that in all the sad tragedy which was 
to cause such bloodshed he had only received one official 
document, and that was the French declaration of war. 

In mentioning the telegram which he had sent on 
the evening of July 13th to the Prussian representatives 
abroad, Bismarck affirmed that it had only been a simple 
message of information and not at all a provocation as 
it was sought to make out in France. He accused the 
latter of having taken the initiative of the war by 
spreading a lie concerning the King of Prussia and thus 
wounding the national feelings of the whole of Germany 
and directly offending his Majesty. And after these 
words, which were neither an excuse nor even an explana- 
tion, but which could be one and all contradicted in 
every point and particular, the Chancellor closed the 
Reichstag. 

The amazing thing in this whole terrible story, the 
consequences of which we see to-day in the struggle 
which is devastating Europe, and which might never 
have taken place but for it, was the utter indifference 
with which other nations surveyed it. Russia remained 
silent ; Austria crossed its arms and said nothing ; Italy did 



182 Germany under Three Emperors 

not move; and England, who, there is no doubt, would 
have liked to prevent the war, nevertheless remained 
neutral. The fact was that the poison instilled by Bis- 
marck into the mind of the whole world was working. No 
one sympathised with France, because everybody believed 
her to have been a silly aggressor. The Empire was pay- 
ing for its former mistakes ; for having allowed Prussia to 
crush Denmark and Austria; for having looked with 
disdain upon the Prussian armaments; for having neg- 
lected to secure for itself useful and strong alliances ; 
for having tolerated the disorders of its military adminis- 
tration. 

On July 15th, 1870, France had scarcely 240,000 
men under arms, whilst the Germans could dispose 
immediately of an army numbering over 450,000, which 
would in a few days have been reinforced by 400,000 
soldiers more. What chance had France? Sedan has 
been too often described for me to linger over its in- 
cidents. The few points concerning it which I wish to 
point out here are connected with the personality of 
Bismarck. He gives at length the incidents of the 
capitulation. What Bismarck forgets to say is that he 
arranged matters in such a manner that he prevented, 
until the capitulation had been signed, an interview 
between his Sovereign and Napoleon. He feared that, 
in his feelings of compassion for a brother Monarch, 
William I. might show himself more lenient than his 
advisers. It is absolutely certain that if the two men 
had met the conditions under which the capitulation 
actually took place would not have been as hard as 
Moltke with his inflexibility and Bismarck with his 
unscrupulousness framed and imposed them. The 
Chancellor handled matters so skilfully that it was only 



The Capitulation 183 

after General Wimpfen had put his name to the awful 
document, which sealed the fate of the Imperial dynasty, 
that the King of Prussia was informed that the Emperor 
had been waiting for him since the early hours of the 
morning. The old man, who had a heart if his Minister 
had not, angrily resented having been kept in ignorance. 
His first impulse would have been to rush to his erstwhile 
enemy, and by the cordiality of his welcome help him to 
forget as far as possible his sad position. 

When Napoleon reached the palace, where he was to 
remain a prisoner until the end of the campaign, he 
found the kind protection of a woman who had taken 
upon herself the task to soothe his great misfortune. 
From the first moment that she had heard of the destina- 
tion of the Imperial captive Queen Augusta had occupied 
herself with all the details concerning his establishment 
in that castle where his uncle, the King of Westphalia, 
had once held his Court. Indeed, had she been per- 
mitted to do so, she would have repaired herself to 
Wilhelmshoe to receive him there with all the honours 
due to a Sovereign. But Bismarck was watching, and 
he proceeded to represent to the King, in the worst light 
possible, the delicacy displayed by the Queen, and to 
accuse her of political intrigues. His was a soul capable 
of tenderness in regard to his nearest and dearest, but 
not of generosity for a fallen enemy. The respect which 
he showed to Napoleon III. on the morning following 1 
the battle of Sedan did not proceed from pity so much as 
from triumph. 

Once the capitulation had been signed the position of 
Bismarck became in some respects more secure than it had 
been before. I say with intention "in some respects," 
because in others he found that his word did not bear 



184 Germany under Three Emperors 

so much weight in war as it had done in peace time. 
The General Staff did not like his way of making the 
military operations dependent upon the general political 
situation. The Chancellor understood very well what 
other gain for Prussia than annexation of territory or a 
large contribution in money was brought within reach 
— an imperial crown for his King. This was of greater 
import to Bismarck than even the occupation of Paris. 
Headquarters had been transferred to Versailles after 
the battle of Sedan, and here Queen Augusta's influence 
became felt as much if not more than it had been at 
home. She determined to try and persuade the King 
that he ought to conduct the war in a gentlemanly, 
chivalrous way. It reached Bismarck's ears that, together 
with her daughter-in-law, the Crown Princess, she had 
tried to prevent the bombardment of Paris by represent- 
ing it to William I. as a useless act of cruelty, and he 
could not bring himself to forgive her for this piece of 
womanly interference. When, too, the bombardment 
was mooted, some friends of the Queen represented to 
certain officers of the Staff that the results of a bombard- 
ment would never legitimatise its expense. General 
Roon, who did not share this opinion, one day spoke 
about the matter to Bismarck. He at once offered to 
furnish the necessary funds out of the Federal Exchequer. 
Roon accepted, and one morning the Prussian batteries 
attacked the forts of the French capital, much to the 
astonishment of the King, who asked how such a decision 
could have been taken without its being expressly referred 
to him for consent or disapproval. He was so angry that 
even Moltke felt embarrassed and had to call Bismarck 
to the rescue. The latter thereupon unblushingly told 
William I. that he had agreed to the suggestion, and a 



Bombardment of Paris 185 

bombardment would accelerate the capitulation of the 
great city and thus bring peace. No plan had ever been 
submitted to the Sovereign, but he did not contradict 
the flagrant untruth. 

Nor was it only the King whom Bismarck deceived. 
In the course of January Bismarck had occasion to speak 
with the Crown Prince, with whom his relations had 
become quite friendly in consequence of the proclamation 
of the Empire respecting the rumours from Berlin, that 
both the Queen and the Crown Princess were doing their 
best to prevent the bombardment of Paris. The Crown 
Prince protested that such was not the case, whereon the 
Chancellor retorted that many people believed it, and in 
consequence the Crown Prince's popularity in the army 
was bound to suffer, that therefore the best thing would 
be for the Prince to do his best to bring about an 
immediate bombardment. He failed. Frederick William 
was also against a measure which he considered useless 
and mischievous; he briefly replied that it was not his 
business to interfere with the decisions of the General 
Staff, and Bismarck had better let Moltke mention the 
matter to the King. 

Bismarck bit his lips, but worked away at his plans. 
He tried to enter into negotiations with Napoleon III. 
The Emperor declined ; the Empress Regent also refused 
to enter into any negotiations the result of which would 
have been the cession of a portion, however small, of 
French territory. These rebuffs did not disconcert Bis- 
marck. He, indeed, had more than enough to occupy 
his undivided attention if the Empire, at the construction 
of which he had laboured for so long and with such 
perseverance, were to be proclaimed at last and put out- 
side any possible danger for the future. 



I 



CHAPTER XIV 

Inauguration of the Spy System 

T is an interesting fact that the strong hostility which 
existed between the General Staff and the Foreign 
Office in Prussia in 1870 is also manifest during the 
present war. In both campaigns each accuses the other 
of compromising success by meddling in matters which 
ought to be left entirely in the hands of the people 
directly responsible for them. In 1866 the Staff already 
hated Bismarck, whom it accused of having stultified the 
success of the Austrian campaign by his interference. 
It decided, before starting for the French front in 1870, 
that this time he would not be allowed a free hand; 
that they would keep him in the dark concerning the 
military dispositions. Bismarck himself relates that 
whilst he was travelling in the King's train to Cologne 
he heard in the next compartment a conversation between 
Generals von Roon and Podbielski, of which he formed 
the subject, and which was clear enough to make him 
understand that he would not be informed of any of the 
decisions taken by the Staff. 

Despite this general feeling, however, when the 
capitulation of Sedan had to be discussed Moltke himself 
asked Bismarck to assist him, and after this he was called 
more than once to give his opinion on occasions when 
some important decision had to be taken. But the rivalry 
between the two departments responsible for the conduct 
of affairs during war continues fierce and unabated to 

l8§ 



A Comparison 187 

the present time. The Staff to-day is just as loud in its 
denunciations and accuses the Foreign Office of all the 
mistakes which have taken place, and brought about the 
crisis that is shaking the whole of Europe, whilst the 
subordinates of Bethmann-Hollweg are loud in the de- 
nunciations of the hurry displayed by the Staff, who 
gave no time for negotiations in its impatience to go 
forward to crush enemies the real strength of whom it 
undervalues in quite a lamentable manner. 

Bismarck, however, was a very different man from 
the present Chancellor of the German Empire. His 
powerful personality could not be set aside so easily, and 
though he was made the object of a kind of military 
boycott, he contrived to be at the King's side whenever 
he thought that the security of public affairs required 
it. He considered that the work of the army was to 
destroy the enemy, but that the aim of every war ought 
to be a peace that satisfied the policy of the State engaged 
in it. The political problem of every campaign, accord- 
ing to Bismarck, was by far the most important, and in 
the long run the question of peace and war always 
depended on the people in charge of the foreign affairs 
of the different belligerent countries. This was what 
the Prussian Staff refused to understand; this was 
what Bismarck intended to teach them. At Versailles, 
where so many grave interests absorbed his attention, 
he resigned himself with a better grace than could have 
been expected from him not to be informed of the details 
concerning the technical conduct of the campaign. But 
as he was the responsible adviser of the King he had to 
try to procure for himself the information which he 
needed. This, however, was not easy. With all his 
intelligence Bismarck did not see how to begin, when one 



188 Germany under Three Emperors 

of his lieutenants, that von Holstein who figured in the 
Hohenzollern candidature in Spain, stepped upon the 
scene. He proceeded to explain to the Chancellor a plan 
at which he had been working since the beginning of 
the war. This plan was nothing more nor less than the 
organisation of the formidable bureau d' espionage , which 
became such a powerful weapon in the hands of Bismarck 
and to the ability of which he owed more than he would 
have cared to own of his successes. 

Von Holstein was a genius in some ways and one 
of the most extraordinary men that have ever lived. 
He had one great ambition : to know everything about 
everybody and to rule everybody through fear of the 
disclosures which he could make were he at any time 
tempted to do so. He was absolutely indifferent to high 
position, titles, decorations, or money. His tastes were 
of the simplest, his wants but few. He could appreciate 
a good dinner, but he could be content with a dry crust 
and never feel unhappy about it. During the years he 
worked at the side of the Chancellor he proved a most 
admirable helpmate, and his administration of the special 
department in the Foreign Office, of which he became 
the head, was perfect ; but when Bismarck, at whose side 
he had remained for something like twenty -five years, 
was dismissed in the way we know, von Holstein did not 
show him the slightest sympathy, parted from him as 
coldly as he did everything else in his life, and continued 
his own special work in which he was engaged with the 
equanimity that had never deserted him at any time of 
his existence. Later on, however, he could not get on 
with Bismarck's successors, in whom he did not find the 
appreciation of his services to which he considered that 
he was entitled, and at last retired from active service, to 



Recruiting the System 189 

die a few years afterwards the possessor of far more 
political secrets than any living man in his time could 
boast of having learned. 

Bismarck held Holstein in high esteem, and when he 
came with his plan for the establishment of a vast 
organisation of almost universal spying, Bismarck had 
grasped immediately the advantages he could obtain from 
it; but even he did not then realise how powerful such 
an organisation could become. Holstein recruited his 
spies in every class of society — men and women, rich and 
poor, high and low. No matter the social condition or 
the material resources of the people whom he took in 
hand, he compelled them to execute his orders, which 
for the most part consisted in the obligation to bring to 
him certain knowledge which he required. His first care, 
whenever any individual capable at a given minute of 
playing a part, no matter how humble, in the great drama 
attracted his attention, was to ferret out all that could 
be learned concerning him or her. With but few excep- 
tions he contrived to lay his finger on a hidden secret. 
Once this preliminary step had been done to his satisfac- 
tion the rest was easy. The unfortunate victim was given 
to understand that he would be shamed in public at any 
time unless . . . unless . . . Well, this must be left 
to the reader whose intelligence will readily enable him 
to understand. 

Thanks to this simple system of, let us call it, in- 
timidation, the Secret Service which proved so useful 
to Bismarck was instituted with much trouble but with 
magnificent results. Not only Berlin and its society, 
but in a certain sense the whole of Europe was subjected 
to an inquisition that left them absolutely no loophole of 
escape, Bismarck knew everything, heard everything, 



190 Germany under Three Emperors 

made use of everything. After the war Holstein was 
for some years secretary to the Embassy at Paris, where 
he worked at the installation of the different branches of 
his service with such secrecy that neither Count Arnim 
nor Prince Hohenlohe ever suspected his occupation. 
Later on Holstein obtained entire control of the Secret 
Service, and became so jealous of his work that he never 
confided its details to anyone ; and when he retired the 
edifice which had been so very near to perfection when 
he stood at its head lost its importance, became, indeed, 
rather a source of bad information for Bethmann-Hollweg 
and his officials. 

At the Foreign Office Holstein, when he was called 
from Paris, was officially the director of the political 
department. He was not only considered with great 
respect by his colleagues and subordinates, but also held 
in high esteem by all the German diplomats and am- 
bassadors abroad, who often came to him for advice and 
relied on him for giving them hints as to how they were 
to proceed in regard to Bismarck and what they were to 
say to him. Even men like Prince Mains ter and Prince 
Hohenlohe were very careful to ascertain through Hol- 
stein the disposition of their great chief before venturing 
into his presence, and often asked him to smooth the 
way. He was always polite, always ready to oblige, but 
only did so when he found it useful to his political 
interests. He used to spend his days in a small, narrow 
little room, which served to him as office and where two 
chairs and a huge desk composed the whole furniture. 
He never went out into society, and though he knew 
everybody very few people knew him even by sight. He 
was a demon for cleverness and unscrupulousness, and 
the fact that personal ambition was a thing utterly un- 



The War Scare of 1875 191 

known to him rendered him all the more dangerous to 
his foes. 

Holstein engineered the Hohenzollern candidature ; 
he arranged the war scare of 1875 when Gortschakov was 
rendered ridiculous and poor Vicomte de Gontaut Biron 
made to play such a sorry part; he organised the vast 
conspiracy which resulted in unfortunate King Lud- 
wig II. of Bavaria ending his days in the blue waters 
of the lake of Starnberg ; he caused secretly the famous 
forged documents which were handed to Alexander III. 
to be fabricated, in order to provoke on the part of the 
Tsar a demonstration of sympathy in favour of Bismarck ; 
he spent his life in intriguing, plotting, working in 
silence and in the dark. 

The great fear of Bismarck during this period was 
that, if the siege of Paris dragged on too long, Europe 
might make some demonstration of sympathy in favour 
of France. The visits of M. Thiers to the principal 
Continental capitals also caused him some sleepless 
nights. Count Beust, too, whom he hated so cordially, 
was agitating to provoke the Russian and English Cabinet 
into making a collective intervention in favour of peace. 
It was this fear which caused Bismarck to shout with 
joy when Russia asked for a revision of the Treaty of 
Paris. Through Prince Peter of Oldenburg, a persona 
grata both at Petersburg and at the Berlin Court, who 
was a cousin of Alexander II. and a great favourite of 
his, it had been insinuated that such a request would 
meet with favour. Prince Peter was very glad to avail 
himself of the hint that he could prove of use in Russia's 
aspirations towards the East by suggesting that Peters- 
burg could profit by the helplessness of France by 
seeking to abolish the clause of the Treaty of 1856 which 



192 Germany under Three Emperors 

prevented any Russian Fleet cruising in the waters of 
the Black Sea. Russia had always thought it humili- 
ating to its dignity, and the Tsar would have been but 
too glad to see the clause abrogated ; but, to the general 
surprise, Prince Gortschakov did not receive the idea 
with enthusiasm. It was finally the Russian military 
attache at the Berlin Court, General Count KutusofT, 
who took upon himself to speak to the Emperor 
Alexander concerning the suggestion made by the 
Berlin Cabinet, and who decided him to take the neces- 
sary steps to enforce it by inviting the Powers which 
had taken part in the Congress of Paris to meet in 
conference in London. The result was what Bismarck 
hoped for; no longer did Russia take up the cause of 
France against Prussia, except in a purely academical 
manner. 

Count KutusorT, who was one of the most convinced 
partisans of a complete understanding between Berlin 
and Petersburg, was one of the puppets of whom Bis- 
marck made most use. An excellent and worthy man, 
but not at all intelligent, he took himself far more au 
serieuoc than anyone else, and liked nothing better than 
to be entrusted with what he thought were diplomatic 
missions. He had got an excellent memory, and could 
be relied upon to repeat with exactitude all that he had 
been told. He did so with the full persuasion that he 
was merely giving expression to his own personal ideas. 
Very often this was precisely what was wanted. With- 
out him, and without the Grand Duke of Saxe- Weimar, 
it is quite possible that Alexander II. would have allowed 
himself to be moved by the pleadings of M. Thiers or 
the letter which the Empress Eugenie wrote to him from 
Chislehurst, asking him to intervene in favour of France. 



Conditions of Capitulation 193 

In this way did Bismarck blind Alexander II. to the 
direction in which his duty should lie. 

I cannot conceive why nobody except Bismarck has 
drawn attention in the numerous accounts which have 
been written concerning the siege of Paris to the fact 
that, whilst it lasted, the Prussians suffered from a 
decided shortage of ammunition. 

Now, who was responsible in 1870 for this want of 
organisation in the Prussian army? Was it due to the 
simple fact that ammunitions really were lacking, or to 
the want of haste in forwarding them? Bismarck 
attributes it to the last circumstance, and perhaps he 
is not very wrong in this appreciation. In 1870 the 
Prussians were not quite the barbarians they have 
become to-day, and among the higher officers of the 
Staff there were many who thought that the bombard- 
ment of Paris was a useless cruelty, and would result 
in the loss of art treasures and monuments of inestimable 
value that nothing could ever replace. 

One wonders really what it was that Bismarck had 
hoped from this wanton ruthlessness. Holstein, who 
spoke about it one day, declared that the Chancellor 
had wanted the bombardment to distract public atten- 
tion from the important negotiations in which he was 
engaged in regard to the proclamation of the Empire. 
This may be true and it may not. The real object of 
this unwarranted action has never been ascertained to 
this day. 

On January 23rd Jules Favre repaired once more 
to Versailles. This time it was to settle the conditions 
of the fall of the brave city. Jules Favre consented to 
everything. His consternation was so great that he and 
the officers of the French Staff entirely forgot to include 



194 Germany under Three Emperors 

in the armistice the Army of the East commanded by 
Chanzy, and neither Bismarck nor Moltke, of course, 
mentioned it. This fact, almost monstrous in its un- 
scrupulousness, allowed the Prussians to continue its 
march against it and to crush it. Jules Favre afterwards 
declared that he had never thought of having this army 
mentioned in a special paragraph in the armistice con- 
vention because he had understood that the latter would 
include all the French armies in general, and William I., 
in his telegram to Queen Augusta, mentioned expressly 
" All the French armies." But of what value were the 
private opinions or thoughts of the Sovereign against the 
determination of Bismarck? 

Such were the broad lines of the tragedy out of the 
pangs of which a new Empire was born and several great 
reputations marred. And if we are to believe von 
Holstein, Bismarck's first words after the proclamation 
of the German Empire at Versailles had been words of 
despondency. Throwing himself into an arm-chair and 
unbuttoning his uniform, he exclaimed, "It is very fine, 
but how long will it last ? ' ' 



CHAPTER XV 
A King becomes Emperor 

THE North German Confederation never had any 
chance of being considered as anything else than a 
provisional arrangement. Everybody had known in the 
later 'sixties that, war or no war, the Empire which 
was in the air would, within a few years, become a 
reality. Germany, together with its various small States, 
would have to be modified to it. The brilliant successes 
which had attended the French campaign brought 
matters to a climax, and the whole of Northern Germany 
had become eager for the elevation of the King of 
Prussia to the rank of an Emperor. In the Southern 
States, however, as we have already seen, this was by 
no means the same thing. Bavaria did not in the least 
care to become a Prussian province, and Wiirtemberg 
felt averse to it. Bismarck, therefore, had to arrange 
matters in such a way that the consent of both the 
Kings of Bavaria and of Wiirtemberg should not only 
be obtained, but appear in the eyes of the man in the 
street as the expression of their willingness that a new 
order of things should be established. 

On the question of the Imperial title, William I. 
held that the value of the Prussian crown was above 
that of Emperor. The latter had been borne in suc- 
cession by so many dynasties who had not contrived to 
keep it for any length of time. The Imperial title 
appeared to him as something in the light of a function 

i95 



196 Germany under Three Emperors 

rather than of a dignity; Bismarck, on the other hand, 
differed from his Royal master. He considered that the 
adoption of the Imperial title by the King of Prussia 
had become a political necessity, because it represented 
to the mind of the German people the unity which was 
indispensable for the development of the Empire, and 
also as an important factor in deflecting attention from 
the Prussian superiority which was looked upon with 
such animosity by so many people. The first time that 
the subject was seriously mentioned to William I. his 
reply was characteristic : ' ' What do you want me to 
do with this title? " he had exclaimed, to which Bis- 
marck had replied, "Your Majesty cannot remain for 
ever a neutral substantive and be called ' das Praesidium ' ; 
it is an abstraction, whereas the title of Emperor will 
always exercise a fascination upon the masses," and he 
philosophically added, "the masses are what is called 
public opinion.' ' 

This, however, did not convert William I. He 
never cared for the title of Emperor, and he never could 
get used to it so long as he lived. Whenever I had 
occasion personally to hear him speak of the Empress 
Augusta, he always called her "the Queen," and he 
would not have in the least resented had other people 
done the same. And, indeed, among the persons who 
were admitted into the intimacy of the Imperial couple 
they were never mentioned otherwise than as the King 
and the Queen. Augusta, however, not because she 
cared for it, but because she thought it to be her duty, 
was always very particular to say "the Emperor." 

With the Crown Prince it was different; he was 
essentially an Imperialist, though Bismarck is not quite 
correct when he pretends in his Reminiscences that 



The Trappings of Power 197 

Frederick had not shown himself favourable to the 
creation of an Empire, and would have preferred his 
father to assume the title of King of the Germans. This 
might have been so in the sense that, like William I., 
he was very proud of the old kingly appellation which 
had been won with so much trouble by his ancestors; 
but he would have contented himself with it only on 
condition that the other German Sovereigns renounced 
it and declared themselves satisfied with being called 
Dukes, as he told Bismarck, or Peers of the Empire, 
as he told me personally one day when we discussed 
the story of this eventful time at Versailles. The 
Crown Princess was decidedly Imperialist in the widest 
conception of this word, and quite against any Federated 
Empire, which, to her mind, seemed to be only an 
anomaly. The very idea of the other Sovereigns relin- 
quishing their titles was, of course, absolutely Utopian. 
" Children must be left in possession of their playthings," 
Bismarck had said brutally one day when a friend of the 
Crown Prince had mentioned this view. Still, Bis- 
marck had fully made up his mind beforehand that these 
titles should remain nothing more than playthings, 
empty of power or dignity. 

The King of Bavaria was not to be persuaded. He 
had always hated Prussia. During that month of 
December, indeed, when he was pressed on all sides to 
play the uncongenial part which was expected from him, 
he showed himself so irritable that one day when his 
own mother, who was by birth a Prussian Princess, 
asked to speak to him he replied, "I do not feel inclined 
to see a Princess of Prussia." 

Bismarck, however, was not the kind of man to allow 
himself to be discouraged. He therefore quietly pro- 



198 Germany under Three Emperors 

ceeded with the underground work in which he had been 
engaged ever since the beginning of the war. He had 
the free disposition of the income of the so-called Guelph 
fund — the confiscated fortune of the King of Hanover — 
without indiscreet control from a third person. These 
funds he used among certain personages at the Bavarian 
Court. He also caused to represent Bavaria at Versailles 
Count von Holstein — the only man in whom the King 
of Bavaria had confidence — and the Chancellor set 
himself the task of persuading the Count that the most 
advantageous thing which could occur, both for him and 
for the future welfare of Bavaria, would be that King 
Ludwig should be induced to look with favourable eyes 
on the revolution — because it was nothing else — it was 
intended to bring about in the constitution of Germany. 
At this particular moment the question of the restora- 
tion of the Empire had reached a very critical stage, and 
might even have collapsed entirely. To this danger 
contributed the haughty silence of the King of Bavaria, 
and the extreme repugnance of the King of Prussia to 
consent to what appeared to him to be a diminution of 
his Royal prerogative and dignity in favour of one that 
had not received the sanction of divine right. At this 
juncture Baron Holstein — who already then had begun 
to assume the function of those confidants of mighty 
personages which we see introduced in the Greek 
tragedies and later on in those of Racine or Corneille — 
then took it upon himself to suggest to Count Holstein 
to ask Bismarck to write a personal letter to Ludwig II., 
in which he would explain the reasons which made it 
expedient to offer to a Hohenzollern the crown of Bar- 
barossa and of Othon. The Count, of course, caught 
at the idea, the more so that it flattered his vanity to 



A Visit to Ludwig II. 199 

be able to say later that it had been his advice which 
had influenced Bismarck at such a grave and anxious 
moment. He therefore presented himself at the Chan- 
cellor's residence at Versailles. Bismarck, who in ques- 
tions of grave importance had absolutely no vanity, 
seemed to become lost in thought for a few moments, 
just to impress Holstein's vanity, then took up a pen 
and wrote to the King of Bavaria a letter which he 
had had elaborated in his mind for the last day or two, 
and the terms of which had been settled long before the 
Bavarian nobleman had craved an audience. The sense 
of this missive was that he quite recognised it would be 
impossible for the Bavarian Sovereign to grant to the 
King of Prussia the presidential rights and privileges, 
which had been already offered to him in an official way 
by Bavaria, without wounding the national feelings of 
the people of that country, Prussia being a neighbour of 
Bavaria. A German Emperor, on the contrary, was not 
a neighbour belonging to a different race, but a German 
compatriot of the Bavarian people. According to his 
(Bismarck's) opinion, King Ludwig could with far more 
decency consent to concessions if he made them to a 
German Emperor than to a King of Prussia. As we 
shall see, the psychological instinct of Bismarck had once 
more proved to be right. 

Count Holstein left for Hohenschwangau, where 
Ludwig II. was residing, on November 27th. Bismarck, 
in his Reminiscences, says that the King, who had at 
first refused to receive him, had him shown into his 
presence when he heard that he was bringing to him a 
letter from the Chancellor, and that, after having read 
this communication, he wrote immediately and signed 
the message which the latter had asked him for. This 



200 Germany under Three Emperors 

is not, however, quite true. Count Holstein remained 
for three days in Hohenschwangau before he was 
admitted into his Sovereign's room. It was only after 
the Monarch's private secretary, Herr von Eisenhardt, 
who was completely won over to the Prussian cause, had 
warned Ludwig that if he refused he risked being de- 
throned in favour of his brother or his uncle, Prince 
Luitpold, that the harassed Monarch at last, after con- 
siderable hesitation and resistance, signed what he called 
his own " decheance." As it was indispensable that the 
consent which had been wrung from him by such un- 
worthy means should have the appearance of having been 
entirely spontaneous, it was given out at Versailles — and 
the untruth was repeated by the Chancellor in his 
Reminiscences — that, owing to the bad state of the 
roads and the difficulty of communications, the journey 
of Count Holstein had taken seven days instead of 
three. It is thus that very often history comes to be 
written. 

So far Bismarck had been successful. The more local 
trouble remained. The opposition of the King of 
Prussia, as time advanced, grew more violent every day. 
The old man at last declared that he thought the whole 
idea preposterous. If he became Emperor he would 
have to give up the simplicity of life which he loved and 
in which he had been born and bred. The title of 
Emperor would only embarrass him, but if he were 
compelled to accept it, he wished to be called Emperor 
of Germany and not German Emperor, which was 
neither the one thing nor the other. Upon seeing that 
the Crown Prince agreed with Bismarck, William I. 
became the more determined to oppose them both to 
such an extent that, in the deliberation which took 




EMPEROR WILLIAM I. IN 1871 

From the Painting by Winterhalter 



Trouble over the Title 201 

place on January 17th, 1871, on the very eve of the 
day chosen for the proclamation of the Empire, he 
declared that he absolutely refused the title of German 
Emperor, and that if he could not be Emperor of 
Germany he would not be Emperor at all. 

Bismarck then had recourse to the argument that if 
the appellation of Emperor of Germany was used it 
might offend the German Princes, who would consider 
that it implied a certain right upon their territories. At 
last, after a long discussion, William I. allowed himself 
to be persuaded, but insisted on his protest to be recorded 
in the protocol of the proceedings. 

Another discussion ensued on questions of prece- 
dence. The King would not admit that the place which 
the Congress of Vienna had awarded to the Russian 
Grand Dukes and the Austrian Archdukes before the 
Prussian Royal Princes could be interfered with. At 
last he got into a perfect passion, struck the table with 
his fist, and exclaimed that he would not give way, and 
commanded things should be left as they had been in 
the past concerning this matter. It was only a few days 
after January 18th, when the irritation which the cere- 
mony that had taken place on that day had given rise 
to had more or less subsided, that the King was per- 
suaded to grant to his son the title of Imperial High- 
ness ; but all the supplications and entreaties of the 
various members of his family did not make him change 
his mind on the subject of a change in their status. 
He declared that, in spite of their desire to be called 
also Imperial Highnesses, they were Princes of Prussia 
and would remain such, because the fact that he had 
become an Emperor had nothing to do with them, and 
could not influence their position. Later on a delibera- 



202 Germany under Three Emperors 

tion of the Bimdesrath decided that it would only be 
the Crown Prince who would have the right, by virtue 
of his position as heir to the German Empire, to receive 
the title of Imperial Highness. 

The heated discussion which had arisen in regard to 
these various incidents decided Bismarck to seek the 
Grand Duke of Baden the next morning, and ask him 
what title he meant to give to his father-in-law when he 
would have to call for a cheer for him after the reading 
of the act of proclamation. The Grand Duke imme- 
diately replied, "Emperor of Germany; such are his 
Majesty's orders." The Chancellor, shocked beyond 
words, proceeded to explain to the Prince that such a 
thing was quite impossible, because the text of the 
Constitution of the new Empire had been already settled 
by the Reichstag. The Grand Duke then said that he 
would speak again with the King. He never told 
Bismarck whether he had done so and what passed at 
the interview, but at the last minute he navigated the 
difficulty : he called the assembly present at the pro- 
mulgation of the new title of his father-in-law to cheer 
the "Emperor William." The new Emperor was 
terribly offended, and attributed his disappointment to 
the interference of Bismarck. He, therefore, refused 
to speak to him after the ceremony ; passing ostenta- 
tiously in front of him without seeming to notice his 
presence, he went to shake hands with a few generals 
standing not far from where was stationed the Chancellor 
of the new Empire, thanking them loudly for their 
services, ignoring the great Minister without whom the 
Empire could never have become an accomplished fact. 

It is a thousand pities that, amidst the correspondence 
of Bismarck which his heirs have thought fit to publish, 



M. Thiers 203 

we cannot find a single letter which would have allowed 
us to guess the state of his feelings during those eventful 
days. A man less conscious than he of the magnitude 
of the work that had been brought to such a successful 
issue might expectedly have given some expressions of 
satisfaction in regard to his own share in it. One wonders 
whether this has been done intentionally, or whether 
really Bismarck, in his letters to his wife and other per- 
sons, thought it such a matter of course that he did not 
think it worth while talking about it. 

January 18th, which saw a new Emperor take his 
seat among the Sovereigns of Europe, was followed, as 
we have seen, by the armistice that settled the fate of 
Paris as well as of France. The latter was called upon 
to elect the National Assembly, on which was to devolve 
the painful task of ratifying the terrible peace condi- 
tions which Prussia had declared to be the only ones to 
which she would consent. M. Thiers had been elected 
a member of this Assembly in twenty-six departments, 
a fact which decided his further election as President of 
the Republic. Thanks to his efforts, some of the demands 
of the German General Staff were reduced. As well 
as Alsace and Lorraine, with Metz, it wanted to take 
also Longuyin, Briey, Nancy, Luneville, Saint-Die, 
and Montbeliard, which were exclusively French terri- 
tories, to which the excuse of a German origin could 
not be applied as in the case of Alsace. Belfort also 
remained French. When Thiers was complimented on 
having retained the possession of this important fortress, 
and asked how he had contrived it, he exclaimed the 
famous words that shook the whole Assembly: "Mes- 
sieurs, je Vai arrache avec mon desespoir," which was 
not quite true. It had been by a subterfuge that he 



204 Germany under Three Emperors 

had succeeded in saving it from the Prussian maw. The 
German Emperor, having discovered after the pre- 
liminaries of peace had been already agreed upon that 
the battlefields of St. Privat and Gravelotte were to 
remain French territory, insisted on their being handed 
over to him, as he did not wish the places where so 
many of his brave soldiers had fallen to be in the hands 
of those who had slain them. It was a sentimental 
reason, but it was connected with the Sovereign's love 
for his army, and, therefore, was not to be refused. 
Thiers was clever enough to see the advantage that he 
could obtain out of this circumstance, and he offered 
both St. Privat and Gravelotte in exchange for Belfort, 
a request which William I. granted spontaneously after 
Thiers had written to him personally on the subject ; and 
this notwithstanding the protestations of General von 
Moltke and of the whole Staff. 

Bismarck was clever enough not to go against Wil- 
liam in this little matter. Indeed, he would have liked 
to show himself more generous in regard to a van- 
quished foe, and would have repeated the tactics that 
had proved so profitable in 1866 at Nikolsburg. But 
this time he had to do with a far stronger opposition 
which, apart from the military leaders who insisted on 
being heard, comprised most of the German Princes 
who at Versailles surrounded the King of Prussia, being 
all convinced that the war which had just terminated so 
brilliantly had never been wished for by Prussia. They 
all of them thought they must have guarantees against 
the possibility of another attack on the part of France. 
Bismarck, of course, could not disabuse them, and he 
began then to reap the fruits of some of the untruths 
he had forced down the throat of the German nation as 



The Treaty of Frankfurt 205 

well as of Europe. His sin was beginning to find him 
out. 

At last the Treaty of Peace was signed at Frankfurt 
on May 10th, 1871. The enormous contribution of five 
milliards, which the financial experts whom Bismarck 
had consulted thought would cripple France for years 
to come — at least ten years, because he never believed 
that after a defeat such as she had experienced, and 
after the horrors of the Commune that had followed upon 
it, France would be able to hold to her engagements. 
For once he was mistaken in his appreciation of not only 
the material riches and resources of the fair country 
which he thought he had crushed for a long time to 
come, but also of its patriotism, its courage, and its 
spirit of self-denial. The Treaty of Frankfurt, which was 
to be the destruction of France as a great nation, proved 
its regeneration. Without it she would never have risen 
to the heights of sacrifice she has attained to-day ; the 
heroic defence of Verdun was due to the tears which 
have been shed over the loss of Strasburg and of Metz. 

It is not generally known that a request to grant 
autonomy to the conquered provinces was made to Bis- 
marck by the Crown Princess Victoria. He decidedly 
refused to entertain such an idea, declaring that in that 
case one could have reason to fear an attempt at reunion 
with the mother country. He was haunted from the very 
day of the signature of the Treaty of Frankfurt with 
the fear of another war with France. His genius told 
him that in such a case she would find strong support 
among other Continental Powers. 

The first thing to which Bismarck applied himself 
after his return to Berlin was to make the Reichstag 
vote an augmentation of the military expenses for a 



206 Germany under Three Emperors 

space of three years, together with the general budget 
of the army for seven years. This measure would allow 
such manipulations of the public funds that would not 
be advisable for the Reichstag to control. He thereafter 
directed the whole brunt of his Foreign Policy toward 
the one object of isolating France. The period of time 
which extends itself from 1871 to the day when he was 
disgraced by William II. was spent by Bismarck in pre- 
paring the German Empire for the new war which he 
knew was unavoidable. It was to prove, perhaps, the 
most interesting period of his whole life, if only on account 
of the fact that it was to be marked by as many reverses 
as successes, Bismarck was feared, respected and wor- 
shipped by the whole of Germany. No King ever wielded 
a greater authority than his. His fortune had never de- 
serted him during the whole course of his extraordinary 
career : can one feel surprised that he never thought that 
for him there could come a day when his Emperor would 
send him away in disgrace? 



Part III 
Development of Militarism 



CHAPTER XVI 
Bismarck and the Empress 

THE war of 1870 and its outcome constitutes the 
greatest of Bismarck's triumphs : the German Em- 
pire was the visible evidence of his constructive genius 
in statesmanship. He was far too clever, however, not 
to realise that there was no real stability in the edifice 
which had taken him such pains to raise, and that its 
strengthening would be the most difficult task he had 
ever faced. As time revealed the different flaws which 
marred his work, the irritability which always marked 
his disposition developed to a still greater degree. But 
his temperament was essentially of the fighting order, 
and he was not happy unless struggling against some- 
thing or somebody. Then again, the full consciousness 
which he possessed of his own superiority, with its 
corresponding belief that all those who surrounded him, 
and with whom he had to work, were but pigmies com- 
pared with himself, combined to make him suspicious, 
mistrustful, and desirous of sweeping away all obstacles 
which beset his path. Out of this sprang an ever-increas- 
ing impatience with the "stupidities" of others, and 
violent outbursts of rage at any opposition which he 
encountered to any of the vast designs which his active 
brain was continually evolving. He was essentially 
revengeful, and the tenacity with which he pursued all 
those who had ventured to cross or oppose him led, in 
many instances, to a useless expenditure of his strength, 
o 209 



210 Germany under Three Emperors 

He never could bring himself to look objectively at 
things or at people, and this it was that made him at 
times such a particularly unpleasant individual. The 
least thing put him out of patience, and he never would 
make any allowance for others, or bring himself to treat 
with disdain the attacks of those weak foes of his to 
whom he attributed an importance which they never 
deserved. He used also to take absurd and unreasoning 
dislikes of certain people ; for instance, in the cases of 
the first French Ambassador at the Berlin Court after 
the Treaty of Frankfurt, the Vicomte de Gontaut Biron, 
and the Empress Augusta. The latter he pursued with 
an inveterate hatred which, instead of frightening her 
by its intensity, only amused her, and gave her an 
exaggerated idea of her own importance. The Empress, 
though a clever woman, never could get rid of her love 
for intrigue, and allowed herself to be influenced by a 
small coterie of persons whom she liked simply because 
they pandered to her love of gossip and brought her all 
the tittle-tattle of the day, true or untrue. She detested 
Bismarck because he had never appreciated her at her 
own value and never consulted her, but, on the contrary, 
did all in his power to keep her outside affairs of State. 
She was instinctively " un personnage d' opposition," and 
even at the time when she had been simply Princess of 
Prussia, with but a distant prospect of becoming Queen, 
she had always set herself up as a criticising power in 
the State, and all the enemies of the Government of the 
day had found a friend in her. Her extreme affection 
for everything that was French had always jarred on the 
nerves of Prince Bismarck, who reproached her for 
having French servants around her, for preferring to 
talk French rather than German, and especially for 



Baron Schleinitz 211 

always having Frenchmen about her; one at least, M. 
Gerard, became the object of the special hatred of the 
Chancellor. He served the Empress in the capacity of 
private secretary, and Bismarck attributed to him first 
the composition of Madame Adam's famous book, "La 
Societe de Berlin," and, secondly, the crime of being the 
particular friend of the Vicomte de Gontaut, which also 
was not true — the latter would most certainly never 
have chosen a red-hot Republican such as M. Gerard 
as secretary to Empress Augusta. 

The Chancellor had several "pet enemies." The 
Empress was one, and the former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, who during the last twenty-five years or so of 
his life had filled the functions of Minister of the Royal 
Household, Baron (later Count) Schleinitz, was another. 
He became the bete noire of the Chancellor, who accused 
him of all kinds of black intrigues of which, nine times 
out of ten, he was perfectly innocent. Bismarck be- 
lieved him to be the person who furnished the Empress 
with information. But in this again he was wrong, 
because the principal source of the gossip which reached 
the ears of the Empress was her maid, Mademoiselle von 
Neundorff, who had been with her for something like 
half a century. Mademoiselle von Neundorff hated Bis- 
marck as only an old maid can hate, and whenever she 
could thwart him or do anything likely to displease or 
to anger him she never missed the opportunity. All 
the enemies of the Chancellor were her friends, and she 
it was who used to keep the Empress aware of all that 
was said in Berlin society, the greatest ladies of which 
visited her and did their best .to win her favour and 
good graces. Bismarck with all his genius failed entirely 
to appreciate the importance of this feminine rival of 



212 Germany under Three Emperors 

his, and in his prejudices and blind hatred of Schleinitz 
attributed to the latter the sins of Mademoiselle von 
Neundorff. 

The Empress had always sympathised with the 
Roman Catholic Church, though the rumour that she 
had joined it had no justification. But she had many 
Catholic friends, and she was by nature adverse to any 
kind of persecution, be it religious or political. The 
Kulturkampf had been for her a source of great sorrow. 
During the whole time that it lasted she never attempted 
to hide her disapproval of a policy in which she saw a 
considerable danger to the security of the German State, 
and she never missed an opportunity of showing the 
nature of her feelings on the subject. 

Her expressions of irritation in regard to the Kultur- 
kampf did not advance the cause of the Catholic party, 
and it is probable that if she had not been there Bis- 
marck would have wearied of this struggle much sooner 
than was the case, which did not originate with him, 
but owed its birth to the discussions which had taken 
place in Bavaria during the administration of Prince 
Hohenlohe between the Liberal parties in that State and 
the Roman Catholic Church. He continued them in 
Prussia, not so much out of hatred for the Catholic 
religion or clergy, but out of dislike for certain people, 
in whom he feared to find not rivals, but adversaries of 
his political views, and out of hatred for the Poles and 
everything which concerned Polish aspirations. The 
Kulturkampf, indeed, would never have taken place but 
for Poland and for the Polish question. It was this 
Polish question which prevented the Kulturkampf from 
coming to an end quicker than was the case. It was 
not so much the Catholics whom Bismarck disliked to 



Storing up Memories 213 

see about the King and Queen, as the Polish elements, 
in whose midst all his other enemies found a friendly 
welcome, and in whose houses they were received with 
open arms. When I first married I remember that the 
feelings of hostility between my husband's family, and 
everybody even remotely connected with the household 
of the Chancellor, were about as violent as they could 
be. The Radziwill Palace, which by a strange irony of 
fate was to become two years later the residence of Bis- 
marck himself, was a centre of reunion for all the 
members of the Opposition in the Reichstag, and it 
would be useless to deny that it constituted a centre 
of animosity against the person of the Chancellor. He 
was not very far wrong when he attributed to the many 
intrigues which took place under its roof a certain in- 
fluence on the deliberations of the Chambers in regard 
to the so-called " Falk Laws," the promulgation of 
which was to raise such a storm of indignation in Ultra- 
montane circles. 

Personally, however, I took no part in these in- 
trigues, which, as I was told by my father, whose judg- 
ment was in many respects an unerring one, could lead 
to nothing, and only end in ridicule. My Russian 
nationality put me outside the sphere of Polish intrigues, 
with which I must say, however, I never sympathised, 
having seen too much of them in Russia. I therefore 
made an exception to the rest of my family, and actually 
visited Princess Bismarck, who always showed herself 
excessively kind to me, and who went so far as to invite 
me to her house, where I had the opportunity to talk 
with the mighty Chancellor, who at that time did not 
seem to consider me in the light of a possible adversary, 
probably because I was far too young to attain any im- 



214 Germany under Three Emperors 

portance in his eyes. Yet once or twice I had the oppor- 
tunity to hear his remarks on some important event of 
the day; and these, when remembered later, helped me 
to form my own opinion concerning the causes of 
several happenings which occurred. After the Congress 
of Berlin I set up a salon of my own, where a violent 
opposition to the policy inaugurated by Bismarck was 
started, and as time went I found myself righting him 
and his views on more than one occasion, and not alto- 
gether without success, as I shall endeavour to show. 

To return, however, to the subject of the Kultur- 
kampf. One of the persons who greatly encouraged 
Bismarck in his anti-Catholic policy was Prince Clovis 
Hohenlohe, together with his two brothers, the Duke 
of Ratibor and Cardinal von Hohenlohe, the latter of 
whom had at one time seriously hoped to be elected 
to the Pontifical throne with the help of Prussia. Those 
three personages, in addition to their family ties, were 
firmly united by their common hatred for the Jesuits, 
a hatred that was carried so far as to be almost ridiculous 
and childish in its expression of dread in regard to the 
influence of the famous Order, in which they saw poisoners 
like the Borgias and people capable of every crime. 
Prince Clovis, who in other respects was such a sound, 
and in a certain sense such a moderate, politician, com- 
pletely lost his self-control whenever the name of Jesuit 
was mentioned, and he it was who first brought forward 
the Bill which abolished the Order in the whole of the 
German Empire. If he had confined his activity to the 
expulsion of the sons of Loyola the evil would not have 
been great, and he certainly might have earned the 
gratitude of all the moderate parties in Germany, who 
did not care for religious intrigues, but who at the same 



Vatican Matters 215 

time objected to persecution in matters of faith becom- 
ing a political principle. Unfortunately, he believed 
himself to be admirably well informed as to all the 
political currents which surged about the Vatican, and 
this was not by any means the case. Indeed, no one 
in Germany, not excepting Bismarck himself, knew 
anything about them. How could they, in view of the 
utter incompetence of the people on whose information 
they relied? One wonders whether one is dreaming or 
awake when one reads the following remarks of Prince 
Hohenlohe when German Ambassador in Paris, and 
remembers that it is a statesman of importance and ex- 
perience who allows his pen to run riot in such utter 
nonsense : " Michaud, a professor at the Catholic 
Faculty of Berne, has related to me to-day that most of 
the victims of the Commune who were shot by the 
insurgents during its last days were enemies of the 
Jesuits, among them the Archbishop of Paris — Darboy — 
whom the Jesuits detested on account of the attitude 
which he had adopted during the Vatican Council ; 
Senator Bonjean, who was known to profess most Liberal 
Catholic opinions ; de Guery, a Liberal priest ; Chaudet, 
the editor of the Steele ; then the Dominicans of Arcueil, 
who were the followers of the doctrines of Lacordaire, 
and all the Jesuits who belonged to the Liberal section 
of their Order, among others the Pere Olivain. No one 
knows precisely how it came that they were taken as 
hostages by the Communists. The well-known Vicar- 
General of the Diocese of Paris, who had been sent to 
Versailles in order to negotiate the liberation of the 
victims in exchange for some prominent insurgents who 
had fallen into the hands of the Government, never 
returned to Paris, as he had promised to do, and when he 



216 Germany under Three Emperors 

did come back, after the city had been recaptured by 
the regular army, the indignation of the clergy against 
him was so great that he had to resign his position. 
Now Archbishop Guibert has again reinstated him. 
Guibert is entirely in the hands of the Jesuits, and pro- 
tects all the religious orders in preference to the regular 
clergy." 

A little later we find that Prince Hohenlohe writes 
again : 

" During my conversation with the Cardinal [i.e. 
his brother] and other priests I have heard the follow- 
ing in regard to the Roman question : 

" There are a large number of Italian statesmen who 
belong to the Jesuit Order by affiliation. Among others 
Ponza di San Martino, Ricasoli, the late Massimo 
d'Azeglio, and Silvio Pellico. The General of the Jesuits 
resides in Paris, and it is King Victor Emmanuel who 
pays his expenses there. 

" The Jesuits have been allowed secretly to remove 
their books from the library of the Gesu College. This 
was done by night during many successive weeks. The 
Italian clergy in general say that the Italian Government 
protects the Jesuits in quite a particular manner. 

" The King of Naples says that he has proofs that 
the Jesuits have sworn the fall of the House of Bourbon, 
and that they are responsible for all the misfortunes which 
have overtaken it. 

" Among the cardinals and prelates with whom one 
could negotiate, and who are enemies of the Jesuits, can 
be reckoned, according to the words of Gustave [i.e. 
Cardinal Hohenlohe] the following : The Cardinals 
Franchi, Guidi, de Luca, Mertel, Angelis in Fermo, 
and the Nuncio Jacobini in Vienna. The Princess 



Why the Struggle Collapsed 217 

Caroline Wittgenstein is also an enemy of the Order, and 
might be induced to work usefully against it." 

One cannot even smile at such inanities, and the 
idea of the Italian Government protecting the Jesuits 
to the extent of paying an annuity to their General is 
so ludicrous as to disarm anger. But the fact that Bis- 
marck could believe such tales, and place confidence in 
the people who related them, sufficiently accounts for 
the collapse of the struggle between the Chancellor and 
the Church of Rome. He would have liked to see 
Cardinal Hohenlohe in the Chair of St. Peter, but what 
qualifications had he for such a position ? How could one 
have trusted a man weak enough in intellect to tell any- 
one — as he did to me quite seriously — that when his 
trusted cook was ill he would not risk engaging another 
in his stead, but had lived only on eggs bought and 
cooked by himself, and this because he was afraid of 
being poisoned by the Jesuits ! One may like or dis- 
like the famous Order, and, personally, I certainly am 
not counted among its friends, but between this and be- 
lieving that its members spend their time in concocting 
plots worthy of any Porte St. Martin melodrama, there 
is a wide difference. 

Bismarck, with all his genius and his keen knowledge 
of human nature, was quite unable to gauge the im- 
portance which, by passive resistance, the Catholic clergy 
and Catholic faction in the Chambers would in time 
acquire. He treated the Roman Church as a negligible 
quantity, and fully believed that in the nineteenth 
century it had lost its influence over the masses, 
especially in Germany, where Protestantism had 
thoroughly permeated public opinion. He committed 
the great mistake of confounding Catholicism and Polish 



2i 8 Germany under Three Emperors 

nationalism, and the result was that in the long run he 
had to resign himself to see one of these elements triumph 
and the other remain unbeaten. But, faithful to his 
principle of never acknowledging himself in the wrong, 
the Chancellor, in his Reminiscences, will not accept 
the responsibility for all the errors into which he was 
led by the development of the Kulturkampf. With 
great ability he throws this responsibility entirely upon 
Falk. After having praised him almost to exaggeration, 
he drops the remark that, having been obliged to allow 
him to retire from public service — as, owing to the 
feminine influences which had been intriguing against 
him at Court, Falk desired — he was enabled to start a 
revision of the work which he had done, but which, out 
of consideration for him, Bismarck had not wished to 
begin so long as Falk remained in office. 

The remarks with which he accompanies this cynical 
utterance are also worthy to be recalled, as they prove, 
among other things, how intensely personal Bismarck 
could show himself, and with what persistence he re- 
curred to a subject which had provoked his irritation. 

"Falk," writes the Chancellor, "succumbed to the 
same intrigue that had been used, but without success, 
against myself. He succumbed to them because he was 
more sensitive than I had ever shown myself to the 
treatment at Court, and also because he was not pro- 
tected by the personal sympathy of the Emperor to the 
same extent that I always was. The animosity of the 
Empress in regard to the Ministry had its source in an 
independence of character which prevented her from 
going hand in hand with a Government the direction of 
which was not left exclusively to her, and which during 
her whole life made her find a particular pleasure in 



Jesuitical Bismack 219 

following the road of a persistent opposition to the 
Government of the day, no matter what the latter hap- 
pened to be. Whilst the Kulturkampf lasted this 
tendency of her Majesty's character was encouraged by 
her Catholic friends, who received from the Ultramontane 
camp their information and instructions. These person- 
ages displayed great ability and a deep knowledge of 
the peculiarities of the temper of the Empress, and un- 
derstood admirably how to use the inclination which she 
had always possessed to exercise an influence on the 
decisions of the Government. Several times I persuaded 
Falk not to send in his resignation to the Emperor, but 
certain letters which the latter addressed to him, and 
the bad treatment meted out to his wife at Court, made 
him at last hold to his decision, much to my regret." 

Whether this regret was sincere I shall not pretend 
to judge, but what I do know was that later on Bis- 
marck complained that he had been led into error by 
Falk, whose sole aim whilst in office was to destroy the 
Catholic Church, which the Chancellor pretended had 
never been his intention. He had merely wanted to fight 
against the separatist tendencies of the Poles, and to him 
Poles and Catholics were one and the same ; that his 
persecution of the Roman Church had been a political 
and not a religious struggle. That, at least, was how 
he tried to explain it, and in this manner hide the extent 
of the defeat which his plans had encountered. 

As he was not a man to admit himself beaten, Bis- 
marck forthwith proceeded, after the arrangement of the 
religious difficulties with Rome and the Vatican, to in- 
augurate the anti-Polish policy to which he clung with 
such pertinacity the whole time that he remained Chan- 
cellor of the German Empire. This, by a kind of 



220 Germany under Three Emperors 

aberration which can neither be explained nor justified, 
the Poles of the Province of Posen seem to have for- 
gotten to-day in their enthusiasm for a so-called 
"restoration of Polish independence," which is cer- 
tainly the dirtiest little " scrap of paper " to which 
Bismarck's successor, but by no means follower, Dr. 
Bethmann-Hollweg, has ever put his signature. 



I 



CHAPTER XVII 

Juggling with War 

NOW come to an incident which at the time it took 
place caused some sensation, and which, by reason of 
the importance given at the Wilhelmstrasse to details 
which in other circumstances would never have demanded 
attention, was magnified to such an extent that it assumed 
the character of a grave international crisis. It affords 
an excellent example of the tortuous manner in which 
intrigues were engineered by Bismarck. 

After the Treaty of Frankfurt the first Ambassador 
the French Republic sent to Berlin was the Vicomte de 
Gontaut Biron, a gentleman of high birth, unimpeach- 
able connections, excellent education, a blameless 
character and moderate intellect. He was a Legitimist 
by conviction with a tinge of Clericalism, and he had 
been recommended to M. Thiers by a friend of the 
latter who held him in high esteem, and who had repre- 
sented to the President that it would be advantageous 
to send to Berlin a man who was related to several 
influential personages at the Prussian Court and who for 
many reasons might soon become there a persona grata. 
Unfortunately he was no diplomat, and his patriotism 
was associated with political convictions which he thought 
it his duty to exhibit rather than to hide. He had been 
warmly recommended to the Empress Augusta by the 
latter's intimate and particular friend, the Princess 
Leonille Wittgenstein, a Russian by birth, who at the 

221 



222 Germany under Three Emperors 

time was considered an old woman, though at the moment 
of writing is still alive and recently celebrated her hun- 
dredth birthday. The Princess was a clever woman, 
extremely fond of intrigue, a zealous convert to the 
Roman Catholic faith ; she was a friend of all the Clerical 
party in France, where she counted relatives without 
number, and where her salon was the meeting-place of 
the leading members of the French clergy and of the 
influential Academicians. She asked the Empress as a 
particular favour to receive the Vicomte de Gontaut as 
warmly and cordially as possible, and Augusta had been 
but too glad to comply with this request. The Crown 
Prince and Princess also, who keenly appreciated the 
difficulties which were sure to beset the first steps of the 
new French Ambassador in Berlin, had done their best 
to smooth the way for him. His own relatives, too, such 
as the Duke and Duchess de Sagan, my sister-in-law the 
Princess Antoine Radziwill, and many of his former 
friends and acquaintances who had met him in Paris 
before the war, vied with each other in putting the 
Vicomte and his daughters at ease in the German capital. 
Had he availed himself in the right manner of all these 
advantages he might have done very well indeed ; but, 
unfortunately for him and for all concerned, he wanted, 
from the first moment he arrived in Berlin, to make what 
he called " de la haute politique," and imagined this 
could be done irrespective of Bismarck. He went for his 
information to the very people Bismarck wanted to keep 
outside State affairs, such as Baron von Schleinitz, 
Count Redern — the Great Chamberlain, who was a per- 
sonal friend of the old Emperor, and very Francophile 
in his sympathies — and — a crowning sin — the Empress 
Augusta. Vicomte de Gontaut had delighted the 



Politics and Politeness 223 

Empress by asking her help to ameliorate the relations 
of France with Germany, and with whom she could 
make "une politique personnelle," as she liked to say. 
In justice to the Empress, however, it must be said that 
she was influenced by the highest of motives. She did 
not believe that Bismarck really wanted to re-establish 
good relations with the French Government ; she im- 
agined that by the personal intervention of the Emperor 
and herself this might be done in spite of the Chancellor. 
The Vicomte was fully persuaded that politics could still 
be made in the salons of influential personages and in 
the antechambers of kings and queens. This was very 
silly, but certainly it was not at all as dangerous as 
Bismarck represented. Had Bismarck, instead of making 
the recall of the Ambassador a diplomatic question, simply 
pointed out that his conduct was bringing ridicule not 
only on himself, but also on the French Government 
and the French nation, it is probable that he would have 
secured his removal without any fuss. But instead of 
this he represented him as a mischievous intriguer , and 
accused him of carrying on underhand manoeuvres in 
Petersburg, whither de Gontaut used to retire almost every 
winter. It was not politics, however, which took him 
there, but his feelings of admiration for a most beautiful 
lady, the Princess Obolensky, at whose feet he had 
worshipped for very many years. 

The Vicomte de Gontaut, on his part, was certainly 
wrongly influenced when he took too much au serieuoc not 
only the gossip which was reported to him, but also some 
of the things which he heard in the Foreign Office in 
Berlin. Very often these were traps designed to induce 
him to make false reports to Paris which could be used 
to strengthen the demand for his recall. He was also 



224 Germany under Three Emperors 

wrong when, in his desire to make himself important, 
he asserted as a fact in 1875, that Bismarck was then 
planning a renewed attack on France. For once the 
Chancellor was telling the truth when he maintained that 
he had no thought of such a thing, though his pacific 
intentions existed merely because the reorganisation of 
the German army and its armaments, which had been 
proceeding sub rosa, and for which it had been using 
part of the French milliards, was not nearly completed. 
Had Vicomte de Gontaut been as well-informed as he 
pretended to be he would have known this essential 
fact; but neither he nor any member of his staff ever 
frequented military or parliamentary circles, relying 
entirely upon the Court circles for information on matters 
of which they knew nothing. 

The strange part of the business was that the French 
Ambassador did not seem in the least to understand that 
his attitude was neither correct nor clever so far as the 
interests of his own country were concerned. He lived 
in a world of his own, full of preconceived opinions, not 
realising whither his blindness was leading him. He used 
to go to Ems and to Baden-Baden just at the time when 
the Emperor visited these watering-places for his annual 
cures, and, of course, whilst there had opportunities of 
meeting the Sovereign under less formal conditions than 
in Berlin. It is certain, however, that he did not discuss 
politics on these occasions, for William I. would have 
refused to do so under such circumstances ; but he be- 
lieved seriously that by putting himself within the reach 
of the King he was only doing his duty after the manner 
of the courtiers of Louis XIV. and Louis XV., who 
always went to Fontainebleau or Marly whenever the 
King visited these places. 



Vicomte de Gontaut Biron 225 

Then, again, there was another matter which brought 
Vicomte de Gontaut into trouble without his ever 
realising why it had done so. Once, when he was at 
Baden-Baden, he allowed himself to be drawn into con- 
fidential conversations with the Russian Minister at the 
Court of Karlsruhe, M. Koloschine, a man possessed of 
inordinate vanity who always wanted to make himself 
important and who took it upon himself to propose to 
the French Representative common action on the part 
of France and Russia in the Near East, where complica- 
tions were already arising which ultimately led to the 
war with Turkey. M. Koloschine's opinion was about 
the last to carry weight in Petersburg, but the poor 
Vicomte imagined that he saw in his communications a 
possibility for France to assert herself again as a great 
nation; his patriotism for once led him to a clear vision 
of future possibilities, and he urged his Government to 
try to help Russia in view of the renewed attack by Ger- 
many on France which was his nightmare, and against 
which Russia might prove such a useful ally. Unfortun- 
ately patriotism is not sufficient for diplomatic success, 
and the time for a Franco-Russian alliance had not arrived 
— it was, indeed, postponed for a considerable period owing 
to these very efforts from which Gontaut had hoped so 
much. He had, in his ignorance of statecraft, merely 
played to M. Koloschine's hand. The latter had imagined 
that, owing to the French Ambassador's encouragements, 
he would be able to report to Prince Gortschakov that 
France was willing to stand by Russia in the matter of 
the Eastern conflict, whilst de Gontaut fully believed 
that in mentioning to the Due Decazes, then French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the overtures of M. Kolo- 
schine, he was laying at the feet of France the offer of 



226 Germany under Three Emperors 

an alliance with the Russian Government. If ever a 
journee des dupes took place it was upon this occasion. 

When these incidents became known to Bismarck 
he declared that he would drive Vicomte de Gontaut out 
of Berlin, and he never rested until he had accomplished 
his purpose. 

This was by no means so easy as it seemed at first 
sight. Even admitting that he asked the French Govern- 
ment — which, in fact, he did on more than one occasion 
— to recall its Ambassador, the request could not well 
be granted in view of the expressed desire of the Emperor, 
conveyed to Marshal MacMahon by some of the friends 
of the Queen, that the Vicomte de Gontaut should be 
left at his post. Prince Bismarck then tried to compro- 
mise the Ambassador by making him appear to be a man 
who sowed dissension where it did not exist, and of 
attempting to make himself important at the expense 
of the grave interests which had been committed to his 
charge. He had heard — probably through one of the 
servants of the French Embassy who had access to the 
writing-table of Gontaut — that the latter had sent to 
his chief in Paris a long report concerning a conversation 
which, according to him, had taken place between the 
Belgian Minister, Baron de Nothomb, and Marshal von 
Moltke, in which the latter had expressed his conviction 
that the recent addition of a fourth battalion to the 
strength of French regiments was an aggressive measure 
of France directed against Germany. The conversation 
had in reality had quite a different sense from the one 
which Gontaut had attributed to it, and anyone who 
knew Moltke well would have at once recognised its 
unlikelihood. The truth of the matter was that during a 
dinner at which both the Belgian Minister and the head 



Manufacturing an Incident 227 

of the German General Staff had been present, the former 
had made an allusion to the rumours of another war which 
were circulating among the public, and the old Marshal 
had made some playful remarks out of which Vicomte de 
Gontaut concocted a long report on what he did not 
hesitate to qualify as an exceedingly grave incident. 
This, however, was only the beginning of the story. 
Bismarck then suggested to one of his secretaries, M. 
von Radowitz (afterwards German Ambassador in Con- 
stantinople and Madrid), that he should at the first oppor- 
tunity engage the Vicomte de Gontaut in a conversation 
which would lead the latter to raise an alarm as to the 
intentions of the German Government in regard to 
France. 

M. von Radowitz found his opportunity at a dinner 
given by the English Ambassador, Lord Odo Russell, 
at which he and de Gontaut were present, and they soon 
engaged in a lively discussion on Franco-German rela- 
tions. Radowitz began by expressing his satisfaction 
that these seemed at last to be re-establishing themselves 
upon an excellent footing, and referred to the gratification 
felt in the Wilhelmstrasse at the explanation given by 
the French Government concerning that unfortunate 
fourth battalion. Then he went on : 

6 ' You say that at present no one in France thinks 
about war. But can you give us a similar assurance 
as to the future? Can you affirm that France, after 
having regained its prosperity and reorganised its military 
strength, will not find then the alliances she needs to-day 
and the disposition to declare war against Germany? If 
we allow France to develop unhindered, shall we not, later 
on, have to repent for having done so? If France is 
always thinking of the day of revenge — and it can hardly 



228 Germany under Three Emperors 

be otherwise — why, on our part, wait to attack her until 
she has contracted alliances ? You must acknowledge that 
politically, philosophically, and even from the Christian 
point of view, my deductions are right, and that it would 
be in the interests of Germany if she allowed herself to 
be influenced by them." 

The amusing part of the story is that out of this 
specious series of arguments de Gontaut conceived, and 
conveyed to the Due Decazes, the conviction that Ger- 
many was preparing to attack France, and this within 
the shortest possible time. 

The French Government became at last thoroughly 
alarmed, and Gontaut then proposed that he should try 
to obtain the mediation of Russia, whose action he thought 
might stop the bellicose designs of Bismarck. The latter 
had not reckoned on this complication. He had wished 
to raise a war scarce, but had never meant it to extend 
beyond the French and German frontiers. He had 
especially never given a thought to the possibility of 
the Due Decazes appealing directly to the Tsar. General 
Le Flo, the French Ambassador in Petersburg, who, on 
his side, had tried to trade on the well-known vanity of 
Prince Gortschakov, was only too delighted at the oppor- 
tunity thus given him to be able to say that, through his 
intervention, he had muzzled the warlike intentions of 
Bismarck. The Russian Chancellor immediately pro- 
ceeded to communicate the letter of the Due Decazes to 
his Sovereign, and accompanied it with remarks calculated 
to arouse the susceptibilities of Alexander II. by repre- 
senting that the peace of the whole of Europe was threat- 
ened by Germany. The Tsar, however, was even then 
meditating a war with Turkey, and he did not feel greatly 
interested in other international complications; but he 



A Sea of Ridicule 229 

promised Prince Gortschakov to use all his influence in 
Berlin, whither he was repairing on his way to Ems in 
order to persuade his uncle William to give up any 
aggressive intentions he might be entertaining in regard 
to France. 

Nevertheless the incident might have remained one of 
these minor diplomatic disturbances that do not go 
beyond Embassy walls had it not been for the determina- 
tion of Bismarck to drown Gontaut in a sea of ridicule. 
At that time Baron von Holstein was still in Paris. 
Prince Bismarck summoned him to Berlin. Holstein 
immediately proposed the advisability of suggesting to 
the famous correspondent of the Times, Blowitz, a 
rumour that Germany was about to attack France ; if 
war did not follow it could then be said that it was due 
entirely to the spirit of moderation shown by the German 
Government in face of the aggressive intentions of the 
French Ambassador in Berlin, who had done all that he 
possibly could to bring about a rupture between the two 
countries. The Prince approved the scheme, and Hol- 
stein confided the story to the journalist under the seal 
of secrecy. He concluded by telling the correspondent 
of the Times that his paper would be doing a good work 
by publishing all this in the hope of influencing some 
Great Power, say England or Russia, to interfere in 
favour of maintaining peace in Europe. 

To those who knew Blowitz it will be easy to imagine 
the joy with which he hailed these confidences of Holstein. 
He was always on the look out for a journalistic coup, 
and he recognised a great opportunity in Holstein's state- 
ments. Nevertheless, he thought it well first to sound 
both the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Due 
Decazes, and the German Ambassador in Paris, Prince 



230 Germany under Three Emperors 

von Hohenlohe. Prince von Hohenlohe, under date of 
May 21st, 1875, refers to the matter : 

"Blowitz went farther in his article than he had led 
me to expect he would do. His reasonings, which in the 
course of our conversation had seemed to be imbued with 
impartiality, became in his article what I had warned 
them they would be — an attack on Germany. The editor 
of the Times received his article on Wednesday, May 5th, 
and immediately telegraphed to its other Continental 
correspondents for information in regard to points raised 
by Blowitz, and it is also likely that he communicated 
on the subject with some leading political personages in 
London. It was only after the editor had become con- 
vinced, as he thought, of the accuracy of Blowitz's 
information that he allowed the article to appear. The 
supposition that it was inspired by Stock Exchange 
speculations is devoid of any foundation. It was simply 
a lapse from tact on the part of Blowitz which he com- 
mitted in the interest of France, and by which he fully 
believed he was acting in the interest of the peace of 
Europe. " 

Bismarck was triumphant because he had contrived at 
last — especially after the visit of the Emperor Alexan- 
der II. to Berlin, some of whose remarks had been dis- 
agreeable to William I. — to persuade his master that 
de Gontaut was a mischief-maker whose stupidity had 
been used to their own ends by the Catholic and other 
Opposition parties in Prussia. The Emperor, though 
he continued to show himself most kind and gracious in 
regard to the French Ambassador, did not completely 
trust him any longer. Nevertheless, the Vicomte main- 
tained himself at his post for something like two years 
longer, in spite of disagreements which any other person 



A Happy Conceit 231 

would have flown to the other end of the world to escape. 
Bismarck never again spoke to him, and carried his dis- 
like of him too far. The common sense of Hohenlohe 
rightly gauged the situation. The Vicomte de Gontaut 
Biron thought himself a far more dangerous and clever 
personage than anyone else did. His vanity led him to 
consider every mark of politeness accorded to him as 
something quite out of the common, and he left Berlin 
with the conviction that he would be mourned there for 
ever by the Emperor, Empress, and the whole of the 
Royal family. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

Balkan Intrigues 

IT sometimes happens that a man of moderate intellect 
has ideas worthy of a genius. Such was the case 
with the Vicomte de Gontaut, when in his mind there 
arose the faint and misty idea of a Franco-Russian 
alliance, or, at least — for his imagination did not go so 
far as that — of a Franco-Russian rapprochement. Un- 
fortunately for him Bismarck became aware of the letter 
to Due Decazes, and at once grasped the influence it 
might exercise over the political situation in Europe. 
How he heard of it is rather curious, and goes to show 
how very careful people occupying public positions ought 
to be in what they say or write. The Due Decazes 
had mentioned the contents of the letter of the French 
Ambassador in Berlin to Marshal MacMahon, who in his 
turn had spoken about it to his alter ego and aide-de- 
camp the Marquis d'Abzac. The latter was married to 
a half -Russian, half-German woman, Mademoiselle de 
Lazareff, whose mother, the Princess Biron von Curland, 
was then alive and living on her estates in Silesia at a 
place called Dyrnfhurt. Her daughter, whose marriage 
with the fascinating French marquis had not been 
altogether a success, used to spend nearly all her time 
with her, going but rarely to Paris, the atmosphere of 
which did not altogether suit her tastes. The Marquis 
d'Abzac, one of the most charming and amiable of men 
it has ever been my fortune to meet, used to visit his 

232 



Marquis d'Abzac 233 

wife once or twice a year in her Silesian home, and whilst 
there used to meet many members of the Prussian 
aristocracy allied to her family. He was popular every- 
where, and in Berlin was a persona grata in Court circles, 
especially with the old Emperor, who was very fond of 
him, and appreciated the great loyalty of his chivalrous 
character. When with his relatives he sometimes allowed 
himself to talk politics with greater absence of self- 
restraint than was, perhaps, altogether wise. 

Bismarck was aware of the fact, and he contrived to 
keep himself pretty well informed as to everything which 
was said and done in the Lazareff-d'Abzac household 
by the spying of a servant who, whilst pretending to 
know no other language than his native German, under- 
stood and spoke French to perfection. This move had 
been suggested to Bismarck by Baron von Holstein, who 
afterwards related this fact to the friend who repeated 
it to me with evident satisfaction. The idea of this 
possible Franco-Russian alliance haunted him to such an 
extent that he applied all his wonderful faculties to the 
achievement of another bond capable of counterbalancing 
its effects, and then bethought himself once more of the 
closer union with Austria. 

He allowed himself to become so entirely absorbed 
by this dread of finding united against him the two 
European Powers which he believed to be the most 
dangerously inclined to thwart his designs, that one day 
when he was talking with Count Peter Schouvaloff — at 
that time Russian Ambassador in London — he allowed 
the latter to perceive that such was the case to such an 
extent that Schouvaloff told him, as he thought, in jest : 
" You have a coalition nightmare." To which remark Bis- 
marck gravely replied, " Of course I have." Schouvaloff 



234 Germany under Three Emperors 

then proceeded to say that the only remedy he could see to 
the evils which the Chancellor was dreading would be a 
strong and firm alliance with Russia, as that would effec- 
tually prevent the possibility of any other coalition 
against Germany. Bismarck, however, observed that, 
owing to the geographical situation and the autocratic 
constitution of the Russian Empire, it would be far 
easier for it to renounce its engagements than for Ger- 
many, and that, after all, the whole traditional Russo- 
Prussian friendship was based only on the disposition of 
the reigning Emperor. Moreover, Germany, by sacri- 
ficing for the sake of Russia its relations with all the 
other Great Powers, would put herself in a state of most 
dangerous dependence on the Muscovite Empire, because 
she could not afford to lose sight of the grave incidents 
and complications that might arise from any French or 
Austrian aggression, and, further, it was impossible to 
rely upon a policy for which Prince Gortschakov was 
responsible. Schouvaloff retorted that the latter was such 
an old man that he could be ignored in any matters 
relative to the future, and that it was only out of con- 
sideration for his past merits that the Emperor still kept 
him at the head of foreign affairs ; that, besides, there 
was really no point of a serious character upon which 
Prussia and Russia could find themselves drawn into a 
conflict with each other. Bismarck conceded this point, 
but, nevertheless, declined the " option" between Austria 
and Russia, and only recommended to Schouvaloff the 
maintenance of the alliance between the three Emperors, 
or, at least, of peace between them. More he would 
not yield, and he carefully concealed from his interlo- 
cutor that already — it was during the Berlin Congress 
that this conversation took place — he had begun to give 



Bismarck Explains 235 

hints to Count Andrassy, in his conversations with the 
latter, of the possibility of the conclusion of a Prusso- 
Austrian agreement in the form of a military convention 
if not of a regular treaty. He had perfectly well realised 
that the whole attitude of Germany in regard to Russia 
during the deliberations of the Berlin Congress was 
bound to provoke feelings of disgust and animosity on 
the part of the latter Power, and that these might easily 
induce it in time to give its attention to the possibility 
of that rapprochement with France foreshadowed by 
Vicomte de Gontaut in his letters to the Due Decazes. 

Bismarck tried to explain the origin of the strained 
relations which, after the Congress, had established them- 
selves between the Petersburg and the Berlin Cabinets 
by the fact that Germany had felt hurt at not having 
been informed by Russia of the text of the Convention 
in regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been 
concluded at Reichstadt, in Bohemia, on July 8th, 1876, 
between the Tsar and Francis Joseph. This explanation, 
however, hardly bears examination, because it applies 
equally against Austria, who also had not thought it worth 
while to inform Germany of the nature of the engage- 
ments she had entered upon. But Bismarck was already 
pursuing the tactics which became so acute later on 
towards isolating both Russia and France, which ulti- 
mately had the unlooked-for result of helping to throw 
them into each other's arms. When this happened, 
however, he was no longer at the head of affairs. 

Bismarck's whole attitude before, during, and after 
the Berlin Congress betrays the irritation that affected 
his mind and his temper. When, in 1876, the German 
military attache in Petersburg, General von Werder, 
was requested by Prince Gortschakov to ask the German 



236 Germany under Three Emperors 

Government whether, in the event of a war between 
Russia and Austria on account of the Eastern Question, 
it would remain neutral, Bismarck was exceedingly angry 
because this communication had not passed through the 
German Ambassador, General von Schweinitz, and he 
asked the Emperor William to forbid Werder for the 
future to accept any diplomatic mission. He also ordered 
General von Schweinitz to come and see him at Varzin, 
where he was nursing another of his periodical fits of 
bad temper, and he told him to declare to the Tsar that 
it was the intention of Germany to oppose the possi- 
bility of either Austria or Russia losing its position as a 
great independent state. This led to the conclusion of 
the Reichstadt Convention, in which Austria, in return 
for the cession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, promised its 
neutrality to Russia in the event of a conflict with Turkey. 
After the fall of Plevna and the conclusion of the 
Treaty of San Stefano England, together with Austria, 
stopped the triumphant march of the Russian army at 
the very doors of Constantinople. Bismarck then offered 
his mediation, or rather imposed it on Europe. Though 
he maintained that during the whole of the delibera- 
tions of the Berlin Congress he had only fulfilled the 
part of "the honest broker," he did very much more 
than that. It was at his instigation that the independence 
of Roumania was recognised, and that Bulgaria and 
Roumelia were divided instead of remaining united under 
one elected Prince, as arranged by the Treaty of San 
Stefano. In general, most of the advantages conceded 
to Russia by the terms of this Treaty were taken away 
from her, and it is no wonder that a profound irritation 
should have arisen in that country in consequence of 
this evident breach of faith on the part of Germany, 



The Bulgarian Accession 237 

who had thus ignored all the promises which her Emperor 
had made to the Tsar in return for Russian neutrality 
in 1870. 

The result of all this was that finally Alexander II. 
wrote to the Emperor William complaining of the 
hostility which his Government was exhibiting towards 
him. The old Emperor, who attached great value to 
his good relations with Russia, then decided to meet 
his nephew at Alexandrovo, on the Prussian frontier. 
This interview was arranged by Marshal von Manteuffel, 
a personal friend of both the Sovereigns, without the 
knowledge of Bismarck, who, as may be imagined, was 
absolutely furious when he heard of it. Its effects were 
not altogether what the promoters of it had imagined, 
because its most immediate consequence was the Austro- 
German Treaty, followed by the Triple Alliance. 

I may perhaps be forgiven if I venture to recount 
here a personal incident that has some importance, if 
only as an illustration of the methods employed by Prince 
von Bismarck and his alter ego, Baron von Holstein. 

On the creation of the Bulgarian principality in 
1878, the question of the Prince who was to assume its 
government became, of course, a most important one. 
I do not remember now how the candidature of Prince 
Alexander of Battenberg originated, but so far as my 
memory serves me it sprang from the desire to conciliate 
the Tsar, of whose Consort the Prince was a nephew, 
morganatically it is true, but a nephew all the same, 
and one of whom she was extremely fond into the 
bargain. However that may be, he was elected, and in 
due course started for the distant country which was to 
prove so fatal to him later on. Before he left Germany 
he went, in duty bound, to pay his respects to Prince 



238 Germany under Three Emperors 

von Bismarck, and it was generally supposed that the 
latter had more or less turned the whole enterprise into 
ridicule, and treated it as something absolutely without 
any consequences as to the future. No one, however, 
heard anything concerning another visit paid by the 
Prince to Baron von Holstein, who just about that time 
was transferred to Berlin as director of the political 
section of the Foreign Office after acting as one of the 
secretaries at the Berlin Congress. 

Prince Alexander of Battenberg was by no means 
the stupid man he has been represented in Russia. On 
the contrary, he was keenly perceptive in his appreciation 
of men and events, was possessed of considerable ambi- 
tion, and a sincere desire not only to make himself useful 
in Bulgaria, but also of playing a part in the history of 
the Balkan Peninsula. He certainly looked forward to 
the day when he would be independent of the Turkish 
suzerainty, and perhaps even in time to become a King, 
just as the rulers of Servia and Roumania had done. 
Considering the family ties which bound him to the 
Russian Imperial house, there was nothing unreasonable 
in this ambition. Events, however, did not occur quite 
as he expected, and the relations of the Prince with his 
Petersburg relatives soon became strained owing to his 
persistence in discarding the advice given to him in that 
quarter. After the murder of Tsar Alexander II. the 
situation became even more acute. The new Emperor 
had always disliked the Bulgarian ruler ever since the 
distant days when, as children, they had played together 
in the gardens of Tsarskoye Selo or at the Castle of 
Jugenheim, near Darmstadt, the favourite residence of 
the Empress Marie of Russia, who had left it in her will 
to her brother, Prince Alexander of Hesse, the father 



Prince Alexander of Battenberg 239 

of the Prince of Bulgaria. The Tsar lost no opportunity 
of acquainting Alexander with his views on the subject 
of his activity at Sofia, which he considered in the highest 
degree injurious to Russian interests. 

Matters had reached this unsatisfactory condition 
when the coronation of the Tsar took place in Moscow, 
in May of 1883. The Prince of Bulgaria thought he 
ought to be present at the ceremony, and duly appeared 
in the old Russian capital, together with the Prince of 
Montenegro. The presence of the two Eastern Princes 
gave Alexander III. an opportunity to manifest his feel- 
ings in no unmistakable manner. Whilst he loaded 
Prince Nicholas with amiabilities, he ignored or snubbed 
Prince Alexander. The latter, of course, was keenly 
hurt, and one evening, after he had endured a particu- 
larly unpleasant rebuff in one of the numerous attempts 
which he had made to obtain a hearing from the Emperor, 
he happened to meet me at a ball given by General von 
Schweinitz, the German Ambassador, and his outraged 
sentiments urged him to unburden his sorrows. He 
forthwith invited me to dance the cotillon with him, and 
whilst it was proceeding he related to me all the mis- 
fortunes with which he had met since his arrival in 
Moscow. 

What struck me, apart from the indignation and 
irritation he expressed, was the assurance with which he 
spoke of the possibility of paying back the Tsar for the 
slight to which he had been subjected. In view of the 
circumstances, and the relative position of the two, this 
struck me as absolutely foolish, and I could not help 
telling the Prince that if he were mad enough to start 
an anti-Russian policy in Bulgaria he would promptly 
be sent out of the country, as no one would sympathise 



240 Germany under Three Emperors 

with him in that attempt. What was my surprise when 
he replied to me that I was absolutely mistaken in my 
surmises, because he would have the support of Germany 
in any enterprise he undertook against Russia. 

I was aghast, and asked him how this could be in 
view of the general belief that Prince Bismarck had 
openly discouraged him. 

"That is what you and other people think," replied 
the Prince; "but, as a matter of fact, our conversation 
was entirely different from what was reported at the 
time." 

" But what did Prince Bismarck tell you," I in- 
quired, " to make your Highness so sure of obtaining 
the support of Germany against Russia? " 

"What he told me," was the unexpected reply, 
" was that I could, if I worked according to certain 
directions which would be given me later on, usefully 
counterbalance in the interests of Germany Russian in- 
fluence in the whole of the Balkans." 

I will spare my readers the rest of the conversation 
of which this was the most salient point, but the whole 
trend of it convinced me that Bismarck had had in view 
the eventuality of using Bulgaria, and perhaps Turkey, 
against Russia in the event of certain European com- 
plications which he must have had in his mind. I be- 
came very uneasy, and in my turn confided the gist of 
my talk with Prince Alexander in a letter to my friend 
Donald Mackenzie Wallace, who at the time was on 
the staff of the Times, asking him, however, not to men- 
tion anything about it to anyone. To my surprise, very 
soon afterwards, I saw an article in the Times, based on 
this letter of mine, with the annoying remark that the 
contents of it had been divulged to the writer by a 



An Indiscretion 241 

Russian lady. Of course, I was very angry, and the 
results of this indiscretion of mine were very soon to 
make themselves felt by all parties concerned. First, 
Prince Alexander never forgave me; then I became the 
pet aversion of Baron von Holstein in Berlin; and at 
last was honoured — for I cannot call it anything else — 
by the recommendation of Count Herbert Bismarck to 
the then German Minister in Cairo, Count Arco Valley, 
to beware of me as a very dangerous woman. We were 
at the time spending the winter in Egypt, but it was 
only afterwards that I learned these facts, Arco having 
in his turn confided this timely, or untimely, warning to 
Chevalier Rosty, the then Austrian Minister at the Court 
of the Khedive. The Chevalier, who was one of my dearest 
friends, wrote me the amusing story, which, I must con- 
fess, I had forgotten until I chanced to come across it the 
other day in sorting and re-reading some old letters. Much 
later another friend of mine confided to me that the 
belief that I had instigated the publication of the article 
in the Times, with the purpose of upsetting Bismarck, 
was firmly established in the Wilhelmstrasse, and that 
it was useless to try to alter that feeling. I did not 
try, and after a time had the consolation of knowing 
that it was Bismarck who came to grief. But this whole 
incident made me most curious to learn what amount 
of truth there had been in the confession which wounded 
pride had induced Prince Alexander of Battenberg to 
make to me; so I asked the person whom I thought 
to be the most capable of helping me to try to " draw " 
Holstein on the subject. Here is what he wrote to me 
in reply : 

" As you may imagine, it was not easy to get Holstein 
to say anything concerning the Eastern Question. He 



242 Germany under Three Emperors 

considers Battenberg a fool, and with his usual brutality 
said so quite plainly. At the same time, he owned that 
the fellow might, had he only known how to do it, have 
come in time to play an important part in the world. He 
considers that it is dangerous to European peace in 
general if Russia becomes too strong, and that it would 
be far more advantageous for everyone if some hindrances 
were put in her way in regard to Constantinople, the 
possession of which she aspires to — a perfectly inadmis- 
sible thing in the opinion of Holstein. On the other 
hand, he quite admits that circumstances may arise which 
will drive the Turks out of it, a contingency which seems 
to make him most unhappy, because he spoke about it 
with a melancholy that was really most amusing. In that 
case, one must have at hand someone who could be put 
in their place, and what would be more natural than for 
the Prince of Bulgaria to become Eastern Emperor? I 
objected that Greece or Roumania might feel affronted 
if this honour was not left to them, but this argument 
did not seem to make any impression on the mind of 
our friend. What he is driving at, and what the all- 
mighty Manitou who decides all such questions is driving 
at, is, of course, beyond my imagination to guess." 

It must not be forgotten that this letter was written 
in 1886, and since then many things have happened 
which have partly justified the forebodings contained in 
it. For one thing, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria stepped 
into the shoes of poor Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 
and he, at all events, did not show himself a fool, but 
resolutely led his people into the inner circle of German 
politics, with the consequences which we have seen. 



CHAPTER XIX 

Fears of Isolation 

BISMARCK acknowledged that the remark made to 
him by Count Schouvaloff, that he had " coalition 
nightmare," was true. The thought of such a contin- 
gency as Germany becoming isolated in her newly 
acquired grandeur was continually with him. The fact 
that both Austria and France had the same religious 
faith contributed more than any other factor to his 
apprehensions. He relied on the possibility of main- 
taining on a satisfactory footing the old family relations 
which for so many years had linked together the Hohen- 
zollerns and the Romanoffs, and thus to inveigle Russia 
into an alliance. After the Berlin Congress, however, 
he realised that this was entirely out of the question, 
and that the moment the old Emperor William I. closed 
his eyes Russo-German relations would undergo a sudden 
change. 

It was on this contingency that all his future policy 
was based. To provide against the dangers which it 
implied he elaborated a plan which, carried out fully by 
his successors, would ensure the safety of this German 
Empire. In these plans he found a willing and able 
instrument in Baron von Holstein, who gradually 
acquired a great influence over his formidable chief, and 
ended by being his evil genius. His devotion to Bis- 
marck, though very real, was not so much to the man 
as to the power possessed by him. It was Holstein who, 

243 



244 Germany under Three Emperors 

by repeating to the latter every criticism directed against 
his person or his policy, developed in him that almost 
morbid hatred of certain people which at last obscured 
his powerful intelligence and made him take every- 
thing from the personal point of view. 

Holstein held in his hands all the threads of Bis- 
marck's complicated intrigues, and at last revealed them 
to the present German Emperor, thus influencing him 
against the Chancellor and inducing him at length to 
dismiss him in the ruthless manner that we know. With- 
out Holstein it is still a question whether Bismarck 
would have fallen under the wrath of his Sovereign, 
and it is largely due to this unscrupulous lieutenant of 
his that the greatest statesman Germany has ever known 
ended his career in a retirement of which he had often 
spoken, but never believed he would be allowed to enjoy. 
On the accession of William II. Holstein realised very 
quickly that he had to make his choice between the 
favour of the young Sovereign and the friendship of the 
Minister to whom he owed his career. He betrayed 
Bismarck with absolute unconcern. He remained in 
possession of the autocratic authority he had exercised at 
the Foreign Office for many years after the fall of his 
early protector, and it was only in 1905, or about that 
time, that the then Prussian Foreign Secretary, Baron 
von Tschirsky, had more courage than either Caprivi 
or Prince von Hohenlohe. He took Holstein at his 
word on one of the many occasions when the latter 
threatened to resign, and coolly accepted his resignation 
and got it signed by the Emperor before the old fox 
had recovered his scared wits. Thus was ended the reign 
of this " Grey Eminence " who for so long had ruled 
the affairs of the German Empire. 




WILLIAM II. IN 1884 



Count Andrassy 245 

It was with Holstein that Bismarck discussed the 
various complications likely to accrue from an estrange- 
ment with the Cabinet of Petersburg, which he saw loom- 
ing in the distance. The active brain of his lieutenant 
immediately grasped the idea in the Chancellor's mind, 
and laid before him a plan for an Austro-German Alliance 
into which Italy might eventually be drawn. 

Bismarck had not given a thought to the latter 
Power, but he saw the immense advantages which her 
adherence to the German Government might procure. 

At that time, in autumn, 1879, Bismarck was aware 
of a fact which no one else yet suspected — the imminent 
retirement of Count Andrassy. The Hungarian states- 
man, who had been one of the most prominent figures 
at the Berlin Congress, was tired of political life, and 
his health, which had never been of the best, was be- 
ginning seriously to fail him. Then differences — of which 
he never liked to speak later on — had arisen between 
him and the Emperor of Austria, who always saw in 
Andrassy the Hungarian rebel who once had been con- 
demned to death, and who had been one of the most 
active enemies of the ancient House of Habsburg. Com- 
plete as was his confidence in Holstein, Bismarck never 
told him anything about it, having promised his Austrian 
colleague to reveal to no one the secrets which had been 
confided to his discretion, a promise which he faithfully 
kept. But this knowledge made him more anxious to 
assure himself of the co-operation of Austria before the 
advent of another Prime Minister in Vienna less likely 
to fall in with his views than Count Andrassy. He had 
contrived to establish excellent relations with Andrassy 
during the Berlin Congress, when he had hinted at the 
possibility of the enemies of the past becoming stanch 



246 Germany under Three Emperors 

friends in the future. Of course, he had spoken only in 
vague terms, but the Hungarian statesman had under- 
stood very well what was meant and had eagerly caught 
at the idea. He saw at once in the common action of 
Germany and Austria in the Near East a possibility of 
revenge for the part taken by Russia in the crushing of 
that Hungarian rebellion which had nearly cost him his 
life, as well as that of securing for the Empire of which 
he was the Prime Minister the eventual probability of 
playing a leading part in the settlement of the everlast- 
ing Eastern Question. Andrassy, indeed, had entered 
so thoroughly into the suggestion made by Bismarck that 
the latter had felt somewhat alarmed at this too easy 
acquiescence, and prudently let the overtures he had 
made on the spur of the moment remain in abeyance. 
But when Bismarck failed in his endeavours to prevent 
the Emperor William I. from meeting the Tsar at 
Alexandrovo, he saw that the hour had struck for the 
development of his nebulous plan, and then it was that 
he consulted Holstein, of whose capacities he was forming 
a high opinion. 

Holstein suggested forestalling consequences by pre- 
viously contracting an engagement with Austria which it 
would be impossible for the German Emperor to dis- 
avow, but it was essential that the initiative of any such 
arrangement should rest with the Austrian Government. 
Prince Bismarck was about to repair to Gastein for his 
annual cure, and Holstein proposed to go to Vienna 
before the departure of his chief for the little watering- 
place in the mountains, and to suggest that Count 
Andrassy should ' ' find himself ' ' also in Gastein at the 
same time as the German Chancellor. This explains 
the admission made by the latter in his Reminiscences 



Austro-German Alliance 247 

that he had arranged an interview with the Austrian 
Prime Minister long before his Sovereign had officially 
signified his consent to meet the Tsar. 

Andrassy arrived at Gastein on August 27th, and 
was at once taken by Baron von Holstein into the 
presence of Bismarck, who received him most cordially. 
The Chancellor immediately began to discuss the general 
political situation of Europe, and confessed his fears as 
to the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance. 

Count Andrassy quite well understood what was 
implied under the disguise of polite words, and told the 
German Chancellor plainly that the only counteractive 
step which could be taken would be to conclude an 
Austro-German alliance. Bismarck immediately retorted 
that Andrassy had given expression to the idea that he 
had had in his mind the whole time. The two states- 
men then started to discuss the question of a purely 
defensive alliance against a possible attack on the part of 
Russia, directed against either Germany or Austria; but 
the suggestion of Bismarck to extend this alliance against 
attacks from any other Power than Russia did not meet 
with approval from Andrassy, who had no intention of 
lending himself to any plans of aggression of his colleague 
in regard to France, for whom he entertained very wide 
sympathies. 

After discussions which lasted two days the principal 
lines of a treaty were drawn up, and in order to ensure 
absolute secrecy against any possible indiscretion the 
minutes of the engagements it was proposed to enter 
upon were written down by Holstein, who alone with 
Bismarck was aware of what was going on. Andrassy 
left for Vienna, and Bismarck promised to bring there 
the authorisation of the Emperor. 



248 Germany under Three Emperors 

Bismarck, however, in spite of his assurance before 
Andrassy, was by no means certain that his plans would 
meet with approval on the part of the old Emperor. He 
therefore bethought himself of securing allies who might, 
if necessary, lend him their aid in breaking down the 
stubbornness of his aged master, and addressed himself 
to the King of Bavaria. He wrote a long letter in which 
he stated the condition of affairs in Russia, and sought 
to persuade Ludwig that the Russian Government, not- 
withstanding its pacific assurances to the contrary, was 
steadily preparing itself for a war with Austria and 
Prussia at the very first opportunity after their strength 
had been made sufficiently secure. 

After having laid stress on the fact that, according to 
information which had reached him from Petersburg, 
Count Schouvaloff had fallen under the disfavour of his 
Sovereign owing to his conduct during the Berlin Con- 
gress, and that the most powerful among other Ministers 
in Russia was now General Milioutine, the head of the 
War Office, Bismarck proceeded to say : 

"It is at the request of Milioutine that now, imme- 
diately after the conclusion of peace, Russia, whom no 
one threatens, is preparing terrible armaments, and this 
notwithstanding the immense financial sacrifices which 
the recent war has occasioned. They propose to add 
something like 56,000 men to the effective strength of 
the Russian army in times of peace, and 400,000 to the 
battalions it would send down to its Western frontiers 
in case of a mobilisation. It is quite evident that these pre- 
parations can only be directed against Austria or against 
Germany, and this is further corroborated by the accumu- 
lation of troops which has recently taken place in the 
Kingdom of Poland. The Minister of War has also 



The European Situation 249 

declared, without reservation, that Russia ought to 
organise herself in view of a European war. . . . 

" Under these circumstances I cannot get rid of the 
idea that in future peace can only be threatened by 
Russia, and by Russia alone. The information which I 
have succeeded in gathering concerning the attitude 
likely to be taken by France and by Italy in case of 
Russia declaring war against one of her Western neigh- 
bours, gives me reason to conclude that both these Powers 
would abstain from taking any part in the conflict. Italy 
is far too weak to do so, and France has declared that 
for the present she is not thinking of going to war, and 
that she did not feel strong enough, with Russia as her 
only ally, to attack Germany. 

"Asa complement to this situation Russia has asked 
us, in the course of the last few weeks, 1 to make a definite 
choice between her and Austria, and to give instructions 
to the German members of the various Eastern Com- 
missions to vote for Russia in every case that appeared 
to be doubtful. According to my opinion this would 
not be interpreting in the right sense the decisions taken 
at the Congress. . . . 

' Though for the most part they were only small 
and insignificant questions upon which a difference of 
opinion arose between the delegates, this desire of Russia 
to see Germany vote with her against Austria has been 
accompanied with threats as to the consequences of a 
refusal. This fact, coupled with the retirement of Count 
Andrassy, of which it seems the Russian Government 
had become aware, was of a nature to make me fear that 
a secret understanding had been arranged between Austria 
and Russia to the detriment of Germany. This fear, 

1 A lie ; Russia had never asked Germany anything of the kind.— C. R. 



250 Germany under Three Emperors 

however, was not justified, and Austria feels just as 
uneasy as we do ourselves concerning the unsettled policy 
of Russia. She seems disposed to come to an under- 
standing with a view to a common defence of our in- 
terests in the case of Russia proceeding to attack either 
of us. Personally, I would consider some convention of 
that kind as an essential guarantee for the security of 
Germany, as well as for the continuance of European 
peace. This convention would have for one of its aims 
the maintenance of good relations with Russia hereafter, 
but would also contain a clause compelling the contract- 
ing parties to help each other in the case of one of them 
being attacked. Once they had this reciprocal guarantee 
the two Empires could then proceed to renew the alliance 
between the three Emperors, and as an ally of Austria 
the German Empire would be able to command the pro- 
tection of England, so that by the pacific policy of the 
two great Central Powers the peace of Europe would be 
guaranteed by two millions of bayonets. The exclusively 
defensive character of the help which the two German 
States would engage themselves to give each other could 
not be considered in the light of a provocation by any- 
one, because a contract of the same kind is contained in 
the old Confederation between them of 1815, which has 
existed for fifty years without being the cause of trouble 
to anyone. 

" Should it be impossible to conclude such a conven- 
tion, we could not take it in bad part if Austria, under 
the pressure of Russian threats and in the uncertainty as 
to what she could expect from Germany, tried to come 
to an understanding with France, and perhaps even with 
Russia. Should this contingency arise Germany, in view 
of the position in which she stands in regard to France, 



A Dangerous Contingency 251 

would find herself completely isolated on the European 
Continent; and in the event of Austria allying herself 
to France and England, as she has done once before — 
in 1854 — Germany would find herself compelled to fall 
back upon Russia and to enter into the views of Russian 
policy both in regard to Home and Foreign Affairs, and 
I very much fear that these are unsatisfactory and even 
dangerous. 

" Should Russia compel us to choose between her 
and Austria, I believe that an alliance with Austria 
would give our policy a conservative and peaceful direc- 
tion, whilst Russia would only make us follow an un- 
certain and unsatisfactory one. ... I hope to be able 
to return home about, or soon after, the 20th of the 
present month, and to stop at Vienna on my way. If 
by that time we have not come to an understanding of 
some kind, at least in principle, I fear that we shall 
have lost the favourable opportunity to do so, because 
after the retirement of Andrassy, it is difficult to foresee 
when such a one may return. 

" I have considered it my duty most respectfully to 
acquaint your Majesty with the present policy of the 
German Empire, and I must beg of your Majesty to 
take a note that both Count Andrassy and myself have 
reciprocally engaged ourselves to keep this matter an 
absolute secret for the present. Until to-day it is only 
their Majesties the two Emperors who are aware of the 
intention of their Prime Ministers to bring about an 
understanding between the two Powers." 

This last phrase contained at least one untruth, be- 
cause William I. had never been made acquainted with 
Bismarck's new plan, and was only told of it when it 
was too late for him to draw back without creating a 



252 Germany under Three Emperors 

scandal, or bringing on his head the wrath of the whole 
of Germany which, by means of a virulent Press cam- 
paign against Russia, engineered with consummate skill 
by von Holstein, had become as much persuaded of the 
existence of a "Russian danger" as she is persuaded 
to-day that in the present war it is she who has been 
attacked by the Allies. The approval of the King of 
Bavaria was most essential to Bismarck's object, because 
it would place him in the position to state that the 
Austro-German alliance was viewed with sympathy even 
by those German Sovereigns who had clung to that 
intimate understanding with Russia which had become 
a tradition not only in Prussia, but everywhere else in 
Germany. King Ludwig II., of course, could do nothing 
against the determination of Bismarck, but in the reply 
which he wrote to the communication, from which I have 
just given extracts, he inserted the following sentence, 
which is most significant from more than one point of 
view : 

" If, owing to unforeseen complications, a war were 
to break out between the German Empire and Russia, 
this most regrettable change in the relations of the two 
Empires would affect me in a most painful manner, and 
I will not give up the hope that it will be possible to 
avoid such a sad solution by bringing our pacific inten- 
tions directly to the notice of his Majesty the Emperor 
of Russia." 

To this remark the Chancellor hastened to reply by 
another long explanation of what he knew to be the 
affirmation of an arrant untruth. 

" In regard to our relations with Russia," he wrote, 
" I will allow myself to remark, with all due humility 
to your Majesty, that the danger of complications likely 



The Lure of the Balkans 253 

to lead to the outbreak of a war which I should most 
deeply deplore not only from the political point of view, 
but also from a personal one, is not, in my opinion, an 
imminent one. It could only become serious if France 
were ready to go hand in hand with Russia. Up to the 
present this is not the case, and in conformity with the 
intentions of the Emperor our policy will neglect nothing 
in order to keep up and strengthen the present peaceful 
relations prevailing between the Empire and Russia, and 
also to try and influence in the same sense the mind 
of his Majesty the Emperor Alexander. The negotia- 
tions concerning a closer union with Austria have only 
a peaceful and purely defensive aim in view." 

Baron von Holstein, when relating later on the inci- 
dents connected with this curious episode in modern 
history, told a personal friend of mine that one of the 
principal arguments which he had used in the conversa- 
tions with Count Andrassy had been that Bismarck 
knew from an absolutely reliable source that Russia meant 
to attack Austria in order to wrench from her Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and to give up these two provinces 
to Servia or Montenegro. There was also to be con- 
sidered the fact that the Austrian mobilisation was always 
a very slow one, and the advantage it would be to Austria 
to have at her side an ally whose military organisation 
was so perfect that it could within one week throw all the 
bulk of its immense forces into the Kingdom of Poland, 
and thus produce a diversion which would give to the 
Austrian staff sufficient time to take measures of defence 
in regard to Galicia, which, it was well known, would be 
the first point of attack on the part of Russia. Holstein 
quite certainly convinced Andrassy that such an aggres- 
sion was planned, and he did it so cleverly that it 



254 Germany under Three Emperors 

appeared as if the Emperor William had become aware 
of it through an indiscretion of one of his Russian rela- 
tives. Of course, this was never said in so many words, 
but the impression was left on the mind of the Hungarian 
statesman that such was the case, and, naturally, it could 
not but influence him and lead him to seek the help of 
Germany. 

It is of curious interest to note how often Germany 
has made use of the words "absolutely reliable source" 
whenever she has tried to excuse some black deed she 
has been planning. If my readers will remember, they 
occur in the ultimatum which the German Government 
presented to Belgium at the outbreak of the Great War, 
in which it is said that Germany had learnt from "an 
absolutely reliable source " that the French were about 
to invade Belgium. It is unnecessary to add that neither 
France, in 1914, nor Russia, in 1879, had the intentions 
which Germany so generously ascribed to them, but in 
both cases the words constituted an excuse which, if it 
convinced no one abroad, satisfied the German nation 
and gave it a pretext for adding another crime to her 
long calendar. 

Whether Andrassy really believed all that Baron von 
Holstein related to him is another matter. But there 
were reasons why he would have liked to gather a few 
more laurels before bidding good-bye to political life, 
among which was the desire to prove to the Emperor 
Francis Joseph that he was above any feelings of rancour, 
and that the first, and indeed the only object he had in 
view was the welfare of the Empire whose policy had 
been for so many years in his hands. He had told no 
one but Bismarck why he was retiring, and, as we have 
seen, the latter had faithfully kept the secret, even in 



The Empress Elisabeth 255 

regard to Holstein, which had been confided to his 
discretion. 

Now that many years have passed since this incident, 
and that the grave has closed on all who were concerned 
in it, it can briefly be said that Francis Joseph, among 
other grievances against Andrassy, had an objection to 
the friendship which existed between the latter and the 
Empress Elisabeth — a friendship which, despite all 
efforts, he could not end. Painful scenes had conse- 
quently arisen which had largely influenced the Count's 
decision to bid farewell to political life, his honour, as he 
expressed it a little while before his death, preventing 
him from continuing to serve a Monarch who had in- 
sulted him so far as to suspect him of having had stronger 
than the most respectful feelings for the Sovereign Lady 
whom all Hungary worshipped, and the brilliant qualities 
of whom had been appreciated everywhere and by 
everyone save by the husband who had outraged her 
at every step. 

In retiring from the political stage Andrassy wished 
it to be established that he had always tried to promote 
the interests of the Austrian Empire, and this was one 
of the reasons which had made him respond so eagerly 
to the overtures made to him by the confidential servant 
of Prince von Bismarck, and to acquiesce in the propo- 
sitions which the latter had made to him, if not officially, 
at least in such a manner that he could not doubt but 
that it had been done with the approval of the all- 
powerful German Chancellor. Altogether the ground 
had been well prepared by von Holstein. Nothing re- 
mained, therefore, after Andrassy 's visit to Gastein, but 
to proceed with the drafting of the Treaty. It was 
essential, however, for Bismarck to obtain the full con- 



256 Germany under Three Emperors 

sent of the Emperor William to his scheme, and, as it 
happened, this did not prove quite the easy matter he 
had assured his friend it would be. The aged Sovereign 
was far too chivalrous to agree forthwith with what 
appeared to him to be an act of treachery towards his 
kinsman the Emperor of Russia. His all-powerful 
Minister had to resort to all kinds of expedients to 
persuade him that he was not breaking any of the engage- 
ments he had personally contracted in other directions. 
When the terms of the Treaty were first submitted to 
him William I. declared that he would rather abdicate 
than put his hand to a document the signing of which 
would dishonour him in his own eyes if not in those of 
the world. 



CHAPTER XX 

The Dual Alliance 

AS I have hinted, it was in connection with this 
-Tl. fatal Treaty of alliance with Austria that Bis- 
marck met for the first time with anything approach- 
ing a real and serious opposition on the part of 
the old Emperor. In the eyes of William I. Bis- 
marck was a great historical figure ; he appreciated his 
genius ; he admired his energy ; but it is an open ques- 
tion whether at heart he really liked him. There were 
certain traits in Bismarck's character which were abso- 
lutely repugnant to his Royal master, among others his 
unscrupulousness. The King believed that treaties were 
made to be observed, a pledge kept. He may have 
accepted out of necessity, but certainly he had never 
endorsed, the principles which the first Chancellor of 
the new German Empire embodied in the famous phrase 
in his Reminiscences, and which has ever since inspired 
Prussian statecraft : ' ' The observation of the treaties 
which bind together great States can only be conditional 
when the struggle for life threatens its solidity. There 
exists no great nation which would ever consent to 
sacrifice its existence to fidelity in regard to a treaty if 
left free choice in the matter." 

When Bismarck expounded to William I. the reasons 
which had led him to respond to the " overtures " made 
by Count Andrassy, the Emperor exclaimed that he 
would never consent to the Treaty. Bismarck declared 

R 257 



258 Germany under Three Emperors 

that he would resign, upon which the Sovereign in his 
turn threatened to abdicate. 

This did not suit Prince Bismarck at all, who, for 
once in his life, was nonplussed. Holstein came to the 
rescue, and suggested that he should call to his assistance 
two men whom he thought might represent matters to 
the Emperor in such a way that the latter might change 
his mind — the German Ambassadors in London and in 
Paris, Count Minister and Prince von Hohenlohe 
Schillingsfiirst. 

The latter has left us in his Memoirs a record of 
the incident, and the story affords an apt illustration of 
Bismarckian methods. The Prince writes : 

" Gastein, September 14>th, 1879. 

"Last night" [the Prince was then staying at his 
villa at Aussee] " I received a telegram from Holstein 
saying that the Chancellor wanted to speak with me this 
evening. There was nothing to do but to obey. I there- 
fore started for Gastein, where Holstein received me and 
told me that the Chancellor wished to confer with me 
on a most important and serious matter. 

"The situation is as follows: Bismarck, who has no 
confidence in Russia, has come here in order to arrange 
outside of the Alliance of the three Emperors another of 
a defensive character with Austria. Andrassy, who was 
on a visit to Gastein on August 28th, would not at first 
believe that Bismarck was in earnest, but when he had 
convinced himself that such was the case, jumped up to the 
ceiling, because it is impossible for Austria to stand alone, 
and she must look about her for alliances of some kind. 
But before the Emperor had received a report on the 
matter from the Chancellor his interview with the Emperor 



The Truth about Russia 259 

of Russia had taken place at Alexandrovo, and he does not 
now want to hear anything more about it. Bismarck, 
on his side, threatens to resign if the Emperor continues 
to withhold his consent. Holstein has proposed that I 
should be asked to see the Sovereign and try to induce 
him to give in, a suggestion to which the Chancellor 
has agreed. I have talked over the matter with Holstein 
this evening, and I have told him that I am not in favour 
of this new scheme. For one thing, I do not trust 
Austria, and for another, I do not consider that Russia 
has any serious plans for aggression. Then again, I 
think that an alliance with Austria would have for 
its immediate consequence an alliance between Russia 
and France, which would most certainly lead to war, 
whilst it seems that Bismarck believes that his scheme 
would ensure a permanent peace. I shall see what I 
can learn later on, after I have talked the matter over 
with the Chancellor." 

"September 16th. 
" I read yesterday all the documents concerning the 
matter, and also talked for a long time with Bismarck. 
The Prince has, after all, convinced me of the necessity 
of an alliance with Austria. He says that it is impos- 
sible for Austria to stand quite alone in view of the 
continual threats of Russia. She must seek an alliance 
with that same Russia or with France. In both cases 
we are running in danger of being left quite isolated in 
any crisis which might unexpectedly arise. The tele- 
gram which I had sent from Paris to the Chancellor con- 
cerning certain Russian overtures there had been of great 
use to him. The Emperor, however, on account of that 
fatal interview at Alexandrovo, will not hear anything 



260 Germany under Three Emperors 

of an understanding with Austria, which he considers a 
perfidy against his nephew. In consequence of our con- 
versation of to-day I shall go on Sunday to Strasburg 
and see what I can do there." 

William I. was attending some manoeuvres in Alsace- 
Lorraine from September 18th to the 25th, and thither 
repaired, in accordance with the instruction which he had 
received from Bismarck, Prince von Hohenlohe, who 
relates in the following words what occurred : 

" September 22nd. 
" The Emperor received me in his study at eight 
o'clock in the evening. He asked me first from where 
I had arrived, and then he asked me whether I had seen 
the Chancellor. I said, 'Yes, in Gastein.' The Emperor 
asked, ' Is he very greatly irritated?' I replied, ' No, 
only anxious.' The Emperor then related to me the 
whole story, told me about the letter which he had re- 
ceived from the Emperor Alexander, his reply, the 
interview at Alexandrovo, his conversations with the 
Tsar, with Milioutine and with Giers. Suddenly, he 
continued, after the most friendly promises had been 
exchanged between him and his nephew, the Chancellor 
— probably out of a feeling of revenge for the Emperor 
Alexander's letter — had proposed to him to conclude an 
alliance with Austria against Russia. This he could not 
do. He had the impression that Bismarck had a coalition 
of Austria, Germany, France and England in view, as 
a new scheme. I contradicted this, and said that if now, 
whilst Andrassy was still at the head of affairs, the alliance 
proposed was not concluded the Conservative party in 
Austria would, at our expense, come to an understanding 



A Talk with the Emperor 261 

with Russia. France would then, as a matter of course, 
join in it. In regard to the latter, Waddington was in 
favour of England against Russia, but he could be driven 
out of office in three months, and it would be quite pos- 
sible then that creatures of Gambetta would come into 
power, and these would find means to get into touch 
with the Russian revolutionary elements and, together 
with them, bring about a war in order to plunge the 
whole of Europe in the horrors of a general revolution. 
An alliance with Austria would thus render Russia a 
double service. It would, first of all, keep in check a 
possible revolution, and, secondly, prevent Austria from 
entering into a coalition against Germany and Russia. 
This seemed to put matters in a new light before the 
Emperor. But he did not make any remark on the sub- 
ject. From the whole tone of my conversation with him 
I have come to the conclusion that he is rather inclined 
to take into consideration the arguments put forward 
by the Chancellor, but that he fears to appear before 
his nephew and friend as disloyal to him. I could not 
arrive at any positive result in spite of all that I told 
him, but I accomplished the mission with which I had 
been entrusted, and I have told the Emperor all that I 
thought on this all-important subject." 

Prince Hohenlohe adds to this passage of his Memoirs 
a memorandum, dated September 22nd, 1879, which 
might appear to the reader to have been written by him- 
self. As a matter of fact, it was given to him at Gastein 
by Holstein, as we shall presently see. It runs thus : 

" Russia is embittered against Austria. Austria 
prevents the execution of her various schemes in regard 
to the Near East. Russia will and must declare war 



262 Germany under Three Emperors 

against Austria if she wants to push these schemes 
through. She will then ask us what we mean to do. 
If we stand by Russia and remain neutral, Austria will 
immediately ally herself with France and England. We 
shall then stand together with Russia against France, 
Austria and England. If we do nothing at present, then 
Austria can arrive at an understanding with Russia. 
In that case, as soon as France feels it is strong enough 
it will start a war with us, during which it will have at 
its side, as unfriendly neutrals in regard to us, Russia 
and Austria. We should thus find ourselves in a state 
of complete isolation, and we might even find ourselves 
faced by a coalition of Austria, Russia and France. On 
the contrary, if we have contrived to bind Austria to 
us by the help of a treaty, then England will always be 
on our side, and then we can consider without the 
slightest uneasiness the enmity of Russia and France. 

" In Russia the Revolutionary movement is so 
powerful that it is impossible to guess to what ex- 
tremities the Government might not find itself driven. 
It is quite possible that the Constitution Reform party 
in Russia wishes for war in order to be able to obtain in 
that way the reforms which it requires. At all events, 
it is impossible to put any confidence in the friendship 
of a country which finds itself in such a state of disorder. 

" The Panslavist party will suffer an ' echec n 
through the German-Austrian alliance, and this will 
afford an opportunity to the Russian Conservative party 
to assert itself once more." 

I have written at length on this Austro-German in- 
cident, because if the reader will follow it in all its details 
he will find that it was but the inauguration of the 

1 The word is written in French in the text. 



Consequences 263 

political methods which Prussia has followed with such 
perseverance until the breaking out of the present war, 
to which it was not only the preface, but, in a certain 
sense, the first chapter. Bismarck, who realised that 
sooner or later the Empire he had founded would find 
itself faced by a combination of the whole of Europe 
against the militarism of which it was the incarnation, 
had had in his mind, from the very first day of its founda- 
tion, the consolidation of it through alliances which 
might, to a certain extent, shield it from demolition and 
ruin. He would have liked to induce France to forget 
the past — the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the milliards 
it had been compelled to pay — and to consent to shake 
the hand which Germany extended to it. But he soon 
realised that this was a forlorn hope, and he understood 
just as quickly that the natural consequence of the war 
which had brought such laurels to Prussia would be a 
Franco-Russian alliance, which the Panslavist and 
Slavophil parties in Petersburg would do their best to 
bring about. For reasons best known to himself he had 
not sided with Russia during the Berlin Congress, but 
had tried to favour both England and Austria, espe- 
cially the latter, in whom he saw a possible rival to 
Russia for that preponderance in the Balkans which the 
Muscovite claimed, and which he did not want to see 
her obtain. If one could have read his heart it is prob- 
able that the whole secret of his attitude would have 
been found in a conviction that whilst he would always 
find in Austria a tool ready to lend itself to all his 
schemes, he could not hope for the same thing from 
Russia, where, even at this time, there existed a strong 
anti-German party. Bismarck had made up his mind 
to keep open for German trade the road to Constan- 



264 Germany under Three Emperors 

tinople and Asia Minor, and this, of course, would have 
been rendered impossible if Petersburg and not Vienna 
ruled in the Balkans. All these considerations had in- 
duced him to summon Count Andrassy to his side at 
Gastein, and to elaborate with him this formidable 
conception of an Austro-German alliance. We have 
seen the manner in which Bismarck had called to his 
help Prince von Hohenlohe, in whose independence and 
conscientiousness the aged monarch believed implicitly, 
to forward his scheme. In reality the Prince was neither 
independent nor conscientious, and it was, indeed, in 
connection with him that the German Chancellor gave 
utterance to Walpole's famous axiom, " Every man has 
his price." Hohenlohe, in spite of his position, was 
ambitious both in respect to power and money. It did 
not take long for Prince von Hohenlohe to find his 
reward ; a few weeks after his visit to Gastein and his trip 
to Strasburg he was asked to take up for a few months 
the office of Foreign Secretary at Berlin, which the 
death of Herr von Biilow had left free. During its 
tenure he was allowed, as a special favour, to retain his 
salary as German Ambassador in Paris, together with 
the one appertaining to the post he was requested to 
fill provisionally, a combination which allowed the Prince 
to pay off a certain number of pressing debts. 

The Austro-German Treaty was one of Holstein's 
pet conceptions. He knew very well that it constituted 
one of the blackest acts of treachery in regard to Russia 
and to its Sovereign that Prussia had ever been guilty 
of. But this man had a clear vision of the develop- 
ments which the political situation in Europe was bound 
to undergo. He did not underrate the strength of 
France, and he knew very well that the next war which 



The Next War 265 

Prussia would have to fight with her would be a much 
more formidable affair, in which France might easily 
find allies and friends among all those who had become 
weary of the growing insolence of Germany. It was 
to provide against this contingency that he had been 
working with Bismarck, to assure that they would not 
stand alone when the next outbreak should occur. Both 
the German Foreign Office and the German General 
Staff had decided that the country ought to prepare 
itself for another war, without which it would be impos- 
sible for it to proceed to the consolidation of the power 
it had acquired. The only question was as to the time 
when this war would be brought about. It remained 
an open one the whole time Bismarck was in power, and 
for long years after he had disappeared from the political 
scene ; but the intention to provoke it has always been 
the leading thought in Prussian politics. If we compare 
what we know of the activity and the designs of Baron 
von Holstein and of his great chief with what has recently 
taken place under our eyes, we find that the events of 
to-day had been foreseen and prepared for by them. 
These designs have been carried out with a thoroughness, 
though, perhaps, not with the cleverness which they 
themselves would have exercised, but executed all the 
same on the very lines they had conceived. 

My friend, when discussing with Holstein the cir- 
cumstances I have just related, asked him why, after 
all, he had preferred an alliance with Austria, the in- 
sufficiency of whose army was so well known to him, 
to one with Russia, because, as he had added, " You 
surely never seriously believed, whatever you tried to 
persuade the old Emperor, that Russia had aggressive 
designs in regard to Germany?" " Of course I did 



266 Germany under Three Emperors 

not," answered Holstein. "What decided the question 
was the knowledge that Russia would not allow herself 
to be used as we might consider necessary and useful to 
our interests at a given moment, and that the Slavophil 
and Panslavist parties might, after all, turn towards 
France, with whom many more sympathies bound them 
than with Germany, to whom they had never forgiven 
the part she played at the time of the Berlin Congress. 
You see, the next war is bound to be for us a question 
of existence. If we fight it successfully, then we shall 
be able to proceed to a general disarmament of Europe, 
together with a restriction of our own military forces. 
Therefore, we ought to watch carefully for the moment 
when this war can be brought about with the minimum 
of risk to ourselves and the maximum to our foes. 
When we consider this moment to have arrived we must 
begin it, whether we like it or not; and what neither 
Bismarck nor myself was sure of was, whether Russia 
would allow us to seize it, whereas with Austria no such 
complication could be feared. Austria would always 
follow the impulse we chose to give her. This was 
the reason which finally decided us and which carried 
the day. Austria marching to war at our side, Austrian 
regiments led by Prussian officers. With Austria beside 
us, and — who knows? — perhaps one or two small Balkan 
States, we can crush both France and Russia and 
neutralise England. With Russia as an ally we might 
crush Austria, but we would never destroy France, and 
it is France which must be destroyed before the German 
Empire can develop itself, as it is essential it should do, 
in the future." 

I will ask my readers to notice that the conversation 
Jiere recorded took place in 1887 or 1888 — that is, after 



An Italian Estimate 267 

the defensive alliance which Bismarck had succeeded in 
concluding with Count Andrassy had been renewed for 
a further term of six years by his successor, Count 
Kalnoky. Nothing then could point towards the catas- 
trophe which was to occur in 1914, and yet how clearly 
Holstein exposed the Prussian programme, and with 
what a terrible exactitude it has been fulfilled ! And this 
notwithstanding the fact that in Austria itself, and even 
among her diplomats and statesmen, there were people 
who saw quite clearly through the Bismarckian game 
and intrigues, and who deplored the facility with which 
these had been allowed to work their way among the 
public, through the medium and influence of a subsi- 
dised Press, the headquarters of which were situated in 
the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin, and the leading spirit of 
which was Baron von Holstein. 

An Austrian diplomat of Hungarian birth, who 
therefore ought rather to have been an enemy of Russia 
than one of her friends — the Chevalier Bo sty, who died 
a good many years ago — in writing to me in August, 
1896, about the famous alliance, used the following 
terms : 

" Ainsi la fameuse triple alliance est renouvelee pour 
six ans. C'est un court espace dans la vie des peuples, 
et ne peut endiguer les courants irresistibles qui poussent 
d'un cote la France a la reprise de ses provinces, et 
d'autre cote la Russie a la marche vers le Bosphore. 
Nos hommes d'etat pensent que la Russie etablie a Con- 
stantinople ne saurait tolerer a ses flancs une Autriche 
puissante. L'Allemagne profite de cette peur pour nous 
attirer dans une alliance appelee a lui garantir sa proie. 
Mais l'historien dans l'avenir aura de la peine a expliquer 
ce que l'ltalie est venue faire la dedans. J'etais a Rome 



268 Germany under Three Emperors 

lors de la conclusion des traites, et je connais les dessous 
des cartes. Je vous avoue, cependant, que j'etais etonne 
de voir Rudini suivre les errements de ses predecesseurs." 1 

And a little later the same diplomat, in writing to 
me, made the following pregnant remarks : 

" Chez nous on commence a s'apercevoir que la triple 
alliance est au fond une duperie, et les articles du Lloyd 
sont de moins en moins apprecies. Cependant, une crise 
financier e deviendra inevitable si nous jetons les millions 
par la fenetre pour des concentrations de troupes faites 
sur des conseils venus de Berlin." 2 

The man who penned these words died in 1892, and 
the letters which contain them are to-day as testimony 
from another world to add force to the knowledge which 
we already possess of the intentions of Germany, both 
in regard to France and to Russia, and of the determina- 
tion with which she proceeded to the execution of the 
ruthless scheme which she hoped would establish her 
power and supremacy not only in Europe, but over the 
whole world. 

1 " So the famous Triple Alliance has been renewed for six years. It is but 
a short space in the life of nations, and it cannot be sufficient to stop the irre- 
sistible currents which push on the one side France to try and recover her lost 
provinces, and on the other Russia to her march forward towards the Bos- 
phorus. Our statesmen think that once Russia is established at Constantinople 
she would not tolerate at her side a powerful Austria. Germany takes ad- 
vantage of this fear to try and entangle us in an alliance the aim of which is 
to guarantee to her the possession of the prey which she has seized. But the 
historian will have in the future much trouble to explain what Italy had to 
do in all this. I was in Rome at the time of the conclusion of the treaties, 
and I know well all that existed behind the cards. I will own, however, that 
I was surprised to see Rudini fall into the errors of his predecessors." 

2 " Here one begins to see that the Triple Alliance is but a ( dupery/ and 
the articles of the Lloyd are every day less and less appreciated. Nevertheless, 
afinancial crisis will be inevitable in the long run if we go on squandering millions 
for concentration of troops on the advice of Berlin." 



CHAPTER XXI 

Some Missing Documents 

THE family of Prince von Bismarck published a great 
part of his correspondence with the old Emperor 
William, but it is curious that in this big volume one 
cannot find a single letter which really tells anything 
concerning the Austro-German Treaty which, after all, 
was one of the most important transactions that took 
place during the Chancellor's administration. Most 
certainly letters concerning it must have been exchanged 
between the monarch and his trusted adviser, and with 
various politicians and diplomats. This is the more 
likely in regard to the Emperor, in that at the time the 
negotiations were taking place with Count Andrassy the 
German Chancellor was far away from his Sovereign. 
Such an absence voluntarily suggests the probability that 
the exchange of notes between the Chancellor and the 
aged monarch would not bear the light of the day or 
the criticisms of the world. Bismarck had no proof that 
Russia nursed any aggressive designs against Germany ; 
he had no proof that the Russian Government was 
about to attack Austria, and he knew nothing at all 
about the aspirations of either the Panslavist or the Con- 
servative parties in the Tsar's Empire ; whilst his asser- 
tion that it would be to the advantage of the latter 
to see concluded against itself an Austro-German de- 
fensive and offensive alliance had something absolutely 
childish about it. 

269 



270 Germany under Three Emperors 

After the fatal month of August, 1879, Germany 
did everything that lay in its power to spoil the relations 
between Vienna and Petersburg, and the Press subsi- 
dised by the Wilhelmstrasse was always trying to excite 
public opinion in Austria, and especially in Hungary, 
against Russia and its successive Sovereigns ; and when 
Italy had joined the alliance of the two Empires the 
same methods were tried in Rome, where to an extent 
they succeeded, especially at the time when the vanity 
of Crispi led him to submit to the directions which he 
received from Friedrichsruhe. This was after the 
famous visit which he had paid to the Prussian Riche- 
lieu, whose disciple he proclaimed himself to be with 
such emphasis. All through the years in which he 
remained in office Bismarck persistently worked with the 
one aim of sowing dissension between Austria and 
Russia, and representing Prance to Russia as a country 
in the throes of anarchy and revolution. 

Holstein, who perhaps was more brutally frank 
even than Bismarck, made no secret of the uneasiness 
which the latter experienced in regard to this possible 
understanding between Paris and Petersburg. He 
openly avowed that it was on that account the Berlin 
Cabinet had shown itself so opposed to a monarchical 
restoration in France, because it hoped that the aversion 
to the Republic which existed in Russian higher spheres 
might prevent the Tsar from accepting the idea of an 
alliance with a Government that was so entirely the 
opposite of his own. 

Had Bismarck been left alone he would most cer- 
tainly, in spite of all his assertions to the contrary, have 
welcomed a war with France, though he might not 
have provoked it for some time until he was tolerably 



The Near East 271 

sure that Germany stood in no danger of being entangled 
thereby in complications with Russia. Infinitely he 
preferred that Germany should look on whilst Russia 
fought with Austria, with the utter weakening of both 
belligerents as an inevitable result. His role would 
then have been that of mediator, and one of his condi- 
tions would have been their acquiescence in Saxony 
and Bavaria becoming, if not vassals, at least the sub- 
missive allies of the German Empire — which achievement 
accomplished he would have no further cause to fear 
France. 

Such, at any rate, were his views at the time of 
which I am writing, though they changed to a consider- 
able extent later on. Not so Holstein, who was eager 
for the destruction both of France and of Russia. His 
desire to hurry on the crisis which Bismarck would have 
preferred to see delayed shortened his vision, and with- 
out recognising consequences he took up with the 
energy which never failed him the task of creating 
annoyances to the Russian Government in the Near 
East, in the hope that these might bring on complica- 
tions while Bismarck was still at the head of affairs. Both 
men wished to keep in their own hands the direction 
of the political affairs of Europe, and both were deter- 
mined to leave no initiative to their subordinates, a fact 
to which must be attributed the utter lack of a worthy 
successor to Bismarck and the general absence of clever 
diplomats in the Prussian service. Whenever one proved 
capable of some initiative, some pretext or other was 
discovered to induce him to send in his resignation. 
The two leading minds at the Wilhelmstrasse required 
only servants and did not admit collaborators, the reper- 
cussion of which mistake can be found in all the negotia- 



272 Germany under Three Emperors 

tions which preceded the outbreak of the present war. 
Even Prince von Biilow failed to be appreciated either 
by Bismarck or by Holstein, and might have fared badly 
at their hands if he had not taken care to efface himself 
as much as possible, and not to allow either of them to 
suspect that he was a man of individuality and not merely 
a machine incapable of independence of action. 

The Foreign Office, in fact, under the rule of Baron 
von Holstein was more a bureau d'espionnage than any- 
thing else, and its whole policy was built on a founda- 
tion of reports which reached it from the army of secret 
agents sent all over Europe with injunctions to relate 
all the gossip they overheard. Every morning Holstein 
used to go to Bismarck with a bundle of reports similar 
to those which were brought to Louis XV. in France by 
his faithful lieutenant de police, and in which were re- 
corded the sayings and doings not only of politicians, 
but of prominent members of society all over Europe. 
These reports allowed him sometimes to exercise a pres- 
sure on certain people whose services he required for 
the moment, and to become possessed of information 
concerning them which gave him the opportunity to 
discredit them if need be. 

This reminds me of an incident that was related to 
me, and which is amusing in regard to the personality 
of one, at least, of the persons implicated in it. At 
the time that Prince von Biilow, then quite a young 
man, was secretary of the German Embassy in Peters- 
burg, he had a flirtation with a lady who, for some 
reason or other, Holstein wanted to have in his power. 
The flirtation had been a very discreet one, and both 
the people concerned in it had hoped that the rumour 
of it had not got abroad. As a matter of fact it had 



A Biilow Incident 273 

not, but somehow Holstein contrived to become 
acquainted with it. The lady did not live in Petersburg, 
but belonged to Berlin society, and had only been in 
Russia on a short visit during the winter season. What 
was her surprise when she returned to the German 
capital to find herself the object of the attentions of 
Holstein who, as a rule, never troubled about women. 
She was not a particularly clever woman, but, never- 
theless, she became suspicious as to the motives of this 
sudden friendliness on the part of Holstein. At last the 
shell burst, and she was given to understand very plainly 
that she was expected to find out certain matters con- 
cerning Biilow, upon which, for reasons best known to 
himself, Holstein wanted information. When she 
protested she was instantly reminded that her reputation 
was at the mercy of the people who wished to avail them- 
selves of her services, and that it was all that her life, 
or rather its peace, was worth to disobey the injunctions 
given her. The lady became so alarmed that, placed 
as she was between her liking for Herr — as he was at 
the time — von Biilow, the necessity to safeguard her 
own existence at home, and the alternative to commit 
what in her eyes was the meanest of actions, she decided 
to break off her relations with the young man. She in- 
dignantly told Holstein that it was most impudent to 
accuse her of an intrigue of which she was innocent, 
and though she had arranged to meet Biilow in the near 
future she never kept the appointment, and carefully 
avoided either giving him an explanation of her con- 
duct or having anything to do with him beyond meeting 
him in society when it was inevitable, and then trying 
not to be drawn into conversation with him. The 
marriage of Herr von Biilow took place a short time 
s 



274 Germany under Three Emperors 

after this incident, and the heroine of the adventure 
confessed to a person who was in her confidence, and 
who after her death told the story to me, that she had 
never in all her life felt more grateful to Providence 
than for the news that the lovely Countess Donhoff had 
become Madame von Biilow, this event putting definitely 
an end to the possibility of any persecution of her on 
the part of Baron von Holstein. 

This little example of the methods employed by the 
faithful lieutenant of Prince Bismarck is an excellent 
illustration of the devious means by which he obtained 
information of which he wished to become possessed. 
He had spies and counter-spies, innocent spies and un- 
willing spies, and spies of every possible kind who, either 
for money or out of fear, or simply out of idleness and 
desire to make themselves important, brought to his 
most willing ears the information which they had 
gathered or which he had ordered them to collect. 
Holstein, therefore, who never went anywhere, who 
scarcely saw anyone outside his circle of immediate 
acquaintances and the political personages with whom 
his duties brought him into contact, was the best in- 
formed individual in Europe. 

There was not a prominent man or woman on the 
Continent of whose private life and general opinions 
Holstein did not possess the most complete and accurate 
knowledge. He made spying an art, and without him the 
famous Intelligence Department, which has contributed 
so much to the military and civil organisation of the 
German Empire, and raised it to such a high state of 
perfection, would never have attained the celebrity which 
it has reached, or proved of such use both then and now 
to German plans for world-dominion. Holstein made 






Baron von Bleichroder 275 

blackmailing a permanent institution, and resorted to it 
with the most complete unconcern whenever it suited him 
to do so, or whenever he saw an advantage to any scheme 
he might have in view. He made the lives of his victims 
as uncomfortable as he could, smiling serenely all the 
while, and allowing them to see that he was thoroughly 
enjoying the pangs of agony in which they were writhing. 

This man, so quiet and so civil outwardly, was abso- 
lutely inexorable, and contrived to give all around him 
the impression that whatever happened he must not 
be interfered with. Not only Bismarck, but all the 
grave and important Ambassadors, Secretaries of State, 
and Ministers who ever had anything to do with him, 
showed themselves most careful in their relations with 
him and took extreme trouble to conciliate him. The 
only man who treated him as an equal, perhaps because 
he had worked with him in a way no one else had done, 
was the great Jewish banker, Baron von Bleichroder, 
who w T as one of his principal agents, and whose agent 
he had also sometimes been, a titre de revanche. 

The Baron, by his financial connections in Paris and 
in Petersburg — the House of Rothschild in the one place 
and M. Sachs, the director of the Discount Bank, in 
the other — kept him supplied with news it would have 
been impossible for him to procure otherwise, made it 
his special care to take to the Chancellor all kinds of 
useful information, and to distribute where it was 
needed — this especially in Russia — a certain amount of 
baksheesh which Bismarck never grudged when he 
thought it might be advantageous to him. It was Bleich- 
roder who generally subsidised the foreign Press, 
apparently for financial, but in reality for political, pur- 
poses. It was Bleichroder who often, in his discussions 



276 Germany under Three Emperors 

with Ambassadors and other influential personages who 
came to seek inspiration in the small study where he 
received such, suggested to them certain things that they 
ought to do or say which Holstein had previously told 
him would be well to mention to them. 

Bleichroder had charge of the money matters, so at 
least it was said, of Count Herbert von Bismarck, and 
advised him in his Stock Exchange operations. This 
fact, which was very well known to Baron von Holstein, 
gave to the latter great facilities for exercising a certain 
influence both on the shrewd banker who appreciated him 
so well, and on the Chancellor who in many things fol- 
lowed the inspirations given to him by his eldest son, 
who again would not have cared for his father to learn 
that he required more money than the very generous 
allowance which was made to him, and which, coupled 
with his own salary, provided him with a nice little income 
that should have satisfied him in every way. 

All these things were common talk in Berlin, though 
no one dared mention them aloud. Everyone felt more 
or less afraid of Baron von Holstein, and even those who 
had nothing to do with him, and who called him in 
derision "the Grey Eminence," were very careful never 
to cross his path. 

Without Holstein Bismarck would not have done 
half the mean things for which he became responsible. 
For instance, in regard to that Austro-German Treaty, 
to which I may be forgiven for recurring so often in 
that it was one of the foundation-stones of the whole 
Bismarckian policy, it was Holstein who had not only 
urged the Prince to conclude it, but who had advised 
him to carry through the business without referring at 
all to the Emperor. 



Lies and Deceptions 277 

Just to emphasise the extent to which Bismarck de- 
ceived his Sovereign in regard to this question, and the 
impudence with which he lied to Count Andrassy, we 
have only to compare official dates as they appear in 
documents we have at our disposal. We have seen the 
diary of Prince von Hohenlohe, dated September 14th 
and 16th, in which he relates how the Chancellor called 
him to Gastein and asked him to go to Strassburg to 
see the Emperor. We had read further that the Prince 
only saw William I. on September 22nd, at eight o'clock 
in the evening, and that when he left the presence of the 
Monarch he had not obtained any positive results in 
regard to the mission which he had accepted. Now, in 
the official correspondence of Bismarck which his son, 
Prince Herbert, published after his father's death, there 
is a letter addressed to Count Andrassy, dated Gastein, 
September 20th, 1879 — that is, two days before the 
audience given by the Emperor William I. to Prince 
Hohenlohe — which contains the following passage : 

" I have presented full and detailed reports on the 
situation as discussed by us during our recent conversa- 
tions, and the acquiescence of the colleagues who repre- 
sent me in my absence has allowed me to surmount the 
various difficulties which have arisen through the dis- 
tance at which I find myself from them, together with 
opposing influences directed against our common work, 
to the extent that I have obtained, in principle, the 
agreement of the Emperor with the views that have in- 
fluenced me during our recent conversations. Accord- 
ing to the communications which I have received from 
my representative, Count von Stolberg-Wernigerode, 
the Emperor is ready to consent to a convention in 
which the two Powers bind themselves to do everything 



278 Germany under Three Emperors 

they can to maintain peace, and especially to maintain 
good relations with Russia ; but also, in the event of 
one of them being attacked by one or several other 
Powers, to resist such an attack with all the strength 
which they both can muster. 

" I am therefore authorised by my august Master 
to conclude a defensive alliance between Austro-Hun- 
gaiy and the German Empire unconditionally, and for 
either a fixed period of time or indefinitely. I entreat 
your Excellency to be kind enough to enter into per- 
sonal negotiations with me on the subject of this offer. 
I shall have, of course, to lay before my august 
Master the result of these negotiations, but I have no 
doubt as to his agreeing to what we shall decide in the 
event of your Excellency being able to accept, in the 
name of his Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph, the 
propositions which I shall make to you." 

People have gone to great trouble to explain the 
iniquity of which Bismarck made himself guilty in chang- 
ing the terms of the Ems dispatch; but it seems to 
me that, bad as it was, that was but a small matter 
compared with the audacious lies contained in the letter 
which I have just quoted. And what can one think 
of the moral character of a man capable of writing so 
to the Prime Minister of a foreign Power on a matter 
the importance of which was of so tremendous a nature 
when he had every reason to fear his Sovereign would 
not consider it even, and when he was using all the 
means in his power, and all the influences of which he 
could dispose, to try to win over this Sovereign to his 
point of view? Again, there is the impudence of the 
reference to Count Stolberg, who did not know one 
word concerning the alliance until it had become an 



Terms of the 79 Treaty 279 

accomplished fact ! Further commentary is unnecessary 
in face of the eloquence of these two dates. 

And now what were really the terms of this famous 
Treaty in which Italy was to join a few months later, 
and which was definitely signed on October 7th, 1879? 
In view of what has developed from it, it is just as well 
to recall its stipulations. These consisted of three prin- 
cipal points : 

1. In the event of one of the two Empires being 
attacked by Russia the other was bound to come to its 
help with all the resources of which it was capable. 

2. In the event of one of the two Empires being 
attacked by any other Power than Russia the second 
was to adhere to an attitude of friendly neutrality. 

3. In the event of the attacking Power being helped 
by Russia the obligation mentioned in Article 1 operated 
on the two contracting parties. 

The official object of the Treaty was to assure the 
security of the two Empires ; its real purpose was an 
offensive alliance against Russia, and eventually against 
France. 

The specious arguments put forward by Bismarck, 
coupled with his threats of resignation, finally induced 
the Emperor to do what was required of him by all the 
people in whom he had confidence — his Prime Minister, 
his son and his wife, and Prince von Hohenlohe — but 
with touching naivete William I. insisted on informing 
the Tsar as to what had been done. This, of course, 
was entirely against the wishes of Bismarck, who would 
have preferred that the latter heard nothing at all about 
it. This frankness of the aged Monarch compelled the 
Chancellor somewhat to change his tactics, and induced 
him, immediately after his arrival in Vienna, to seek 



280 Germany under Three Emperors 

the French Ambassador at the Austrian Court, and to 
assure him that his presence there did not mean any- 
thing hostile to France. It was adding insult to injury, 
but this was nothing new to Bismarck. 

This journey of the great Minister to Austria was, 
perhaps, one of the greatest triumphs which he achieved 
in the course of his triumphant career. The Austrians 
are a good-natured people, and they seemed to have 
forgotten Sadowa in the ovations with which they re- 
ceived the man who, after having humiliated them in 
every possible way, now came to offer them his friend- 
ship. The population of Vienna cheered him as it did 
not often cheer their Kaiser. The Emperor Francis 
Joseph received him with great pomp at the Hofburg, 
assured him of his everlasting friendship, shed tears of 
joy over the Treaty which Andrassy had signed in his 
name, and declared effusively to the successful and 
lucky Chancellor that he would always think of him as 
a dear brother ! Nothing in the way of compliments, 
expressions of gratitude and of admiration were omitted, 
and, secure in the future, Bismarck returned to the soli- 
tudes of Varzin in order to contemplate the great work 
which he had brought to a close. Little did he think 
that this Treaty, which he considered as a shield against 
any possible danger of Franco-Russian aggression against 
the German Empire, would, by a strange irony of 
destiny, be the direct cause of the establishment of the 
Triple Entente. 



CHAPTER XXII 

Bulgarian Matters 

IT is a common saying in Russia that old men forget 
what they thought or did in their youth. In like 
manner one might say the same of a statesman when out 
of power. We find in the Reminiscences of Prince 
Bismarck a curious chapter treating of the future policy 
of Germany and of Russia, in which he says, among 
other things, that the absence of every immediate in- 
terest in all questions concerning the Near East is of 
great advantage to German policy, and that lit is in 
Germany's interests to remain at peace with all her 
neighbours. This may have been the Chancellor's 
opinion after he had been dismissed by William II., but 
he certainly did not hold it during his long years of 
intrigue in order to thrust Russia into difficulties in the 
Balkans or to sow dissension between her, Austria, 
France, England and all the other countries in Europe. 
Even if we could believe that it was his innocent desire 
to draw the Tsar into an intimate alliance with Ger- 
many, we have seen how he secretly encouraged Prince 
Alexander of Battenberg, and the ominous manner in 
which he told him that Bulgaria might become a useful 
counterbalance to Russian influence in the Balkans, a 
statement which certainly was not uttered without intent, 
for Bismarck always thought twice before saying any- 
thing. But even if, for the sake of argument, we admit 
that the Prince of Battenberg did not understand the 

281 



282 Germany under Three Emperors 

Chancellor, we find confirmation of the latter's sym- 
pathies with the cause of the enemies of Russia in the 
Near East in the Memoirs of Hohenlohe, who, on Sep- 
tember 6th, 1883, writes from Gastein : 

" Bismarck spoke to me about the Russian armaments, 
and added, ' they always say nice things, but they continue 
to arm, and have already got their troops ready and 
equipped on the frontier. Of what use to me are fine 
words when at the same time one keeps holding a loaded 
pistol at my breast? This kind of thing cannot go on. 
They may protest that these armaments concern Austria 
only, but we cannot allow Austria to be destroyed or 
even weakened. If we looked on without interfering or 
rendering assistance we should find ourselves after the 
war confronted with a triple alliance against us of Aus- 
tria, France and Russia.' It seems to me," continues 
Hohenlohe, "that Bismarck wants to extend our 
alliances still further. The presence of Bratiano, whom 
he has summoned to Gastein, seems to indicate that he 
is thinking about an alliance with Roumania. He is 
very much occupied with Bulgarian affairs, and it appears 
that Prince Alexander is now very much set against 
Russia, in which Bismarck encourages him. The Prince 
of Montenegro wants to take Herzegovina, and under- 
takes in that case to keep Albania in order and sub- 
missive to the Turks. Karageorgevitch wishes to become 
Prince of Bulgaria so as to get hold of Servia later on. 
That is the drift of Russian intrigue in the Balkans." 

Prince Hohenlohe certainly cannot be accused of in- 
venting these things. This admission of his confirms 
absolutely the confidences which poor Prince Alexander 
of Battenberg poured into my ear in Moscow in 1883, 
and is another proof of the interference of the German 




HMPEROR WILLIAM I 

IN 1884 



Bagdad on the Horizon 283 

Government in the various complications which made 
the Near East the scene of so many untoward and 
serious events all through the years which followed upon 
the Berlin Congress down to the breaking out of the 
present war. But it does not agree in the very least 
with Bismarck's assertions. Even at that time the 
various schemes which culminated in the building of the 
Bagdad Railway were on foot, and Baron von Holstein 
for one was working with all the energy of which he 
was possessed towards the supplanting of Russian in- 
fluence with that of Austria- Germany in the Balkan 
Peninsula. 

Undoubtedly it was in view of the various complica- 
tions which he determined to bring about in the event 
of their not developing unhelped that Germany, in the 
years which followed upon the conclusion of the Triple 
Alliance, did everything possible to strengthen her 
armaments. Bismarck well knew the security of the 
Empire depended upon the victorious issue of another 
war which he was determined should occur. After that 
he hoped to come forward as the apostle of a general 
disarmament of Europe. With Austria installed in the 
Balkans, a great Bulgaria ruled by a prince devoted to 
Germany, France deprived of a few more provinces, 
and Russia thrown back behind the Vistula, with her 
line of fortresses in Prussian hands — he never ceased 
working to make sure of victory — it would be relatively 
easy to talk about peace. Europe would then be entirely 
German, or, at least, under German influence, and 
German Kultur would rule the world. The scheme was 
a magnificent one, and perhaps had Bismarck lived long 
enough, and remained long enough in power, he might 
have accomplished it. 



284 Germany under Three Emperors 

It is just as well at this point to recall the remark 
of Bismarck after he had forced through the years from 
1871 to 1888 a series of enormous credits for increased 
armaments. More than once the Reichstag opposed 
the war-burden, but, as I attempt to show, Bismarck 
triumphed. 

The legend which Bismarck's worshippers have always 
tried to spread is that he was a partisan of peace all 
through the last years of his life and administration. But 
was he? In 1871 the military Budget of the German 
Empire was voted by the Reichstag for three years. In 
1874 and 1880 it was done for a far longer time, namely 
for seven years. The nation as well as the Reichstag 
was of opinion that this Budget represented a burden far 
too heavy for the financial resources of the country, and 
did not want to engage themselves again for such a con- 
siderable period. This was in 1887. Bismarck was 
advised that the parliamentary opposition to the proposals 
of the Government was very strong, and that it was just 
possible these might be rejected by the Reichstag. This 
electrified him and urged him to make one of the most 
famous speeches of his life, in which he publicly declared, 
for the first time — until then he had avoided expressing 
an opinion on the subject — that France was always think- 
ing of her lost provinces, and preparing for a desperate 
effort to regain their possession. 

But for once his eloquence failed to convince his 
listeners, and the Budget was only voted for a space of 
three years. A dissolution followed upon this attempt 
at independence on the part of the Imperial Parliament, 
and strong measures had to be resorted to in order to 
influence the elections and secure a majority willing to 
consent to the series of measures which the Government 



A Contemptible Phrase 285 

declared to be indispensable to the military security of 
the country. 

Just before the death of the Emperor William I. 
the Prussian War Office again applied for increased 
credits. The opposition of the Reichstag was crushed 
by Bismarck in the famous speech which contains the 
phrase, " We Germans fear God, but nothing else in 
the world." And then added scornful words that shook 
perhaps for the first time the complacency of the Tsar 
Alexander III. as to the pacific intentions of the Berlin 
Cabinet, "We are no longer anxious to be liked either 
in Russia or in France." This occurred on February 8th, 
1888. Exactly one month after that date the reign of 
William I. came to an end, and three months later there 
occurred in Petersburg an apparently trivial incident 
which proved more important than the people concerned 
in it could have imagined, and which had much to do 
with the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance. 

Before relating it, however, I must return once more 
to the subject of the Bismarckian intrigues in the Balkan 
Peninsula. The story of poor Prince Alexander of 
Battenberg had come to a sad ending. Bismarck de- 
clared that he deserved his fate and abandoned him, 
posing as the champion of Russian interests at Sofia and 
as the adversary of Battenberg, whose fault had been 
that he had obeyed Bismarck too well. But Alexander 
of Battenberg 's disappearance from the political scene 
was, in a certain sense, a check to German plans. The 
Tsar had seen through Germany's scheme, or at least 
looked upon it with suspicion, and considerable prudence 
was required in order to establish on a firm footing a 
Germanophile Sovereign at Sofia. 

The idea of placing Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg 



286 Germany under Three Emperors 

on the throne which Alexander of Battenberg had been 
compelled to abandon had not been at all agreeable to 
Bismarck. He did not care for the Coburg dynasty, 
whom he suspected of being too much under English 
influence ; he hated the Orleans family on account of 
their claims to the French throne, and the thought of 
a grandson of Louis Philippe becoming a Sovereign in 
his own right was extremely distasteful to him at first, 
and caused him to dispatch instructions to General von 
Schweinitz, the German Ambassador in Petersburg, in 
which he enjoined him to declare to M. de Giers, then 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Germany 
would go hand in hand with Russia and support the 
latter in regard to the Bulgarian question. This 
became known to Prince Ferdinand, but it did 
not impress him in the very least. He knew per- 
fectly well what he had to do, and also that his 
greatest difficulty consisted in conveying to the German 
Chancellor several things which he was perfectly well 
aware would considerably modify the latter 's ideas as 
to his (Prince Ferdinand's) individuality, and it is 
likely that but for a lucky chance he would not have 
contrived to do so, at least not immediately. The lucky 
chance came with a journey which Princess Clementine 
of Coburg, the clever mother of the newly elected Prince 
of Bulgaria, made to Italy about that time, where, as 
fate would have it, she met Baron von Holstein at 
Bologna. He was enjoying one of his rare holidays. 

He did not as a rule like to go away, because his ex- 
perience had taught him that the proverb, " Les absents 
ont toujours tort" is an exceedingly true one, and he 
hated to trust the secrets in which he dabbled to a sub- 
ordinate, whom, of course, it was impossible to initiate 



Ferdinand Succeeds Alexander 287 

entirely into the details of the various intrigues without 
which he could not live. It happened, however, that at 
times his overwrought nervous system imperatively 
claimed a rest, and then he would go away for a while 
without letting anyone know whither he was repairing ; 
and sometimes these holidays, so grudgingly and sparingly 
taken, gave him opportunities to learn many different 
things he could not have discovered at home. 

Holstein never allowed an opportunity to slip by. 
He therefore hastened to ask for an introduction to 
the Princess Clementine. In her way the old lady 
was as clever as the Baron, and she also managed to 
keep herself very well informed as to the social status 
of the people whom she admitted into her presence. 
She had heard a great deal about Holstein, and she did 
not attempt to hide from him the great pleasure it 
gave to her to meet him "at last." They had several 
interviews, after which Holstein returned to Berlin with 
very different opinions from when he had left it. 

Prince Ferdinand was elected, and, duly provided 
with the considerable sums of money which his mother 
put at his disposal, he embarked upon what the generality 
of his friends believed would be an adventure without 
a morrow. The Tsar had declared that he would never 
recognise him as Prince of Bulgaria, and the other Great 
Powers had also repudiated him. People wondered how 
he had plucked up sufficient courage to start for Sofia 
with such immense confidence in his own powers. Some 
suggested that most probably he had " strong protec- 
tions " somewhere, but the " where " remained shrouded 
in impenetrable darkness. 

On his arrival in his new dominions the present 
King of Bulgaria proved himself far shrewder and cleverer 



288 Germany under Three Emperors 

than anyone had imagined. Ferdinand did not attempt 
to conciliate conflicting interests. He meant all along 
to snatch Bulgaria frcm Russian influence, but he pro- 
ceeded to do so in quite a different manner from that 
of Alexander of Battenberg, perhaps because that 
whereas the latter had simply been given hints as to 
what would be profitable for him to do, his successor had 
received complete instructions as to the course of conduct 
likely to prove advantageous to him. 

The underground policy which Ferdinand of Coburg 
inaugurated from the very first day he set foot on Bul- 
garian soil had not escaped the notice of the Russian 
Government, and the Tsar Alexander III. conceived 
suspicions that the action of the Berlin Cabinet in 
regard to the Bulgarian question was not free from double 
dealing. 

He had, indeed, allowed some of his suspicions to 
become known, to the surprise of Prince Bismarck, who, 
so far, had not been informed by Holstein of the details 
of the latter's conversations at Bologna with the Princess 
Clementine of Orleans-Coburg. The Chancellor protested 
his good faith, and became very angry when he perceived 
that this was doubted. At that time he had not realised 
the formidable trump card which Ferdinand I. would 
prove in the difficult game which he was playing. Or 
rather which Holstein was playing together with him, as, 
for reasons of his own, the latter had thought it advisable 
to let matters take their course a little longer in order to 
bring them to a climax, after which there would be no 
drawing back for anyone. 

The first thing for Germany to do, in view of this 
distrust of the Tsar, was to lull his suspicions by proving 
to him that Germany was an innocent lamb, unjustly 



Russia and Bulgaria 289 

calumniated by its enemies in general, and by France 
in particular. Hoist ein calculated that if once Alexander 
III. became convinced that someone had wanted to make 
him quarrel with the German Government, by false repre- 
sentations to the latter 's intentions, he would no longer 
be easily led to fear that his plans in regard to the Near 
East might meet with a check or a rebuff. 

It was known that the Russian Sovereign had set 
his heart on the reinstatement of the regime in Bulgaria 
prior to the reign of Prince Alexander, and that he con- 
sidered the election of Prince Ferdinand in the light of 
a personal affront. Any intriguer, therefore, who de- 
signed to spoil the good relations between Russia and 
Germany would at once turn his attention to that Bul- 
garian question, which was in all respects like a barrel 
of gunpowder in the midst of the general European 
situation. If persuaded that he had been led astray by 
misrepresentations the Tsar would be the first to take 
in a friendly clasp the hand of the people who had been 
calumniated to him. Baron von Holstein therefore em- 
barked upon another complicated intrigue, the develop- 
ment of which was to provoke a nine days' wonder all 
over Europe. 

He had agents scattered everywhere, especially in 
France, where Baron Mohrenheim, who at that time was 
Russian Ambassador in Paris, was working with great 
perseverance towards the conclusion of a Franco-Russian 
alliance. Mohrenheim, most unfortunately, had been 
accused of dabbling in financial speculations which he 
would have done better to avoid, considering his official 
position. It is not for me to say whether the accusa- 
tions were justified or not. The fact remains that they 
had been common talk not only in the Paris Press and 

T 



290 Germany under Three Emperors 

in Parisian political circles, but also abroad. It may be 
that he was not sufficiently prudent in his relations with 
financial personages, who afterwards boasted quite openly 
of having advised him in regard to certain Stock Ex- 
change operations, absolutely honest and correct in them- 
selves, but which, of course, were supposed to have been 
based on information which he had been enabled to 
obtain through his official position. 

The Baron was a diplomat of the old school, with most 
polite manners and a considerable experience of Foreign 
Office routine. He was a persona grata at the Russian 
Court owing to a long sojourn at Copenhagen, where 
he had been admitted into the inner circle of the Royal 
family, and had known the present Dowager Empress 
of Russia when she was still a girl. 

Mohrenheim relied far too much on the secret police 
service which the Russian Government had established 
in Paris. Certain of these agents were afterwards dis- 
covered to be in the pay of the German Government, a 
fact of which the Russian authorities were blissfully 
ignorant, and which had a great deal to do with many 
of the complications that subsequently arose when the 
Franco-Russian alliance came to be seriously discussed. 
One of these agents one day brought to Baron Mohren- 
heim certain documents relating to the Bulgarian ques- 
tion, among others the copy of a so-called dispatch of 
Prince Reuss, the German Ambassador at Vienna, to 
Prince Ferdinand of Coburg, which, if it had been a 
genuine document, would have established beyond doubt 
the complicity of the Berlin Cabinet in the anti-Russian 
movement which was becoming every day more and 
more pronounced. 

The very style of composition should have put the 



A Forged Document 291 

Russian Ambassador upon his guard against this docu- 
ment, for his diplomatic experience ought to have made 
him detect certain expressions in it of which no homme 
de metier would have made use. In his delight, however, 
at having at length in his hands proof of the German in- 
trigues at Sofia, about which he had more than once 
spoken with his chiefs, and which, as he hoped and 
believed, would definitely incline the Tsar towards adopt- 
ing this plan of an understanding with the French 
Government, he failed to do so. He dispatched the 
precious documents for which, needless to say, he had 
paid a very handsome price, by special messenger to 
the Princess Waldemar of Denmark (nee Princess Marie 
of Orleans), the sister-in-law of Alexander III., with 
whom she was a great favourite, with the request that 
she would find a favourable moment to lay them before 
the Tsar. 

The Princess was completely deceived by the com- 
munication of Baron Mohrenheim, and she took the first 
opportunity that presented itself to execute the com- 
mission he had begged her to undertake. The famous 
letters were shown to the Russian Sovereign, and aroused 
his ire to such a degree that the interview which had 
been arranged between him and the old Emperor Wil- 
liam I. at Stettin was immediately cancelled. This caused 
an enormous sensation in Germany and considerably 
surprised Prince Bismarck, who had given himself a 
great deal of trouble to bring it about, the more 
so that he considered it in the light of a great event, 
the importance of which was further enhanced by the 
peculiar circumstances of the hour. The Crown Prince 
Frederick William was already suffering from the cancer 
to which he succumbed a few months later, whilst his 



292 Germany under Three Emperors 

father's age pointed to the probability of a change that 
would soon bring about drastic modifications in German 
political life. It was essential that cordial relations 
should be established between Alexander III. and the 
future German Emperor, and Bismarck was doing all 
he could think likely to secure them. It was, therefore, 
a matter of great mortification to him to find that at 
the eleventh hour all his work had come to nothing, and 
that the Tsar for some flimsy reason had excused him- 
self from meeting his great-uncle. Strenuous efforts 
were made to clear the horizon, in which it is said that 
the then Prince of Wales took part, Bismarck having 
appealed to him to try to put an end to the evident mis- 
understanding which had arisen. At last the Tsar was 
persuaded to take Berlin on his way home from Copen- 
hagen, where he had stayed rather longer than usual 
owing to illness in the family circle. It was not an 
easy matter; indeed, it was only upon the representa- 
tions of the then Queen of Denmark that, if he evaded 
staying for a few hours in Berlin, it would create a 
sort of scandal which would be doubly regrettable in 
presence of the misfortunes that had fallen on the 
German Imperial family through the hopeless illness of 
the Crown Prince. This personal argument decided 
him at last to pay his respects to his aged grand-uncle. 

When the matter had been settled, and then only, 
did Baron von Holstein seek the Chancellor and tell him 
what he had done. The first feeling of Bismarck was 
one of intense rage, then he very quickly saw the capital 
which could be made out of the devilish invention of his 
confederate, and quietly, and even with a certain satis- 
faction, awaited the arrival of Alexander III. in Berlin. 

The latter, of course, received the formidable Minister 



The Open Door 293 

a few hours after he had reached the German capital. 
The interview took place at the Russian Embassy, and 
the first thing which the Tsar did was to take out of 
his pocket the famous letters that Mohrenheim had sent 
to him and to show them to his visitor with the quiet 
request for an explanation. Bismarck glanced at the 
papers, and then just as quietly declared them to be for- 
geries, perpetrated for the evident purpose of disturbing 
the long friendship which had united the Romanoffs 
and the Hohenzollerns. The explanation which followed 
completely justified the anticipations of Baron von Hol- 
stein, and the Emperor of Russia was convinced that he 
had been fooled by a handful of intriguers. When he 
left Berlin he was not, perhaps, quite convinced of the 
sincerity of the assurances of friendship which had been 
lavished upon him, but he had been effectively persuaded 
that Prince Reuss had never written the incriminating 
letter supposed to have been addressed to Prince Fer- 
dinand of Coburg. 

Once more matters seemed to readjust themselves 
between Berlin and Petersburg. There were some 
people, however, who, though they were convinced that 
Baron Mohrenheim had fallen a victim of a clumsy 
though successful plot, did not believe in the denials 
which Bismarck had made with such pathos, and re- 
mained certain that he was continuing at Sofia, with 
more caution, perhaps, and also with more luck, the 
game he had been playing when Prince Alexander of 
Battenberg was there. It was quite evident to those 
who knew him that he would continue to foment anti- 
Russian intrigues in Bulgaria, if only because it was in 
his interest always to keep an open door in the emergency 
of some new complication in regard to the Balkan 



294 Germany under Three Emperors 

Peninsula. He had not concluded in vain the Treaty 
of alliance which bound his country with Austria, and 
it was more than likely that, sooner or later, he would 
seize an opportunity of provoking a conflict between 
the latter Power and Russia, of which the Eastern Ques- 
tion would furnish the excuse. 

In view of this inevitable solution to the ever-increas- 
ing Balkan difficulties it was necessary for Russia that 
she also should have some strong allies on whom she 
could rely for help at a given moment. Therefore a 
closer union between her and France became absolutely 
indispensable. The great difficulty was to bring it about, 
in view of the fact that M. de Giers, then in charge of 
the Foreign Office in Petersburg, had decidedly strong 
pro-German leanings, and had been working sedulously 
towards the establishment of better relations between 
the Russian and the German Courts, whilst everything 
relative to the French Republic was decidedly taboo to 
him, his strong monarchical convictions making him 
hate everything connected with demagogy, no matter in 
what shape or form. 

Now I come to the incident to which I referred at 
the beginning of this chapter, asking indulgence for 
introducing the personal element in it which, unfortu- 
nately, I cannot avoid. 

Among those in France who had been most ardently 
predisposed in favour of a Franco-Russian alliance was 
the famous Madame Juliette Adam, whose salon in Paris 
was such a great political centre during the years which 
followed immediately upon the establishment of the Re- 
public. Madame Adam was a woman of genius, whose 
conceptions were always sound and earnest, and whose 
views were far wider and far broader than those of 



Proofs of Duplicity 295 

many of the reputed statesmen of her time. She was 
a great friend of mine, and we had often discussed this 
question of an alliance between our two countries as 
the only means to check Teuton ambitions. Madame 
Adam had acquaintances among the Orleanist party, 
and in particular among the small circle of people who 
lived in the intimacy of the Princess Clementine of 
Coburg, the mother of Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 
and she had learned through them several things which 
had corroborated my suspicions engendered by my con- 
versation with Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and on 
the confidences which Baron von Holstein had made to 
my friend, and which the latter had repeated to me. 
We would both have liked to prove that the famous 
forged dispatches had been sent by an agent of the Baron 
to Mohrenheim, but this, of course, was not possible 
on the information we possessed. At length, however, 
Madame Adam became possessed of certain papers, not 
forgeries this time, which established clearly the double 
game played by Bismarck all through the years which 
had elapsed since the Congress of Berlin. The almost 
insurmountable difficulty then presented itself of bring- 
ing them under the eyes of the Tsar. It was most 
essential, in view of the changes about to take place in 
Germany, and of the well known aggressive feelings of 
the young man who would take his grandfather's place 
on the throne of the Hohenzollerns, to put Alexander III. 
upon his guard by making him acquainted with the 
papers which had come into the possession of Madame 
Adam. At that time — it was in April, 1888 — I was 
staying in Petersburg, whither I had been called by my 
father's last illness. Madame Adam wrote to me asking 
whether I could find a way of getting the papers to the 



296 Germany under Three Emperors 

Tsar. I discussed the matter with my old friend Count 
Ignatieff, but he was not in favour with his Sovereign, 
and any attempt he might have made in that direction 
would certainly not have been well received. In the 
meanwhile Madame Adam had sent the papers to Peters- 
burg through a lady whose name is rather well known, 
the beautiful Miss Maud Gonne. She brought part of 
them to me, whilst others were sent by a French Deputy, 
M. Lucien Millevoye, who, unfortunately, did not dis- 
play in this affair the tact he might have done, as will 
presently be shown. I read the papers, and found them 
conclusive in their evidence. They consisted mostly of 
correspondence exchanged between Prince Ferdinand 
of Coburg and German agents. But the difficulty re- 
mained as to what could be done with them. I at last 
had the inspiration of taking them to M. Pobedonostseff, 
at that time Procurator of the Holy Synod, and perhaps 
the most influential man in Russia, and of asking him 
what he thought about them, and whether he would be 
disposed to help us in the matter. M. Pobedonostseff 
read the documents, and immediately told me that he 
would himself lay them before the Emperor. 

The awkward part of the story was to follow. 
Pobedonostseff wished to see M. Lucien Millevoye. I 
did not know at the time that he was an active partisan 
of General Boulanger, then at the height of his glory 
and fame, and that, in accepting the mission with which 
Madame Adam had entrusted him, he had pursued 
another aim about which he had told her nothing, be- 
cause if he had she would certainly have chosen another 
messenger. He had come to Petersburg with certain 
propositions emanating from the General himself, which 
he developed to M. Pobedonostseff, thereby raising the 



Undeceiving the Tsar 297 

latter 's suspicions and fears of becoming entangled in 
an intrigue which was hopeless from the very outset. It 
was this fact which prevented M. Millevoye from seeing 
the Emperor, which he would surely have done under 
different circumstances. Later on M. de Giers came 
to see me at the Hotel d' Europe where I was staying, 
and we had a long conversation concerning the papers 
which had been transmitted to the Tsar, about which he 
was very interested, whilst wondering how they had 
reached the hands of Madame Adam. 

I have related the story exactly as it occurred, and 
would not have done so had it not been that almost all 
the personages concerned in it are alive, and that Juliette 
Adam, Miss Maud Gonne, and Lucien Millevoye can all 
three of them testify that the incident took place exactly 
as I have narrated it. Whether it had anything to do 
with the sending of the Russian fleet to Toulon, the visit 
of the French fleet to Cronstadt, and the subsequent 
understanding between the Republic and the Tsar's 
Government it is impossible for me to say or to express 
an opinion upon, but it is a fact that after the docu- 
ments sent to me by Madame Adam were placed in the 
possession of the Procurator, the Franco-Russian rela- 
tions improved until they ripened into the alliance which 
Great Britain joined for the general benefit of all the 
parties concerned. 

Looking back upon the only political intrigue in 
which I have ever taken part, I cannot regret the share 
I had in it, feeling convinced that I rendered a service 
to my country and to the cause of civilisation in general 
by helping to denounce the undercurrent of German 
politics. 

The curious side to this story can be found in the 



298 Germany under Three Emperors 

Memoirs of Hohenlohe (which always help one to un- 
derstand the complicated political system followed by 
Bismarck and the secret service machinery organised by 
Baron von Holstein). On May 25th, 1888, during the 
last days of the life of the Emperor Frederick, and a few 
weeks after Madame Adam had sent the letters to Peters- 
burg, the Prince refers to a conversation which he had 
on that same day with the then Crown Prince and 
present German Emperor, during which the latter men- 
tioned the forged documents sent to Alexander III. at 
Copenhagen, and added that they had been fabricated 
by Mohrenheim and Ignatieif . The latter, who disliked 
Mohrenheim, had most certainly nothing to do with the 
papers that Baron von Holstein had caused to be trans- 
mitted to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, but, as I 
have related, he had been involved through my having 
consulted him in the matter of the papers brought to 
Russia by the friends of Madame Adam. It is probable 
that one or other of the innumerable secret agents of 
the Intelligence Bureau of the Wilhelmstrasse had an 
inkling that something had been going on in which Igna- 
tieff had been concerned, and in the reports which had 
been made to the then Crown Prince by Bismarck the 
names of the two statesmen had been mixed up inten- 
tionally, probably in order to represent as a Panslavist 
intrigue the two distinct incidents of the false and 
genuine documents which had reached Alexander III. 



CHAPTER XXIII 
Behind the Veil of Intrigue 

IT was in the course of the year 1887, when Prince 
Ferdinand of Coburg was elected to the Bulgarian 
throne, that German intrigues in the Balkans began to 
assume a more active form. By that time the old 
Emperor William, whose ninetieth year had struck, had 
ceased to be more than a figurehead in the government 
of the German Empire. His son and successor was 
struggling against the attacks of the disease to which he 
was to succumb a few months after his father's death. 
Prince William of Prussia, the Kaiser of to-day, was 
not yet able to assert himself as he would have liked to 
do. The eyes of Europe turned, therefore, to Germany 
in anxiety as to what would be its course in the near 
future. Bismarck was directing affairs, but no longer 
the Bismarck of 1866 and 1870. The ponderous, clever 
politician had given place to an irritable, nervous old 
man, with an autocratic temper which he did not even 
attempt to restrain, and a tyrannical disposition from 
which not only his immediate subordinates, but also 
perfect strangers who displeased him suffered. He had 
fallen under the influence of Baron von Holstein, who 
was now the real master of the situation. People abroad 
were so obsessed with the great central figure of Bis- 
marck that they failed to observe that this redoubtable 
personage had, in the course of time, reduced politics 
to a personal equation. It is an undeniable fact that 

299 



300 Germany under Three Emperors 

towards the end of his career the German Chancellor 
became a tyrant; that the only matter which engrossed 
his attention was the success of his own schemes, inde- 
pendent of everything else. At times, it is true, he 
still showed himself interested in big questions of State, 
and to the end he was concerned over the possible danger 
of a Franco-Russian alliance ; but the great thing which 
absorbed his attention, to the detriment of everything 
else, was the continuance of his own tyrannical sway, not 
only on the politics of Germany, but also on German 
society, on the Press, and even on the members of the 
reigning dynasty. For many years he had at regular 
intervals played with the weapon of his resignation, with 
which he had threatened the old Emperor whenever he 
was crossed or some objection raised to something which 
he had proposed, certain that this would bring his aged 
Master to what he called " reason," and make him yield 
to his Minister even at the expense of his personal 
feelings and opinions. But after the illness of the heir 
to the throne had assumed a threatening aspect Bismarck 
no longer spoke of retiring from the position he had 
occupied for so long a time ; but, on the contrary, he 
applied himself to win the good graces of the young 
Prince who, in all probability, would soon occupy the 
throne of his grandfather, and thus secure for himself a 
longer tenure of power. He feared more than ever any 
adverse influences that might represent him as having 
outlived his time. 

It was this dread of having to resign that, more than 
anything else, induced him to foment trouble abroad, 
which he imagined and expected would require his 
presence at the head of affairs so imperatively that even 
a new Sovereign anxious to rule alone would not find 



A Talkative Empress 301 

courage to dispense with his services. He professed to 
be nervous in regard to French "intrigues" in Alsace- 
Lorraine. They only existed in his imagination, but he 
persisted in representing them as fraught with terrible 
peril for the security of the German Empire. His irrita- 
bility, too, increased in a remarkable degree, and to this 
Holstein contributed by the continual tales which he 
used to bring him of the sayings and doings of people 
whom he considered, rightly or wrongly, as his enemies, 
and who on their part were imprudent enough not to 
hide their feelings towards him. Such, for instance, was 
the case with the Empress Augusta, who, generally so 
dignified in all her actions, lost her equanimity wher- 
ever the Chancellor was concerned, and showed her 
want of tact by speaking openly of his many peculiari- 
ties. This, of course, was immediately reported to Bis- 
marck, very often by the people with whom she had 
conversed. A case in point was when she received the 
then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Wadding- 
ton, and asked him, when he went to Berlin in 1878 as 
a member of the Congress, whether Bismarck had been 
in a good temper, adding that when he had "nerves" 
he was simply impossible. The Chancellor immediately 
became acquainted with these remarks of the Empress 
and was infuriated, this time it must be confessed not 
without reason, for Augusta certainly would have done 
better not to have spoken about her husband's Prime 
Minister with a member of the French Cabinet. She 
always called Bismarck "le grand homme" when she 
had occasion to mention him. 

An interesting incident relative to this once occurred 
in my presence. It was on one of the rare occasions 
when the Chancellor had condescended to attend a 



302 Germany under Three Emperors 

festivity of some kind or other at the Imperial Palace. 
A lady, who was rather well known for her sharp tongue, 
was talking with a foreign diplomat when the Chancellor 
suddenly entered the room by a door which was close 
to the spot where they stood. The diplomat, who, it 
must be remarked, was a persona grata with the Empress, 
observed to his companion sotto voce, " Here comes the 
great man." Bismarck overheard the remark and walked 
furiously up to the culprit and asked him, " Of whom 
are you speaking? Are the words 'great man' to be 
considered as applying to myself? If so, I must tell 
you that I think it most unseemly for a foreign diplomat 
to make fun of the Foreign Minister of the Court to 
which he is accredited." The unfortunate young man 
on being thus snubbed in public nearly collapsed. The 
lady, however, did not in the least lose her presence 
of mind, but, turning to Bismarck, coolly said, " The 
words which you have overheard, Prince, could not by 
any possibility apply to yourself, because no really great 
man could have behaved as you have just done." For 
once the Chancellor was nonplussed, but if he could have 
killed the woman who had administered this well-deserved 
rebuff there is no doubt that he would have done so with 
the greatest of pleasure. 

Women in general were braver than men with Prince 
Bismarck, perhaps because they felt safer from punish- 
ment, in which they were vastly mistaken, for the Chan- 
cellor could be just as ferocious with the fair sex as he 
invariably was with men. He was far too much of a 
Prussian ever to be merciful, and in his adversaries he 
saw only the enemy to be destroyed and not spared, 
even occasionally as a matter of policy, such as after 
Sadowa had led him to oppose the General Staff and 



Holstein and the Press 303 

King William I. when they insisted on marching upon 
Vienna. 

Baron von Holstein, who was more closely acquainted 
with the temperament of the Chancellor than anyone 
else, played upon this side of it with all the skill of which 
he was capable, and often, indeed, took advantage of it 
when he had a personal score to wipe off. Holstein was a 
perfect artist in all matters of revenge, and the manner 
in which he handled the Press, for instance, was abso- 
lutely marvellous. It was not in vain that this Press — 
the principal organs of which were the semi-Govern- 
mental Post, the Gazette of Cologne, and a few other 
papers entirely devoted to the interests of the Govern- 
ment, from whom they received most generous sub- 
ventions — was called the " Reptile Press," because 
anything more venomous than the articles which Hol- 
stein inspired has never been known in the annals of 
journalism. His manner of working in this direction was 
in this wise. The editors of most of the principal organs 
of the German Press, or their representatives in Berlin, 
generally visited the Foreign Office every morning in 
search of news. The Baron always received them in the 
most amiable manner possible. He would talk with 
them about the weather and then proceed to refer to 
politics, in general touching upon different subjects 
which, he remarked, might be considered from different 
points of view. Whenever any political complication 
was looming on the horizon, he generally represented it 
as being of no importance, but added that there might 
be some patriotic men who would judge them in such 
and such a manner, which, of course, might or might 
not be the correct one. This, as a rule, was sufficient, 
«nd the people to whom he addressed himself took the 



304 Germany under Three Emperors 

hint, and the next morning, or a few days later, one 
could read a virulent attack on the political party or the 
foreign country whose doings had been thus brought to 
the attention of the Press by Holstein. In the rare cases 
when they had not understood what he had meant to 
convey to them a swift punishment overtook the papers 
to which they belonged by a loss of advertisements which 
threatened their very existence, for, as a rule, these were 
covered by the secret funds at the disposal of the Baron, 
who was far too shrewd to pay in cash or an official sub- 
vention the services he demanded from the Press. He 
was essentially un homme de fagade, and wanted to be 
able to deny with an apparently clear conscience any 
accusation of inspiring the Bismarckian newspapers. 
When these did their duty they were overwhelmed with 
advertisements from all kinds of small trading concerns, 
who seemed to have an unlimited amount of money at 
their disposal wherewith to announce the excellence of 
their wares, which, nevertheless, they sold but scantily. 
This stream of prosperity flowed steadily until transgres- 
sion occurred of certain unwritten laws as cevere and 
unbending as those of the Medes and Persians, when it 
suddenly ran dry, and was cut off until such time as it 
pleased the great Manitou of the Wilhelmstrasse, Baron 
von Holstein, to renew it. 

Now this Press had become more and more aggressive 
in tone as time had passed, encouraged doubtless by 
Bismarck's rabid anti-French and anti-Russian attitude. 
The Chancellor propounded a series of measures, totally 
unjustified, destined to add to the already unenviable lot 
of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, among the prin- 
cipal of which was the question of passports, which he 
contrived to make the unfortunate Emperor Frederick 




KMPKROR FRHDKK1CK Hi. 



Eager for War 305 

III. endorse, much against the latter 's will, and which 
Prince Hohenlohe tried in vain to oppose. The Chan- 
cellor seemed determined to excite the anger of France 
by every means in his power, and to sow distrust in its 
mind against Germany. The rapidly approaching end 
of the Emperor, and the grave condition of Frederick, 
were but minor considerations to which his mind gave 
no attention. His sole desire was to bring matters to a 
climax in regard to foreign politics, so as to be enabled 
to strike a blow strong enough to shatter for ever that 
troublesome fear of a coalition of Europe against the 
German Empire. 

It is curious and very significant of the state of moral 
unscrupulousness which the efforts of the Chancellor had 
succeeded in imposing not only upon his country, but 
in a certain sense upon the whole of Europe, that the 
people in whom he had the greatest confidence, such as 
the Baron von Holstein and the banker Bleichroder, were 
those whom he had made the most impatient, and who 
judged him the most severely. The latter — who was 
supposed to be more than anyone else in Berlin in "the 
secret of the gods" — after the death of William I. and 
during the short reign of his unfortunate successor, spoke 
quite openly of Bismarck's political vagaries, and owned to 
Hohenlohe during a conversation on May 26th, 1888, 
that he no longer understood the policy that was being 
carried on at the Wilhelmstrasse. He could not see why 
France was continually being threatened when she had 
the unanimous desire to live on good terms with Ger- 
many. The same remark could be applied to Russia. 
There the continual unpleasantnesses had the result of 
depreciating the value of the rouble, thus allowing Russia 
to send her goods to Germany with considerable profit. 



306 Germany under Three Emperors 

As soon as the rouble increased in value, then Russia 
would have no advantage whatever in exporting her 
produce. 

Bleichroder was of opinion that Bismarck wished at 
all costs to remain in power and to secure himself with 
the future Emperor, at that time still the Crown Prince 
William. There had been a time when he had told the 
Crown Prince that he would stay at his side only on con- 
dition that war should not be declared on any nation, but 
at present, remarked Bleichroder, he would do so even at 
the cost of a European war. His continuous efforts to 
provoke a conflict with France were nothing but a con- 
cession to the warlike proclivities of the future Emperor 
and of his military advisers. 

Herbert Bismarck, too, had a good deal to do with 
the aggressive tendencies which has father displayed. 
The old Prince, in spite of his mercilessness and utter 
unscrupulousness, had one soft spot in his iron character, 
and that was love for his eldest son, whose defects he 
never perceived, and whom he would have liked to become 
his successor. The Grand Duke of Baden's remark, 
when the Emperor William II. dismissed his grand- 
father's adviser and great Minister, that the question 
was one as to which dynasty should govern the German 
Empire — that of the Hohenzollerns or of the Bismarcks, 
was not such a paradox as it seems at first sight. It is 
certain that Herbert believed himself to be capable of 
continuing the work of his father, and that the latter, in 
his blind affection for his son, was convinced of it. There 
was a time when Herbert exercised a considerable in- 
fluence over the mind of the present Emperor. This was 
during the last winter of the life of William I., when it 
was still a question as to who should die first : the aged 



William II. 307 

Sovereign bowed down with the weight of his ninety-one 
years, or his son smitten by a disease for which no science 
has so far found a remedy. Herbert Bismarck toadied 
to William, the heir to the Crown of United Germany, 
tried to ingratiate himself into his favour by appealing to 
his worst instincts and by flattering the most distressing 
defects of his character. 

The Chancellor, whose experience of mankind and 
of the human heart ought to have rendered him more 
sceptical, was entirely deceived as to the real character 
of the young man in whom he had hoped to find a 
submissive instrument of his own will and schemes. 
William II. had seemed to be as wax in the powerful 
hands of Bismarck and his son Herbert, who especially 
had deluded himself into the firm conviction that his 
future Sovereign would simply place into the hands of 
the Bismarck family all the burden which fate had laid 
upon his shoulders, contenting himself with the pomp 
and advantages of his exalted position, not troubling as 
to what would happen to his realm. 

This was the more surprising in view of the fact that, 
so far back as the year of his marriage with the Princess 
Augusta Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein, Prince William 
had acquired the reputation of being a young man abso- 
lutely devoid of scruples, and who, to quote the words 
of Prince von Hohenlohe, was always in conflict with 
his father and feared by his own mother. This might 
have given Bismarck good grounds for going carefully 
with him, but he fully believed himself capable of retain- 
ing absolute control of the youth by impressing him with 
the sense of his own importance, thus thinking to ensure 
his sway. The calculation proved an entirely erroneous 
one, but this was to take Bismarck some time to discover. 



308 Germany under Three Emperors 

In the meantime the Chancellor was steadily working 
towards the furthering of his ambitious plans in relation 
to the European political situation generally. He, who 
had declared that he would not sacrifice the bones of a 
single Prussian grenadier on the altar of the Eastern 
Question, was beginning that interference in Turkish and 
Balkan affairs which Germany continued to exercise for 
so many years. As far back as 1880 — that is, at the time 
when he still hoped that Prince Alexander of Battenberg 
would be able to maintain himself at Sofia — Bismarck 
had secured for Germany a predominant position at Con- 
stantinople by inducing the Sultan to entrust to German 
officers the education of his troops. This had intensely 
displeased the then Crown Prince, Frederick William, 
who feared that their presence in Turkey might lead 
to their services being employed against the signatory 
Powers of the Treaty of Berlin in the Balkan Peninsula, 
and he had requested Hohenlohe, then Ambassador 
in Paris, who was about to go to Varzin on one of his 
periodic visits to Bismarck, to acquaint the latter 
with his apprehensions on the subject. The Prince 
immediately replied that he could not share them in the 
very least, and, on the contrary, that he considered the 
dispatch of this military mission as likely to prove of 
great advantage to the interests of the German Empire. 
For one thing, it would give the officers sent to Con- 
stantinople an opportunity to prove what they were really 
worth, and it would also enable the German Foreign 
Office to obtain trustworthy reports as to what was going 
on in Turkey, which it would be quite impossible to obtain 
otherwise. Then again, the influence Germany would 
thus acquire in Turkey might prove of inestimable value 
later on. The question as to what Turkey would do 



Germany and Turkey 309 

with these officers, and whether their going there would 
be acceptable or pleasant to the other European Powers, 
ought not to influence Germany in the very least, be- 
cause its policy had but one aim — the furtherance of 
German interests. It might, one day, be of advantage 
to Germany to have Turkey as a friend, and while Turkey 
could never become dangerous for Germany, circum- 
stances might very easily occur when her enemies would 
also be those of Germany, and this contingency ought 
never to be lost sight of in any plans one might make 
for the future. History, indeed, has proved the import- 
ance, in European politics, of the Near East. 

My friend once asked Holstein why he did not try 
to smooth down the difficulties in regard to Bismarck, and 
induce him to look at things and people with less 
antagonism and more indulgence. "Why should I do 
so?" retorted the Baron. "Things cannot go on as 
they are. So long as the Emperor is alive it is easy for 
Bismarck to do what he likes ; but do you really suppose 
that a young man impatient to reign and to have his 
own way in everything will resign himself to be a mere 
puppet in the hands of his Prime Minister? And do 
you seriously think that Bismarck will ever agree to 
consult someone else after twenty-five years of uninter- 
rupted power, especially when that one is a mere child 
in experience ? No ! a rupture is almost unavoidable, 
and Bismarck will not triumph. It is therefore far better 
to make the inevitable more acceptable to public opinion 
than it would be otherwise, by allowing the world to 
see that Bismarck has become unbearable. The more 
general this knowledge, the easier it will be for the 
Emperor to dispense with his services. It will have to 
come to that, whether he likes it or not ; I always submit 



310 Germany under Three Emperors 

to inevitable facts, and only try to tone down as much 
as possible their unpleasantness." 

"But you mean to stick to your guns, no matter 
what happens?" inquired my friend. 

"Most certainly," was Holstein's emphatic reply, 
given with that enigmatical smile of his that meant so 
much or so little. 

"You see, my dear friend," he went on after a few 
moments' silence, "Bismarck has outlived himself. He 
has had the rare luck to bring to a finish the work he 
had set himself to perform, and it would have been 
infinitely better for his reputation in history if he had 
died immediately after the German Empire had become 
a reality. In the eighteen years which have passed since 
the French war he has made the mistake of thinking 
that a nation can be governed in the same way in peace 
as in war. He may impose his opinions on his audience 
while he is addressing them, but the convictions of his 
hearers fade as reason takes the place of enthusiasm. 
And then he clings too much to office, not on his own 
account, but for the sake of his son. Without Herbert 
the Prince would have been endurable, but Herbert has 
contrived to shake his father's power. Whenever he 
wishes to do something on his own initiative, Herbert 
interferes, not only because he fails to understand, but 
because the plans do not suit his own mercenary views. 
You can have no idea of the kind of buying and selling 
and speculation which goes on here," and Holstein 
waved his hand in the direction of the room sacred to 
the Under-Secretary of State. "He studies far more 
the daily quotations of the various Stock Exchanges of 
the world than the map of Europe. All he cares for is 
money, and he would not hesitate for one single instant 



Politics and Finance 311 

to plunge his country in the throes of war if he could 
by doing so add to his ill-gotten millions. Bleichroder 
could tell you many a story I should not care to repeat. 
Only remember that the raison d'etre of the newspaper 
campaign which is started now and then without any 
apparent cause is generally to be found in the fact that 
the younger Bismarck's account is overloaded with some 
stock or other which he desires to get rid of. Bleichroder 
himself has been making too much money owing to the 
close touch in which he stood to our Foreign Office to 
say anything, but he is beginning to get tired of this 
kind of thing, besides being far too shrewd not to know 
that the moment the old Emperor closes his eyes there 
will be found plenty of people to acquaint his successor 
with what is going on in the Bismarck family circle. 
And then . . . then . . . there will be the devil to 
pay. For the present Prince William requires the help 
of Bismarck because he is frightened at the thought of 
what his position will be when his father ascends the 
throne, even if he occupies it but for a short time. But 
when he is the master I doubt whether he will consent to 
be treated like a child by his Prime -Minister, or rather 
by the latter's son, because this is what it amounts to. 
The Chancellor thinks that he can make his place heredi- 
tary in his family," added Holstein, who thus anticipated 
the words which the Grand Duke of Baden was to use 
later on — ' ' and you surely cannot think that an enter- 
prising and energetic Sovereign mil ever consent to such 
a dynasty rivalling his own?" 

My friend listened aghast to this declaration of a 
man whom he had always known to be unscrupulous, 
but whom he had believed to be at least grateful to the 
statesman to whom he owed his career. Holstein, 



312 Germany under Three Emperors 

however, in his own way, was just as eager for power as 
Bismarck, but in justice to him it must be said he was 
not greedy from the monetary point of view. He loved 
intrigue far better than money, and the only thing which 
might have affected him would have been the thought 
of having to retire into private life with his chief. His 
efforts were therefore directed to the task of impressing 
all those on whose good will he directly or indirectly 
depended that he had nothing to do with certain actions 
of his great chief. 

The death of William I. would sound the knell of 
the omnipotence exercised by his Chancellor. This out- 
burst on the part of Holstein explains the aggressiveness 
of the German Press, and why the widespread opinion 
that another war was imminent was not denied by the 
Secretary of State. In 1887 war was in the thoughts 
of everybody, and was even wished for by a good many. 
The military party clamoured for it because it believed 
that the spirit of the German Army required to be main- 
tained, and that could only be done by active service. 
The nation was in favour of it because it was beginning 
to feel the burden of the terrific and ever-increasing 
armaments. The Socialists looked upon it as a sad 
necessity, but hoped that certain reforms which they 
claimed would have a better chance afterwards. The 
Emperor's grandson was most eager for it, as his ambi- 
tions led him to envy the reputation and the laurels of 
Frederick the Great, to whom some of his flatterers 
and admirers had compared him. Financial people saw 
in a war the means to extend their influence. Herbert 
Bismarck looked forward to it as the possibility to make 
milliards of the millions which he had already amassed. 
The only persons who were against it, and who would 



Portents of Trouble 313 

never have allowed it to break out had they been spared, 
were the aged Sovereign and his son. Both of them 
were about to die, and in disappearing to leave a free 
field to the activity of their successor. Unfortunately 
for the peace of the world, William II. was to take 
up anew the sword which he had snatched out of Bis- 
marck's hand, and to continue the policy of lies, deceit, 
unscrupulousness and ruthless cruelty. 



Part IV 
William II. in Power 



CHAPTER XXIV 
Last Days and First Days 

JANUARY 1st, 1888, was the first day of a year which 
was to bring about a complete change not only in 
the history of Germany, but also in that of Prince Bis- 
marck. Had circumstances been different, and the Em- 
peror Frederick III. still been a strong and healthy 
man, the Chancellor would not have felt any misgivings 
as to what would happen after the death of William I. 
In spite of the difference in views which had existed 
between the Crown Prince and his father's Minister, yet 
the relations of the two men had remained cordial, and 
the former was far too conscious of all that his dynasty 
owed to the latter. The heir to the German throne, like 
all the Hohenzollerns, was grateful by nature, and his 
Imperialist ideas and tendencies had been gratified by the 
energy with which the Chancellor had worked towards 
the building of this new Empire, for which he 
cared more, perhaps, than for the old Prussia that had 
been the cradle of his race, different in this from Wil- 
liam I., who was far prouder of his title of King of the 
old Realm to which he had succeeded than of that of 
Emperor. Both Frederick and the Crown Princess were 
fully conscious of the fact that the small kingdom which 
had been looked upon with scorn by so many people 
had become a great and powerful monarchy, and that it 
was to Bismarck it had owed this transformation. 

Frederick William? therefore, had quite made up his 

3i7 



318 Germany under Three Emperors 

mind that though he would not obey his Prime Minister 
blindly he would not part from him when he ascended 
the throne, and he had told Bismarck so more than 
once. The great statesman did not, in consequence, 
feel any anxiety at the idea of a change of reign. Ever 
since the war of 1870 with France the future Emperor 
Frederick had nursed one great idea, and that was to 
try to bring about a general if not total disarmament, 
or, at least, a considerable reduction in the military forces 
of Europe. Had a longer life been granted to him, it 
is probable that he would have attempted it together 
with Nicholas II. of Russia, who took the same initiative 
during the first years of his reign, and most probably 
the combined efforts of these two Sovereigns might have 
brought about such a result and allowed the influence 
of the Hague Conference to be something more than 
it is. Bismarck knew very well that the Crown Prince 
had got an idea of the kind, but he did not view it with 
such an antagonism as might have been supposed. He 
was far too clever not to realise that it would be impos- 
sible in the long run to go on increasing the armaments 
of the whole of Europe on the scale that had been done 
for years without its culminating one day in a catastrophe 
such as the world had never yet seen, which might com- 
promise, and perhaps even destroy, the great work it 
had taken the best years of his life to accomplish. Before 
things came to such a pass an effort might well be made 
to try to stem the torrent, which otherwise might sweep 
everything down before it, and to do something to compel 
the world to put an end to the ever-increasing spirit of 
militarism which was fast becoming a formidable danger 
to the whole of humanity. Bismarck, indeed, though he 
showed himself so warlike during the last years of his 



The Army First 3 X 9 

administration, once told Baron von Holstein that it 
might have been desirable to enter into the peaceful 
schemes of the Emperor Frederick had the latter lived. 
But whilst the old Emperor had been at the head of the 
State the army always remained the first consideration. 
His grandson shared his opinions on that subject, and 
added to them the impetuosity and impatience of youth, 
on account of which Bismarck would have preferred that 
the course of nature should prevent William II. from 
ascending the throne for a few years longer. But when 
circumstances had shown that his inheritance was only a 
question of months, the Chancellor had immediately 
applied himself to the task of trying to assume the direc- 
tion of the younger William's mind, a thing that was 
easier said than done, considering the character of the 
young Prince. 

All this worried Bismarck, and, indeed, had worried 
him for a longer time than people had guessed or sus- 
pected. Brutal as he was, he had sometimes exclaimed 
that the old Emperor was outliving himself, and that 
it would have been better for the country if he had closed 
his eyes sooner than proved ultimately the case. The 
fact was that as Holstein told his friend and confidant, 
the Chancellor considered it would have been of advan- 
tage to the course of affairs in general if the Crown Prince 
Frederick had become Sovereign whilst his eldest son was 
still a boy, or at least relatively young enough to be kept 
in a position of complete subordination in regard to 
his parents. Bismarck knew that Frederick William 
would not interfere with him; he did not feel quite so 
certain as to that point in regard to the son. 

The relations between Prince William of Prussia and 
Bismarck were not at all so intimate as people imagined. 



320 Germany under Three Emperors 

It had been in the interest of both of them to foster 
among the public the opinion that they looked up to 
one another, and were determined always to act in 
perfect accord. But the Prince, who all through his life 
had played a double game, had only nattered Bismarck, 
and tried to insinuate himself into his good graces and 
favour, because he required to have somebody on his 
side on whom he could rely in the difficult months which 
would follow on the demise of the old Emperor. That 
that period would need much skill to negotiate the grand- 
son of William I. did not doubt for an instant. But, at 
the same time, he fully meant to keep the independence of 
his own opinions, and never allow the Chancellor to for- 
get with whom he had to deal. Bismarck, on his side, 
did not feel as enthusiastic concerning this pupil of his 
— the future William II. liked so to call himself — as he 
pretended was the case. 

Notwithstanding these pretensions, there were some 
people who suspected that this great friendship, about 
which such fuss was being made, was nothing else but 
bluff. Prince Hohenlohe narrates in his Memoirs that 
when the news of the last illness of the old Emperor 
reached him at Strasburg he went to tell his secretary, 
Herr Heuduck. " I was sure until now that Prince 
William is entirely in accord with Bismarck,' ' writes 
Hohenlohe, " but Heuduck, though he agreed with me 
in a general way, told me that there were some signs 
which pointed to the likelihood that the Prince, when 
once he became Emperor, would not be able long to bear 
with Bismarck. It seems that there exist some Con- 
servative elements at enmity with Bismarck which might 
easily overturn him. This would be most unpleasant. 
Prince William, as it is, is not popular in Germany, and 



The Royal Prerogative 321 

will have to be very careful if he wants to win public 
opinion to his side." 

According to Holstein, who differed in this from the 
generally accepted version, there occurred far fewer 
complications in the relations between the Emperor 
Frederick III. and Bismarck than is commonly supposed. 
In spite of the callousness of the latter, he felt sorry for 
the Sovereign stricken in the full strength of his man- 
hood, and enduring with a patient and silent heroism the 
tortures of a lingering and most painful death, the in- 
evitability of which he was fully aware. The most serious 
conflict of his short reign with the Chancellor occurred 
on the occasion of the prolongation of the term of the 
legislature in the Reichstag, as well as in the Prussian 
Landtag, from three years to five, that had already been 
decided before the death of William I. 

Frederick did not care for it, but after his attention 
had been drawn by his Minister to the particular circum- 
stances inherent to the German Constitution, which did 
not allow the Emperor the privilege of vetoing the 
decisions of the Reichstag, when they agreed with those 
of the Bundesrath, where he only possessed one voice as 
King of Prussia, he immediately granted the signature 
which was required from him. But in regard to the 
Prussian Landtag he inquired from Bismarck what was 
the point of view of the Prussian Constitution concerning 
his rights, and upon hearing that the King as well as each 
of the two Chambers was at liberty to accept or to refuse 
his sanction to any legislative Bill, he reserved his 
decision. A few days later, on May 27th, he sent back 
of his own accord to Bismarck the definite text of the 
Bill duly signed as well as approved by him. 

The other cause of conflict, which, however, never 
v 



322 Germany under Three Emperors 

assumed the proportions accredited to it by the public, 
arose in consequence of the proposed betrothal of the 
Princess Victoria of Prussia with Prince Alexander of 
Battenberg after his relinquishment of the Bulgarian 
throne. The engagement had met with the sympathies 
of the Empress Frederick, who always favoured marriages 
of affection, and who was anxious for her daughter to 
make one. For years the young Princess had been in 
love with the handsome Prince Alexander, but so long 
as her grandfather had been alive the thing had been out 
of the question, as William I. was violently opposed to 
the idea. After his death, however, the Empress Vic- 
toria brought forward the question once more, and tried 
to push it through against her husband's better judg- 
ment. The Emperor Frederick was antagonistic to the 
scheme, first, because in his heart he did not think the 
Battenbergs good enough to marry a Princess of Prussia, 
and, secondly, he feared complications with Russia as 
a consequence of the marriage. His daughter's tears, 
however, shook his resolution, and he might even in time 
have been induced to consent if Bismarck had not 
appeared upon the scene. He tried to enlist on his side 
the sympathies of Queen Victoria, to whom he explained 
during the audience which she granted to him at Char- 
lottenburg the various reasons which rendered such a 
marriage highly unacceptable for all concerned. Finally 
the thing fell through, after having caused much stir 
among the public. 

It is an interesting and remarkable psychological side- 
light upon the sentiments of Frederick III. that this 
incident did not affect the dying Emperor half so much 
as did the Puttkamer incident, which threw such a shade 
of trouble on the last days of his short reign. 



The Puttkamer Affair 323 

This Puttkamer affair arose out of the interference of 
the Minister of that name in the elections, where he was 
over-zealous in pushing forward, by all kinds of devices, 
the governmental candidates, and to defeat those belong- 
ing to the Opposition parties. The Emperor was incensed, 
and wrote personally to von Puttkamer requesting him 
to hand over his resignation, which was done. Prince 
Bismarck, though he had provoked the conflict, as he 
had long wished to get rid of a colleague he had more 
than once found in his way, yet contrived, as the Empress 
Victoria reproached him with later on, to throw upon 
the dying Frederick all the odium of this dismissal, and 
he invited in a demonstrative manner the fallen Minister 
to dine with him a few days after the latter's resignation 
had become an accomplished fact. 

This, however, did not affect the personal relations 
of Bismarck with Frederick III., though it is not to be 
disputed that it caused friction between him and the Em- 
press Victoria. The two men remained friendly towards 
each other until the end, and perhaps Frederick was not 
sorry to know that he would leave after him, to moderate 
the ambitions and aggressiveness of his son, so experi- 
enced a politician and statesman. 

The fact was that no one trusted the impetuous young 
man ; but, at the same time, no one cared for Bismarck, 
who was fast making himself odious to everybody. His 
insolence, his overbearingness surpassed everything. 
And his son Herbert behaved, if possible, more out- 
rageously than his father. He actually had the im- 
pertinence to say to the Prince of Wales (afterwards 
Edward VII.), who had come over to Potsdam for the 
funeral of his brother-in-law, that an Emperor deprived 
of speech ought never to have reigned. The Prince, 



324 Germany under Three Emperors 

justly incensed at this remark, declared later on that if 
it had not been for the circumstances that he did not 
care to add to the difficulties of his sister's position, and 
that he cared a good deal for the maintenance of good 
relations between Great Britain and Germany, he 
would have thrown the younger Bismarck out of the 
window. As it was, Albert Edward added, it had only 
been with great difficulty that he had restrained himself 
from doing so. 

One wonders sometimes whether, without his son, 
Bismarck would have contrived to keep his position until 
his death. Perhaps yes, perhaps no. It is, of course, 
impossible to say ; but it is quite certain that at the time 
of the accession of William II. all those people who 
were aware of the under-currents that were shaking the 
equanimity of the Berlin Court were looking forward to 
the day when the old giant would fall under the blows 
dealt out to him by the hand of that much loved son. 

A growing cause for European anxiety was the in- 
fluence that the military party was gaining upon the 
mind of the new Emperor William, and especially con- 
cerning the power that General von Waldersee was 
exercising in that way through his wife. This lady was 
related to the young Empress Augusta Victoria, who 
was extremely fond of her and always ready to listen to 
her advice. The astute Bleichroder was one of those who 
followed with the most interest the events which were 
going on around the young Monarch. He said to Hohen- 
lohe that Waldersee was a personal enemy of Bismarck, 
and that he had proved himself as being able to do any- 
thing in the world, no matter what, in order to obtain 
what he wanted. He was quite capable of telling the 
unexperienced and passionate Sovereign that he was 



Alsace-Lorraine 325 

but a puppet in the hands of Bismarck, who alone governed 
Germany. With William I. such tales had had no effect, 
and he had merely smiled both at them and the people 
who had carried them to him, but with a young man 
this might be different. For this reason the Chancellor 
heartily wished Waldersee elsewhere. He added that the 
new Emperor would not begin a war of his own accord, 
but that if it broke out it would not be unwelcome to 
him. 

The latter fact explains, perhaps, why Bismarck, 
in spite of all that one could tell to him, had adopted 
such a quarrelsome policy with his neighbours, and 
especially why he had suddenly inaugurated, against the 
better sense of everybody, including Prince Hohenlohe, 
the aggressive measures already referred to in regard 
to Alsace-Lorraine. Hohenlohe — who was Governor- 
General of the annexed provinces — consulted the Grand 
Duke of Baden on the subject, who advised him to yield 
rather than resign. The Grand Duke explained that it 
was necessary to react against the new Franco-Russian 
intrigue that, according to the information which he 
declared he had received from trustworthy sources, was 
being actively pushed forward, and the object of which 
was to induce France to occupy the Italian military 
harbour of Spezzia. This would naturally result in a 
Franco-Italian war, during which Germany would be 
prevented by Russia from interfering, and one of the 
aims of which was to bring about a restoration of the 
Pope's temporal power. This would hold Austria back 
and prevent her from marching to the help of Germany, 
and it would also considerably damp the enthusiasm of 
the German Catholics for their home government, a fact 
which caused much speculation both in Russia and in 



326 Germany under Three Emperors 

France. According to Bismarck's knowledge things had 
proceeded so far that the English Cabinet had become 
alarmed, and instructed the Duke of Edinburgh to 
bombard Toulon in case the French squadron occupied 
Spezzia. When one reads to-day these stories, worthy 
of Rinaldo Rinaldini, one wonders only how a serious 
man like Hohenlohe could ever repeat or Bismarck 
relate them, so absurd do they seem. Nevertheless, 
Bismarck had recourse to tales of the same kind whenever 
he had occasion to sow distrust in Germany against France 
and Russia, not because he objected to them individually, 
but because he was absolutely determined to prevent their 
ever becoming allied with each other. 

It is curious to watch the indecisions of the great 
Bismarck during the first twelve months that followed 
upon the demise of the Emperor Frederick. His splendid 
assurance seemed to fail him, and he allowed himself to 
be carried away by passion in political matters. Above 
all things, he wanted to assume and keep control over 
the young Emperor. Yet he did not hesitate to rebuke 
him. Thus, for instance, when, after the death of 
Frederick III., his son and successor had caused the 
approaches of the New Palace in Potsdam, where the 
unfortunate Sovereign had breathed his last, to be sur- 
rounded by troops and bad prevented the widowed 
Empress from coming out of her room into the garden 
where she had wanted to gather roses to put on the bed 
of her deceased husband, it had been Bismarck who had 
protested against this gross insult offered to the unhappy 
and broken-hearted Victoria. He reminded William II. 
that it was not with impunity one ventured to offend a 
Princess of Great Britain. His intervention proved 
successful, because the guard was withdrawn, but the 



San Remo Incidents 327 

manner in which it had been installed was calculated yet 
further to embitter the relations of the young Kaiser 
with his mother. 

Personally, I do not believe for one moment the 
truth of the story related by Prince Radolin when he 
said that Bismarck had replied that he had no time to 
go and see the widowed Empress when the latter had 
asked to speak with him. Hard as he was, he would not 
have done such a thing, if only on account of the reason 
that he would have hoped by a personal interview with 
her to learn a few things which still were not quite clear 
to him concerning certain incidents that had taken place 
at San Remo. 

Talking about San Remo reminds me of the scenes 
which were reported to have occurred there between the 
then German Crown Princess and her first-born son. 
Neither of them ever referred to them, but that scenes 
of some kind had taken place was pretty well known. 
Holstein, always on the look out for news, even tried 
the Princess's lady-in-waiting, the Countess Hedwig 
Bruhl, and paid her a long visit, under some pretext or 
other, to try to discover of what nature had been the 
painful explanations, the distressing sounds of which had 
shook the walls of the Villa Zirio. He, as well as 
Bismarck, would have liked to learn the exact truth, in 
which they both hoped to find weapons against the young 
Emperor in case he felt tempted to show the same in- 
dependence of character in regard to his Prime Minister 
as he had manifested in questions where his father and 
mother were concerned. But Countess Bruhl either 
knew nothing or did not wish to say anything, and so 
Baron Holstein for once in his life was baffled in his 
curiosity. 



328 Germany under Three Emperors 

Holstein was playing a curious double game at that 
period I am referring to. Whilst to all appearances he 
seemed to identify himself more than ever with the 
policy of his great chief, he tried in an underhand way 
to insinuate himself into the good graces of William II., 
to whom more than once he secretly communicated 
papers of importance before the Chancellor did so, thus 
allowing the Sovereign to form an idea as to their con- 
tents before being asked to give his decisions in regard 
to the proposals which they contained. He explained 
his conduct by the fear of irritating Bismarck, but the 
Emperor, not being a fool, understood very well what 
lay behind this excuse, and felt grateful to the Baron 
for his attention. Thus private relations established 
themselves between the Monarch and the astute director 
of the political department of the German Foreign 
Office. These relations, however, never became public, 
and did not survive the dismissal of Bismarck, as Holstein 
fondly believed they would. 

Almost as soon as William II. ascended the throne 
the Chancellor wrote a private letter to the Tsar 
Alexander III. in which he referred to the dying words 
of the old Kaiser, and expressed the hope that the rela- 
tions between Germany and Russia would remain as 
cordial in the future as they had been in the past. He 
added the significant remark that so far as he was con- 
cerned he would far rather retire from office than ever 
lend his hand to any estrangements between them, and 
in concluding, referred to the so-called French intrigues, 
the influence of which, he freely owned, might become 
dangerous. The excitable brain of his young Sovereign 
might conceivably lead him into rash actions which he 
would be the first to repent later on. The letter had 



Course of German Policy 329 

remained unanswered, and Bismarck was particularly 
irritated at being passed over as a man whose com- 
munications were not of sufficient importance to merit 
acknowledgment. 

At the same time the attention of the Prussian 
Foreign Office became more absorbed than it had ever 
been with everything that concerned the Near East. 
Bismarck declared that the next great European crisis 
would begin in that corner of the world, and perhaps 
also . . . end. A strong desire to develop German 
trade and industry in Bulgaria suddenly sprang into 
existence, and relations between the Berlin Cabinet and 
the Government of Prince Ferdinand became, somehow, 
an established thing, notwithstanding the fact that Ger- 
many had not then recognised him as Prince of Bulgaria. 
German capitalists also made themselves much at home 
at Constantinople, where Russia was losing ground every 
day. 

Altogether the whole course of German policy was 
being diverted into an entirely new channel, one of its 
most curious features being that whilst the Emperor 
was becoming every day more rabidly Austrian in his 
sympathies, Bismarck, on the contrary, affected to have 
lost his trust in Austria after Andrassy's retirement, and 
made no secret of the fact that he hoped that when she 
would attack Russia it would be upon her own initiative, 
so that the casus foederis could not be applied by her 
to Germany. The Grand Duke of Baden even went so 
far as to say one day that Bismarck, after having preached 
war for so many years, suddenly affected to be all in 
favour of peace, and was making all kinds of advances 
to Russia, simultaneously with the appearance in the 
inspired Press of venomous articles against Austria, 



330 Germany under Three Emperors 

Thus, the Grand Duke asserted, had Bismarck tried to 
bring confusion into the public mind in regard to foreign 
relations with Germany merely to satisfy his personal 
antipathies. There was a good deal of truth in the sar- 
casm of this comment. But, then, the Grand Duke had 
never cared for Bismarck, though in many things he 
had been one of the strongest supporters of his policy, 
partly out of necessity, and partly out of conviction. He 
had known too much of the secret intrigues of the Chan- 
cellor, and he had despised them with all the loftiness 
of a mind which, while not great by any means, had 
always remained honest and above undignified com- 
promises. His opinion may be accepted as being that 
of all sincere German patriots who, whilst admiring the 
colossal work of the great statesman to whom they owed 
so much, yet regretted the many errors into which he 
had been led, and especially the double game which 
seemed more and more, as time went on, to be the only 
one that he cared to play. 

Holstein, who, perhaps, knew better than anyone 
else the mind of his chief, had come to the conclusion 
that his days were numbered, a conclusion that had made 
him at once adopt a line of conduct calculated to prevent 
himself from being engulfed when Bismarck's downfall 
occurred. 

A few months after the death of the Emperor 
Frederick III. the situation of Bismarck could be 
summed up in a few words. The Titan was aware that 
a final and decisive blow was about to be struck at him, 
and he was throwing himself from one side to another 
in the vain hope of escape. But — and this is what few 
people have realised because so very few have paid any 
attention to the domestic side of Bismarck's life, it 



A Fond Hope 331 

was not for himself that he was fearing the executioner's 
axe, but for that much-beloved son who, unknown to 
his father, had been the principal cause of his ruin, and 
whom, in his fond blindness, he had hoped would 
succeed him one day as heirs to a throne succeed to 
their father's crown. 



CHAPTER XXV 
William II. and Bismarck 

SMALL disagreements occurred between William II. 
and Bismarck from the very first hours of the new 
Monarch's reign. The young Emperor had been in the 
habit as Crown Prince of visiting the Chancellor almost 
daily at the latter 's own house, and several times also 
after his accession he went to consult Bismarck at his 
own house. Then, one morning, he summoned him at 
Potsdam, a proceeding which surprised the old man con- 
siderably. Bismarck excused himself from complying 
with his Sovereign's wishes on the plea of ill-health. 
When this was reported to him William II. drily re- 
marked that it was regrettable that a Prime Minister 
should be so sickly as not to be able to fulfil the duties 
of his position, and this was the great hindrance in the 
management of public affairs. Of course, the words were 
repeated, even in an aggravated form, to the person whom 
they concerned, and that did not please him, as may be 
easily imagined. 

William II. objected from the first to what he called 
the "hesitating and unsettled" policy of Bismarck. The 
expressions sounded surprising when one remembered the 
ferocious determination and inflexibility of the Prince's 
administration; but in reality the words were a nearer 
appreciation of the whole European situation than the 
man in the street could suppose. The Bismarck of 1888 
was no longer the Bismarck of 1870. He had tried to 

332 



Foreign Policy of William II. 333 

the best of his immense intellectual powers to consolidate 
the great work he had achieved, but he had at the same 
time made that effort administer to his personal, or rather 
to his paternal ambitions, and sought to prepare an easy 
future for his son as his successor as the head of the 
Government of the German Empire. Others had seer* 
through this ambition, and very quickly made capital out 
of it by sowing distrust against the old Chancellor in the 
mind of the general public as well as in that of the young 
and energetic Prince who was about to take into his own 
hands the conduct of affairs in the German Empire, and 
whose ardent nature and temperament refused to accept 
anything which savoured of a compromise. 

William II. had most decided views in regard to the 
foreign policy he meant to maintain. He had made up 
his mind to hold fast to the alliance with Austria, in 
opposition to any understanding with Russia. It is a 
curious fact that though, in preference to that of his 
own parents, he had chosen his grandfather as the example 
to follow, he had inherited none of the Russian sym- 
pathies which William I. possessed to such a high degree, 
but nursed many of the prejudices held by the Emperor 
Frederick in regard to the Empire of the Tsars. He 
believed that one could not trust to Russian promises ; 
he considered that it was indispensable for the mainten- 
ance of the European equilibrium to prevent Constan- 
tinople from falling into the power of the Muscovites; 
and, thirdly, he felt a personal antipathy for the person 
of Alexander III., who had not taken sufficiently au 
serieux his young and impetuous Prussian relative. 

The Russian Emperor was far too strong in his per- 
sonality not to have perceived the shallowness of many 
of the theatrical performances so dear to the heart of 



334 Germany under Three Emperors 

William II., and his earnest, straightforward nature con- 
sidered them with an indulgent, but by no means patient, 
contempt. This the young German Monarch had very 
quickly perceived, because he was a shrewd observer, and 
resented it accordingly. His feeling, therefore, was sym- 
pathetic to the voices of those who sought to antagonise 
Russia, and he determined that he ought to prepare 
against the contingency of a conflict with Russia. Some 
observers go farther than this and assert that William II. 
was determined to provoke war at the earliest moment 
he thought opportune, and in which he reckoned that 
Austria would not only help him, but also give him the 
occasion for. Bismarck objected most absolutely to any 
such scheme, and told his young master so. He knew 
very well that a war with Russia would make sure of a 
Russian alliance with France which would constitute a 
formidable danger for the security of the German Empire. 
On the other hand Bismarck believed that if — according 
to his own pet theory — a war were fought single-handed 
by Germany against France, and with the French as the 
instigators, Russia would remain neutral, as she had done 
in 1870. About the issue of such a war with his Southern 
neighbours Bismarck had no misgivings, and it in- 
furiated him to find that the young man who had neither 
the experience nor the authority of either his father or 
grandfather showed himself so stubborn, refusing to 
accept his views and opinions with the same deference 
his predecessors on the throne had done. 

This state of things, however, conspired to lead Ger- 
many at a faster pace than ever along the path of 
militarism. Out of different motives it is true, but the 
effect was the same. Bismarck wished to crush France 
as soon as possible ; the Emperor wanted to destroy the 



The Military Party 335 

power of Russia, with the help of Austria, and then to 
come to terms with France, extending to her a hand 
of friendship filled with many gifts, among which he 
even admitted in his mind as a possibility the autonomy 
of Alsace-Lorraine. 

Between the two men the military party was be- 
coming a paramount factor, and persistently and openly 
spoke about the coming war. In June, 1889, the then 
German military attache in Paris, Captain von Huene, 
arrived in Berlin on leave, and whilst there spoke quite 
openly about the necessity of increasing the German 
armaments in view of an approaching conflict. He said 
that the French army was fast becoming superior in many 
respects to the German force ; that its armaments and its 
powder were excellent, and that the infantry was quite 
wonderfully well disciplined and equipped. He assured 
his superiors that the French generals and officers were 
eager for another war, in which they fully believed they 
would this time be victorious. On the other hand, 
he lamented that, according to what he had seen and 
heard, it would take at least another six months before 
the new modifications introduced in the training of the 
Prussian troops could be sufficiently well advanced to 
allow the risks of a campaign to be run. He added that 
he felt absolutely certain that a war between Germany 
and France could not be avoided, and that most likely 
it would break out immediately after the Exhibition 
about to take place in Paris. 

As a contrast to these utterances we find in the 
Memoirs of Hohenlohe mention of a conversation which 
he had in August of that same year of 1889 with General 
von Waldersee, who was then head of the German 
General Staff. The latter advised him not to be in a 



336 Germany under Three Emperors 

hurry to sell the estates which the Princess Hohenlohe 
had just inherited in Russia from her brother, Prince 
Peter of Sayn- Wittgenstein. According to the Russian 
law she had to part with them in the course of the next 
three years, but in that time many things could occur. 
" This," adds the shrewd Prince Clovis, "seems as if 
Waldersee wanted to hint at the probability of a war 
with Russia in the immediate future." 

This was also the opinion prevailing among the military 
party, while the German Press invariably represented 
Russia as the one great enemy of Germany and of its 
famous Kultur and civilisation. Bismarck was pur- 
suing quite a different aim. He wished to get rid of 
the Austrian alliance, to arrange a close union and 
understanding between Germany and Russia, and to 
abandon Austria to its fate. He soon convinced himself 
that Russia did not wish to change her attitude in regard 
to Germany, and so sought to revive his flirtation with 
Austria. These hesitations on the part of a man who 
had never known before what hesitation meant had 
made the Emperor distrustful, and inspired him with 
a great deal more confidence in his own strength than 
he had ever felt before. Conflicts, at first small, had 
arisen between him and Bismarck, and these led to 
complaints by the Emperor against the authoritative 
manner and the impatience at contradiction which Bis- 
marck was displaying. " He thinks that I am a boy," 
declared William II. more than once to several people, 
" and he forgets that at any moment I could remind 
him that I am his Sovereign." 

The Grand Duke of Baden related these incidents 
to Prince Hohenlohe one day when he was in an ex- 
pansive mood, and told him that William II. had of 



How the Crisis Game 337 

late often spoken in this strain. The eventuality of 
Bismarck having to retire, therefore, should be thought 
of, was the hint the Grand Duke added. To this 
remark the Prince retorted by asking what, then, would 
happen, because, though the Emperor probably be- 
lieved himself quite capable of managing alone the foreign 
affairs of the Empire, this might become very dangerous. 
The Grand Duke replied that the Emperor had had 
enough of Bismarck, and added that Herbert Bis- 
marck, too, had made himself unbearable to his 
Sovereign. William II., indeed, only intended to keep 
his Chancellor in office until the new military credits 
had been accepted by the Reichstag, after which he 
should immediately dismiss him. 

This kind of thing went on for some months, when 
it became evident that a crisis of some kind was bound 
to happen. Here I must relate an incident which so 
far I know has not yet been revealed. It came to me 
through a friend of Holstein, who had it from Baron 
Bleichroder. Though Bismarck himself did not even 
admit in imagination the possibility of being curtly dis- 
missed by his Sovereign, his son Herbert believed in 
the eventuality, and toward the end of February, 1889, 
when no one outside a very small circle of people thought 
of the possibility of the fall of the Chancellor, he sold 
secretly funds to a considerable amount in expectation 
of their fall on the news becoming public, and thus 
realised a handsome profit out of his father's disgrace. 

The crisis, as generally happens, was provoked by 
an incident which in other circumstances would have 
been easily passed over. William II., who had ever 
since his accession given a great deal of his attention 
to the social and economical questions of his Empire, 
w 



338 Germany under Three Emperors 

caused to be published without the counter-signature of 
the Chancellor a circular calling together an international 
conference of representatives of the working classes to 
discuss different questions concerning their position in 
regard to capitalism. Bismarck blamed severely the 
terms of this circular, and told the Emperor that it would 
have a detrimental influence upon the elections then im- 
pending. He complained that the Emperor was communi- 
cating without the intervention of his Prime Minister 
with the other members of the Cabinet, and reminded 
William II. that a Royal Order issued by Frederick Wil- 
liam IV. on April 8th, 1852, gave to the President of 
the Council the sole responsibility of every official 
measure, and forbade any step being taken that had not 
been previously submitted to the Prime Minister for 
approval. Upon this William II. declared he should 
issue a decree abolishing that statute. This was the 
immediate cause of the conflict, and the one which the 
public was asked to accept. It would not have been 
wise, nor in the interests of the Sovereign, to allow the 
public to guess that the real reason lay in Bismarck's 
conduct of foreign affairs. A suspicion had taken firm 
hold of the mind of the young Emperor that Bismarck 
was leading them, according to plans he had not thought 
it necessary to lay before his Imperial master, towards 
the abandoning of the Triple Alliance and the conclusion 
of a treaty with Russia, which the Emperor absolutely 
refused himself to sanction. It must here be added that 
in Vienna strenuous efforts had been made to shake 
William II. 's confidence in his Prime Minister, to 
which even the Emperor Francis Joseph himself had 
lent himself. 

That the German Emperor was entirely given up 




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The Reichstag Elections 339 

to the cause of Austria at the moment when he was 
parting from Bismarck can be seen out of the very im- 
prudent confidences which he made to the Generals in 
command of the different army corps whom he sum- 
moned to Berlin at this juncture, and to whom he 
related the reasons which had induced him to dismiss 
the Chancellor. He told them that Russia had wished 
to occupy Bulgaria, and had asked for Germany's 
neutrality in case she should send troops to Varna. 
With this demand Bismarck would have been ready to 
comply, but he, the Emperor, could not do so, because 
he had promised to be a true ally to the Emperor of 
Austria, and was in honour bound to stand by Francis 
Joseph. The occupation of Bulgaria by Russian troops 
would mean an Austro-Russian war, and he would not 
abandon Austria. He then solemnly declared that he 
would throw in the fate of Germany with Austria even 
if this involved the risk of becoming entangled in war 
with Russia and with France at the same time. Most 
enthusiastic cheers greeted this oration. But when Bis- 
marck was informed of its purport he merely raised his 
shoulders, with the remark that the Emperor understood 
politics after the manner of Frederick William IV., one 
of the most bitter sarcasms that he could possibly have 
uttered. 

On February 20th and on March 1st the elections 
for the Reichstag had taken place, and, as Bismarck had 
foreseen, they had been held on the issue of the working 
class question, based on the circular which the Emperor 
had caused to be published. Their result had been a 
considerable majority against the Chancellor. The latter 
wished to come to an understanding with the leaders of 
the different Parliamentary groups, and he invited Wind- 



340 Germany under Three Emperors 

horst, the chief of the Catholic party, to an interview. 
This put the climax to the affected irritation of the Em- 
peror — in reality it was only " affected " — and he sent von 
Lucanus, the chief of his private officers, to Bismarck 
to demand an explanation and to command him to ask 
for the Imperial assent whenever he thought it necessary 
to hold communications with deputies belonging to the 
Opposition groups. The Chancellor, justly incensed this 
time, replied that he would allow no one the right to 
say whom he was or was not to receive in his house. 
The next day was March 15th. The Emperor had had 
an interview with Hoist ein in the early morning, after 
which he had told the Grand Duke of Baden that he 
had heard Bismarck had written to the Tsar to inform 
him that, against his advice, his Sovereign was going 
to inaugurate an anti-Russian policy. He did not say 
from whom he had received this information, but had 
himself at once driven to the house of the Chancellor. 
It was ten o'clock in the morning, and the latter, who 
kept very late hours, was still in bed; he had to get up 
and to dress in a hurry to receive his Monarch. Wil- 
liam II. began the conversation by asking him what his 
negotiations with Windhorst meant. Bismarck answered 
that he had not negotiated anything with him, only re- 
ceived him privately. " I must again request you to 
keep me informed when you think it necessary to confer 
with Parliamentary leaders," insisted the Emperor. "I 
cannot admit any interference concerning my relations 
with anyone," retorted Bismarck, "and the commands 
of my Sovereign do not concern the Princess Bismarck, 
who alone has the right to say whom she will or will 
not receive in her drawing-room. It is only in com- 
pliance with a promise which the Emperor William I. 



Bismarck Resigns 34 1 

asked me to give to him upon his death-bed that I have 
consented to remain in the service of his grandson, and 
if I have ceased to please your Majesty I am quite ready 
to retire." 

" I accept your resignation," said the enraged 
Sovereign, who left the room banging the door behind 
him, whilst Bismarck did not even attempt to accom- 
pany him to the door, as etiquette would have required 
him to do. Two days later, on March 17th, William II., 
finding that the threatened resignation had not yet 
reached him officially, sent his aide-de-camp, General 
von Hahnke, to ask the Chancellor to forward it to him 
without any further delay. 

Holstein, in the version which he gave of the cir- 
cumstances that accompanied this historical event, de- 
clared that the first idea of Bismarck had been to throw 
his resignation into the face of the Emperor and to leave 
the same night for Friedrichsruhe, leaving his family 
behind to pack up their belongings. But here Herbert 
interfered. He clung to office far more than his father 
had ever done, and he feared that his own chances of 
remaining secretary for Foreign Affairs would suffer if 
the latter irritated the Sovereign more than was already 
the case. 

Whether this was true or not it is, of course, difficult 
to say, but things certainly looked as if the Chancellor 
was clinging to power and hoping for something im- 
possible to happen that would allow him to retain his 
post and his dignities. He replied quite coolly to General 
von Hahnke that, in presence of the gravity of the 
general situation and circumstances, he would consider 
it a want of conscience on his part, both in regard to his 
Sovereign and to his Fatherland, if he voluntarily 



342 Germany under Three Emperors 

deserted the post which he occupied. If he sent in his 
resignation, as he was requested to do, it would give 
to the public an entirely false impression of what had 
occurred. His Majesty had the right to dismiss him 
whenever it pleased him to do so, but he could not of 
his own accord put an end to his political career by an 
act which he considered likely to have fatal consequences 
for the German Empire. 

Hahnke had to retire without the resignation he had 
been ordered to bring back with him. The Grand Dukes 
of Hesse, Baden and Saxe-Coburg tried to interfere in 
the conflict, but William II. would not listen to the 
advice they attempted to give him. He sent a second 
messenger to Bismarck, this time von Lucanus, with 
instructions to request once more his resignation, adding 
that he was surprised not to be earlier in possession of it. 
The message was that William II. could only give him 
a few hours' longer grace. 

Bismarck then replied that he was quite ready to 
sign his retirement, but that, as the document in which 
he would express his reasons for resigning the offices he 
had held for so many years, and would be the last official 
one emanating from the pen of a Minister who had 
figured more or less conspicuously in the history of Ger- 
many and of Prussia, he required a certain time in which 
to write it. He owed it both to himself and to history, 
he added, to explain why he had been dismissed. 

There was nothing to do but to wait, and at last, 
on March 18th, Bismarck signed the letter in which he 
fully related the differences between him and the Em- 
peror which, according to his opinion, had brought about 
his retirement. In it he declared that for some time 
William II. had put restrictions on the authority with 



A Last Word 343 

which he was invested that prevented him from con- 
ducting the affairs of the State in a way worthy of him, 
and of the services which he had rendered to his country. 
He added that, in regard to the foreign relations of the 
Empire, the policy which the Sovereign wanted to 
follow appeared to him to be of a nature likely to com- 
promise all the important results which he had obtained 
in that direction during the two preceding reigns. And 
he ended his letter with the following remark, the deep 
irony of which could not help striking in a most un- 
pleasant manner the Monarch to whom it was addressed : 
" I would have already, one year ago, presented to your 
Majesty the request to be allowed to give up my func- 
tions if I had not had the impression that your Majesty 
desired to make use for some time longer of the experi- 
ence and of the faculties of a faithful servant of your 
ancestors. But now that I am quite certain that your 
Majesty does not need them any more I can retire from 
political life without having to fear that this decision 
will be condemned as premature by public opinion." 

And a few hours before having dispatched this docu- 
ment, the last official paper which was to bear his signa- 
ture, Bismarck declared to one of his confidants, Moritz 
Busch, that he " did not wish to take upon his shoulders 
at the close of his career the stupidities and the mistakes 
of a presumptuous and inexperienced mind." He wished 
still, in short, to keep up before the world of his day 
the fiction that his retreat had not been a compulsory 
one. 

Holstein's version is probably nearer the truth be- 
cause it is the more human. He saw Bismarck imme- 
diately after the visit of General von Hahnke. From the 
window of his study he had watched the General take 



344 Germany under Three Emperors 

his departure, and feeling sure of its purport he had 
sought the presence of Bismarck in the endeavour to 
learn some particulars of the interview. He found the 
Chancellor in his arm-chair, his arms hanging listlessly 
at his side, and his face suddenly aged by ten years and 
pathetic in its deep despondency. When Holstein had 
asked him what had occurred, and whether he was to 
call anyone to his help, his chief had merely shaken his 
head and then called him by a sign to his side. "It is 
all over," he had said in a stifled voice, " and destiny 
wants me to look upon the destruction of my own work." 

And then after a time he had added : " Can you 
understand what it is to feel that one has become 
nothing after having been everything?" 

At this moment someone knocked at the door. Bis- 
marck straightened himself up, and after having passed 
his hand over his eyes, as if to shake off a bad dream, 
turned round to his stupefied subordinate and in his 
usual voice asked him what he had come for and what 
was the current business of the day, settling to it in his 
usual manner as if nothing out of the way had occurred. 
It was only after lunch that he had acquainted the Prin- 
cess Bismarck and Herbert with what had happened, 
and in concert with them decided what was to be done. 

Later on he unburdened his soul to Holstein, and 
confided to him his apprehensions as to what the future 
held in store for Germany. He was very well aware of 
the desire of the Emperor to come to some kind of 
arrangement with France, to the detriment of Russia, 
and he held the idea as absolutely disastrous. It was 
madness, Holstein reported that Bismarck said to him, 
to try to provoke a conflict with Russia before one had 
assured oneself of the alliance and co-operation of Turkey 



A Definition 345 

and of other Balkan States, and this he thought the 
Emperor William rendered impossible. "It is curious," 
Bismarck added, "how, after declaring that he wanted 
in everything to follow the example of his grandfather, 
this rash youth does precisely what this grandfather 
would have particularly objected to — pick a quarrel with 
Russia, with whom we ought always to remain upon 
good terms." One might have reminded Bismarck that 
there had been a time when he had himself done every- 
thing possible to thwart Russian policy not only in the 
Near East, but everywhere else. 

Holstein is credited with the best definition of the 
great Chancellor's character and intelligence. He de- 
clared that Bismarck's was a mind "that would inevitably 
come to grief when it found it was unable any longer 
to perform extraordinary and wonderful things." This 
was so most absolutely, because nothing in Bismarck's 
policy, apart from the raising of the German Empire, 
testifies to what is called in French "I' esprit de suite." 
We see him perpetually wandering from one thing to 
another, attacking in turns the Roman Catholic Church 
and trying immediately afterwards to make friends with 
it ; rushing into the arms of Austria and then embracing 
Russia; allying himself in matters of home interests to 
all the different parties in the Reichstag; proposing one 
social reform after the other, and in the midst of all 
these things remaining absolutely personal and forgetting 
that politics cannot be conducted in accord with one's 
feelings of aversion or of attachment to this or to that 
person, to this or to that nation. With another Sovereign 
than old William I. Bismarck would have been compelled 
to retire almost immediately after the French war, or 
at least as soon as it had become evident that for him 



346 Germany under Three Emperors 

governing meant the extension of his own despotism over 
everything and everybody with whom he came into 
contact. He only maintained himself in power because 
he happened to be standing beside a Monarch who was 
so really great that it did not matter to him whether 
others should be considered or should think themselves 
so. With an undoubtedly intelligent but at the same 
time vain and self-reliant man like the present Kaiser 
it is only to be wondered how two years could pass by 
without matters having been brought to the supreme 
climax, after which there remained nothing for Bismarck 
to do but to bid good-bye to the responsibilities and to 
the cares of political life either of his own accord or 
because it had been imposed upon him by a will for 
once stronger than his own. 

The days which elapsed between the visit of 
General von Hahnke and the official publication of the 
Chancellor's retirement were perhaps the most terrible 
in his whole life. He used to sit for hours in his chair, 
looking into space with eyes that seemed to pierce the 
future, to seek there for the revenge on those personal 
wrongs of his which he considered far more important 
than the gravest interests of the German Empire. At 
times he used to fall into fits of rage, during which he 
broke whatever happened to be within his reach, then 
he would relapse into a silence whence it was almost im- 
possible to rouse him. Had he been allowed to follow 
his first impulse, to leave Berlin for Friedrichsruhe 
immediately after the request of the Emperor for his 
resignation, there would have been at least some dignity 
in his departure, but this did not suit the designs of 
Herbert, and Herbert sacrificed his father to his own 
selfish and greedy purposes. 



Caprivi in Charge 347 

Hohenlohe, whose relations with the Chancellor had 
become rather strained, had arrived in Berlin on the 
very day that the newspapers had published the astound- 
ing news of the dismissal of the man with whom were 
associated some of the most glorious pages in German 
history. He thought it polite to pay him a visit, and 
to tell him how much he had been surprised at the events 
that had just taken place, and how little he had expected 
them. " You could not have been more surprised than 
myself," replied Bismarck, "because three weeks ago I 
did not think it could be possible I would have to go 
away, although I ought to have been prepared for it, 
because the Emperor wants now to govern alone." And 
he forthwith began pouring into the ear of his visitor 
the whole long story of his real and supposed wrongs. 
It was evident that he could not forgive William II. for 
his ingratitude, but his irritation was most violent against 
the Grand Duke of Baden, whom Bismarck charged 
with indirectly bringing about his dismissal by the manner 
in which he had encouraged the Emperor in his ideas 
of independence. 

All these recriminations took away from the dignity 
of the fallen Minister, and, had circumstances been 
different, would have harmed him in public opinion to 
a considerable degree had not the nation resented his 
departure. The Emperor's conduct was considered to 
have been ungrateful, and Bismarck consoled himself for 
his misfortunes and disappointment by noticing the ex- 
pressions of disapproval to the address of the Sovereign 
that one could hear everywhere in Berlin. 

The Chancellor had one more interview with Holstein 
before handing over the direction of affairs to his suc- 
cessor, General Caprivi. The first thing that he asked 



348 Germany under Three Emperors 

this lieutenant who for so many years had worked beside 
him, and helped him in so many of his vast schemes, was 
when he meant to resign. Holstein replied that he had 
no intention of doing so. This surprised the Prince so 
much that he exclaimed, " But how will you be able to 
work without me? " The Baron smiled and remarked 
that he would work towards the day when he would see 
his former chief return to the place which he had been 
compelled to abandon. " I shall never do so," said Bis- 
marck, " unless — unless " — here he made a long pause — 
" unless the nation calls upon me to repair some of the 
stupidities which he is sure to perpetrate.' ' 

He then gave instructions to Holstein as to what was 
to be done in order to avoid a rupture with Russia. The 
latter promised everything, but meant the whole time to 
conduct affairs along quite a different course to the 
one in which they had been led so long while Bismarck 
presided over matters. Holstein was already busily 
engaged looking out for his successor as Foreign Minister, 
and had submitted several names for the Sovereign's 
approval, foremost among them that of Herr von Mar- 
schall, one of the cleverest diplomats that the Prussian 
State had ever possessed. 

As the hour for his departure was drawing nigh the 
former Chancellor recovered some of his lost dignity. 
He asked to see the Empress Frederick to take leave of 
her. She immediately received him. He had been her 
enemy for many years, but the noble woman felt some 
pity for him in her kind heart, and, apart from this, she 
resented the manner in which he had been dismissed. 

On March 29th, 1890, Bismarck left for ever the 
house where he had spent so many eventful years. A few 
hours before he had been at Charlottenburg, carrying 



A Solemn Leave-taking 349 

a bunch of roses which he laid on the coffin of the old 
Emperor with whose help he had been able to perform 
so many great things. It was his last and his only sincere 
good-bye. A huge crowd accompanied him to the rail- 
way station, and when he got out from his carriage at 
the door, tall and erect in his cuirassier uniform with 
its yellow collar, he appeared more like the gigantic ghost 
of a gigantic past than like a Titan fallen. The multi- 
tude cheered him vociferously and covered him with 
flowers. He looked grave but peaceful. For one brief 
moment he was again master of himself, as of old, and 
the only sign of emotion which he gave were the words, 
" The Emperor shall see me again," which, from his 
railway carriage, he threw as a farewell to the crowds 
that had gathered to see him depart. 

There was something so solemn in this leave-taking 
that even Holstein felt awed. It is not every day that 
we see something really great disappear into space, and 
many on that eventful evening had the feeling that a 
new leaf had been turned in the book of German history. 
In future days more than one sad thing was to be in- 
scribed upon the blank page which that day lay extended 
before the eyes of the nation. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

After the Crash 

BISMARCK gave to the world as the reason of his dis- 
missal that, after having thirty years of almost un- 
limited power, with his Sovereign, his country and the 
Reichstag deferring to his advice, it had been impossible 
for him to become a docile servant. And as if to 
accentuate this fact he had given directions to have 
written on his funeral monument the significant words : 
"Prince von Bismarck, a faithful German servant of 
the Emperor William I.," which desire was executed 
by his family. 

The fact, however, was that Bismarck might have 
maintained himself in his position had he only succeeded 
in converting to his point of view the new Sovereign, 
and had he not had his son Herbert at his side, to whom 
he had gradually come to report all his actions, and whose 
future had become his first consideration. It is incon- 
testable that it was a great deal due to the conduct of 
that much-loved son that Bismarck's political career had 
come to such an abrupt end. 

It seems that the whole Foreign Office was tired of 
the domineering ways of Herbert Bismarck, who was 
far more its master than even his father. Those belong- 
ing to the inner official circle, too, had discovered the 
unscrupulous way in which Herbert used for the advantage 
of his various financial speculations the knowledge which 
his official position allowed him to obtain. This gave 

35o 



Breaking with Russia 351 

his enemies a strong weapon against him, which they 
used mercilessly as soon as they found that they could 
do so with impunity. The elder Bismarck they accused 
of having suddenly become strongly pro-Russian, and 
Russia, ever since the accession of William II., had 
fallen into strange discredit, especially among the mili- 
tary party. The people knew that all along the Emperor 
had nursed the dream of a reconciliation with France, 
and they who were in his confidence were aware that his 
greatest ambition was to visit Paris in his official capacity 
and to arrange some kind of modus vivendi between the 
German Empire and the country he declared he esteemed 
beyond all others. Whether these assurances were sincere 
it is better not to inquire into too closely, but the fact 
remained that at the beginning of his reign William II. 
refused himself to endorse the aggressive policy of his 
Prime Minister in regard to France, and felt inclined to 
make some concession to the feelings of the French 
nation. 

Whoever had the opportunity to see the former 
Chancellor in Friedrichsruhe after his dismissal realised 
the tragedy it was to him. His was not a nature capable 
of appreciating any rest from his colossal labours ; he 
missed this same work to such an extent that his in- 
activity became for him a real obsession. What espe- 
cially infuriated him was to see all that he had been 
working for turned topsy-turvy, and his most cherished 
political and diplomatic complications crumbled to pieces. 
For instance, Caprivi refused to renew a secret conven- 
tion with the Russian Government, in which Bismarck 
had engaged himself to guarantee to it the liberty of its 
movements in Bulgaria and at Constantinople if it con- 
sented in its turn to promise Germany its neutrality in 



352 Germany under Three Emperors 

case of another war with France. When Bismarck was 
asked a few days later by a visitor to Friedrichsruhe how 
he could reconcile such a convention with those which 
existed already between the Berlin Cabinet and Turkey, 
the former Chancellor exclaimed, ■' Conventions are 
made to be broken, and I should not have worried over 
that one at all after it had done its duty and helped me 
to get rid of the nightmare of a Franco-Russian 
alliance.' ' 

Not one single person found grace in Bismarck's 
eyes — neither Hohenlohe, neither Marschall, neither 
Biilow, neither Caprivi, nor the Emperor. The last two 
were the special objects of his sarcasms, and he openly 
declared that, according to what he heard, it seemed to 
him that the Government of the German Empire was 
drifting away towards the unknown under the guidance 
of a capricious leader. He laughed at the new German 
Colonial policy so dear to the heart of William II., and 
he did not spare from his raillery either the philanthropic 
ideas of the Emperor, as shown in the new social legis- 
lation which was being introduced, or the commercial 
policy inaugurated by Caprivi, to whose administration 
he prophesied the greatest disasters. 

Unfortunately, all his rage and invective only added 
to the number of his enemies. At the same time his 
conduct exasperated the Emperor and caused consider- 
able uneasiness to the Government. Soon the quarrel 
between Bismarck and William II. assumed such con- 
siderable proportions that one began to speak about the 
possibility of the Emperor instituting a criminal prosecu- 
tion against his grandfather's great Minister and adviser. 
Patience did not belong to the qualities with which the 
Kaiser was endowed, and though he did not have the 



Count Herbert Bismarck's Marriage 353 

courage to proceed to any extreme measures against 
Bismarck he took another course which was perhaps even 
more mortifying, and he caused a circular to be sent to 
Germany's representatives abroad, in which they were 
advised not to attach any importance to whatever the 
former Chancellor might say or write. But the situation 
reached its climax when the latter wished to go to Vienna 
to be present at the marriage of his son Count Herbert 
with an Austrian lady, the Countess Margaret Hoyos. 

Some of the very few friends left to Bismarck tried 
to persuade him to have this marriage celebrated some- 
where in the country quietly, but he had refused to listen 
to reason; he fully intended to make this occasion an 
opportunity to prove to the world that he had not be- 
come so unimportant as his Sovereign seemed to think. 
He had written to the Great Master of the Emperor of 
Austria's household to ask for the favour of an audience 
with that Monarch, and he meant to tell him many things 
that he himself admitted it would be unadvisable to 
publish in the newspapers for the moment. Francis 
Joseph had signified his consent, and everything seemed 
to be going on quite well when one fine morning the 
German Beichsanzeiger published two Imperial com- 
munications, one of which was an order forbidding the 
German Ambassador in Vienna to be present at 
the marriage ceremony of Count Herbert Bismarck, 
whilst the other one was a severe censure of the old 
Prince for his free use of the Press. William II. did 
not rest there; he also wrote to the Emperor Francis 
Joseph asking him not to receive Bismarck, and to cause 
no official recognition of his presence to be made in the 
Austrian capital. 

Francis Joseph had held friendly relations with 



354 Germany under Three Emperors 

Bismarck for something like forty years. But Francis 
Joseph had never been one of those who could be trusted 
either by his friends or by his foes, and when Bismarck 
arrived in Vienna on June 19, 1892, he was met by 
the news that the audience which already had been 
promised was refused. At the same time was com- 
municated to him the contents of a note addressed by 
Caprivi to the German Ambassador in Vienna, in which 
was said among other things that the Emperor William 
made a difference between the Bismarck of former days 
and the present one, and that he wished it to be under- 
stood that the latter would never have in the future any 
influence on the affairs of the German State. The note 
added that it was the Sovereign's desire its contents 
should be communicated to Count Kalnoky, who was 
at that time Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Nothing more offensive nor more insulting could have 
been imagined, and it is but natural that Bismarck should 
have become enraged at finding himself treated in such 
a manner after all that he done for the welfare and for 
the greatness of the German Empire and the German 
Fatherland. He immediately summoned to his side a 
correspondent of the Vienna paper, the Neue Freie Presse, 
and to him he unburdened his soul, criticising without 
mercy the administration of Count Caprivi, and openly 
declaring that henceforward it would be war to the knife 
between them. For once he felt he had got the German 
nation at his side, and, indeed, what had taken place at 
Vienna, instead of harming him in public opinion, had 
given a new life to Bismarck's popularity. On his 
leaving Vienna he was made the object of great mani- 
festations of sympathy, and all along his way to Kissingen, 
whither he repaired after the wedding of his son, he 



A Visit to Friedrichsruhe 355 

was received with ovations and expressions of enthusiasm 
for his person that must have consoled him for many 
a rebuff. 

When he had returned to Friedrichsruhe, both 
Bleichroder, the banker, and Holstein visited him there. 
The former had been one of those who had tried to per- 
suade him not to go to Vienna. Now he wished to hear 
from him his impressions upon all that had taken place 
there. Bismarck did not hide his feelings from his old 
friend and financial adviser, and he told him among other 
things that, whatever might be the opinion of the 
Emperor William, the nation would like to see him once 
more at the head of affairs, and that he meant to take 
possession of his seat in the Reichstag, whither he had 
been elected by the town of Hanau, in order to start 
a campaign against the Government, in which he was 
convinced that he would be followed by the country. 

This made Bleichroder uneasy. The shrewd financier 
knew very well that in some points Bismarck was right, 
and he also understood that if the latter took up to lead 
an opposition in Parliament the Government of the day 
would have but a poor chance of holding its own against 
him and his ever-increasing popularity. When he re- 
turned to Berlin he asked Holstein to call upon him, and 
they discussed the situation together, with the result 
that the Baron in his turn started for Friedrichsruhe. 

His account of his visit is most interesting. He came 
at once to the point, and told his former chief that he 
had come as an ambassador to learn what were his con- 
ditions for the conclusion of a peace which no one, he 
affirmed, wished for more than the Emperor himself. 
To his surprise Bismarck replied that he had no condi- 
tions to make ; he did not care for the Emperor nor 



356 Germany under Three Emperors 

for what the latter thought about him. Germany was 
being led to its ruin, and he owed it to the memory 
of his old master and to his own reputation in history 
to protest against it. 

Holstein allowed the old Prince to have his say, and 
then suddenly asked him what he would do if, exasperated 
by opposition, the Sovereign had him imprisoned. Bis- 
marck instantly replied : " I wish he would ; that would 
be the end of the Hohenzollern dynasty, and there are 
others that could take its place.' ' 

Holstein then inquired if he meant by that his own 
line. 

" I am not a fool," answered the former Chancellor, 
"and you must not take me for one; but any dynasty 
I should support would have a fair chance to maintain 
itself on the Imperial throne. I am not thinking of 
Prussia, of course." 

The Baron was not a man to be taken aback by any- 
thing. He dropped the mildness and aimed with his 
big batteries. What he really told Bismarck he never 
confided to anyone, but the result of his conversation was 
that the Prince convinced himself that, unless he desisted 
from his provocative attitude, the misdeeds of his beloved 
son Herbert would be made public, and that the proofs 
of the latter's speculations on the Stock Exchange were 
in the Emperor's hands, who would not hesitate to use 
them in case of need. 

The news came like a thunderbolt on the aged man, 
who had never expected anything of the kind. He did 
not even ask Holstein to promise him secrecy — he knew 
very well the Baron would not speak unless compelled 
to do so — but after his conversation with him he modified 
much of his conduct. At the same time he contrived 



Holstein and William II. 357 

to convey to the knowledge of William II., by Holstein, 
that he, too, possessed certain papers, the publication 
of which might prove highly embarrassing to the young 
Monarch, among which figured a number of private 
letters of the latter written during his father's last illness. 
This was sufficient to prevent the possibility of violent 
measures either in regard to Bismarck himself or in the 
direction of Count Herbert. 

The health of the old Prince received a serious shock 
from all these emotions and worries, and at last he fell 
seriously ill. This was in autumn of the year 1893. The 
Emperor, in the meanwhile, had also allowed his reason 
to take the upper hand on his impetuousness, and he 
seized upon the former Chancellor's illness to send him 
an olive branch in the shape of a bottle of rare old wine 
out of the Imperial cellars. He had already offered 
him the use of one of his castles on the Rhine as a 
residence during his convalescence. Bismarck had re- 
fused, of course, but in terms of politeness, and the ice 
had thus been broken after four years of continual strife. 
The Sovereign also invited his grandfather's adviser to 
visit him in Berlin on the occasion of his jubilee of 
twenty-five years' military service, and this invitation the 
aged Prince did not decline. 

On January 26, 1894, Bismarck returned to Berlin. 
Everything was arranged to give this visit an appear- 
ance of triumph. The Emperor's brother, Prince 
Henry of Prussia, had met him at the station, and it 
was in his company that, escorted by two squadrons of 
cuirassiers, in a Royal carriage with outriders, Prince 
Bismarck had reached the Imperial castle, where rooms 
had been prepared for him, and where the Emperor and 
Empress, surrounded by their sons, had received him in 



358 Germany under Three Emperors 

state. Crowds without number had waited for him in 
the streets and had given him the warmest of welcomes. 

The country was glad to see that at last a reconcilia- 
tion had been effected between the old and great states- 
man whose gigantic work was to leave such deep traces 
in the history of the world and the Sovereign from 
whom differences had parted him. Bismarck was per- 
haps the least moved of the two when they met again 
at last in the presence of the guard of honour who pre- 
sented arms before the rehabilitated Minister. He 
understood very well the meaning of all this : after one 
had not succeeded in reducing him to silence by threats 
one wanted to shut his mouth and to bury his resentment 
under the flowers with which one covered him. 

A family luncheon took place almost immediately 
after Bismarck's arrival, a luncheon at which he was 
the only guest, then he called on the Empress Frederick, 
and on the same evening, at seven o'clock, he took the 
train back to Friedrichsruhe. His visit, short as it had 
been, had, nevertheless, caused a considerable sensation, 
and some fears were expressed in some quarters that 
the Emperor might be tempted to call him back at the 
head of affairs. This was especially the case at the 
Foreign Office, where no one wished for his return, not 
excepting Holstein, who, finding that under the regime 
of Caprivi he was left far more free to do what he liked, 
would not have welcomed at all being put back under 
the control of an exacting and not always just master, 
and who, besides, had every reason to dread that he 
might be reminded of certain things he had told the 
Prince during his famous visit at Friedrichsruhe. So, 
with characteristic prudence, he presented, on the very 
next day after the former Chancellor's return to Berlin, 



A Cheap Retort 359 

a report to the Emperor, in which he emphasised several 
grave mistakes which his old chief had made in diplo- 
matic and political matters, among which figured his 
conduct during the Berlin Congress, his intervention in 
China in favour of France, and his interference between 
Great Britain and Russia in regard to the Afghanistan 
conflict. 

These fears, however, were quite groundless. Wil- 
liam II. had got absolutely no intention to recall 
Bismarck to power. He had realised that this estrange- 
ment between them was beginning to harm his own 
popularity as a Sovereign, and therefore tried to take 
the venom out of the teeth which had already bitten him 
so hard, and he allowed something of what he had had 
in his mind to escape him during a conversation with 
Hohenlohe, who had congratulated him on the wisdom 
of the step which he had taken. Hohenlohe had re- 
marked that the rabid Bismarckians were not yet satisfied 
with what had been done, but that they declared the 
Emperor ought to have gone first himself to Friedrichs- 
ruhe. 

" I am aware of it," had replied William II., " but 
they could have waited a long time for such a thing. 
He had to come here first." 



CHAPTER XXVII 

The Outcome 

AS time went on no change came over the opinions 
xTL of the Emperor ; he still clung to his favourite idea 
of an arrangement with France, owing to the value 
French neutrality would be to him in the event of an 
Anglo-German war that already at the time I am 
writing about was on his programme. Bismarck knew 
very well that it was an absolute illusion on the part of 
William II. to imagine that France could give up the 
hope of recovering its lost provinces. He knew, too, 
that Russia rather than France held the key to the 
general European situation. 

The obduracy of William II. in this matter did not 
arise out of a mere spirit of antagonism to his ex-Chan- 
cellor. It lay deeper than that. He had made up his mind 
that sooner or later Russia had to be driven back in 
Asia, and he had had his eye all along on the possibility 
of Prussia obtaining the fortresses which defended the 
line of the Vistula on the Russian side, which he con- 
sidered would then be in far better hands. This idea 
had haunted his mind ever since the day he had been 
sent as quite a young man by his grandfather to attend 
some Russian manoeuvres near Brest Litovsk, and when 
he had been struck by the strong works of fortification 
that defended this part of the world against the possi- 
bility of an invasion from the West. No one then 
admitted the thought that Prussia and Russia would 

3 6 ° 



An Illusion of William II. 361 

ever find themselves at war with each other, but the 
active brain of the present Kaiser had gone farther than 
his elders in this respect, and I remember very well 
that on his return from Brest Litovsk he gave way to 
some expressions which, when remembered later on in 
the light of subsequent events, might have meant a good 
deal more than could have been expected at the time 
they were uttered. 

The young Sovereign was perhaps a remarkably 
clever man, but the divine spark of genius with which 
he thought he was richly endowed evaded him. 

This illusion on the part of William II. and his 
vascillating nature were often the object of Bismarck's 
satire. Not very long after the reconciliation a man 
who, during the whole time Bismarck had been in power, 
had belonged to the Opposition, though he had known 
him well, happened to be in Hamburg. He thought it 
decent to try to see the Prince, just to show that he had 
not forsaken him, as so many others had done. He 
wrote to Friedrichsruhe, and, receiving a favourable 
reply, repaired to the castle by the next train. 

He was very well and even warmly received by the 
great statesman. After luncheon Bismarck took his 
visitor for a walk in the beautiful park amidst which the 
house was built. The Prince was in a communicative 
mood, and freely commented on the circumstances that 
had accompanied his dismissal. He did not mention 
the Emperor with any bitterness, but with an un- 
measurable contempt : " He will never keep any 
Minister for long," he said, "because it will be impos- 
sible for any responsible adviser of the Crown to endorse 
the vagaries of a mind which can never settle seriously 
to anything and which only goes by feelings, discarding 



362 Germany under Three Emperors 

the dictates of reason. One cannot govern a country 
as one commands a regiment, and militarism cannot be 
applied to politics without producing chaos and trouble. 
Stability is required to lead men and to rule nations, and 
a politician must first of all look toward the future and 
any complications the latter may bring. Sentimental 
politics, inspired by vanity or by revenge, are never 
sound. It is all very well to talk about what ought to 
be done, but in real life the only thing which has got 
to be considered is what can be done. This the young 
man who believes himself to be able to improve upon the 
work of his grandfather forgets entirely. It is all very well 
to make war, but war, like everything else, ought to 
have a purpose, and without one I would never have 
lent myself to an attack either on Austria or France. 
Now, what possible purpose could a war with Russia 
have? We do not require Russian territory, and a cam- 
paign against it, even if it became a victorious one, 
would only entangle us in difficulties on account of 
Poland, which would become an embarrassment for 
everybody. 

" There was a time when I advocated an alliance 
with Austria against Russia, but then the political con- 
stellation was very different from the present one for 
one thing, and for another, I was sure that with the 
Emperor William I., and even with his heir, the Crown 
Prince Frederick, Austria would never be allowed to 
seek a futile quarrel with anyone, and the peace of the 
world would not become seriously endangered. 

"At present things are changed; the Sovereign is 
essentially an adventurous character, capable of allow- 
ing his feelings to carry him away to where his sympathies 
are engaged. 



Turning toward Russia Again 363 

" This is what made me consider the advisability of 
our turning once more our attention toward Russia, an 
alliance with whom might be of great use to us against 
a possible French aggression and in other directions. The 
Emperor would not understand me. He thought that 
he knew best; youth often does. This was the real 
reason why we quarrelled. He will quarrel with other 
people, and I can hardly believe that he will ever bear 
to have a Chancellor with a private opinion of his own, 
unless the latter takes particular care to hide that such 
is the case. But, then, this will mean the return to 
absolute government, and an absolute government, to 
be carried on successfully, requires far different qualities 
than those of William II." 

" Germany has been governed absolutely by your- 
self," said Bismarck's visitor. "It therefore surprises 
me that you use the words, ' the return to absolute 
government', instead of saying the * continuance of 
absolute government.' " 

" Ah ! " sighed the Prince, " that was very different. 
I may have been autocratic, but I do not think that I 
have ever boasted such was the case. There lies the 
difference." 

He smiled and looked at his interlocutor, then went 
on, this time with something of excitement in his voice : 

" On the whole, I am glad that I have been turned 
out of office in the way it has taken place. I was, I 
will own, very angry at first, but at present my ideas 
have somewhat changed. It is a comfort to think that 
I have no responsibility in what is going on, that, what- 
ever befalls Germany, my name will be left out of it; 
that, on the contrary, people will say that if I had been 
at the head of affairs such and such a thing would not 



364 Germany under Three Emperors 

have happened. It would most probably have happened 
all the same, because it is impossible to arrest a river 
in its course — and what is the temper of a young man 
who believes he knows better than anyone else but a 
river — and then the world would have said that Bismarck 
had grown old, and had lost that sure touch in politics 
he had wielded before. This would not have suited me, 
and might have put me before history in an entirely false 
light. As things have turned out, I shall be regretted 
more and more as time shall go by, and as new ideals 
will take the place of those which were fashionable in 
my time. Then I shall be revenged, even if I do not 
live to see it. It is all that I require. As for the Ger- 
man Empire — well, it must take its fate, as so many 
other things in the world have to." 

"But you believe in its prosperity?" asked the 
Prince's visitor. 

"No, I do not," was the unhesitating reply. 

" What do you mean? " 

" Precisely what I say. I do not believe that the 
Empire, such as I have made it, has got many years of 
existence before it. It will have to be transformed in 
some way or other, and it depends on exterior causes 
how long a time this transformation will take to become 
apparent to the naked eye. The German Empire, to 
consolidate itself, requires a different Emperor from 
William II. Believe me that, in saying so, I am not 
giving way to personal spite, but to a deep feeling of 
patriotism. I know that what I have done is destined 
to perish. I only hope that I shall not be compelled to 
see the catastrophe which will carry away what has taken 
me such trouble to create." 

He paused for a few moments, then went on : 



Bulow in the Balance 365 

" I have made a great mistake, and I see it now — 
I have not given sufficient care to the choice of men 
among whom my successor had to be taken. But, then, 
I never could stand human stupidity ; it is one of those 
capital errors for which there exists no forgiveness. I 
ought to have tried to create a school of diplomats and 
political men. I have not done so, and we see the result. 
There is not now, with the exception of Hatzfeld, one 
single man whom one could call a statesman in our 
Foreign Office. Hohenlohe is too selfish to be ever any- 
thing else but personal. Bulow is clever and brilliant, 
but seldom sees beyond the satisfaction of the present 
triumph. No, I see no one." 

Evidently the old Prince was prejudiced, but in the 
remarks which I have quoted can, nevertheless, be de- 
tected something above personal spite and personal 
regrets. The statesman was not dead in him yet on that 
day when he thus unburdened his soul to a man who 
had been in the past one of his most violent adversaries, 
though retaining personal friendly relations with him. 
It was the statesman foreseeing what the future was 
holding in reserve for the German Empire. 

The last triumph which Bismarck was to know 
occurred on April 1, 1895, when his eightieth birthday 
was celebrated with a pomp which might have reminded 
him of the ovations that so often had greeted his steps 
all through his wonderful career. This eightieth birthday 
was to mark the close of the career of the old Titan 
upon whose shoulders had rested for so many years the 
fate not only of his own country, but also of the whole 
of Europe. He was to live for three years longer, with 
all his remarkable intellectual faculties unimpaired, but 



366 Germany under Three Emperors 

dissatisfied, morose, and unhappy at having, as he once 
pathetically exclaimed, to look into the newspapers for 
details as to what was going on in a world the destinies 
of which he had controlled for so many years. 

In spite of the affection of his children, he found him- 
self lonely and miserable in a solitude to which he never 
got used, but out of which he did not desire to escape. 
In those hours of enforced rest he had the leisure to 
recapitulate the past, and in this self-examination he 
found his punishment. 



Death, however, proved more merciful to him than 
men had been. His last illness was a short one, and car- 
ried him off after a struggle which had only lasted a few 
hours. It was on July 30, 1898, that he breathed his 
last, just about midnight, whilst a hurricane was blowing 
in the North Sea, and the wind shaking the walls of the 
Castle of Friedrichsruhe and howling among the trees 
of the stately Sachsenwald. He who had roused so many 
tempests passed away during a storm. . . . 



The man has disappeared, but the evils of the system 
which he inaugurated have survived both him and 
his works. We feel their effects to-day ; we see how 
bad they are, and we realise their impotency. He 
had trained a whole nation to believe that might was 
right, and a dynasty to think that its will ought to be 
the one supreme law that guides it. His policy, at first 
clear and determined, had at last dwindled into in- 
coherency. After he had gone, those who succeeded to 
the place which he had filled, but which they merely 



A Capricious Ruler 367 

occupied, tried to follow in his footsteps. They failed. 
He wrote a great page in the history of Prussia, but a 
sad one in that of Europe. 

And what of William II.? The young Sovereign, 
who had for a time flattered Bismarck, toadied to him, 
and made use of him for the furtherance of his own 
schemes, thought himself a match for him, and believed 
himself capable of carrying out a conception which he had 
never properly understood. Thus, for instance, in regard 
to Alsace-Lorraine and his desire for an understanding 
with France which for so many years remained the 
Utopian dream of the Kaiser's fertile brain. It has been 
related to me that, during the crisis brought about by 
the two Balkan Wars that preceded the present great 
European conflict, William II., in his desire to assure 
himself of the neutrality of France in the case of a 
struggle with Russia, which he kept all the time 
encouraging Austria to begin, had gone so far as to take 
upon himself the arrangement of a plebiscite, in which 
the inhabitants of the annexed provinces would be called 
upon to declare whether they were willing to remain 
German or to become French once more. It was the 
Emperor Francis Joseph who interfered, and who pre- 
vented him from taking any steps in this direction. The 
plan had got a shadow of Bismarckianism about it which 
had appealed to the imagination of a Sovereign who had 
made caprice the one powerful motive directing his 
actions. 

Bismarckianism without Bismarck ! Its imitation was 
to bring savage ruin to the world, despair to millions of 
human beings, destruction everywhere. Its results have 
been the bankruptcy of Christianity in a nation who had 
substituted might ^or right, brutal appetities for justice 



368 Germany under Three Emperors 

and honour, and a horrified, terror-stricken Europe to- 
day anxiously awaits the dawning of the new era that 
will sweep away the last remnants of the detestable 
system. Of this system, to which we owe such incom- 
mensurable misery, Bismarck was the founder and 
William II. the real executor. 



INDEX 



Abekkn, Herr von, a fateful telegram 

from, 175 
Abzac, Marquis d', 232 
Adam, Madame Juliette, and the 
Franco-Russian Alliance, 294 
"La Societe de Berlin" of, 210 
Adlerberg, Herr, 40, 44 
Albert, Prince Consort, 29 
Albert Edward, Prince (Edward VII., 
King), attends funeral of Em- 
peror Frederick III., 323 
Alexander II., Tsar, a complaint to 
William I., 237 
a sinister report to, 228 
and the Treaty of Paris, 192 
murder of, 238 
Alexander III., Tsar, cancels a meet- 
ing with William I., 291 
coronation of, 239 
suspicions of Germany, 285, 288 
the Holstein forged documents and, 
191 
Alexander of Battenberg, Prince, 237, 
285, 322 
confidences to author, 239, 282, 

295 
Alexander of Hesse, Prince, 238, 239 
Alexandra Feodorovna, Empress, 38 
Alexandrovo, a fateful meeting at, 

246, 259 
Alliances, Bismarck's view of, 60 
Alsace-Lorraine, French "intrigues" 

in, 301 
Alvenslebem Convention, the, 82 
Andrassy, Count, Bismarck and, 235 
Empress Elisabeth and, 255 
interview with Bismarck, 247 
retirement of, 245 
Angouleme, Duchess of, 171 
Anspach, no, 114 
Augusta, Empress, and Crown Prince 

Frederick's letter to William I., 

97 



Augusta, Empress [contd.) — 

and Bismarck, 32, 33, 34, 59, 65, 

66, 775 97> x 73y l8 3> 2I °> 2II » 

218, 301 
and the Kulturkamff, 218 
intrigues of, 168, 171, 210 
relations of William I. and, 93, 168 
the captivity of Napoleon III. and, 

183 

the Schleswig - Holstein question 

and, 104 
Vicomte de Gontaut Biron and, 222 
von Roon's criticism of, 58 
Austria and Prussia, 10, 49, 100 
and the German Confederation, 5 
and the Prussian conditions of 

peace, 114 
appeals to Napoleon III., no 
Archduke John of, 2 
becomes a pawn in the hands of 

Prussia, 112, 115 
humiliation of, 108 
mobilises against Prussia, 109 
position in the new Germany, 2 
Prince Felix Schwarzenberg. [See 

S chw arzenber g ) 
result of Convention of Olmiitz, 14 
separation from Germany, 5, 7 
strained relations with Prussia, 29 
war with Prussia, 109 
Austro-German Alliance, the, 245, 257 
a pet conception of von Holstein, 

264 
Austro-German Treaty, the, 237 
Austro-Prussian War, an armistice, 

in 
peace negotiations : Prussia's de- 
mands, 113 

Baden hostility to alliance with 
Prussia, 153 
signs preliminary Treaty of Union, 

*59 



369 



370 



Index 



Baden, Grand Duke of, 140, 325 
and Bismarck's dismissal, 342 
and the Imperial title, 202 
hostile to Austria, 145 
on Bismarck, pere et fils, 337 
on Bismarck's volte-face, 329, 330 
Bagdad Railway, the, 283 
Balkans, the, German fear of Russian 
influence in, 281 
German intrigues in, 232 et seq., 
240, 285, 299 
Bavaria, a secret Convention with 
Prussia, 134 
and the lesser States, n 
complete Prussianisation of, 160 
hatred of Prussia, 195, 197 
negotiations for union with Prus- 
sia, 147 
Prussian intrigue in, 139 
sides with Prussia on Luxemburg 

question, 151 
under the heel of Prussia, 159 
Bayreuth, no, 114 
Belfort remains French territory, 203, 

204 
Benedek, General, a check for, no 
Benedetti, Count, 120 

and the peace recommendations, 114 
interview with William I., 172 
the "insult" at Ems, 179 
Berlin, a conference upon Union at, 

*54 

diplomatic relations with Stuttgart 

broken, 13 
war fever in, 180 

William I. signs order for mobilisa- 
tion, 180 
Berlin Congress, the, 235, 236, 248, 263 
Bernstorff, Count, and Queen Augusta, 

59 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. Maurice von, 
128 
and Polish independence, 220 
Beust, Count von, 9 

Bismarck's hatred of, 191 
Biron, Vicomte de Gontaut, 191, 221 
his idea of a Franco-Russian 
rapprochement, 232 
Biron von Curland, Princess, 232 
Bismarck, Count Herbert von, 276 
a shrewd move by, 337 
an impertinent remark to the Prince 
of Wales, 323 



Bismarck, Count Herbert von (contd.) — 
financial speculations of, 337, 350, 

356 
marriage of, 353 
Bismarck, Prince, a faked entry in 
official correspondence of, 277 
a pen picture of, 40 
a protest from the Crown Prince 

(Frederick III.), 88 
advocates alliance with Russia, 47, 

53 
affection for William I., 65 
after his dismissal, 351 
Alexander III. and, 293 
and Count Seherr Thoss, 25 
and Prince William, 31 
and Napoleon III., 100, 120 
anti-Catholic policy of, 214. {See 

Kulturkampj) 
anti-Polish policy of, 219 
antipathy towards Austria, 24 
appointed King's Delegate, 27 
appreciation of Holstein, 189 
Army boycott of, 186, 187 
as "honest broker " at Berlin Con- 
gress, 236 
attempted bribery of, 34 
audacious speech in Reichstag, 181 
betrayal of, 244, 309, 358 
cause of his dismissal, 244 
chairman of Union conference at 

Berlin, 154 
"coalition nightmare" of, 233, 243, 

352 
contempt for the Kaiser, 361 
death of, 366 
dexterous manipulation of Secret 

Service funds, 37 
diplomacy of, 126 et seq. 
disagreements with William II., 332 
dismissal of, 340 et seq. 
eightieth birthday of, 365 
election for Hanau, 355 
Empress Augusta and, 32, 33, 34, 

59. 65, 66, JT, 97, 173, 183, 210, 

211, 2l8, 3OI 

encourages Prince Leopold's candi- 
dature for Spanish throne, 771 

epitaph of, 350 

examples of his unscrupulousness, 
277 et seq. 

far-sighted machination of, 100 

fear of Russia, 27 



Index 



37i 



Bismarck, Prince {contd.) — 

fear of war with France, 114, 119, 

205 
final interview with Holstein, 347 
first diplomatic success of, 83 
Frederick III. and, 84 
friction with Empress Victoria, 323 
growing unpopularity of, 101, 108 
his dread of resignation, 300 
his son, 306, 333, 337, 342, 350, 356, 

357 
Holstein and, 243 
Holstein's version of his dismissal, 

34 1 , 343 
Imperialism of, 85, 121 
in a rage, 172, 173 
in 1887, 299 
increasing irritability of, 209, 235, 

299 
interview with Napoleon III., 24 
invited to enter the Cabinet, 56, 63 
isolation of, 101 
Italy and, 109 

Kaiser offers the olive branch, 357 
keen psychological instinct of, .199 
last days of, 365, 366 
last official paper of, 343 
memorable sayings of, 52, 60, 107, 

196, 264, 285, 352 
Minister in Petersburg, 32 
Monarchical convictions of, 14, 46, 

5i> 57 
nonplussed, 302 
not originator of German Hohen- 

zollern Empire, 6 
on "absolute government," 363 
on Prince Gortschakov, 38 
on the Olmutz Convention, 22 
on treaties, 257 

opinion of Russia and France, 39 
overhears a private conversation, 

186 
policy of deceit, 185 
political debut of, 14 
presented to Queen Victoria, 29 
President of Council of Ministers, 

86 
private letter to Alexander III., 328 
proposes division of German States, 

107 
Prussian Minister in Paris, 60 
rebuffed by Napoleon III., 185 
rebukes William II., 326 



Bismarck, Prince [contd.) — 

reconciliation with the Kaiser, 357 
Reminiscences : a curious chapter,. 

281 
Roman Catholicism and, 217 
sarcastic criticism of William II., 

339. 36i 5 362 

scheme for welding the Southern 

States, 137 
secret of his power, 52 
sensational declaration by, 69-70 
serious illness of, 357 
signs the Peace Treaty, 121 
strained relations with the Crown 

Prince, 91 
suspicion in Russia against, 73 
sympathy with, after dismissal, 354 
threatens resignation, 258, 259 
underhand intrigues of, 131 
unexpected firmness of William I., 

116 
unpublished memoirs of, 37 
unscrupulousness at Sedan, 182 
unstable character of, 345 
Vienna's ovation to, 280 
visits Paris Exhibition, 132 
von Schleinitz and, 54, 55 
withdraws his predecessors' Bud- 
get, 69 

Bismarck, Princess, author and, 213 

Bleichroder, Baron von, 275 

Bismarck's frank talk with, 355 
criticism of Bismarck, 305 

Bloudov, Countess, 40 

Blowitz, M. de, 229 

his article in the Times, 230 

Bohemia, Germany and, 5 

invaded by Prussian troops, 109 

Bonjean, Senator, 215 

Bosnia ceded to Austria, 235, 236 

Boulanger, General, 296 

Brest Litovsk, Russian manoeuvres at, 
360 

Bruhl, Countess Hedwig, 327 

Buchanan, Sir Andrew, and the 
Alvenslebem Convention, 82 

Bulgaria, candidature of Prince Alex- 
ander, 237 
matters in, 281 et seq. 

Biilow, Herr von, a flirtation in Rus- 
sia, 272 
Bismarck on, 365 
marriage of, 273 



372 



Index 



Bunsen, Baron von, a fiery epistle 
from Count Pourtales, 18 
memoirs of, 5 

Buol, Count, an autograph letter from, 
36 

Busch, Moritz, 343 

Caprivi, General, an official note to 

Vienna, 354 
Bismarck's sarcastic remarks on, 

352 
refuses to renew a secret convention 

with Russia, 351 
succeeds Bismarck, 347 
Chambord, Comte de, 171 
Charlottenburg, Bismarck at, 348 
Chaudet, M., 215 
Christian IX., King of Denmark, and 

the Duchy of Schleswig, 102 
Christian of Sonderburg Augusten- 

berg, Duke, 101 
Clementine of Coburg, Princess, Hol- 

stein and, 286 
Constantinople, a German military 

mission to, 308 
Cortes, Donoso, a letter from, 6 
Crimean War, the, 29 

Bismarck's opinion of, 53 
Crispi, Signor, 270 
Cronstadt, French fleet at, 297 
Customs Union. (See Zollverein) 

Dalwigk, Herr, at Union conference, 

Berlin, 155, 156 
Darboy, Archbishop, 215 
Decazes, Due, 225, 228, 232 
De Guery, Pere, 215 
Delbriick, Councillor, 155 
Denmark, Prussia at war with, 104 
De Winter., mayor of Dantzig, 88 
Donhoff, Countess, marries von Biilow, 

274 
Dresden Congress, the, 27 
Dual Alliance, the, 245, 257 et seq. 

entry of Italy into, 270, 279 
Duncker, Max, 86 

Eisenhardt, Herr von, 200 
Elisabeth, Empress, and Andrassy, 

255 
Ems, William I. and Benedetti's meet- 
ing at, 172 



Ems dispatch, the, new light on, 166 
et seq. 
true story of, 174 
Espionage, 232, 272 et seq. 

inauguration of system, 186 et seq. 
Eugenie, Empress, a letter to Alexan- 
der II., 192 
an unjust accusation against, 180 
loss of political influence, 179 



Falk, Herr, Bismarck shields himself 

behind, 218 
" Falk Laws," the, 213 
Favre, Jules, and the fall of Paris, 193 
Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King, 242, 

285 
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, Prince. 

(See Ferdinand of Bulgaria) 
Finckenstein, Colonel Count Finck 

von, 109 
Forckenbeck, Max von, and Bismarck, 

69 
France and the Alvenslebem Conven- 
tion, 83 
and the Luxemburg question, 149 
Bismarck and, 24 
declares war on Prussia, 181 
election of National Assembly in, 

203 
recommendations for peace condi- 
tions by, 114 
the Commune, 215 
war excitement in, 180 
warnings of Prussia to, unheeded, 

131 
Francis Joseph, Emperor, a promised 

audience refused, 353-4 
Bismarck's cordial reception by, 

280 
his grievance against Andrassy, 

255 

interview with King William at 

Gastein, 100 
interviews Emperor Nicholas, 15 
meets William I., 105 
prevents a plebiscite, 367 
refuses Bismarck's proposal, 107 
Franco-Prussian War, the, 119 
inception of, 176 
neutrality of nations in, 181 
number of opposing armies, 182 
Treaty of Peace signed, 205 



Index 



373 



Franco-Prussian War (contd.) — 

unscrupulous omission in armistice, 

193-4 
Franco-Russian Alliance, completion 
of, 297 
German fears of, 54, 55 
inception of, 285 
necessity of, 294 
Frankfurt, Parliament of, 4, 5 

Treaty of, 205 
Fransecky, General, 111 
Frederick III., Emperor, accession, 305 
an audience with Prince Hohen- 

lohe, 161 
and Alsace-Lorraine, 304 
and the peace proposals, 117 
Bismarck and, 84, 321 
hatred of war, 117, 162, 163 
his father, 84 et seq., 93 
his ideal, 318 
illness of, 291, 299, 305 
Imperialism of, 99, 196, 200, 317 
marches on Koniggratz, 109 
strictures of, as Crown Prince, 88, 

89 
the Dantzig incident, 88 
the Paris bombardment, 185 
the Puttkamer affair, 323 
the smaller German States and, 84 
Frederick VII., King of Denmark, 

death of, 101 
Frederick, Empress, Bismarck's visit 
to, after his dismissal, 358 
leave-taking of Bismarck, 348 
Frederick William, Crown Prince. 

[See Frederick III.) 
Frederick William IV., King of 
Prussia, and the insurrection 
in Hesse, 15 
death of, 55 

Frankfurt Parliament and, 1, 2 
in a dilemma, 15 
offer to Bismarck, 27 
the army and, 3, 4 
Frederick William of Brandenburg 
(the Great Elector), a charge to 
his descendants, 125 
Freydorf, Herr, at Union Conference, 
Berlin, 155, 156 



Galicia, Germany and, 5 

Gerard, M., Bismarck's hatred of, 211 



Gerlach, General von, a letter from 

Bismarck, 29 
German Confederation, the, and the 
Schleswig-Holstein question, 102 
Austria and, 5, 7 
English statesmen and, 5 
reorganisation of, 104 
German Empire, proclamation of, 194 

Foreign Office, the, 272 
German Southern States, the, confer- 
ences in Stuttgart, 140 
secret treaties with Prussia, 130, 
140 
Germany, a significant forecast of, 7 
a subsidised Press, 267, 303 
Bismarck's fears of isolation, 243 
Bismarck's ideal, 50 
development of militarism, 324 
kultur of, 38 

monarchical and democratic atti- 
tudes of, 1, 2 
religious troubles in. [See Kultur- 

kamff) 
separation of Austria, 5 
strained relations with Russia, 235 
the dawn of Imperialism, 1 et seq. 
Giers, M. de, pro-German tendencies 

of, 294 
Goltz, Baron von, 103 
Gonne, Miss Maud, 296 
Gortschakov, Prince, and the Treaty 
of Paris, 192 
Bismarck and, 38 
humiliation of, 191 
suspicions of Berlin, 127 
Govone, General, 109 
Gramont, Due de, 170 
a tactless telegram, 174 
mistrust of the Empress, 179 
Gravelotte, the battlefield of, 204 
Great Britain enters Triple Entente, 

297 
Great Elector, the. {See Frederick 

William of Brandenburg) 
Great War, the, ultimatum to Bel- 
gium, 254 
Guelph fund, the, 198 
Guibert, Archbishop, 216 



Hahnke, General von, ordered to ob- 
tain Bismarck's resignation, 
34i 



374 



Index 



Hanover, annexation of, desired by 

William I., 114 
Hanover, King of, denounces the 

Treaty, 8 
Hatzfeld, Bismarck on, 365 
Henry of Prussia, Prince, Royal 

honours to Bismarck, 357 
Herzegovina, cession of, 235, 236 
Hesse, a history-making insurrection 

in, 15 
annexation of, asked for by 
William I., 113 
Hesse-Darmstadt assents to prelimin- 
ary Treaty of Union, 159 
Hesse, Grand Duke of, and dismissal 

of Bismarck, 342 
Heuduck, Herr, 320 
Heydt, von der, and the Zollverein, 

Hohenlohe, Cardinal, 133 
and the Kulturkam-pf , 214 
fear of the Jesuits, 217 
Hohenlohe, Prince Clovis von, 133 et 
seq., 258 
a curious report to the King of 

Bavaria, 134 
advocates union of Bavaria with 

Prussia, 146 
and Holstein, 190 
and the Kulturkam-pf, 214 
Bismarck on, 365 
Bismarck's ally in Bavaria, 135 
concludes a military alliance with 

Prussia, 134, 160 
converses with Waldersee, 335 
convinced of necessity of Dual 

Alliance, 259 
discusses Dual Alliance with 

William I., 260 
Governor-General of Alsace-Lor- 
raine, 325 
on Commune victims, 215 
on de Blowitz' Times article, 230 
on Russian intrigue in the Balkans, 

282 
Prussian tendencies of, 134 
received by Crown Prince of 

Prussia, 161 
report of Union conference at 

Berlin, 154-5 
resignation of, 146 
signs the Treaty of Union, 159 
the Luxemburg incident, 149 



Hohenlohe, Prince Clovis [contd.) — 

the peace negotiations, 118 
Holland and the Luxemburg ques- 
tion, 131 
Holnstein, Count von, asks a favour 
of Bismarck, 198 
received by Ludwig LI., 199 
Holstein entered by Prussian troops, 

109 
Holstein, Baron von, 166, 198, 238 
and a lady, 272 

and the Times correspondent, 229 
as Kaiser's ambassador to Bis- 
marck, 355 
author becomes pet aversion of, 241 
baffled, 327 

betrays Bismarck, 244, 309, 358 
Bismarck's confidences to, 113, 115 
defines Bismarck's character and 

intelligence, 345 
devotion to Bismarck, 243 
his part in formation of Dual 

Alliance, 253, 258 et seq. 
notable intrigues of, 191 
on Count Herbert Bismarck, 310 
on Germany's " next war," 266 
organises the bureau d' 'espionage, 

188, 272 et seq. 
resignation of, 244 
subsidises German Press, 267, 303 
threatens Bismarck, 356 
Hoyos, Countess Margaret, 353 
Huene, Captain von, 335 
Humbert of Piedmont, Crown Prince, 

wedding of, 161 
Hungarian rebellion, the, 246 
Hungary, Bismarck on, 24 
Germany and, 5 

reconciliation with the Habsburg 
dynasty, 25 



Ignatieff, Count, 296 

Italy, an alliance with Prussia, 109 

and the Jesuits, 216, 217 

Bismarck and, 109 

cession of Venice to, no 

joins the Dual Alliance, 245, 270, 
279 



Jesuits, the, abolition of the Order 
Germany, 214 



Index 



375 



Jesuits, the [contd.) — 

notable enemies of, 216 
John, Archduke of Austria, 2 

Kalnoky, Count, 267 
Karolyi, Count, 114 
Kiel harbour and canal, 104 
Koloschine, M., 225 
Koniggratz, battle of, 109 
Kulturkamff, the, 133, 212, 214 

Empress Augusta and, 212 
Kutusoff, General Count, 191 



Lazareff, Mile, de, 232 

Le Flo, General, 228 

Leopold of Hohenzollern and the 
Spanish throne, 166 et seq. 
relinquishes candidature of Spanish 
throne, 173 

Levinstein, Mr., and Bismarck, 35, 36 

Lhyys, M. Drouyn de, 127 

London Conference, the, 132, 152, 192 

Lucanus, von, 340, 342 

Ludwig II., King of Bavaria 2 134 
a momentous letter from, 146 
authorises negotiations for union, 

J 47 
Bismarck on a Dual Alliance, 248 
hatred of Prussia, 197 
refuses to meet the King of Prussia, 

160 
signs his own " dechiance" 200 
tragic death of, 135, 191 
Luitpold, Prince, 200 
Luxemburg, evacuation of fortress of, 

127 
inner meaning of the question, 153 
Napoleon II.'s negotiations with 

Holland for, 131 
neutrality of : a conference in 

London, 132, 152, 192 
question of cession to Prussia, 24, 

127, 149 

MacMahon, Marshal, 232 

and the French Ambassador in 
Berlin, 226 

Manteuffel, Marshal von, 16, 237 

Margherita of Savoy, Princess, mar- 
riage of, 161 

Marschall, Herr von, 348 



Mazarredo, Sefior Salazar y, 168 
Melchers, Mgr., Archbishop of 

Cologne, 128 
Menabrea, General Count, 109 
Mercy d'Argenteau, Countess de, on 

Bismarck, 162, 163 
Metternich, Prince, Napoleon III. and, 

61, 62 
Michaud, Professor, 215 
Milioutine, General, 248 
Millevoye, Lucien, tactlessness of, 296, 

297 
Mohrenheim, Baron, 289 
Moltke, Count von, a conversation 
with Baron de Nothomb, 226 
and the Austro-Prussian campaign, 

no 
and the bombardment of Paris, 184 
Bismarck and, 173 
inflexibility of, 182 
Montgelas, Count, 141 

the Luxemburg incident, 149 
Munich, Prussian influence in, 139 
Miinster, Count, 258 
Minister, Prince, and Holstein, 190 

Naples, the King of, and the Jesuits, 

216 
Napoleon I., Emperor, Bismarcs on, 

43 
Napoleon III., Emperor, a missed op- 
portunity, no 
a. prisoner, 183 
and Bismarck, 24, 60, 100 
and the Franco-German War, 119 
apprised of Prussia's conditions of 

peace, 113 
Bismarck's appreciation of, 29 
compromises himself, 120 
creates Rhine Confederation, 126 
desires a Franco-Prussian alliance, 

60 
indiscretion of, 62 
mistrust of Austria, 61, 62 
rebuffs Bismarck, 185 
regrettable weakness of, 179 
the Hohenzollern candidature for 
Spanish throne, 172, 174 
Nesselrode, Count de, Bismarck and, 

34 
Neundorff, Mdlle. von, 211 
Nicholas I., Tsar, interviews Emperor 
Francis Joseph, 15 



376 



Index 



Nicholas II., Tsar, and disarmament, 

Nikolsburg, a Peace Council at, 115 

Convention of, no, 112 

the Treaty of, 21 
Nordeck, Councillor von, 155 
North German Confederation, a pro- 
visional arrangement, 195 

organisation of, 126 

reorganised, 131 
Nothomb, Baron de, 226 

Obolensky, Princess, 223 
Oldenburg, Prince Peter of, 191 
Olivain, Pere, 215 
Ollivier, Emile, 174 

and the consort of Napoleon III., 
179 
Olmutz, Convention of, 14 

a sequel to, 18, 21 

Bismarck's view of, 22 

Prussia's humiliation, 17 
Orloff, Princa Alexis, at the Congress 

of Paris, 73 
Orloff, Princess, 73 

criticism of Bismarck by, 74 

German sympathies of, 74 

Palmerston, Lord, 5 

on the Schleswig-Holstein question, 
101 
Paris, Congress of, 73 

Exhibition (1867), the, William I.'s 

visit to, 132 
fall of, 193 

siege of, 184, 191, 193 
Treaty of, revision asked by 
Russia, 191 
Peel, Sir Robert, 5 

Perponcher, Count, and the Luxem- 
burg Treaty, 151 
Peter of Oldenburg, Prince, 191 
Philipsborn, Councillor, 155 
Plevna, fall of, 236 
Pobedonostseffj M., 296 
Podbielski, General, 186 
Polish mutiny of 1863, the, 82 
question, the, 219 
the Kulturkamff and, 212 
Posen, the Poles of, 220 
Pourtales, Count Albert, on the Olmutz 
Convention, 18 



Prim, Marshal, 167 

Prokesch, von, demands his passports, 

17 
Prussia, a denounced Treaty, 9 

a secret Convention with Bavaria, 

*34 

a suppressed book, 23 

acquires Schleswig, 104 

an alliance with Italy, 109 

and Austria, 10, 49 et seq., 100 

and Russia, 33 et seq. 

and the German Confederation, 5, 6 

annexations announced in the 

Chamber, 130 
Austria's strained relations with, 29 
conditions of peace, 113 
departmental rivalry in, 186 
humiliation of, 14, 17, 79. (See also 

Olmutz) 
indignation with France, 180 
institution of the Secret Service in, 

189 
King of, becomes Emperor, 195 
liberty of the Press limited in, 87, 

88 
Prince Felix Schwarzenberg and, 

10 
signatories to preliminary Treaty 

of Union, 159 
the Frankfurt programme, 4 
the Polish mutiny, 82 
the Press and the Ems dispatch, 180 
war with Austria, 109 
Puttkamer, Herr von, 323 



Radolin, Prince, an unauthenticated 

story of Bismarck, 327 
Radowitz, General von, 15 

and Vicomte de Gontaut Biron, 227 

mobilises the army, 16 

resignation of, 15 
Radziwill, Prince Anthony, aide-de- 
camp to William I., 174 
Radziwill, Prince Boguslas, 128 
Radziwill, Princess Antoine, 222 
Radziwill, Princess Catherine, and 
Madame Adam, 295 

constant fights with Bismarck, 214 
Ratibor, Duke of, 133, 137 

a letter from, 142 

and the Kulturkamff, 214 
Redern, Count, 222 



Index 



377 



Reichsanzeiger, the, Imperial com- 
munications in, 353 

Reichstadt Convention and the cession 
of Bosnia and Herzegovnia, 

235> 2 3 6 
Religious persecutions in Germany. 

{See Kulturkamff) 
Reuss, Prince Henry of, 140, 290 

a letter to Prince Hohenlohe, 141 
Rhine Confederation, the, creation of, 

126 
Roman Catholic Church. {See Kultur- 
kamff) 
Roon, General von, 186 
and Bismarck, 55, 173 
and the bombardment of Paris, 184 
displeasure at Bismarck's " witty 
digressions," 75 
Rosty, Chevalier, 241 

on the Triple Alliance, 267 
Roumania, independence of, 236 
Russia, and Prussia, 33 et seq. 
and the Berlin Congress, 266 
asks for revision of Treaty of Paris, 

191 
Bismarck's fear of, 27, 248 
coronation of Tsar, 239 
German hostility towards, 236 
German influence in the Court of, 

37 
strained relations with Germany, 

235 
suspicion of Bismarck in, 73 
the Dual Alliance treachery to, 264 

Russell, Lord John, 5 

Russell, Lord Odo, 227 

Rzewuski, Count, on Bismarck, 40, 44, 

49 
on the Convention of Olmiitz, 18 

Sadowa, a sequel to the Olmiitz Con- 
vention, 18, 21 
battle of, 109 
Sagan, Duke and Duchess of, 222 
St. Privat, the battlefield of, 204 
San Remo affair, the, 327 
San Stefano, Treaty of, 236 
Saxe-Coburg, Grand Duke of, and 

Bismarck's dismissal, 342 
Saxe-Weimar, Grand Duke of, 192 
Saxony and the Convention of 1850, 11 
annexation of, desired by William 
I., no, 114 



Saxony, King of, and the Treaty of 

1849, 8 
Schleinitz, Count, 54, 222 
and Bismarck, 211 
resignation of, 58 
Schleswig-Holstein question, the, 101 
Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix, 5 

intrigues of, 10, n 
Schweinitz, General von, Bismarck 

and, 236 
Schwerin, Count, and Bismarck, 81 
Schouvaloff, Count Peter, 233 

accuses Bismarck of "coalition 

nightmare," 233, 243 
at Berlin Congress, 248 
Sedan, incidents of capitulation of, 

182 
South German States, the, and the 

Luxemburg incident, 152 
Spain, the throne of, and Prince 
Leopold of Hohenzollern, 166 
et seq. 
Spezzia, harbour of : a fictitious 

romance, 325-6 
Spy system, the, 233, 272 et seq. 

its inauguration, 186 et seq. 
Starnberg, the tragedy of, 191 
IStavenberg, Herr, 102 
Stockmar, Ernest von, 86 

resignation of, 91 
Stolypin, Marie, and Bismarck, 40 
Stuttgart, momentous conferences in, 
140 



Thiers, M., 191 

elected President of the Republic, 
203 

prevision of, 70 
Thoss, Count Seherr, 23 

second meeting with Bismarck, 25 
Thun, Count, and Bismarck, 28 
Times, the, memorable articles in, 89, 

230, 240 
Toulon, Russian fleet at, 297 
Triple Alliance, the, 267, 268, 279 

formation of, 237 

{See Dual Alliance) 
Triple Entente, the, 297 

direct cause of, 280 
Tschirsky, Baron von, 244 
Turkey, a, German military mission to, 
308 



378 



Index 



Valley, Count Arco, 241 
Varnbiiler, Herr von, 140, 148 

at Union Conference, Berlin, 155, 

156 

visits Hohenlohe, 155 
Venice ceded to Italy, no 
Versailles, proclamation of German 
Empire at, 194 
Prussian headquarters, 184 
Victor Emmanuel, King, and the 
Jesuits, 216 
dispatches a military mission to 
Berlin, 109 
Victoria, Empress, a request to Bis- 
marck, 205 
the San Remo incident, 327 
Victoria of Prussia, Princess, ques- 
tion of betrothal of, 322 
Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and 
Ireland, Bismarck's presenta- 
tion to, 29 
Frederick III.'s consultation with, 
322 
Vienna, a suppressed book in, 23 

Bismarck refused audience of 

Francis Joseph in, 354 
Bismarck's ovation in, 280 
Vienna, Congress of, question of pre- 
cedence, 201 
Vienna, Treaty of, and the Prussian 

frontiers, 70 
Virchow, Herr, 102 
Vitzthum of Eckstadt, Count, 127 



Waddington, M,, Empress Augusta's 
query to, 301 

Wagner, Richard, Ludwig II. and, 
238 

Waldemar of Denmark, Princess, 291 

Waldersee, General von, 324 
Hohenlohe's chat with, 335 

Wallace, Donald Mackenzie, 240 

Weber, 'Councillor, 155 

Wellington, the Duke of, advice to 
Hanover and Saxony, 9 

Werder, General von, and the neutral- 
ity of Germany, 236 

Werthern, Baron, 141, 149, 150 
William I. irritated with, 174 

William I., Emperor, a snub for Bene- 
detti, 175 
accepts a "shameful peace," 117 



William I., Emperor {contd.) — 
accession of, 55 
affection of Bismarck for, 65 
an interview with Emperor Francis 

Joseph, 100 
and his son Frederick III., 84 et 

seq. 
and the oath of allegiance, 55 et 

seq. 
becomes Emperor, 195 
Bismarck's conversation with, 31 
Bismarck's final good-bye to, 349 
conditions of peace, 113 
coronation of, 58 
curious relations with his consort, 

93 
death of, 305 
desire for peace, 171, 172 
dislike of Imperial title, 196, 200 
Frederick's letter to, and Bis- 
marck's comments thereon, 87 et 
seq. 
his reply to the Archbishop of 

Cologne, 129 
his sense of duty, 77 
in a passion, 201 

informs Tsar of Dual Alliance, 279 
love of his army, 204, 319 
meets Francis Joseph, 105 
meets Napoleon III. after Sedan, 

183 
muzzles the Press, 87 
Nikolsburg Peace Council, 115 
on Austria's "lies and perfidies," 

129-30 
strained relations with his consort, 

59 
the French Ambassador and, 172 

et seq. 
the Prussian Ambassador in Paris 

and, 174, 175 
threatens to abdicate, 64, 258 
visits Paris, 132 
William II., Emperor, a frustrated 

plebiscite, 367 
accession of, 244 
and Count Herbert Bismarck, 306, 

3°7 

and French neutrality, 367 
as Crown Prince, 307 
Bismarck's jubilee, 357 
calls an international conference of 
workpeople, 338 



Index 



379 



William II., Emperor {contd.) — 
disagreements with Bismarck, 332 
dismisses Bismarck, 306, 340, 341 
imprudent confidences of, 339 
in power, 317 et seq. 
rebuked by Bismarck, 326 
reconciliation with Bismarck, 357 
unfilial letters of, 357 
unpopularity as Prince, 320 

William of Hohenzollern, Prince, 55 

Wimpfen, General, 183 

Wincke, Herr von, 143 

Windhorst, chief of Catholic party, 
339 



Wittgenstein, Countess Caroline, 217 
Wittgenstein, Princess Leonille, 221 
Wrangel, Field-Marshal, 143 
Wurtemberg, hostility to alliance with 
Prussia, 153 
signs preliminary Treaty of Union, 

159 

the Convention of 1850, n 
Wurtemberg, King of, a momentous 
speech by, 12 



ZOLLVEREIN, the, 142 

discussed at Union conference, 155 












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